| |
UNDER The Securities Act of 1933 |
☐ |
| |
Pre-Effective Amendment No. |
☐ |
| |
Post-Effective Amendment No. 59 |
☒ |
| |
UNDER The Investment Company Act of 1940 |
☐ |
| |
Amendment No. 61 |
☒ |
| It is proposed that this filing will become effective: | |
| ☐ |
immediately upon filing pursuant to paragraph (b) |
| ☐ |
on (date) pursuant to paragraph (b) |
| ☐ |
60 days after filing pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) |
| ☐ |
on (date) pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) |
| ☒ |
75 days after filing pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) |
| ☐ |
on (date) pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 485 |
| if appropriate, check the following box: | |
| ☐ |
This post-effective amendment designates a new effective date for a previously filed post-effective amendment. |
| Fund+ |
Share Class (Ticker) |
| 1290 Equity 500 Index
Fund |
Class E ( )
|
| 1. |
| |
| |
2 | |
| 2. |
| |
| |
8 | |
| |
8 | |
| |
8 | |
| 3. |
| |
| |
10 | |
| |
12 | |
| 4. |
| |
| |
23 | |
| |
23 | |
| |
25 | |
| |
25 | |
| 5. |
27 | |
| 6. |
28 | |
| 7. |
29 | |
| 8. |
32 | |
| 9. |
34 | |
| 10. |
35 | |
| 11. |
36 | |
| 12. |
| |
| |
37 |
| Not applicable. |
|
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund |
Class E
Shares |
| Management Fee |
0.25% |
| Distribution and/or Service Fees (12b-1 fees) |
0.00% |
| Other Expenses1 |
0.75% |
| Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses |
1.00% |
| Fee Waiver and/or Expense Reimbursement2 |
(0.72)% |
| Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waiver and/or Expense Reimbursement |
0.28% |
| |
1 Year |
3 Years |
| Class E Shares |
$29 |
$247 |
| Name |
Title |
Date Began
Managing
the Fund |
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski, CFP®, CLU, ChFC |
Executive Vice President and Chief Investment
Officer of the Adviser |
2026 |
| Miao Hu, CFA® |
Vice President and Assistant Portfolio Manager
of the Adviser |
2026 |
| Xavier Poutas, CFA® |
Vice President and Assistant Portfolio Manager
of the Adviser |
2026 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
Vice President and Assistant Portfolio Manager of the Adviser |
2026 |
| Name |
Title |
Date Began
Managing
the Fund |
| Joshua Lisser |
Head of Index and Derivative Solutions of
AllianceBernstein |
2026 |
| Geoff Tomlinson, CFA® |
Portfolio Manager, Index and Derivative Solutions of AllianceBernstein |
2026 |
| |
Class E |
| Minimum Initial Investment |
$1,000,000 |
| Minimum Additional |
No subsequent minimum |
| |
Class E |
| Investment |
|
| Fund |
First
$2 Billion |
Next
$4 Billion |
Next
$2 Billion |
Next
$2 Billion |
Thereafter |
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund |
0.250% |
0.200% |
0.175% |
0.150% |
0.125% |
| | |||||
| |
Total Annual Operating Expenses Limited to
(% of average daily net assets, excluding expenses noted above) |
| Fund |
Class E |
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund |
0.28% |
| |
| |
Class E |
| Availability |
Limited to certain investors, including insurance company affiliates of the
Adviser, or such other affiliated institutional accounts as the Adviser
shall approve for investment. |
| Minimum Initial Investment |
$1,000,000 for all accounts, unless otherwise approved by the Adviser.
|
| Minimum Additional
Investment |
No subsequent minimum |
| Type of Account |
Minimum to
Open an
Account* |
Minimum for
Subsequent
Investments |
| Insurance company institutional accounts |
$1,000,000 |
No minimum
requirement |
| Restriction |
Situation |
| • The Fund may suspend the right of redemption or postpone payment for more than 7 days: |
• When the New York Stock Exchange is closed (other than a weekend/holiday). • When trading is restricted by the SEC. • When the SEC declares that an emergency exists. • Any other period permitted by the SEC. |
| • The Fund reserves the right to suspend account services or refuse transaction requests: |
• With a notice of dispute between registered owners. • With suspicion/evidence of a fraudulent act. |
| Restriction |
Situation |
| • The Fund may pay the redemption price in whole or part by a distribution in kind of readily marketable securities in lieu of cash or may take up to 7 days to pay a redemption request in order to raise capital: |
• When it is detrimental for the Fund to make cash payments as determined in the sole discretion of the Adviser. • Securities distributed in kind are subject to market risk until
sold, and shareholders may incur brokerage or other costs
and realize capital gains when converting those securities
to cash. |
| • The Fund may withhold redemption proceeds until the check or funds have cleared: |
• When redemptions are made within 10 calendar days of
purchase by check of the shares being redeemed. |
| Total Market Value = |
Total market value of securities |
+ |
Cash and other assets |
- |
Liabilities |
| Number of outstanding shares | |||||
| 2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
2022 |
2023 |
2024 |
2025 |
| 11.84% |
21.71% |
(4.42)% |
31.36% |
18.29% |
28.58% |
(18.11)% |
26.19% |
24.93% |
17.80% |
| Best quarter (% and time period): |
20.47% |
2020 2nd Quarter |
| Worst quarter (% and time period): |
(19.57)% |
2020 1st Quarter |
| Period ended December 31, 2025 |
1 Year |
3 Year |
5 Year |
10 Year |
Since
Inception
(12/31/84) |
| Composite |
17.80% |
22.92% |
14.35% |
14.73% |
11.89% |
| S&P 500 Index (reflects no deduction for fees, expenses, or taxes) |
17.88% |
23.01% |
14.42% |
14.82% |
11.92% |
| Fund |
Share Class (Ticker) |
| 1290 Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund |
Class A (TNRAX); Class I (TNXIX); Class R (TNXRX)* |
| 1290 Diversified Bond Fund |
Class A (TNUAX); Class I (TNUIX); Class R (TNURX) |
| 1290 Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
Class A (ESCFX); Class I (ESCJX); Class R (ESCKX) |
| 1290 GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
Class A (TNVAX); Class I (TNVIX); Class R (TNVRX) |
| 1290 High Yield Bond Fund |
Class A (TNHAX); Class I (TNHIX); Class R (TNHRX) |
| 1290 Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
Class A (TNXAX); Class I (TNVDX); Class R (TNYRX) |
| 1290 Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund |
Class A (TNMAX); Class I (TNMIX); Class R (TNMRX) |
| 1290 SmartBeta Equity Fund |
Class A (TNBAX); Class I (TNBIX); Class R (TNBRX) |
| Fund |
Share Class (Ticker) |
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund |
Class E ( ) |
| |
Page |
| Description of the 1290 Funds |
|
| 1290
Funds Investment Policies |
|
| Investment Strategies and Risks |
|
| Portfolio Holdings Disclosure Policy |
|
| Management of the 1290 Funds |
|
| Investment Management and Other Services |
|
| Brokerage Allocation and Other Strategies |
|
| Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures |
|
| Conflicts of Interest |
|
| Purchase, Redemption and Pricing of Shares |
|
| Taxation |
|
| Other Information |
|
| Other Services |
|
| Financial Statements |
|
| Appendix A — Ratings of Corporate Debt Securities |
|
| Appendix B — Portfolio Manager Information |
|
| Appendix C — Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures |
|
| Appendix D — Control Persons and Principal Holders of Securities |
|
| Appendix E — Securities Lending Activities |
E-1 |
| Name and
Year of Birth |
Position(s)
Held With
Trust |
Term of
Office** and
Length of
Time Served |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years |
Number of
Funds
in Fund
Complex
Overseen
by Trustee† |
Other Directorships
Held by Trustee |
| Interested Trustee | |||||
| Steven M. Joenk*
(1958) |
Trustee,
Chief
Executive
Officer, and
President |
Trustee and
Chief
Executive
Officer from
June 2014 to
present;
President
from
September
2023 to
present |
Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive
Officer (January 2023 to
present) and President
(August 2023 to January
2024) of EIM II;
Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive
Officer (May 2011 to
present) and President
(May 2011 to November
2021 and August 2023
to January 2024) of EIM;
Chief Investment Officer
(April 2017 to April 2024)
of Equitable Financial
Investment
Management, LLC; and
employee (September
1999 to present) of
Equitable Financial. |
118 |
None. |
| Independent Trustees | |||||
| Michael B. Clement
(1957) |
Trustee |
January 2019
to present |
Retired. Previously,
Professor of Accounting,
University of Texas, from
1997 to 2002 and 2004
to August 2024
(Department of
Accounting Chair from
2018 to 2022); Visiting
Professor, Harvard
Business School, 2023. |
118 |
Adamas Trust, Inc. |
| Name and
Year of Birth |
Position(s)
Held With
Trust |
Term of
Office** and
Length of
Time Served |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years |
Number of
Funds
in Fund
Complex
Overseen
by Trustee† |
Other Directorships
Held by Trustee |
| Donald E. Foley
(1951) |
Trustee |
June 2014 to
present |
Retired. Previously,
Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive
Officer, Wilmington Trust
Corporation, 2010 to
2011; Senior Vice
President, Treasurer and
Director of Tax, ITT
Corporation, 1996 to
2010. |
118 |
Wilmington Funds (10) |
| Patricia M. Haverland
(1956) |
Trustee |
April 2022 to
present |
Retired. Previously, Vice
President and Chief
Investment Officer North
America Pensions,
Siemens, 2009 to 2018. |
118 |
None. |
| Marcia Haydel
(1962) |
Trustee |
January 2024
to present |
Retired. Previously,
Founding Partner and
Managing Director,
Performance Equity
Management, 2005 to
2024. |
118 |
None. |
| Kimberly Thompson
Laughton
(1963) |
Trustee |
January 2024
to present |
Retired. Previously,
President, Schwab
Charitable, 2011 to 2021
(and, prior thereto, Vice
President from 2007 to
2011); various positions
at Charles Schwab
Corporation, including
Vice President - Mutual
Funds enterprise from
2003 to 2005, and Vice
President - Fixed Income
enterprise from 1999 to
2002. |
118 |
None. |
| H. Thomas
McMeekin
(1953) |
Trustee |
June 2014 to
present |
Managing Partner and
Founder, Griffin
Investments, LLC, 2000
to present; CEO of Blue
Key Services, LLC., 2015
to present; previously,
Chief Investment Officer,
AIG Life & Retirement
and United Guaranty
Corporation and Senior
Managing Director of
AIG Asset
Management,2009 to
2012. |
118 |
Wilmington Funds (10) |
| Name and
Year of Birth |
Position(s)
Held With
Trust |
Term of
Office** and
Length of
Time Served |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years |
Number of
Funds
in Fund
Complex
Overseen
by Trustee† |
Other Directorships
Held by Trustee |
| Jeffery S. Perry
(1965) |
Trustee |
April 2022 to
present |
Founder and Chief
Executive Officer, Lead
Mandates LLC (business
and leadership advisory
firm), 2020 to present.
Previously, Global Client
Service Partner, Ernst &
Young LLP, 2004 to 2020. |
118 |
Fortune Brands
Innovations, Inc.;
MasterBrand, Inc. |
| Gary S. Schpero
(1953) |
Chairman of
the Board |
Independent
Trustee from
June 2014 to
present;
Chairman of
the Board
from October
2017 to
present; and
Lead
Independent
Trustee from
June 2014 to
September
2017 |
Retired. Prior to
January 1, 2000, Partner
of Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett (law firm) and
Managing Partner of the
Investment Management
and Investment
Company Practice
Group. |
118 |
Blackstone Funds (3) |
| Kathleen Stephansen
(1954) |
Trustee |
January 2019
to present |
Senior Economist, Haver
Analytics, 2019 to
present. Previously,
Senior Economic Advisor,
Boston Consulting
Group, 2016 to 2019;
Chief Economist, Huawei
Technologies USA Inc.,
2016 to 2017. |
118 |
None. |
| Trustee |
Aggregate
Compensation
from
1290 Funds |
Pension or
Retirement
Benefits Accrued
As Part of 1290
Funds Expenses |
Estimated Annual
Benefits Upon
Retirement |
Total
Compensation
from 1290 Funds
and Fund Complex
Paid to Trustees1 |
| Interested Trustee | ||||
| Steven M. Joenk |
$- |
$- |
$- |
$- |
| Independent Trustees | ||||
| Mark A. Barnard2 |
$3,900 |
$- |
$- |
$442,500 |
| Michael B. Clement |
$4,275 |
$- |
$- |
$485,000 |
| Donald E. Foley |
$4,275 |
$- |
$- |
$485,000 |
| Patricia M. Haverland |
$4,275 |
$- |
$- |
$485,000 |
| Marcia Haydel |
$3,900 |
$- |
$- |
$442,500 |
| Kimberly Thompson Laughton |
$3,900 |
$- |
$- |
$442,500 |
| H. Thomas McMeekin |
$4,418 |
$- |
$- |
$501,250 |
| Jeffery S. Perry |
$3,900 |
$- |
$- |
$442,500 |
| Gary S. Schpero |
$5,387 |
$- |
$- |
$611,250 |
| Kathleen Stephansen |
$4,275 |
$- |
$- |
$485,000 |
| Trustee |
1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund |
1290
Diversified
Bond
Fund |
1290
Essex
Small Cap
Growth
Fund |
1290
Equity 500
Index
Fund |
1290
GAMCO
Small/Mid
Cap Value
Fund |
1290
High Yield
Bond Fund |
1290
Loomis
Sayles
Multi-Asset
Income
Fund |
1290
Multi-
Alternative
Strategies
Fund |
1290
SmartBeta
Equity
Fund |
| |
Interested Trustee | ||||||||
| Steven M. Joenk |
A |
A |
A |
A |
E |
A |
A |
A |
E |
| |
Independent Trustees | ||||||||
| Michael B. Clement |
A |
A |
A |
A |
D |
A |
A |
A |
D |
| Donald E. Foley |
A |
A |
A |
A |
B |
A |
B |
B |
B |
| Patricia M. Haverland |
A |
A |
C |
A |
A |
A |
A |
A |
C |
| Marcia Haydel |
A |
A |
A |
A |
C |
A |
A |
A |
A |
| Kimberly Thompson
Laughton |
A |
A |
B |
A |
B |
B |
A |
A |
B |
| H. Thomas
McMeekin |
A |
A |
A |
A |
C |
A |
A |
A |
C |
| Jeffery S. Perry |
A |
A |
A |
A |
A |
A |
C |
A |
C |
| Gary S. Schpero |
A |
A |
A |
A |
C |
A |
A |
A |
A |
| Trustee |
1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund |
1290
Diversified
Bond
Fund |
1290
Essex
Small Cap
Growth
Fund |
1290
Equity 500
Index
Fund |
1290
GAMCO
Small/Mid
Cap Value
Fund |
1290
High Yield
Bond Fund |
1290
Loomis
Sayles
Multi-Asset
Income
Fund |
1290
Multi-
Alternative
Strategies
Fund |
1290
SmartBeta
Equity
Fund |
| Kathleen Stephansen |
A |
A |
A |
A |
B |
A |
C |
A |
A |
| Trustee |
Aggregate Dollar Range of Equity
Securities in All Funds Overseen
in Family of Investment Companies* |
| Interested Trustee | |
| Steven M. Joenk |
E |
| Independent Trustees | |
| Michael B. Clement |
E |
| Donald E. Foley |
C |
| Patricia M. Haverland |
D |
| Marcia Haydel |
C |
| Kimberly Thompson Laughton |
C |
| H. Thomas McMeekin |
D |
| Jeffery S. Perry |
C |
| Gary S. Schpero |
C |
| Kathleen Stephansen |
C |
| Name, Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
With Fund* |
Term of Office
and Length of
Time Served** |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years |
| Steven M. Joenk
(1958) |
Trustee, Chief
Executive Officer, and
President |
Trustee and Chief Executive Officer
from June 2014 to present; President
from September 2023 to present; and
Chairman of the Board from June 2014
to September 2017 |
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (January 2023 to present) and President (August 2023 to January 2024) of EIM II; Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (May 2011 to present) and President (May 2011 to November 2021 and August 2023 to January 2024) of EIM; Chief Investment Officer (April 2017 to April 2024) of Equitable Financial Investment Management, LLC; and employee (September 1999 to present) of Equitable Financial. |
| Name, Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
With Fund* |
Term of Office
and Length of
Time Served** |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years |
| Brian Walsh
(1968) |
Chief Financial
Officer and Vice
President |
Chief Financial Officer from June 2014
to present; Vice President from 2026 to
present |
Senior Vice President of EIM II (June
2022 to present); Director (February
2011 to present) and Senior Vice
President (May 2011 to present) of EIM;
and Signatory Officer (November 2021
to present) and employee (February
2003 to present) of Equitable Financial. |
| Joseph J. Paolo***
(1970) |
Chief Compliance
Officer and Vice
President |
June 2014 to present |
Chief Compliance Officer and Vice
President of EIM II (June 2022 to
present); Chief Compliance Officer
(June 2007 to present) and Senior Vice
President (May 2011 to present) of EIM;
and Signatory Officer (November 2021
to present) and employee (June 2007
to present) of Equitable Financial. |
| Kenneth Kozlowski
(1961) |
Senior Vice President
and Chief Investment
Officer |
June 2014 to present |
Executive Vice President and Chief
Investment Officer of EIM II (June 2022
to present); Executive Vice President
and Chief Investment Officer (June
2012 to present) and Director (May
2017 to present) of EIM; previously,
Senior Vice President of EIM (May 2011
to June 2012); and Signatory Officer
(November 2021 to present) and
employee (February 2001 to present) of
Equitable Financial. |
| Jessica Baehr
(1982) |
Senior Vice President |
March 2024 to present |
Director and President (February 2024
to present) and Chief Operating Officer
(February 2024 to November 2025) of
EIM II and EIM; and employee of
Equitable Financial (September 2011 to
present). |
| James Chen
(1988) |
Vice President and
Director of Risk |
July 2022 to Present |
Vice President of EIM II (June 2022 to
present); Vice President of EIM (July
2022 to present); employee of
Equitable Financial (2015 to present). |
| James Kelly
(1968) |
Treasurer and
Controller |
Controller from June 2014 to present;
Treasurer from 2026 to present |
Vice President of EIM II (June 2022 to
present); Vice President of EIM (May
2011 to present); and employee of
Equitable Financial (September 2008 to
present). |
| Andrew Houston
(1990) |
Vice President |
September 2022 to Present |
Senior Vice President (December 2024 to present), Chief Operating Officer (November 2025 to present), and Vice President (July 2022 to November 2024) of EIM; Senior Vice President (December 2024 to present), Chief Operating Officer (November 2025 to present), and Vice President (January 2023 to November 2024) of EIM II; and employee of Equitable Financial (2017 to present). |
| Name, Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
With Fund* |
Term of Office
and Length of
Time Served** |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years |
| Miao Hu
(1978) |
Vice President |
June 2016 to present |
Vice President of EIM II (December
2022 to present); Assistant Portfolio
Manager (May 2016 to present) and
Vice President (June 2016 to present) of
EIM; and employee of Equitable
Financial (November 2013 to present). |
| Kevin McCarthy
(1983) |
Vice President |
September 2019 to present |
Vice President of EIM II (June 2022 to
present); Assistant Portfolio Manager
(December 2018 to present) and Vice
President (July 2022 to present) of EIM;
and employee of Equitable Financial
(August 2015 to present). |
| Xavier Poutas
(1977) |
Vice President |
June 2016 to present |
Vice President of EIM II (December
2022 to present); Assistant Portfolio
Manager (May 2011 to present) and
Vice President (June 2016 to present) of
EIM; and employee of Equitable
Financial (August 2002 to present). |
| Shane Daly
(1970) |
Chief Legal Officer,
Senior Vice President
and Secretary |
March 2023 to present |
Executive Vice President, Secretary and
General Counsel of EIM II and EIM
(March 2023 to present); employee of
Equitable Financial (2011 to present). |
| Maureen E. Kane, Esq.
(1962) |
Vice President and
Assistant Secretary |
March 2023 to present |
Senior Vice President, Assistant
Secretary and Associate General
Counsel of EIM II and EIM (March 2023
to present); employee of Equitable
Financial (February 2019 to present);
and Managing Director and Managing
Counsel of The Bank of New York
Mellon (July 2014 to February 2019). |
| Trayne Wheeler, Esq.
(1973) |
Vice President and
Assistant Secretary |
April 2024 to present |
Senior Vice President, Assistant
Secretary and Associate General
Counsel of EIM II and EIM (April 2024 to
present); employee of Equitable
Financial (April 2024 to present); and
Partner, Investment Management of
K&L Gates LLP (January 2010 to April
2024). |
| Victoria Zozulya, Esq. (1983) |
Vice President and
Assistant Secretary |
September 2024 to present |
Senior Vice President, Assistant
Secretary and Associate General
Counsel of EIM II and EIM (July 2024 to
present); employee of Equitable
Financial (Sept 2018 to May 2022 and
July 2024 to present); and Counsel at
Lord, Abbett & Co. LLC (May 2022 to
June 2024). |
| Cheryl Cherian
(1979) |
Vice President and
Assistant Secretary |
March 2023 to present |
Employee of Equitable Financial (April
2019 to present); and Compliance
Associate at Manifold Fund Advisors
(November 2016 to March 2018). |
| Artemis Brannigan
(1974) |
Vice President |
September 2019 to present |
Vice President of EIM II (June 2022 to present); Vice President of EIM (August 2019 to present); employee of Equitable Financial (August 2019 to present); and Director of Prudential Financial (January 2016 to July 2019). |
| Name, Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
With Fund* |
Term of Office
and Length of
Time Served** |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past 5 Years |
| Aysha Pride
(1988) |
Vice President |
July 2022 to Present |
Vice President of EIM II (June 2022 to
present); Vice President of EIM (July
2022 to present); employee of
Equitable Financial (2014 to present). |
| Helen Lai
(1973) |
Assistant Vice
President |
June 2016 to present |
Employee of Equitable Financial (March
2013 to present). |
| Michelle Gallo
(1973) |
Assistant Controller |
March 2023 to present |
Employee of Equitable Financial (July
2013 to present). |
| Roselle Ibanga
(1978) |
Assistant Controller,
Vice President and
Anti-Money
Laundering
Compliance Officer |
Assistant Controller from June 2014 to
present; Vice President and Anti-Money
Laundering Compliance Officer from
January 2023 to present |
Vice President the EIM (December 2024
to present); Vice President of Equitable
Investment Management, LLC
(December 2024 to present); and
employees of Equitable Financial
(February 2009 to present). |
| Lisa Perrelli
(1974) |
Assistant Controller |
June 2014 to present |
Vice President of EIM (December 2024
to present); Vice President of Equitable
Investment Management, LLC
(December 2024 to present); and
employee of Equitable Financial
(November 2002 to present). |
| Maria Urso (1971) |
Assistant Controller |
June 2024 to present |
Employee of Equitable Financial
(October 2015 to present). |
| Jennifer Mastronardi
(1985) |
Assistant Vice
President |
June 2014 to present |
Vice President of EIM II (June 2022 to
present); Vice President of EIM (April
2015 to present); and employee of
Equitable Financial (February 2009 to
present). |
| Helen Espaillat
(1963) |
Assistant Secretary |
June 2014 to present |
Assistant Vice President and Assistant
Secretary of EIM II (June 2022 to
present); Assistant Vice President and
Assistant Secretary of EIM (March 2015
to present); and employee of Equitable
Financial (July 2004 to present). |
| Lorelei Fajardo
(1978) |
Assistant Secretary |
June 2016 to present |
Employee of Equitable Financial (July
2013 to present). |
| Monica Giron
(1976) |
Assistant Secretary |
July 2019 to present |
Employee of Equitable Financial (June 2019 to present); and Senior Paralegal at Gemini Fund Services (August 2015 to May 2019). |
| Fund |
Management Fee |
Management Fee Paid to Adviser After Fee
Waiver |
Total Amount of Fees Waived and Other
Expenses Assumed by Adviser Pursuant to
Expense Limitation Agreement |
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund* |
$29,041
|
$—
|
$129,096
|
| 1290
Diversified Bond Fund |
$3,861,791
|
$831,778
|
$3,030,013
|
| 1290
Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$291,757
|
$—
|
$412,087
|
| 1290
GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
$924,774
|
$513,641
|
$411,133
|
| 1290
High Yield Bond Fund |
$355,167
|
$55,238
|
$299,929
|
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
$346,154
|
$63,252
|
$282,902
|
| 1290
Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund |
$66,126
|
$—
|
$122,841
|
| 1290
SmartBeta Equity Fund |
$1,253,197
|
$696,304
|
$556,893 |
| Fund |
Management Fee |
Management Fee Paid to Adviser After Fee
Waiver |
Total Amount of Fees Waived and Other
Expenses Assumed by Adviser Pursuant to
Expense Limitation Agreement |
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund |
$453,609
|
$189,209
|
$264,400
|
| 1290
Diversified Bond Fund |
$3,795,535
|
$1,143,501
|
$2,652,034
|
| 1290
Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$431,030
|
$176,666
|
$254,364
|
| 1290
GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
$1,109,844
|
$707,215
|
$402,629
|
| 1290
High Yield Bond Fund |
$410,899
|
$115,975
|
$294,924
|
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
$415,142
|
$55,878
|
$359,264
|
| 1290
Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund |
$74,498
|
$—
|
$117,430
|
| 1290
SmartBeta Equity Fund |
$1,441,944
|
$888,069
|
$553,875 |
| Fund |
Management Fee |
Management Fee Paid to Adviser After Fee
Waiver |
Total Amount of Fees Waived and Other
Expenses Assumed by Adviser Pursuant to
Expense Limitation Agreement |
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund |
$924,043
|
$654,913
|
$269,130
|
| 1290
Diversified Bond Fund |
$3,558,414
|
$1,269,451
|
$2,288,963
|
| 1290
Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$561,608
|
$291,866
|
$269,742
|
| 1290
GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
$1,231,071
|
$835,029
|
$396,042
|
| 1290
High Yield Bond Fund |
$477,729
|
$174,265
|
$303,464
|
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
$522,444
|
$74,983
|
$447,461
|
| Fund |
Management Fee |
Management Fee Paid to Adviser After Fee
Waiver |
Total Amount of Fees Waived and Other
Expenses Assumed by Adviser Pursuant to
Expense Limitation Agreement |
| 1290
Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund |
$99,438
|
$— |
$123,427
|
| 1290
SmartBeta Equity Fund |
$1,593,514
|
$1,079,809 |
$513,705 |
| Fund |
Sub-Advisory Fee Paid | ||
| 2023 |
2024 |
2025 | |
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund* |
— |
$117,382
|
$240,405
|
| 1290
Diversified Bond Fund |
$751,987
|
$740,070
|
$698,039
|
| 1290
Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$155,505
|
$230,064
|
$299,849
|
| 1290
GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
$376,088
|
$451,570
|
$500,686
|
| 1290
High Yield Bond Fund |
$221,481
|
$255,662
|
$296,307
|
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
$133,132
|
$159,709
|
$200,937
|
| 1290
SmartBeta Equity Fund |
$219,894
|
$247,356
|
$273,233 |
| Fund |
Name and Control Persons of the Sub-Adviser |
| 1290 Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund |
American Century is a wholly owned subsidiary of American Century Companies, Inc.
(“ACC”). The Stowers Institute for Medical Research
(“SIMR”) controls ACC by virtue of its beneficial ownership of more than 25% of the voting securities of ACC. |
| 1290 Diversified Bond Fund |
Brandywine Global is a wholly-owned, but independently operated, subsidiary of Legg
Mason, Inc. Legg Mason, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Franklin
Resources, Inc., a publicly owned company engaged in the financial
services industry. |
| 1290 Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
Essex is a registered investment adviser, organized as a Delaware limited liability
company. Essex is a 100% independent, employee-owned entity with no
single owner exceeding 50%. Essex is managed by Co-CEO’s Nancy
B. Prial, CFA & Robert J. Uek, CFA within an Executive Committee structure which consists of four senior management employees of the firm.
|
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund |
AllianceBernstein, a limited partnership organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware, is a majority-owned subsidiary of Equitable Holdings, Inc.,
the holding company for a diversified financial services
organization. |
| 1290 GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
GAMCO is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GAMCO Investors, Inc. (“GAMI”).
Mr. Mario J. Gabelli may be deemed a controlling person of GAMCO
because of his controlling interest in GAMI, the parent company of
GAMCO, a financial services company. |
| 1290 Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income
Fund |
Loomis Sayles is a Delaware limited partnership. Loomis Sayles' sole general
partner, Loomis, Sayles & Company, Inc., is directly owned by
Natixis Investment Managers, LLC (“Natixis LLC”). Natixis LLC is a direct subsidiary of Natixis Investment Managers, an international asset management group based in
Paris, France, that is in turn owned by Natixis, a French investment banking and
financial services firm. Natixis is wholly-owned by BPCE, France's
second largest banking group. BPCE is owned by banks comprising two
autonomous and complementary retail banking networks consisting of Caisse d'Epargne regional savings banks and the Banque Populaire regional cooperative banks. |
| 1290 High Yield Bond Fund
1290 SmartBeta Equity Fund |
AXA IM is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BNP Paribas Cardif S.A. |
| Fund |
Administrative Fee Paid | ||
| 2023 |
2024 |
2025 | |
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund* |
$30,000
|
$136,085
|
$277,214
|
| 1290
Diversified Bond Fund |
$965,448
|
$949,022
|
$889,604
|
| 1290
Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$58,352
|
$86,215
|
$112,323
|
| 1290
GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
$184,956
|
$221,991
|
$246,215
|
| 1290
High Yield Bond Fund |
$88,791
|
$102,736
|
$119,432
|
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
$79,883
|
$95,811
|
$120,564
|
| 1290
Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund |
$30,000
|
$29,998
|
$30,020
|
| 1290
SmartBeta Equity Fund |
$268,543
|
$309,021
|
$341,467 |
| Share Class |
Distribution Fee and/or Service Fee (as a % of average daily net assets attributable to the class) |
| Class A |
0.25% |
| Class R |
0.50% |
| Fund |
Class A Distribution Fee Paid
|
Class R Distribution Fee Paid
|
Total Distribution Fees Paid
|
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund^ |
$1,117
|
- |
$1,117
|
| 1290
Diversified Bond Fund |
$10,535
|
$8,634
|
$19,169
|
| 1290
Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$619
|
$918
|
$1,537
|
| 1290
GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
$16,460
|
$7,722
|
$24,182
|
| 1290
High Yield Bond Fund |
$5,303
|
$2,817
|
$8,120
|
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
$13,558
|
$1,175
|
$14,733
|
| 1290
Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund |
$780
|
$830
|
$1,610
|
| 1290
SmartBeta Equity Fund |
$15,420
|
$19,417
|
$34,837 |
| Fund |
Brokerage Commissions Paid | ||
| 2023 |
2024 |
2025 | |
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund* |
$192
|
$6,572
|
$844
|
| 1290
Diversified Bond Fund |
$78,971
|
$96,727
|
$139,463
|
| 1290
Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$260,610
|
$312,148
|
$235,405
|
| 1290
GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
$21,437
|
$23,374
|
$24,230
|
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
$20,645
|
$17,193
|
$25,914
|
| 1290
Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund |
$4,125
|
$2,284
|
$2,887
|
| 1290
SmartBeta Equity Fund |
$14,747
|
$14,688
|
$15,460 |
| Fund |
Affiliated Broker-Dealer |
Aggregate Brokerage Commission
Paid† |
Percentage of Total Brokerage
Commissions |
Percentage of Transactions (Based on
Dollar Amounts) |
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., LLC |
$287 |
0.00% |
1.39% |
| Fund |
Affiliated Broker-Dealer |
Aggregate Brokerage Commission
Paid† |
Percentage of Total Brokerage
Commissions |
Percentage of Transactions (Based on
Dollar Amounts) |
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., LLC |
$808 |
4.70% |
0.64% |
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund |
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., LLC |
$1,553 |
23.64% |
24.33% |
| Fund |
Affiliated Broker-Dealer |
Aggregate Brokerage Commission
Paid† |
Percentage of Total Brokerage
Commissions |
Percentage of Transactions (Based on
Dollar Amounts) |
| 1290
Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
Bernstein Institutional Service LLC |
$20 |
0.08% |
0.01% |
| Fund |
Transaction Amount |
Related Brokerage Commission
Paid |
| 1290
Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$82,311,832.03
|
$235,405.40 |
| Fund |
Broker or Dealer (or Parent Company) |
Type of Security D= debt
E= equity |
Value ($000s omitted)
|
| 1290
Diversified Bond Fund |
Wells Fargo Securities, LLC |
D |
2,738 |
| 1290 Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income
Fund |
Barclays Capital, Inc. |
D |
296
|
| BofA Securities, Inc. |
D |
357
| |
| |
E |
51
| |
| Citigroup Global Markets Inc. |
D |
4,288 | |
| |
E |
38
| |
| Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC |
D |
594
| |
| |
E |
54
| |
| HSBC Securities (USA) Inc. |
D |
546
| |
| J.P. Morgan Securities LLC |
D |
4,471 | |
| |
E |
120
| |
| Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC |
D |
418
| |
| |
E |
40
| |
| Wells Fargo Securities, LLC |
E |
43
| |
| 1290
Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth
Fund |
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
428
|
| 1290
SmartBeta Equity Fund |
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
1,351 |
| Equitable Investment Management, LLC (“EIM II” or the
“Adviser”) | ||||||||||||
| Portfolio Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number
of other accounts managed by the portfolio
manager and the total assets in the accounts
managed within each category as of April 30, 2026. |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of
accounts and the total assets in the accounts
with respect to which the advisory fee is based
on the performance of the account. | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| 1290 Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund |
||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
117 |
$170.44 B |
6 |
$213.73 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Miao Hu |
117 |
$171.37 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
44 |
$79.86 B |
6 |
$207.13 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
44 |
$79.86 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 Diversified Bond Fund | ||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
117 |
$170.09 B |
6 |
$213.73 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Miao Hu |
117 |
$171.37 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
44 |
$79.86 B |
6 |
$207.13 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
44 |
$79.86 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 Essex Small Cap Growth Fund | ||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
117 |
$170.55 B |
6 |
$213.73 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Miao Hu |
117 |
$171.37 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
44 |
$79.86 B |
6 |
$207.13 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
44 |
$79.86 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund* | ||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Miao Hu |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund | ||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
117 |
$170.47 B |
6 |
$213.73 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Miao Hu |
117 |
$171.37 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
44 |
$79.86 B |
6 |
$207.13 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
44 |
$79.86 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 High Yield Bond Fund | ||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
117 |
$170.56 B |
6 |
$213.73 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Miao Hu |
117 |
$171.37 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
44 |
$79.86 B |
6 |
$207.13 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
44 |
$79.86 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund | ||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
117 |
$170.56 B |
6 |
$213.73 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Miao Hu |
117 |
$171.37 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
44 |
$79.86 B |
6 |
$207.13 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
44 |
$79.86 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund | ||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
117 |
$170.63 B |
6 |
$213.73 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Equitable Investment Management, LLC (“EIM II” or the
“Adviser”) | ||||||||||||
| Portfolio Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number
of other accounts managed by the portfolio
manager and the total assets in the accounts
managed within each category as of April 30, 2026. |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of
accounts and the total assets in the accounts
with respect to which the advisory fee is based
on the performance of the account. | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| Miao Hu |
117 |
$171.37 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
44 |
$79.86 B |
6 |
$207.13 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
44 |
$79.86 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Lee Soja |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 SmartBeta Equity Fund | ||||||||||||
| Kenneth T. Kozlowski |
117 |
$170.39 B |
6 |
$213.73 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Miao Hu |
117 |
$171.37 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Xavier Poutas |
44 |
$79.86 B |
6 |
$207.13 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin McCarthy |
44 |
$79.86 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
over
$1,000,000 |
| 1290 Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund |
|||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 Diversified Bond Fund | |||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund* | |||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 Essex Small Cap Growth Fund | |||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund | |||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 High Yield Bond Fund | |||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund | |||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
|
X |
|
|
|
|
|
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund | |||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
|
X |
|
|
|
|
|
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
over
$1,000,000 |
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Lee Soja |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 SmartBeta Equity Fund | |||||||
| Kenneth Kozlowski |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Miao Hu |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Xavier Poutas |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin McCarthy |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| AllianceBernstein L.P. (“AllianceBernstein”) |
||||||||||||
| Portfolio Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number
of other accounts managed by the portfolio
manager and the total assets in the accounts
managed within each category as of [ ], 2026. |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of
accounts and the total assets in the accounts
with respect to which the advisory fee is based
on the performance of the account | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund | ||||||||||||
| Joshua Lisser |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
| Geoff Tomlinson |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
[ ] |
$[ ] |
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
over
$1,000,000 |
| 1290 Equity 500 Index Fund | |||||||
| Joshua Lisser |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Geoff Tomlinson |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| American Century Investment Management, Inc. (“American Century”) | ||||||||||||
| Portfolio Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number of other
accounts managed by the portfolio manager and the total
assets in the accounts managed within each category as of
October 31, 2025 |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of accounts
and the total assets in the accounts with respect to which the
advisory fee is based on the performance of the
account | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| 1290 Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund |
||||||||||||
| Eduardo Repetto |
48 |
$94.403B |
1 |
$317.866M |
21 |
$434.244M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Mitchell Firestein |
43 |
$91.987B |
1 |
$317.866M |
21 |
$434.244M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Daniel Ong |
48 |
$94.403B |
1 |
$317.866M |
21 |
$434.244M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Ted Randall |
43 |
$91.987B |
1 |
$317.866M |
21 |
$434.244M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Matthew Dubin |
43 |
$91.987B |
1 |
$317.866M |
21 |
$434.244M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
over
$1,000,000 |
| 1290 Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund |
|||||||
| Eduardo Repetto |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Mitchell Firestein |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Daniel Ong |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Ted Randall |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Matthew Dubin |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| AXA Investment Managers US Inc. (“AXA IM”) | ||||||||||||
| Portfolio
Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number
of other accounts managed by the portfolio
manager and the total assets in the accounts
managed within each category as of October 31, 2025 |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of
accounts and the total assets in the accounts
with respect to which the advisory fee is based
on the performance of the account | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| 1290 High Yield Bond Fund | ||||||||||||
| Michael Graham |
2 |
$267.516 M |
20 |
$10.389 B |
23 |
$3.217 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Robert Houle |
2 |
$267.516 M |
11 |
$5.007 B |
10 |
$2.279 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| 1290 SmartBeta Equity Fund | ||||||||||||
| Cameron Gray |
1 |
$273.9 M |
29 |
$5.358 B |
24 |
$4.179 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Ram Rasaratnam |
1 |
$273.9 M |
29 |
$5.358 B |
24 |
$4.179 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Jonathan White |
1 |
$273.9 M |
29 |
$5.358 B |
24 |
$4.179 B |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
over
$1,000,000 |
| 1290 High Yield Bond Fund | |||||||
| Michael Graham |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Robert Houle |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1290 SmartBeta Equity Fund | |||||||
| Ram Rasaratnam |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Cameron Gray |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Jonathan White |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Brandywine Global Investment Management, LLC (“Brandywine
Global”) | ||||||||||||
| Portfolio Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number
of other accounts managed by the portfolio
manager and the total assets in the accounts
managed within each category as of October 31, 2025 |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of
accounts and the total assets in the accounts
with respect to which the advisory fee is based
on the performance of the account | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| 1290 Diversified Bond Fund | ||||||||||||
| Anujeet Sareen |
11 |
$3.304 B |
42 |
$10.087BB |
41 |
$15.372 B |
0 |
$0 |
2 |
$263.675 M |
8 |
$8.709
B |
| Tracy Chen |
11 |
$3.304 B |
42 |
$10.153 B |
42 |
$14.983 B |
0 |
$0 |
2 |
$263.675M B |
0 |
$8.709
B |
| Brian Kloss |
11 |
$3.304 |
42 |
$10.153 B |
42 |
$14.983 B |
0 |
$0 |
2 |
$263.675 M |
8 |
$8.709
B |
| Paul Mielczarski |
9 |
$2.747 B |
28 |
$5.296 B |
38 |
$14.435 B |
0 |
$0 |
1 |
$80.907 M |
7 |
$7.785 B
|
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
over
$1,000,000 |
| 1290 Diversified Bond Fund | |||||||
| Anujeet Sareen |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Tracy Chen |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Brian L. Kloss |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Paul Mielczarski |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Essex Investment Management LLC (“Essex” or
“Sub-Adviser”) | ||||||||||||
| Portfolio Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number
of other accounts managed by the portfolio
manager and the total assets in the accounts
managed within each category as of October 31, 2025 |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of
accounts and the total assets in the accounts
with respect to which the advisory fee is based
on the performance of the account | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| 1290 Essex Small Cap Growth Fund | ||||||||||||
| Nancy Prial |
1 |
$96.7 M |
0 |
$0 |
20 |
$348.9 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
over
$1,000,000 |
| 1290 Essex Small Cap Growth Fund | |||||||
| Nancy Prial |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| GAMCO Asset Management Inc. (“Sub-Adviser”) | ||||||||||||
| Portfolio Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number
of other accounts managed by the portfolio
manager and the total assets in the accounts
managed within each category as of October 31, 2025 |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of
accounts and the total assets in the accounts
with respect to which the advisory fee is based
on the performance of the account | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| 1290 GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund | ||||||||||||
| Mario J. Gabelli |
21 |
$16.9 B |
10 |
$998.6 M |
807 |
$6.6 B |
1 |
$132.9 M |
8 |
$910.1 M |
0 |
$0 |
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
over
$1,000,000 |
| 1290 GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund | |||||||
| Mario J. Gabelli |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Loomis, Sayles & Company, L.P. (“Loomis Sayles” or
“Sub-Adviser”) | ||||||||||||
| Portfolio Manager |
Presented below for each portfolio manager is the number
of other accounts managed by the portfolio
manager and the total assets in the accounts
managed within each category as of October 31, 2025 |
Presented below for each of the categories is the number of
accounts and the total assets in the accounts
with respect to which the advisory fee is based
on the performance of the account | ||||||||||
| Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts |
Registered
Investment
Companies |
Other Pooled
Investment
Vehicles |
Other Accounts | |||||||
| Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total
Assets | |
| 1290 Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund | ||||||||||||
| Elaine Kan |
1 |
$99.499 M |
0 |
$0 |
1 |
$1.364 M |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Kevin Kearns |
2 |
$149.308 M |
9 |
$4.184 B |
36 |
$4.127 B |
0 |
$0 |
1 |
$108.179 M |
3 |
$944.159 M |
| Vivek Garg |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
| Portfolio Manager |
None |
$1-
$10,000 |
$10,001-
$50,000 |
$50,001-
$100,000 |
$100,001-
$500,000 |
$500,001-
$1,000,000 |
Over
$1,000,000 |
| 1290 Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund | |||||||
| Elaine Kan |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kevin Kearns |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Vivek Garg |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
EQ ADVISORS TRUST
1290 FUNDS
(individually, a “Trust” and collectively, the “Trusts”)
| I. | Trusts’ Policy Statement |
Each Trust is firmly committed to ensuring that proxies relating to the Trust’s portfolio securities are voted in the best interest of the Trust. The following policies and procedures have been established to implement each Trust’s proxy voting program (the “Program”).
| II. | Trusts’ Proxy Voting Program |
Equitable Investment Management Group, LLC serves as the investment adviser to each series of EQ Advisors Trust, and Equitable Investment Management, LLC serves as the investment adviser to each series of the 1290 Funds (each series of each Trust, a “Portfolio”, and together, the “Portfolios”). Equitable Investment Management Group, LLC and Equitable Investment Management, LLC are referred to herein as “EIM”. Each Trust has delegated proxy voting responsibility with respect to each Portfolio to EIM. EIM, through its Proxy Voting Committee, is responsible for monitoring and administering the Program. Equitable Investment Management, LLC (“Administrator”) serves as the administrator of the Trusts and is generally responsible for monitoring, testing and maintaining compliance policies, procedures and other items for the Trusts, and thus assists in monitoring compliance with applicable requirements pursuant to these Policies and Procedures.
| A. | Sub-Advised Portfolios |
EIM is responsible for the selection and ongoing monitoring of investment sub-advisers (the “Sub-Advisers”) who, among other responsibilities, provide portfolio management services including the day-to-day research and stock selection for each sub-advised Portfolio or an allocated portion of a Portfolio (a “Sub-Advised Portfolio”). EIM views proxy voting as a function that is incidental and integral to the portfolio management services provided by Sub-Advisers. Therefore, except as described in Section III below, EIM, in turn, delegates proxy voting responsibility with respect to each Sub-Advised Portfolio to the applicable Sub-Adviser. The primary focus of the Trusts’ Program as it relates to the Sub-Advised Portfolios, therefore, is to seek to ensure that the Sub-Advisers have adequate proxy voting policies and procedures in place and to monitor each Sub-Adviser’s proxy voting. The Sub-Advisers’ proxy voting policies and procedures may be amended from time to time and need not be identical.
| B. | “Fund-of-Funds Portfolios” |
EIM provides the day-to-day portfolio management services to certain Portfolios, or an allocated portion of a Portfolio (“Allocated Portion”), each of which seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in other mutual funds managed by EIM (“Underlying Affiliated Portfolios”), unaffiliated mutual funds (“Underlying Unaffiliated Funds”) or exchange-traded funds (“Underlying ETFs”) (referred to collectively as the “Fund-of-Funds Portfolios”). Accordingly, EIM retains proxy voting responsibility with respect to each Fund-of-Funds Portfolio and votes proxies in accordance with the policies and procedures set forth in Section III below.
| III. | EIM’s Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures |
EIM has a fiduciary duty to vote proxies on behalf of a Portfolio in the best interest of the Portfolio and its shareholders. EIM believes that its proxy voting policies and procedures represent the voting positions most likely to support a Portfolio’s and its shareholders’ best interests across a range of sectors and contexts.
| A. | Underlying Affiliated Portfolios. EIM will vote the Fund-of-Funds Portfolios’ or Allocated Portions’ shares in Underlying Affiliated Portfolios either for or against a proposal, or abstain, in the same |
C-1
| proportion as the vote of all other securities holders of the applicable Underlying Affiliated Portfolio (whether or not the proposal presents an issue as to which EIM or its affiliates could be deemed to have a conflict of interest). If there are no security holders of an Underlying Affiliated Portfolio except Fund-of-Funds Portfolio, EIM will vote a Fund-of-Funds’ Portfolios’ shares in Underlying Affiliated Portfolio in its discretion, subject to compliance with other provisions of these Procedures, including Section III.E.2. below regarding resolution of potential conflicts of interest regarding a proposal. |
| B. | Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, Underlying ETFs and Certain Sub-Advised Portfolios. |
| 1. | With respect to voting proxies of Underlying Unaffiliated Funds and Underlying ETFs where a Portfolio, and other members of its “advisory group” (as defined in Rule 12d1-4 under the Investment Company Act of 1940) in the aggregate (i) hold more than 25% of the outstanding voting securities of an Underlying Unaffiliated Fund or Unaffiliated ETF as a result of a decrease in the outstanding voting securities of the acquired fund, or (ii) hold more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of an Underlying Unaffiliated Fund or Unaffiliated ETF that is a registered closed-end management investment company or business development company, each member of such “advisory group” will vote its securities in the same proportion as the vote of all other holders of such securities; provided, however, that in circumstances where all holders of the outstanding voting securities of the Underlying Unaffiliated Fund or Unaffiliated ETF are required by the rule or otherwise under Section 12(d)(1) to vote such securities in the same proportion as the vote of all other holders of such securities, the Portfolio will seek instructions from its security holders with regard to the voting of all proxies with respect to such Underlying Unaffiliated Fund or Underlying ETF securities and vote such proxies only in accordance with such instructions. |
| 2. | With respect to voting proxies for Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, Underlying ETFs in all other circumstances, and certain Sub-Advised Portfolios as described in Section III. D below, the following guidelines generally will apply: |
| 1. | The decision whether, and if so, how to vote a proxy will be made by EIM based on what it determines to be in the best interest of the relevant Portfolio and its shareholders and in accordance with these procedures. |
| 2. | EIM, with the assistance of Administrator, may enlist the services of an independent proxy voting service to assist with the research and analysis of voting issues, provide voting recommendations and/or carry out the actual voting process, as further described in Section III.E below. |
| 3. | EIM’s policy is to vote all proxies, except under circumstances in which EIM has determined that it is consistent with the best interest of the relevant Portfolio and its shareholders not to vote the proxy or to abstain on one or more proposals. Such circumstances may include the following: |
| a. | The security is on loan. See Section VI for additional information. |
| b. | The issuer is based in a country that requires “share blocking,”1 and EIM believes that the value of exercising the vote is outweighed by the detriment of not being able to sell the shares during the blocking period. |
| c. | EIM has not received sufficient information to make an informed decision. |
| 1 | Shareholders in “share blocking” countries wishing to vote must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting (usually one week) with a designated depositary. During the blocking period shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares are returned to clients’ custodian banks. |
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| C. | Seed Capital Investments. EIM and any affiliate will vote Portfolio shares they own, including through “seed money” investments in a Portfolio, either for or against a proposal, or abstain, in the same proportion as the vote of all other security holders of the Portfolio (whether or not the proposal presents an issue as to which EIM or its affiliates could be deemed to have a conflict of interest), or as otherwise required under applicable law (e.g., as may be required under a “mixed and shared funding” order). If EIM or an affiliate is the sole shareholder of a Portfolio, EIM or the affiliate will vote the Portfolio’s shares that it owns in its discretion. |
| D. | Sub-Advised Portfolios; No Delegation. Under certain circumstances EIM may assume responsibility for voting the proxies for shares held by a Sub-Advised Portfolio. For example, if a Sub-Adviser notifies EIM that it is unable or unwilling to assume responsibility for voting a proxy for a Sub-Advised Portfolio (e.g., if voting such proxy presents a potential material conflict of interest for the Sub-Adviser), EIM will vote such proxy in accordance with these procedures. |
| E. | EIM and Administrator will be required to maintain proxy voting policies and procedures that satisfy the following elements: |
| 1. | Written Policies and Procedures: EIM and Administrator must maintain written proxy voting policies and procedures in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and must provide to each Trust copies of such policies and procedures. |
| 2. | Conflicts of Interest: If EIM or Administrator becomes aware that a proxy voting issue may present a potential material conflict of interest, the issue will be referred to the CCO or other member of Legal and Compliance. If the CCO and/or Legal and Compliance determines that an affiliated person of EIM has a potential material conflict, that affiliated person will not participate in the voting decision. |
| | Potential material conflicts may arise between the interests of a Portfolio and EIM or any of its affiliated persons if, for example, a proxy vote relates to a matter involving issuers in which EIM or its affiliates have a substantial economic interest. Potential conflicts of interest include, but are not limited to: |
| | Portfolio Managers owning shares of Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, ETFs or shares of securities that are also held in the Portfolios of the Trust(s). |
| | Equitable Financial Life Insurance Company (“Equitable”) holding investments in Underlying Unaffiliated Funds or ETFs that are also held in the Portfolios of the Trust(s). It is possible that EIM may vote differently than Equitable. |
| 3. | Voting Guidelines: EIM, with the assistance of Administrator, may engage an independent proxy voting service to assist with the research and analysis of voting issues, provide voting recommendations and/or carry out the actual voting process as deemed necessary. Currently, EIM subscribes to the corporate governance and proxy research services of International Shareholder Services (“ISS”), a provider of proxy voting services. ISS provides voting recommendations based on established guidelines and practices. The ISS U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines (the “ISS Guidelines”) are attached hereto as Appendix A. Based on its review of the ISS Guidelines, EIM has determined generally to instruct ISS to vote proxies for Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, Underlying ETFs and certain Sub-Advised Portfolios as described in Section III.D above consistent with the ISS Guidelines. However, EIM’s use of the ISS Guidelines is not intended to constrain EIM’s consideration of any proxy proposal, and so there may be times when EIM deviates from the ISS Guidelines. EIM reserves the right not to vote in accordance with the ISS recommendation if it determines that it is not in the best interest of a Portfolio and its Shareholders to do so. In addition, if EIM becomes aware of a conflict of interest between ISS and an issuer subject to a proxy vote, EIM will consider the recommendation of the issuer and instruct ISS to vote the proxy based on what EIM believes to be in the best interest of the Portfolio and its shareholders. |
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The Proxy Voting Committee, with the assistance of Administrator, will maintain records regarding EIM’s determination generally to vote proxies for Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, Underlying ETFs, and certain Sub-Advised Portfolios as described in Section III.D above consistent with the ISS Guidelines, and that determination will be reviewed periodically.
The following guidelines describe EIM’s general positions on common proxy issues for Underlying Unaffiliated Funds and Underlying ETFs:
| | Election of Directors: EIM generally votes in favor of slates recommended by the board of directors. |
| | Fee Increases: EIM generally votes against proposals to increase fees. |
| | Changes to the investment strategy, investment objective or fundamental investment restrictions, and proposed mergers: EIM generally votes against changes that would impact adversely the allocation model of a Fund-of-Funds Portfolio. |
The EIM and Administrator Compliance Department (“Compliance”) will conduct a due diligence review of any proxy voting service (“Proxy Service”) engaged by EIM or Administrator to assess (1) the adequacy and quality of the Proxy Service’s staffing, personnel and technology, and whether the Proxy Service has the capacity and competence to adequately analyze proxy issues and the ability to make proxy voting recommendations based on materially accurate and complete information; (2) whether the Proxy Service has the ability to execute proxy votes in accordance with EIM’s instructions; (3) whether the Proxy Service has adequately disclosed to EIM the methodologies it uses in formulating its voting recommendations, including its process for obtaining current and accurate information relevant to matters included in its research and on which it makes recommendations, the nature of any third-party information sources that the Proxy Service uses as a basis for its voting recommendations, and how and when the Proxy Service would expect to engage with issuers and third parties; (4) the effectiveness of the Proxy Service’s process for seeking timely input from issuers; and (5) the adequacy of the Proxy Service’s policies and procedures for identifying, disclosing and addressing actual and potential conflicts of interest. EIM or Administrator will require the Proxy Service to update EIM or Administrator, as applicable, on an ongoing basis regarding (1) any business changes relevant to its capacity and competence to provide independent proxy voting advice or carry out voting instructions, (2) any conflicts of interest that may arise with respect to its proxy voting recommendations, and (3) any operational or compliance issues or problems. The due diligence review will be conducted at least annually and may be conducted by on-site visit or written questionnaire. In the event that EIM or Administrator becomes aware of factual errors, incompleteness or methodological weaknesses in the Proxy Service’s analysis, it will assess whether this materially affected the research or recommendations used by EIM and the Proxy Service’s efforts to correct any material deficiencies in its analysis or methodology.
| 4. | Record Retention and Inspection: EIM, or Administrator on EIM’s behalf, will maintain all documentation associated with its proxy voting decisions. Compliance is responsible for verifying that such documentation is properly maintained in accordance with the Trusts’ procedures and applicable laws and regulations. |
| IV. | Due Diligence and Compliance Program |
EIM, with the assistance of Administrator, will conduct a due diligence review of each Sub-Adviser’s proxy voting policies and procedures (including any proxy voting guidelines) in connection with the initial selection of the Sub-Adviser to manage a Sub-Advised Portfolio and on at least an annual basis thereafter. As part of its ongoing due diligence and compliance responsibilities, with respect to the Sub-Advised Portfolios, EIM, with the assistance of Administrator, will seek to ensure that each Sub-Adviser maintains proxy voting policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to comply with applicable laws and regulations.
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| V. | Sub-Advisers’ Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures |
Each Sub-Adviser will be required to maintain proxy voting policies and procedures in conformance with Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, and that satisfy the following elements:
A. Written Policies and Procedures: The Sub-Adviser must maintain written proxy voting policies and procedures in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and must provide to the Trusts, EIM, and Administrator, upon request, copies of such policies and procedures.
B. Fiduciary Duty: The Sub-Adviser’s policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to ensure that the Sub-Adviser votes client securities in the best interest of its clients.
C. Conflicts of Interest: The Sub-Adviser’s policies and procedures must include appropriate procedures to identify and resolve as necessary, before voting client proxies, all material proxy-related conflicts of interest between the Sub-Adviser (including its affiliates) and its clients.
D. Voting Guidelines: The Sub-Adviser’s policies and procedures must address with reasonable specificity how the Sub-Adviser will vote proxies, or what factors it will consider, when voting on particular types of matters, e.g., corporate governance proposals, compensation issues and matters involving social or corporate responsibility. The Sub-Adviser’s policies and procedures also should describe the considerations it will take into account if it retains a Proxy Service to assist it in discharging its proxy voting duties and its process for conducting due diligence on, and overseeing, services provided by a Proxy Service.
E. Monitoring Proxy Voting: The Sub-Adviser must have a system and/or process that is reasonably designed to ensure that proxies are voted on behalf of its clients in a timely and efficient manner.
F. Record Retention and Inspection: The Sub-Adviser must have an established system for creating and retaining all appropriate documentation relating to its proxy voting activities as required by applicable laws and regulations. The Sub-Adviser must provide to the Trusts, EIM, and Administrator such information and records with respect to proxies relating to the Trust’s portfolio securities as required by law and as the Trusts, EIM, or Administrator may reasonably request.
| VI. | Securities on Loan |
Securities on loan as of a record date cannot be voted. In certain circumstances, a security on loan may be recalled before the record date if, for example, EIM or the applicable Sub-Adviser receives relevant information about a material proxy issue (such as a contested director election or a merger or acquisition) prior to the record date. In addition, EIM or a Sub-Adviser may elect to participate in an automatic recall program in which securities on loan are recalled prior to the record date. Generally, however, securities out on loan remain on loan and are not voted because, among other reasons, EIM or the applicable Sub-Adviser was not aware of relevant information about a material proxy issue prior to the record date, or because the income that the Portfolio derives from the loan outweighs the benefit the Portfolio would receive from voting the security.
| VII. | Disclosure of Trusts’ Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures and Proxy Voting Record |
EIM and Administrator, on behalf of the Trusts, will take reasonable steps as necessary to seek to ensure that the Trusts comply with all applicable laws and regulations relating to disclosure of the Trusts’ proxy voting policies and procedures and proxy voting records. EIM and Administrator (including, at their option, through third-party service providers) will maintain a system that is reasonably designed to ensure that its actual proxy voting record and the actual proxy voting record of the Sub-Advisers with respect to the Trusts’ portfolio securities are collected, processed, filed with the SEC and made available to the Trusts’ shareholders as required by applicable laws and regulations.
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| VIII. | Proxy Voting Committee |
The Proxy Voting Committee is responsible for monitoring and administering the Program. The Proxy Voting Committee is composed of EIM’s and Administrator’ CCO, officers of EIM and Administrator, and/or members of EIM’s or Administrator’s (as applicable) Investment Management Services, Legal and Compliance, or any combination thereof, who may be advisory members of the Committee. The Proxy Voting Committee holds meetings as needed, but no less frequently than annually.
| IX. | Reports to Trusts’ Board of Trustees |
EIM, with the assistance of Administrator, will periodically (but no less frequently than annually) report to the Board of Trustees with respect to each Trust’s implementation of the Program, including summary information with respect to: 1) the proxy voting record of the Sub-Advisers with respect to the Sub-Advised Portfolios’ portfolio securities; 2) the proxy voting record of EIM with respect to the Fund-of-Funds Portfolios or Allocated Portions; and 3) the proxy voting record of EIM with respect to the portfolio securities of any Sub-Advised Portfolio for which EIM has assumed proxy voting responsibility. In addition, if a material conflict of interest was reported to the CCO and/or the Legal and Compliance during the previous quarter and it was determined that a material conflict of interest did exist, EIM, with the assistance of Administrator, will report such material conflict of interest to the Board of Trustees at the next quarterly meeting. EIM, with the assistance of Administrator, will also provide the Board of Trustees with any other information requested by the Board.
The CCO’s annual written compliance report or other reports to the Board of Trustees will contain a summary of material changes to these policies and procedures during the period covered by the report.
Adopted by EQ Advisors Trust (“EQAT”) Board of Trustees: March 1, 2011
Effective: May 1, 2011
Predecessor Procedures of the Investment Manager Adopted: August 6, 2003
Amended: July 11, 2007
Adopted by 1290 Funds Board of Trustees: June 10, 2014
Effective: June 10, 2014
Policies of EQAT and 1290 Funds Combined: July 14, 2014
Revised: April 12-13, 2017
Policies of EQAT and 1290 Funds Combined with EQ Premier VIP Trust: July 18-20, 2017
Revised: September 26, 2019
Revised: December 15, 2020
Revised: August 2021
Revised: December 2021
Revised: January 2023
Revised: November 2023 to remove EQ Premier VIP Trust
Revised: September 2024
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The U.S. research team provides proxy analyses and voting recommendations for the common shareholder meetings of U.S. — incorporated companies that are publicly-traded on U.S. exchanges, as well as certain OTC companies, if they are held in our institutional investor clients’ portfolios. Coverage generally includes corporate actions for common equity holders, such as written consents and bankruptcies. ISS’ U.S. coverage includes investment companies (including open-end funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts), limited partnerships (“LPs”), master limited partnerships (“MLPs”), limited liability companies (“LLCs”), and business development companies. ISS reviews its universe of coverage on an annual basis, and the coverage is subject to change based on client need and industry trends.
Foreign-incorporated companies
In addition to U.S. — incorporated, U.S. — listed companies, ISS’ U.S. policies are applied to certain foreign-incorporated company analyses. Like the SEC, ISS distinguishes two types of companies that list but are not incorporated in the U.S.:
| | U.S. Domestic Issuers — which have a majority of outstanding shares held in the U.S. and meet other criteria, as determined by the SEC, and are subject to the same disclosure and listing standards as U.S. incorporated companies (e.g. they are required to file DEF14A proxy statements) — are generally covered under standard U.S. policy guidelines. |
| | Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) — which are allowed to take exemptions from most disclosure requirements (e.g., they are allowed to file 6-K for their proxy materials) and U.S. listing standards — are generally covered under a combination of policy guidelines: |
| | FPI Guidelines (see the Americas Regional Proxy Voting Guidelines), may apply to companies incorporated in governance havens, and apply certain minimum independence and disclosure standards in the evaluation of key proxy ballot items, such as the election of directors; and/or |
| | Guidelines for the market that is responsible for, or most relevant to, the item on the ballot. |
U.S. incorporated companies listed only on non-U.S. exchanges are generally covered under the ISS guidelines for the market on which they are traded.
An FPI is generally covered under ISS’ approach to FPIs outlined above, even if such FPI voluntarily files a proxy statement and/or other filing normally required of a U.S. Domestic Issuer, so long as the company retains its FPI status.
In all cases — including with respect to other companies with cross-market features that may lead to ballot items related to multiple markets — items that are on the ballot solely due to the requirements of another market (listing, incorporation, or national code) may be evaluated under the policy of the relevant market, regardless of the “assigned” primary market coverage.
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| 1. | Board of Directors |
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections
Four fundamental principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:
Independence: Boards should be sufficiently independent from management (and significant shareholders) to ensure that they are able and motivated to effectively supervise management’s performance for the benefit of all shareholders, including in setting and monitoring the execution of corporate strategy, with appropriate use of shareholder capital, and in setting and monitoring executive compensation programs that support that strategy. The chair of the board should ideally be an independent director, and all boards should have an independent leadership position or a similar role in order to help provide appropriate counterbalance to executive management, as well as having sufficiently independent committees that focus on key governance concerns such as audit, compensation, and nomination of directors.
Composition: Companies should ensure that directors add value to the board through their specific skills and expertise and by having sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives.
Responsiveness: Directors should respond to investor input, such as that expressed through significant opposition to management proposals, significant support for shareholder proposals (whether binding or non-binding), and tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered.
Accountability: Boards should be sufficiently accountable to shareholders, including through transparency of the company’s governance practices and regular board elections, by the provision of sufficient information for shareholders to be able to assess directors and board composition, and through the ability of shareholders to remove directors.
General Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees1 considered on case-by-case basis):
Independence
Vote against2 or withhold from non-independent directors (Executive Directors and Non-Independent Non-Executive Directors per ISS’ Classification of Directors) when:
| | Independent directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board; |
| | The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee; |
| | The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or |
| 1 | A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question. |
| 2 | In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use “Withhold” as the contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use “Against”. However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company. |
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| | The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee. |
ISS Classification of Directors — U.S.
| 1. | Executive Director |
| 1.1. | Current officer1 of the company or one of its affiliates2. |
| 2. | Non-Independent Non-Executive Director |
Board Identification
| 2.1. | Director identified as not independent by the board. |
Controlling/Significant Shareholder
| 2.2. | Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group). |
Current Employment at Company or Related Company
| 2.3. | Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives). |
| 2.4. | Officer1, former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company. |
Former Employment
| 2.5. | Former CEO of the company. 3, 4 |
| 2.6. | Former non-CEO officer1 of the company or an affiliate2 within the past five years. |
| 2.7. | Former officer1 of an acquired company within the past five years.4 |
| 2.8. | Officer1 of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years. |
| 2.9. | Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made.5 |
Family Members
| 2.10. | Immediate family member6 of a current or former officer1 of the company or its affiliates2 within the last five years. |
| 2.11. | Immediate family member6 of a current employee of company or its affiliates2 where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role). |
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Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships
| 2.12. | Director who (or whose immediate family member6) currently provides professional services7 in excess of $10,000 per year to: the company, an affiliate2, or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; or who is (or whose immediate family member6 is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services. |
| 2.13. | Director who (or whose immediate family member6) currently has any material transactional relationship8 with the company or its affiliates2; or who is (or whose immediate family member6 is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationship8 (excluding investments in the company through a private placement). |
| 2.14. | Director who (or whose immediate family member6) is a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments8 from the company or its affiliates2. |
Other Relationships
| 2.15. | Party to a voting agreement9 to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote. |
| 2.16. | Has (or an immediate family member6 has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its Compensation Committee.10 |
| 2.17. | Founder11 of the company but not currently an employee. |
| 2.18. | Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers. |
| 2.19. | Any material12 relationship with the company. |
| 3. | Independent Director |
| 3.1. | No material12 connection to the company other than a board seat. |
Footnotes:
1. The definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will generally be classified as a Non-Independent Non-Executive Director under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation exceeding $10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Director.
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2. “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. ISS uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.
3. Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).
4. When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, ISS will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.
5. ISS will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. ISS will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.
6. “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, stepchildren, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.
7. Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services, commercial banking (beyond deposit services), investment services, insurance services, accounting/audit services, consulting services, marketing services, legal services, property management services, realtor services, lobbying services, executive search services, and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services, IT tech support services, educational services, and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of $10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.
8. A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity, exceeding the greater of: $200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, for a company that follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of $1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, for a company that follows NYSE listing standards. For a company that follows neither of the preceding standards, ISS will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).
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9. Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as Independent Directors if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders’ interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.
10. Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on
each other’s boards and at least one serves on the other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).
11. The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, ISS may deem him or her an Independent Director.
12. For purposes of ISS’s director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal, or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.
Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except nominees who served only part of the fiscal year3) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:
| | Medical issues/illness; |
| | Family emergencies; and |
| | Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer). |
In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.
If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.
Overboarded Directors: Generally vote against or withhold from individual directors who:
| | Sit on more than five public company boards; or |
| 3 | Nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy. |
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| | Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own — withhold only at their outside boards4. |
NOTE: For shareholder meeting reports published on or after February 25th, 2025, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has indefinitely halted the consideration of the gender diversity of a company’s board when making vote recommendations with respect to the election or re-election of directors at U.S. companies covered by these guidelines under its proprietary ISS U.S. Benchmark policy.
Gender Diversity: Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at companies where there are no women on the company’s board. An exception will be made if there was at least one woman on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to return to a gender-diverse status within a year.
NOTE: For shareholder meeting reports published on or after February 25th, 2025, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has indefinitely halted the consideration of the racial and/or ethnic diversity of a company’s board when making vote recommendations with respect to the election or re-election of directors at U.S. companies covered under these guidelines under its proprietary ISS U.S. Benchmark policy.
Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity: For companies in the Russell 3000 or S&P 1500 indices, generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) where the board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse members5. An exception will be made if there was racial and/or ethnic diversity on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to appoint at least one racial and/or ethnic diverse member within a year.
Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:
| | The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are: |
| | Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote; |
| | Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation; |
| | The subject matter of the proposal; |
| 4 | Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards with publicly-traded common stock will be counted as separate boards, ISS will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships. |
| 5 | Aggregate diversity statistics provided by the board will only be considered if specific to racial and/or ethnic diversity. |
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| | The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings; |
| | Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders; |
| | The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and |
| | Other factors as appropriate. |
| | The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered; or |
| | At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote. |
Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and/or the say-on-pay proposal when the company’s previous say-on-pay received support of less than 70 percent of votes cast.
Factors that will be considered in assessing board responsiveness include:
| | Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated); |
| | Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition; and |
| | Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns. |
If the company discloses meaningful engagement efforts, but in addition states that it was unable to obtain specific feedback, ISS will assess company actions taken in response to the say-on-pay vote as well as the company’s explanation as to why such actions are beneficial for shareholders.
Additional factors that may be considered include:
| | Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated; |
| | The company’s ownership structure; |
| | Significant corporate activity, such as a recent merger or proxy contest; and |
| | Any other compensation action or factor considered relevant to assessing board responsiveness. |
If the say-on-pay support level was less than 50 percent of votes cast, this would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness, as assessed under the factors noted above.
Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) if the board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.
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PROBLEMATIC TAKEOVER DEFENSES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
Poison Pills: Generally vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case) if:
| | The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature6; |
| | The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or |
| | The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders7. |
Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill6 (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:
| | The trigger threshold and other terms of the pill; |
| | The disclosed rationale for the adoption; |
| | The context in which the pill was adopted, (e.g., factors such as the company’s size and stage of development, sudden changes in its market capitalization, and extraordinary industry-wide or macroeconomic events); |
| | A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; |
| | The company’s overall track record on corporate governance and responsiveness to shareholders; and |
| | Other factors as relevant. |
Unequal Voting Rights: Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a multi-class capital stock structure with unequal voting rights8.
Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:
| | Newly-public companies9 with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public; |
| | Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs; |
| | Convertible preferred shares that vote on an “as-converted” basis; |
| 6 | If a short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, ISS will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption. |
| 7 | Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient. |
| 8 | This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”). |
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| | Situations where the enhanced voting rights are limited in duration and applicability, such as where they are intended to overcome low voting turnout and ensure approval of a specific non-controversial agenda item and “mirrored voting” applies; |
| | Situations where the super-voting shares represent less than 5% of total voting power and therefore considered to be de minimis; or |
| | The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained. |
Classified Board Structure: The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.
Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards: The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.
Problematic Governance Structure: For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting9 of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights:
| | Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; |
| | A classified board structure; or |
| | Other egregious provisions. |
A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.
Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.
Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments: Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:
| | The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification; |
| | Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment; |
| 9 | Includes companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering. |
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| | The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter; |
| | The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions; |
| | The company’s ownership structure; |
| | The company’s existing governance provisions; |
| | The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and |
| | Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders. |
Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:
| | Classified the board; |
| | Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; |
| | Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws; |
| | Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or |
| | Adopted another provision deemed egregious. |
Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals: Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the governance committee if:
| | The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis. |
Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Generally continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.
Director Performance Evaluation: The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:
| | A classified board structure; |
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| | A supermajority vote requirement; |
| | Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections, or a majority vote standard in contested elections; |
| | The inability of shareholders to call special meetings; |
| | The inability of shareholders to act by written consent; |
| | A multi-class capital structure; and/or |
| | A non-shareholder-approved poison pill. |
Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions: Vote against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board, where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:
| | The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot; |
| | The board’s rationale for seeking ratification; |
| | Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail; |
| | Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request; |
| | The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision; |
| | The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings; |
| | Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal; |
| | The company’s ownership structure; and |
| | Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals. |
Problematic Audit-Related Practices
Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the Audit Committee if:
| | The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive; |
| | The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or |
| | There is persuasive evidence that the Audit Committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm. |
Vote case-by-case on members of the Audit Committee and potentially the full board if:
| | Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted. |
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Problematic Compensation Practices
In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item or in egregious situations, vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:
| | There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance); |
| | The company maintains significant problematic pay practices; or |
| | The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders. |
Generally vote against or withhold from the Compensation Committee chair, other committee members, or potentially the full board if:
| | The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or |
| | The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions. |
Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more consecutive or non-consecutive years/across multiple years) of awarding excessive or otherwise problematic10 non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.
Adverse recommendations may be warranted in the first year for particularly egregious director compensation issues/instances/cases10.
Problematic Pledging of Company Stock: Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:
| | The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity; |
| | The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume; |
| | Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time; |
| | Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and |
| | Any other relevant factors. |
| 10 | May include excessive magnitude, problematic perquisites, performance awards, stock options, or retirement benefits. |
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For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain11, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where ISS determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and mitigate risks related to climate change to the company and the larger economy.
Minimum steps to understand and mitigate those risks are considered to be the following. Both minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with the policy :
| | Detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including: |
| | Board governance measures; |
| | Corporate strategy; |
| | Risk management analyses; and |
| | Metrics and targets. |
| | Appropriate GHG emissions reduction targets. |
At this time, “appropriate GHG emissions reductions targets” will be medium-term GHG reduction targets or Net Zero-by-2050 GHG reduction targets for a company’s operations (Scope 1) and electricity use (Scope 2). Targets should cover the vast majority of the company’s direct emissions.
Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:
| | Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight12, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company; |
| | Failure to replace management as appropriate; or |
| | Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company. |
| 11 | Companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list. |
| 12 | Examples of failure of risk oversight include but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant adverse legal judgments or settlement; or hedging of company stock. |
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Voting on Director Nominees in Contested Elections
General Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote-no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:
| | Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry; |
| | Management’s track record; |
| | Background to the contested election; |
| | Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements; |
| | Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management; |
| | Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and |
| | Stock ownership positions. |
In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether there are more candidates than board seats).
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use of company stock will be considered.
Board refreshment is best implemented through an ongoing program of individual director evaluations, conducted annually, to ensure the evolving needs of the board are met and to bring in fresh perspectives, skills, and diversity as needed.
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General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals regarding director term/tenure limits, considering:
| | The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit; |
| | The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process; |
| | Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures; |
| | Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to non-independent directors; and |
| | Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner. |
Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for the company to adopt director term/tenure limits, considering:
| | The scope of the shareholder proposal; and |
| | Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals seeking to fix the board size or designate a range for the board size.
Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board outside of a specified range without shareholder approval.
Classification/Declassification of the Board
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board.
Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering, at a minimum, the following factors:
| | The reasonableness/scope of the request; and |
| | The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process. |
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General Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulate voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting, unless:
| | The company has proxy access13, thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and |
| | The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections. |
Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (insider voting power > 50%).
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals on director and officer indemnification, liability protection, and exculpation14.
Consider the stated rationale for the proposed change. Also consider, among other factors, the extent to which the proposal would:
| | Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care; |
| | Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of loyalt; |
| | Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness; and |
| | Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to indemnify. |
Vote for those proposals providing such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if both of the following apply:
| | If the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and |
| | If only the individual’s legal expenses would be covered. |
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and the degree to which they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.
| 13 | A proxy access right that meets the recommended guidelines. |
| 14 | Indemnification: the condition of being secured against loss or damage. Limited liability: a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff. Exculpation: to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director or officer to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer. |
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Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:
| | The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers; |
| | The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
| | The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and |
| | The scope and structure of the proposal. |
Establish Other Board Committee Proposals
General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee, as such proposals seek a specific oversight mechanism/structure that potentially limits a company’s flexibility to determine an appropriate oversight mechanism for itself. However, the following factors will be considered:
| | Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
| | Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
| | Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
| | Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and |
| | The scope and structure of the proposal. |
Filling Vacancies/Removal of Directors
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause. Vote for proposals to restore shareholders’ ability to remove directors with or without cause.
Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.
Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.
General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requiring that the board chair position be filled by an independent director, taking into consideration the following:
| | The scope and rationale of the proposal; |
| | The company’s current board leadership structure; |
| | The company’s governance structure and practices; |
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| | Company performance; and |
| | Any other relevant factors that may be applicable. |
The following factors will increase the likelihood of a “for” recommendation:
| | A majority non-independent board and/or the presence of non-independent directors on key board committees; |
| | A weak or poorly-defined lead independent director role that fails to serve as an appropriate counterbalance to a combined CEO/chair role; |
| | The presence of an executive or non-independent chair in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chair, and/or departure from a structure with an independent chair; |
| | Evidence that the board has failed to oversee and address material risks facing the company; |
| | A material governance failure, particularly if the board has failed to adequately respond to shareholder concerns or if the board has materially diminished shareholder rights; or |
| | Evidence that the board has failed to intervene when management’s interests are contrary to shareholders’ interests. |
Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees
General Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed threshold by ISS’ definition of Independent Director (See ISS’ Classification of Directors.)
Vote for shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors unless they currently meet that standard.
Majority Vote Standard for the Election of Directors
General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections. Vote against if no carve-out for a plurality vote standard in contested elections is included.
Generally vote for precatory and binding shareholder resolutions requesting that the board change the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.
Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.
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General Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:
| | Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power; |
| | Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group; |
| | Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group; and |
| | Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board. |
Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access. Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.
Require More Nominees than Open Seats
General Recommendation: Vote against shareholder proposals that would require a company to nominate more candidates than the number of open board seats.
Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee)
General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:
| | Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board; |
| | Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders; |
| | Company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals, or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and |
| | The company has an independent chair or a lead director, according to ISS’ definition. This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders. |
| 2. | Audit-Related |
Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the issue of auditor indemnification and limitation of liability. Factors to be assessed include, but are not limited to:
| | The terms of the auditor agreement — the degree to which these agreements impact shareholders’ rights; |
| | The motivation and rationale for establishing the agreements; |
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| | The quality of the company’s disclosure; and |
| | The company’s historical practices in the audit area. |
Vote against or withhold from members of an audit committee in situations where there is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to ratify auditors unless any of the following apply:
| | An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; |
| | There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position; |
| | Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as fraud or misapplication of GAAP; or |
| | Fees for non-audit services (“Other” fees) are excessive. |
Non-audit fees are excessive if:
| | Non-audit (“other”) fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees |
Tax compliance and preparation include the preparation of original and amended tax returns and refund claims, and tax payment planning. All other services in the tax category, such as tax advice, planning, or consulting, should be added to “Other” fees. If the breakout of tax fees cannot be determined, add all tax fees to “Other” fees.
In circumstances where “Other” fees include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (such as initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs) and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees that are an exception to the standard “non-audit fee” category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit/audit-related fees/tax compliance and preparation for purposes of determining whether non-audit fees are excessive.
Shareholder Proposals Limiting Non-Audit Services
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to prohibit or limit their auditors from engaging in non-audit services.
Shareholder Proposals on Audit Firm Rotation
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for audit firm rotation, taking into account:
| | The tenure of the audit firm; |
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| | The length of rotation specified in the proposal; |
| | Any significant audit-related issues at the company; |
| | The number of Audit Committee meetings held each year; |
| | The number of financial experts serving on the committee; and |
| | Whether the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated for both audit quality and competitive price. |
| 3. | Shareholder Rights & Defenses |
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory, and shareholder review.
To be reasonable, the company’s deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year’s meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120-day window). The submittal window is the period under which shareholders must file their proposals/nominations prior to the deadline.
In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent’s economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.
Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.
Vote case-by-case on proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders, taking into account the following:
| | Any impediments to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws (i.e. supermajority voting requirements); |
| | The company’s ownership structure and historical voting turnout; |
| | Whether the board could amend bylaws adopted by shareholders; and |
| | Whether shareholders would retain the ability to ratify any board-initiated amendments. |
Control Share Acquisition Provisions
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.
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Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.
Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.
Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.
Control Share Cash-Out Provisions
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.
Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to “cash-out” of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.
Disgorgement provisions require an acquirer or potential acquirer of more than a certain percentage of a company’s stock to disgorge, or pay back, to the company any profits realized from the sale of that company’s stock purchased 24 months before achieving control status. All sales of company stock by the acquirer occurring within a certain period of time (between 18 months and 24 months) prior to the investor’s gaining control status are subject to these recapture-of-profits provisions.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions (provisions that stipulate that an acquirer must pay the same price to acquire all shares as it paid to acquire the control shares), evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.
Generally vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions. Freeze-out provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to adopt anti-greenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.
Vote case-by-case on anti-greenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.
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Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of its shares, the practice discriminates against all other shareholders.
Federal Forum Selection Provisions
Federal forum selection provisions require that U.S. federal courts be the sole forum for shareholders to litigate claims arising under federal securities law.
General Recommendation: Generally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify “the district courts of the United States” as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.
Vote against provisions that restrict the forum to a particular federal district court; unilateral adoption (without a shareholder vote) of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.
Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters
Exclusive forum provisions in the charter or bylaws restrict shareholders’ ability to bring derivative lawsuits against the company, for claims arising out of state corporate law, to the courts of a particular state (generally the state of incorporation).
General Recommendation: Generally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the state of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.
For states other than Delaware, vote case-by-case on exclusive forum provisions, taking into consideration:
| | The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision; |
| | Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum; |
| | The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and |
| | Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections. |
Generally vote against provisions that specify a state other than the state of incorporation as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters, or that specify a particular local court within the state; unilateral adoption of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.
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Fee-shifting provisions in the charter or bylaws require that a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation and its directors and officers.
General Recommendation: Generally vote against provisions that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).
Unilateral adoption of a fee-shifting provision will generally be considered an ongoing failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:
| | The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing 5-percent holder); |
| | The value of the NOLs; |
| | Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL); |
| | The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and |
| | Any other factors that may be applicable. |
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)
Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy
General Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: (1) A shareholder-approved poison pill in place; or (2) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:
| | Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or |
| | The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate. |
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If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.
Management Proposals to Ratify a Poison Pill
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:
| | No lower than a 20 percent trigger, flip-in or flip-over; |
| | A term of no more than three years; |
| | No deadhand, slowhand, no-hand, or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill; and |
| | Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill. |
In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.
Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:
| | The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent); |
| | The value of the NOLs; |
| | Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs); |
| | The company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and |
| | Any other factors that may be applicable. |
Proxy Voting Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Tabulation
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding proxy voting mechanics, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect
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shareholder rights. Specific issues covered under the policy include, but are not limited to, confidential voting of individual proxies and ballots, confidentiality of running vote tallies, and the treatment of abstentions and/or broker non-votes in the company’s vote-counting methodology.
While a variety of factors may be considered in each analysis, the guiding principles are: transparency, consistency, and fairness in the proxy voting process. The factors considered, as applicable to the proposal, may include:
| | The scope and structure of the proposal; |
| | The company’s stated confidential voting policy (or other relevant policies) and whether it ensures a “level playing field” by providing shareholder proponents with equal access to vote information prior to the annual meeting; |
| | The company’s vote standard for management and shareholder proposals and whether it ensures consistency and fairness in the proxy voting process and maintains the integrity of vote results; |
| | Whether the company’s disclosure regarding its vote counting method and other relevant voting policies with respect to management and shareholder proposals are consistent and clear; |
| | Any recent controversies or concerns related to the company’s proxy voting mechanics; |
| | Any unintended consequences resulting from implementation of the proposal; and |
| | Any other factors that may be relevant. |
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions
General Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.
In addition, voting against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:
| | The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot; |
| | The board’s rationale for seeking ratification; |
| | Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail; |
| | Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request; |
| | The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision; |
| | The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings; |
| | Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal; |
| | The company’s ownership structure; and |
| | Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals. |
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Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses.
When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.
Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:
| | The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election; |
| | One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected; |
| | Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and |
| | The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw. |
General Recommendation: Management or shareholder proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation should be evaluated case-by-case, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:
| | Reasons for reincorporation; |
| | Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and |
| | Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state. |
Vote for reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent
General Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to act by written consent.
Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent, taking into account the following factors:
| | Shareholders’ current right to act by written consent; |
| | The consent threshold; |
| | The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; |
| | Investor ownership structure; and |
| | Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals. |
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Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions:
| | An unfettered15 right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold; |
| | A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections; |
| | No non-shareholder-approved pill; and |
| | An annually elected board. |
Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings
General Recommendation: Vote against management or shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.
Generally vote for management or shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account the following factors:
| | Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings; |
| | Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10 percent preferred); |
| | The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; |
| | Investor ownership structure; and |
| | Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals. |
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that ask the board to consider non-shareholder constituencies or other non-financial effects when evaluating a merger or business combination.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, and anti-greenmail provisions).
Supermajority Vote Requirements
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote.
Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements. However, for companies with shareholder(s) who have significant ownership levels, vote case-by-case, taking into account:
| | Ownership structure; |
| 15 | “Unfettered” means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting. |
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| | Quorum requirements; and |
| | Vote requirements. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only16 meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.
Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:
| | Scope and rationale of the proposal; and |
| | Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices. |
| 4. | Capital/Restructuring |
Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock
General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.
Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value.
General Authorization Requests
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:
| | If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized share; |
| | If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares; |
| | If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage; or |
| | In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization. |
| 16 | Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting. |
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Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:
| | The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes; |
| | On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization; |
| | The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or |
| | The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval. |
However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:
| | In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern; |
| | The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or |
| | A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios. |
For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.
Specific Authorization Requests
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:
| | twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and |
| | the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:
| | The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, such as: |
| | The company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or |
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| | The new class of shares will be transitory; |
| | The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; and |
| | The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder. |
Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder-approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that seek preemptive rights, taking into consideration:
| | The size of the company; |
| | The shareholder base; and |
| | The liquidity of the stock. |
General Authorization Requests
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:
| | If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares; |
| | If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares; |
| | If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage. |
| | In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization; or |
| | If no preferred shares are currently issued and outstanding, vote against the request, unless the company discloses a specific use for the shares. |
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Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:
| | If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;17 |
| | The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”); |
| | The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they are convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders; |
| | The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares; |
| | On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization; |
| | The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); and |
| | The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval. |
However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:
| | In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern; |
| | The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or |
| | A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios. |
For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.
Specific Authorization Requests
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with
| 17 | To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan. |
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transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:
| | twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and |
| | the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account the following:
| | More simplified capital structure; |
| | Enhanced liquidity; |
| | Fairness of conversion terms; |
| | Impact on voting power and dividends; |
| | Reasons for the reclassification; |
| | Conflicts of interest; and |
| | Other alternatives considered. |
General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:
| | The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or |
| | The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock Authorization policy. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:
| | Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting; |
| | Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing; |
| | The company’s rationale; or |
| | Other factors as applicable. |
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.
General Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 20 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.
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For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.
Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.
Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.
General Recommendation: For U.S. — incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:
| | Greenmail; |
| | The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics; |
| | Threats to the company’s long-term viability; or |
| | Other company-specific factors as warranted. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.
Share Repurchase Programs Shareholder Proposals
General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals prohibiting executives from selling shares of company stock during periods in which the company has announced that it may or will be repurchasing shares of its stock. Vote for the proposal when there is a pattern of abuse by executives exercising options or selling shares during periods of share buybacks.
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends
General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock Authorization policy.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as:
| | Adverse governance changes; |
| | Excessive increases in authorized capital stock; |
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| | Unfair method of distribution; |
| | Diminution of voting rights; |
| | Adverse conversion features; |
| | Negative impact on stock option plans; and |
| | Alternatives such as spin-off. |
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore or provide shareholders with rights of appraisal.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset purchase proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Purchase price; |
| | Fairness opinion; |
| | Financial and strategic benefits; |
| | How the deal was negotiated; |
| | Conflicts of interest; |
| | Other alternatives for the business; and |
| | Non-completion risk. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset sales, considering the following factors:
| | Impact on the balance sheet/working capital; |
| | Potential elimination of diseconomies; |
| | Anticipated financial and operating benefits; |
| | Anticipated use of funds; |
| | Value received for the asset; |
| | Fairness opinion; |
| | How the deal was negotiated; and |
| | Conflicts of interest. |
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General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities. When evaluating these proposals, the investor should review the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.
Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.
Corporate Reorganization/Debt Restructuring/Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans/Reverse Leveraged Buyouts/Wrap Plans
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt restructuring plan, after evaluating:
| | Dilution to existing shareholders’ positions; |
| | Terms of the offer — discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; termination penalties; exit strategy; |
| | Financial issues — company’s financial situation; degree of need for capital; use of proceeds; effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital; |
| | Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives; |
| | Control issues — change in management; change in control, guaranteed board and committee seats; standstill provisions; voting agreements; veto power over certain corporate actions; and |
| | Conflict of interest — arm’s length transaction, managerial incentives. |
Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration the following:
| | The reasons for the change; |
| | Any financial or tax benefits; |
| | Regulatory benefits; |
| | Increases in capital structure; and |
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| | Changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company. |
Absent compelling financial reasons to recommend for the transaction, vote against the formation of a holding company if the transaction would include either of the following:
| | Increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum (see discussion under “Capital”); or |
| | Adverse changes in shareholder rights. |
Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following:
| | Offer price/premium; |
| | Fairness opinion; |
| | How the deal was negotiated; |
| | Conflicts of interest; |
| | Other alternatives/offers considered; and |
| | Non-completion risk. |
Vote case-by-case on going dark transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:
| | Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock); and |
| | Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following: |
| | Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction? |
| | Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction? |
| | Does the company have strong corporate governance? |
| | Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction? and |
| | Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders? |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account the following:
| | Percentage of assets/business contributed; |
| | Percentage ownership; |
| | Financial and strategic benefits; |
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| | Governance structure; |
| | Conflicts of interest; |
| | Other alternatives; and |
| | Non-completion risk. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on liquidations, taking into account the following:
| | Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives; |
| | Appraisal value of assets; and |
| | The compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation. |
Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions. Review and evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:
| | Valuation — Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale. |
| | Market reaction — How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal. |
| | Strategic rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions. |
| | Negotiations and process — Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value. |
| | Conflicts of interest — Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. The CIC figure presented in the “ISS Transaction Summary” section of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists. |
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| | Governance — Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance. |
Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements, warrants, and convertible debentures taking into consideration:
| | Dilution to existing shareholders’ position: The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. Although newly issued common stock, absent preemptive rights, is typically dilutive to existing shareholders, share price appreciation is often the necessary event to trigger the exercise of “out of the money” warrants and convertible debt. In these instances from a value standpoint, the negative impact of dilution is mitigated by the increase in the company’s stock price that must occur to trigger the dilutive event. |
| | Terms of the offer (discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion, conversion features, termination penalties, exit strategy): |
| | The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial condition. Ideally, the conversion price for convertible debt and the exercise price for warrants should be at a premium to the then prevailing stock price at the time of private placement. |
| | When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, consider factors that influence the discount or premium, such as, liquidity, due diligence costs, control and monitoring costs, capital scarcity, information asymmetry, and anticipation of future performance. |
| | Financial issues: |
| | The company’s financial condition; |
| | Degree of need for capital; |
| | Use of proceeds; |
| | Effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital; |
| | Current and proposed cash burn rate; and |
| | Going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets. |
| | Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives: A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger, or sale of part or all of the company. |
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| | Control issues: |
| | Change in management; |
| | Change in control; |
| | Guaranteed board and committee seats; |
| | Standstill provisions; |
| | Voting agreements; |
| | Veto power over certain corporate actions; and |
| | Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium. |
| | Conflicts of interest: |
| | Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor; and |
| | Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests? |
| | Market reaction: |
| | The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price. |
Vote for the private placement, or for the issuance of warrants and/or convertible debentures in a private placement, if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.
Reorganization/Restructuring Plan (Bankruptcy)
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:
| | Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company; |
| | Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company; |
| | Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee); |
| | The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s); |
| | Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and |
| | Governance of the reorganized company. |
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Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:
| | Valuation — Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target if it is a private entity. |
| | Market reaction — How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price. |
| | Deal timing — A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date. |
| | Negotiations and process — What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors. |
| | Conflicts of interest — How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 percent of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24-month timeframe. |
| | Voting agreements — Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights? |
| | Governance — What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger? |
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) — Proposals for Extensions
The main purpose of SPACs is to identify and acquire a viable target within a specified timeframe, and failure to achieve this objective within the allotted time calls into question management’s ability to execute its primary objective. The end of that timeframe is generally referred to as the termination date.
General Recommendation: Generally support requests to extend the termination date by up to one year from the SPAC’s original termination date (inclusive of any built-in extension options, and accounting for prior extension requests).
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Other factors that may be considered include: any added incentives, business combination status, other amendment terms, and, if applicable, use of money in the trust fund to pay excise taxes on redeemed shares.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on spin-offs, considering:
| | Tax and regulatory advantages; |
| | Planned use of the sale proceeds; |
| | Valuation of spinoff; |
| | Fairness opinion; |
| | Benefits to the parent company; |
| | Conflicts of interest; |
| | Managerial incentives; |
| | Corporate governance changes; and |
| | Changes in the capital structure. |
Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by:
| | Hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives; |
| | Selling the company; or |
| | Liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders. |
These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:
| | Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight; |
| | Signs of entrenched board and management (such as the adoption of takeover defenses); |
| | Strategic plan in place for improving value; |
| | Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; and |
| | The company actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor. |
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| 5. | Compensation |
Underlying all evaluations are five global principles that most investors expect corporations to adhere to in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs:
| 1. | Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment, with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: This principle encompasses overall executive pay practices, which must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. It will take into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance; the mix between fixed and variable pay; performance goals; and equity-based plan costs; |
| 2. | Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation; |
| 3. | Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed); |
| 4. | Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly; and |
| 5. | Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors is reasonable and does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices. |
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation — Management Proposals (Say-on-Pay)
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on ballot items related to executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation.
Vote against Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay or “SOP”) if:
| | There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance); |
| | The company maintains significant problematic pay practices; or |
| | The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders. |
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Vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:
| | There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP would otherwise be warranted due to pay-for-performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof; |
| | The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast; |
| | The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating; or |
| | The situation is egregious. |
Primary Evaluation Factors for Executive Pay
Pay-for-Performance Evaluation
ISS annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to identify strong or satisfactory alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the S&P1500, Russell 3000, or Russell 3000E Indices, this analysis considers the following:
| 1. | Peer Group18 Alignment: |
| | The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a five-year period. |
| | The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a five-year period. |
| | The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median over one- and three-year periods. |
| 2. | Absolute Alignment19 — the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years — i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period. |
If the above analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of companies outside the Russell indices, a misalignment between pay and performance is otherwise suggested, our analysis may include any of the following qualitative factors, as relevant to an evaluation of how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:
| | The overall ratio of performance-based compensation to fixed or discretionary pay; |
| | The ratio of performance- to time-based long-term incentive awards; |
| 18 | The ISS peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using factors such as market cap, revenue, assets, GICS industry group, and the company selected peers’ GICS industry group. ISS’ peer selection methodology is detailed in the U.S. Peer Group FAQ. |
| 19 | Russell 3000E Index companies (excluding S&P1500 and Russell 3000 companies) are not subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis. |
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| | Vesting and/or retention requirements for equity awards that demonstrate a long-term focus; |
| | The rigor of performance goals; |
| | The complexity and risks around pay program design; |
| | The transparency and clarity of disclosure; |
| | The company’s peer group benchmarking practices; |
| | Financial/operational results, both absolute and relative to peers; |
| | Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards); |
| | Realizable and/or realized pay compared to granted pay; and |
| | Any other factors deemed relevant. |
Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:
| | Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements; |
| | Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and |
| | Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements. |
The list of examples below highlights certain problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:
| | Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options); |
| | Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups; |
| | New or materially amended agreements that provide for: |
| | Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus); |
| | CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition; |
| | CIC excise tax gross-up entitlements (including “modified” gross-ups); and/or |
| | Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions; |
| | Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits; |
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| | Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible; |
| | Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason); and/or |
| | Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors. |
The above examples are not an exhaustive list. Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Compensation Policies FAQ document for additional detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as problematic and may lead to negative vote recommendations.
Options Backdating
The following factors should be examined case-by-case to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud:
| | Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes; |
| | Duration of options backdating; |
| | Size of restatement due to options backdating; |
| | Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and |
| | Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future. |
Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness
Consider the following factors case-by-case when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:
| | Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or |
| | Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received low support taking into account the factors identified under the Responsiveness section in the Board of Directors policy with respect to say-on-pay. |
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”)
General Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.
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Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers but also considering new or extended arrangements.
Features that may result in an “against” recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):
| | Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance; |
| | Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards; |
| | Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control; |
| | Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale; |
| | Excessive cash severance (generally >3x base salary and bonus); |
| | Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable; |
| | Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or |
| | Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or |
| | The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote. |
Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.
In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s advisory vote on compensation (management say-on-pay), ISS will evaluate the say-on-pay proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.
Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans
Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Equity Compensation Plans FAQ document for additional details on the Equity Plan Scorecard policy.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on equity plan proposals subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard framework, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors under three pillars:
I. Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:
| | SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and |
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| | SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants. |
II. Plan Features:
| | Quality of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC); |
| | Discretionary vesting authority; |
| | Liberal share recycling on various award types; |
| | Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan; |
| | Dividends payable prior to award vesting; and |
| | Cash-denominated award limits for non-employee directors. |
III. Grant Practices:
| | The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; |
| | Vesting requirements in CEO’s recent equity grants; |
| | The estimated duration of the plan; |
| | The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards classified by ISS as performance-based; |
| | Whether the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy; and |
| | Whether the company maintains sufficient post-exercise/vesting share-holding requirements. |
Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following egregious factors (“overriding factors”) apply:
| | Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition; |
| | The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it — for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies — or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing — for non-listed companies); |
| | The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant pay-for-performance disconnect under certain circumstances; |
| | The plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings; |
| | The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; |
| | The plan lacks sufficient positive features under the Plan Features pillar; or |
| | Any other factors that are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests. |
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Further Information on certain EPSC Factors:
Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)
The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors. SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full-value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types.
For proposals that are not subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size, and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company’s benchmark.20
Three-Year Value-Adjusted Burn Rate
A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Value-Adjusted Burn Rate benchmarks are calculated as the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.
The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate is calculated as follows:
Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).
Liberal Change in Control Definition
Generally vote against equity plans if the plan has a liberal definition of change in control and the equity awards could vest upon such liberal definition of change in control, even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition include, but are not limited to,
| 20 | For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company’s SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors. |
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announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.
Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. “Repricing” typically includes the ability to do any of the following:
| | Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs; |
| | Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs; |
| | Cancel underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or |
| | Provide cash buyouts of underwater options. |
While the above cover most types of repricing, ISS may view other provisions as akin to repricing depending on the facts and circumstances.
Also, vote against or withhold from members of the Compensation Committee who approved repricing (as defined above or otherwise determined by ISS), without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.
Vote against plans that do not expressly prohibit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval if the company has a history of repricing/buyouts without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.
Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect
If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for problematic pay practices, vote against the plan.
ISS may recommend a vote against the equity plan if the plan is determined to be a vehicle for pay-for-performance misalignment. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:
| | Severity of the pay-for-performance misalignment; |
| | Whether problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or |
| | Whether equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the other NEOs. |
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.
Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:
| | Addresses administrative features only; or |
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| | Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent directors, per ISS’ Classification of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time for any reason (including after the company’s initial public offering), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below). |
Vote against proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:
| | Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per ISS’ Classification of Directors. |
Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes.
Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:
| | If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments; |
| | If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments; and |
| | If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments do not include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown only for informational purposes. |
In the first two case-by-case evaluation scenarios, the EPSC evaluation/score is the more heavily weighted consideration.
Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations
Options that have Dividend Equivalent Rights (DERs) associated with them will have a higher calculated award value than those without DERs under the binomial model, based on the value of these dividend streams. The higher value will be applied to new shares, shares available under existing plans, and shares awarded but not exercised per the plan specifications. DERS transfer more shareholder equity to employees and non-employee directors and this cost should be captured.
Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
For Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), include the common shares issuable upon conversion of outstanding Operating Partnership (OP) units in the share count for the purposes of determining: (1) market capitalization in the Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) analysis and (2) shares outstanding in the burn rate analysis.
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General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).
Employee Stock Purchase Plans — Qualified Plans
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:
| | Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value; |
| | Offering period is 27 months or less; and |
| | The number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the outstanding shares. |
Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where when the plan features do not meet all of the above criteria.
Employee Stock Purchase Plans — Non-Qualified Plans
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:
| | Broad-based participation; |
| | Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary; |
| | Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and |
| | No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a company matching contribution. |
Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when the plan features do not meet all of the above criteria. If the matching contribution or effective discount exceeds the above, ISS may evaluate the SVT cost of the plan as part of the assessment.
Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:
| | Historic trading patterns — the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term; |
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| | Rationale for the re-pricing — was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?; |
| | Is this a value-for-value exchange?; |
| | Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?; |
| | Timing — repricing should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price; |
| | Option vesting — does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?; |
| | Term of the option — the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option; |
| | Exercise price — should be set at fair market or a premium to market; and |
| | Participants — executive officers and directors must be excluded. |
If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company’s total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.
In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing and warrants additional scrutiny. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.
Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.
Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange.
Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, ISS will not make any adjustments to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation.
Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs
General Recommendation: One-time Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.
Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:
| | Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating; |
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| | Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; and |
| | There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants. |
Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management’s control. A review of the company’s historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term.
Ongoing TSO program: Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the ongoing TSO program, structure, and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited, to the following:
| | Eligibility; |
| | Vesting; |
| | Bid-price; |
| | Term of options; |
| | Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and |
| | Option repricing policy. |
Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:
| | If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and |
| | An assessment of the following qualitative factors: |
| | The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile; |
| | The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation; |
| | Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements; |
| | Equity award vesting schedules; |
| | The mix of cash and equity-based compensation; |
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| | Meaningful limits on director compensation; |
| | The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and |
| | The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation. |
Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:
| | The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; |
| | The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers (in certain circumstances); and |
| | The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk). |
On occasion, non-employee director stock plans will exceed the plan cost or burn-rate benchmarks when combined with employee or executive stock plans. In such cases, vote case-by-case on the plan taking into consideration the following qualitative factors:
| | The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile; |
| | The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation; |
| | Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements; |
| | Equity award vesting schedules; |
| | The mix of cash and equity-based compensation; |
| | Meaningful limits on director compensation; |
| | The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and |
| | The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation. |
Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans
General Recommendation: Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors. Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors.
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation
Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:
| | The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation; |
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| | Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and |
| | Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place. |
Compensation Consultants — Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization
General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s), and fees paid.
Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors
General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, provided the information requested is relevant to shareholders’ needs, would not put the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its industry, and is not unduly burdensome to the company.
Generally vote against shareholder proposals seeking to set absolute levels on compensation or otherwise dictate the amount or form of compensation (such as types of compensation elements or specific metrics) to be used for executive or directors.
Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.
Vote case-by-case on all other shareholder proposals regarding executive and director pay, taking into account relevant factors, including but not limited to: company performance, pay level and design versus peers, history of compensation concerns or pay-for-performance disconnect, and/or the scope and prescriptive nature of the proposal.
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals for which the broad-based employee population is eligible.
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans. The following factors will be taken into account:
| | The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained; |
| | The time period required to retain the shares; |
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| | Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements; |
| | Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives; |
| | Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and |
| | Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus long-term focus. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals calling for an analysis of the pay disparity between corporate executives and other non-executive employees. The following factors will be considered:
| | The company’s current level of disclosure of its executive compensation setting process, including how the company considers pay disparity; |
| | If any problematic pay practices or pay-for-performance concerns have been identified at the company; and |
| | The level of shareholder support for the company’s pay programs. |
Generally vote against proposals calling for the company to use the pay disparity analysis or pay ratio in a specific way to set or limit executive pay.
Pay for Performance/Performance-Based Awards
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:
| | First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options, or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards; and |
| | Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test. |
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In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation plan for senior executives. These proposals generally include the following principles:
| | Set compensation targets for the plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median; |
| | Deliver a majority of the plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards; |
| | Provide the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and non-financial performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan; |
| | Establish performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies; and |
| | Limit payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance. |
Consider the following factors in evaluating this proposal:
| | What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven? |
| | If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group? |
| | Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure? and |
| | What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to? |
Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)
General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the addition of certain safeguards in prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives. Safeguards may include:
| | Adoption, amendment, or termination of a 10b5-1 Plan must be disclosed in a Form 8-K; |
| | Amendment or early termination of a 10b5-1 Plan allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board; |
| | Request that a certain number of days that must elapse between adoption or amendment of a 10b5-1 Plan and initial trading under the plan; |
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| | Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a 10b5-1 Plan; |
| | An executive may not trade in company stock outside the 10b5-1 Plan; and |
| | Trades under a 10b5-1 Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive. |
Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals seeking a policy to prohibit any outside CEO from serving on a company’s compensation committee, unless the company has demonstrated problematic pay practices that raise concerns about the performance and composition of the committee.
Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to recoup incentive cash or stock compensation made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned turn out to have been in error, or if the senior executive has breached company policy or has engaged in misconduct that may be significantly detrimental to the company’s financial position or reputation, or if the senior executive failed to manage or monitor risks that subsequently led to significant financial or reputational harm to the company. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where an executive’s fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. However, such policies may be narrow given that not all misconduct or negligence may result in significant financial restatements. Misconduct, negligence, or lack of sufficient oversight by senior executives may lead to significant financial loss or reputational damage that may have long-lasting impact.
In considering whether to support such shareholder proposals, ISS will take into consideration the following factors:
| | If the company has adopted a formal recoupment policy; |
| | The rigor of the recoupment policy focusing on how and under what circumstances the company may recoup incentive or stock compensation; |
| | Whether the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems; |
| | Whether the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent; |
| | Disclosure of recoupment of incentive or stock compensation from senior executives or lack thereof; and |
| | Any other relevant factors. |
Severance and Golden Parachute Agreements
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requiring that executive severance (including change-in-control related) arrangements or payments be submitted for shareholder ratification.
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Factors that will be considered include, but are not limited to:
| | The company’s severance or change-in-control agreements in place, and the presence of problematic features (such as excessive severance entitlements, single triggers, excise tax gross-ups, etc.); |
| | Any existing limits on cash severance payouts or policies which require shareholder ratification of severance payments exceeding a certain level; |
| | Any recent severance-related controversies; and |
| | Whether the proposal is overly prescriptive, such as requiring shareholder approval of severance that does not exceed market norms. |
Share Buyback Impact on Incentive Program Metrics
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the company exclude the impact of share buybacks from the calculation of incentive program metrics, considering the following factors:
| | The frequency and timing of the company’s share buybacks; |
| | The use of per-share metrics in incentive plans; |
| | The effect of recent buybacks on incentive metric results and payouts; and |
| | Whether there is any indication of metric result manipulation. |
Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)
General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company’s executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.
Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to limit the executive benefits provided under the company’s supplemental executive retirement plan (SERP) by limiting covered compensation to a senior executive’s annual salary or those pay elements covered for the general employee population.
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment/Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment and/or eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity.
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The following factors will be considered:
| | The company’s current treatment of equity upon employment termination and/or in change-in-control situations (i.e., vesting is double triggered and/or pro rata, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares, etc.); and |
| | Current employment agreements, including potential poor pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements. |
Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits automatic acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives upon a voluntary termination of employment or in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).
| 6. | Routine/Miscellaneous |
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.
Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction. Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.”
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration:
| | The new quorum threshold requested; |
| | The rationale presented for the reduction; |
| | The market capitalization of the company (size, inclusion in indices); |
| | The company’s ownership structure; |
| | Previous voter turnout or attempts to achieve quorum; |
| | Any provisions or commitments to restore quorum to a majority of shares outstanding, should voter turnout improve sufficiently; and |
| | Other factors as appropriate. |
In general, a quorum threshold kept as close to a majority of shares outstanding as is achievable is preferred.
Vote case-by-case on directors who unilaterally lower the quorum requirements below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration the factors listed above.
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General Recommendation: Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to change the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely impact shareholder value.
Change Date, Time, or Location of Annual Meeting
General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the proposed change is unreasonable.
Vote against shareholder proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the current scheduling or location is unreasonable.
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to approve other business when it appears as a voting item.
| 7. | Social and Environmental Issues |
Global Approach — E&S Shareholder Proposals
ISS applies a common approach globally to evaluating social and environmental shareholder proposals. which cover a wide range of topics, including consumer and product safety, environment and energy, labor standards and human rights, workplace and board diversity, and corporate political issues. While a variety of factors goes into each analysis, the overall principle guiding all vote recommendations focuses on how the proposal may enhance or protect shareholder value in either the short or long term.
General Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case, examining primarily whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value. The following factors will be considered:
| | If the issues presented in the proposal are being appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or regulation; |
| | If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal; |
| | Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive; |
| | The company’s relevant practices compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal; |
| | Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s practices related to the issue(s) raised in the proposal; |
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| | If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources; |
| | If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage; and |
| | Whether the proposal addresses substantive matters that may impact shareholders’ interests, including how the proposal may impact shareholders’ rights. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals seeking a company’s endorsement of principles that support a particular public policy position. Endorsing a set of principles may require a company to take a stand on an issue that is beyond its own control and may limit its flexibility with respect to future developments. Management and the board should be afforded the flexibility to make decisions on specific public policy positions based on their own assessment of the most beneficial strategies for the company.
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a report on a company’s animal welfare standards, or animal welfare-related risks, unless:
| | The company has already published a set of animal welfare standards and monitors compliance; |
| | The company’s standards are comparable to industry peers; and |
| | There are no recent significant fines, litigation, or controversies related to the company’s and/or its suppliers’ treatment of animals. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to phase out the use of animals in product testing, unless:
| | The company is conducting animal testing programs that are unnecessary or not required by regulation; |
| | The company is conducting animal testing when suitable alternatives are commonly accepted and used by industry peers; or |
| | There are recent, significant fines or litigation related to the company’s treatment of animals. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting the implementation of Controlled Atmosphere Killing (CAK) methods at company and/or supplier operations unless such methods are required by legislation or generally accepted as the industry standard.
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Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting a report on the feasibility of implementing CAK methods at company and/or supplier operations considering the availability of existing research conducted by the company or industry groups on this topic and any fines or litigation related to current animal processing procedures at the company.
Genetically Modified Ingredients
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting that a company voluntarily label genetically engineered (GE) ingredients in its products. The labeling of products with GE ingredients is best left to the appropriate regulatory authorities.
Vote case-by-case on proposals asking for a report on the feasibility of labeling products containing GE ingredients, taking into account:
| | The potential impact of such labeling on the company’s business; |
| | The quality of the company’s disclosure on GE product labeling, related voluntary initiatives, and how this disclosure compares with industry peer disclosure; and |
| | Company’s current disclosure on the feasibility of GE product labeling. |
Generally vote against proposals seeking a report on the social, health, and environmental effects of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Studies of this sort are better undertaken by regulators and the scientific community.
Generally vote against proposals to eliminate GE ingredients from the company’s products, or proposals asking for reports outlining the steps necessary to eliminate GE ingredients from the company’s products. Such decisions are more appropriately made by management with consideration of current regulations.
Reports on Potentially Controversial Business/Financial Practices
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s potentially controversial business or financial practices or products, taking into account:
| | Whether the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent abuses; |
| | Whether the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the products/practices in question; |
| | Whether the company has been subject to violations of related laws or serious controversies; and |
| | Peer companies’ policies/practices in this area. |
Pharmaceutical Pricing, Access to Medicines, and Prescription Drug Reimportation
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting that companies implement specific price restraints on pharmaceutical products unless the company fails to adhere to legislative guidelines or industry norms in its product pricing practices.
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Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting that a company report on its product pricing or access to medicine policies, considering:
| | The potential for reputational, market, and regulatory risk exposure; |
| | Existing disclosure of relevant policies; |
| | Deviation from established industry norms; |
| | Relevant company initiatives to provide research and/or products to disadvantaged consumers; |
| | Whether the proposal focuses on specific products or geographic regions; |
| | The potential burden and scope of the requested report; and |
| | Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines at the company. |
Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on the financial and legal impact of its prescription drug reimportation policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.
Generally vote against proposals requesting that companies adopt specific policies to encourage or constrain prescription drug reimportation. Such matters are more appropriately the province of legislative activity and may place the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its peers.
Product Safety and Toxic/Hazardous Materials
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its policies, initiatives/procedures, and oversight mechanisms related to toxic/hazardous materials or product safety in its supply chain, unless:
| | The company already discloses similar information through existing reports such as a supplier code of conduct and/or a sustainability report; |
| | The company has formally committed to the implementation of a toxic/hazardous materials and/or product safety and supply chain reporting and monitoring program based on industry norms or similar standards within a specified time frame; or |
| | The company has not been recently involved in relevant significant controversies, fines, or litigation. |
Vote case-by-case on resolutions requesting that companies develop a feasibility assessment to phase-out of certain toxic/hazardous materials, or evaluate and disclose the potential financial and legal risks associated with utilizing certain materials, considering:
| | The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its product safety policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms; |
| | Current regulations in the markets in which the company operates; and |
| | Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines stemming from toxic/hazardous materials at the company. |
Generally vote against resolutions requiring that a company reformulate its products.
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General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on resolutions regarding the advertisement of tobacco products, considering:
| | Recent related fines, controversies, or significant litigation; |
| | Whether the company complies with relevant laws and regulations on the marketing of tobacco; |
| | Whether the company’s advertising restrictions deviate from those of industry peers; |
| | Whether the company entered into the Master Settlement Agreement, which restricts marketing of tobacco to youth; and |
| | Whether restrictions on marketing to youth extend to foreign countries. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding second-hand smoke, considering;
| | Whether the company complies with all laws and regulations; |
| | The degree that voluntary restrictions beyond those mandated by law might hurt the company’s competitiveness; and |
| | The risk of any health-related liabilities. |
Generally vote against resolutions to cease production of tobacco-related products, to avoid selling products to tobacco companies, to spin-off tobacco-related businesses, or prohibit investment in tobacco equities. Such business decisions are better left to company management or portfolio managers.
Generally vote against proposals regarding tobacco product warnings. Such decisions are better left to public health authorities.
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan21, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:
| | The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards; |
| | Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3); |
| | The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant); |
| | Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based; |
| 21 | Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan. |
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| | Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050; |
| | Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years; |
| | Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance; |
| | Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy; |
| | Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and |
| | The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers. |
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:
| | The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure; |
| | The company’s actual GHG emissions performance; |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and |
| | Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive. |
Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on resolutions requesting that a company disclose information on the climate change related financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces to its operations and investments or on how the company identifies, measures, and manages such risks, considering:
| | Whether the company provides current, publicly-available information on the climate change-related financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces to its operations and investments or on the impact that climate change may have on the company; |
| | Associated company policies and practices addressing climate change related risks and/or opportunities; |
| | The company’s level of disclosure compared to industry peers; and |
| | Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s climate change-related performance. |
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Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting that a company report on its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from company operations and/or products and operations, considering:
| | Whether the company discloses current, publicly-available information on the impacts that GHG emissions may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities; |
| | Whether the company’s level of disclosure is comparable to that of industry peers; or |
| | Whether there are significant, controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s GHG emissions. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals that call for the adoption of GHG reduction goals from products and operations, considering: :
| | The company’s actual GHG emissions performance; |
| | The company’s current GHG emission policies, oversight mechanisms, and related initiatives; |
| | Whether the company provides disclosure of year-over-year GHG emissions performance data; |
| | Whether company disclosure lags behind industry peers; and |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to GHG emissions. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its energy efficiency policies, unless:
| | The company complies with applicable energy efficiency regulations and laws, and discloses its participation in energy efficiency policies and programs, including disclosure of benchmark data, targets, and performance measures; or |
| | The proponent requests adoption of specific energy efficiency goals within specific timelines. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on the feasibility of developing renewable energy resources unless the report would be duplicative of existing disclosure or irrelevant to the company’s line of business.
Generally vote against proposals requesting that the company invest in renewable energy resources. Such decisions are best left to management’s evaluation of the feasibility and financial impact that such programs may have on the company.
Generally vote against proposals that call for the adoption of renewable energy goals, taking into account:
| | The scope and structure of the proposal; |
| | The company’s current level of disclosure on renewable energy use and GHG emissions; and |
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| | The company’s disclosure of policies, practices, and oversight implemented to manage GHG emissions and mitigate climate change risks. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on a company’s efforts to diversify the board, unless:
| | The gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; or |
| | The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals asking a company to increase the gender and racial minority representation on its board, taking into account:
| | The degree of existing gender and racial minority diversity on the company’s board and among its executive officers; |
| | The level of gender and racial minority representation that exists at the company’s industry peers; |
| | The company’s established process for addressing gender and racial minority board representation; |
| | Whether the proposal includes an overly prescriptive request to amend nominating committee charter language; |
| | The independence of the company’s nominating committee; |
| | Whether the company uses an outside search firm to identify potential director nominees; and |
| | Whether the company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding equal employment practices. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case on proposals requesting a company disclose its diversity policies or initiatives, or proposals requesting disclosure of a company’s comprehensive workforce diversity data, including requests for EEO-1 data. Factors that will be considered are:
| | Whether the company publicly discloses equal employment opportunity policies and initiatives; |
| | Whether the company publicly discloses comprehensive workforce diversity data/EEO-1 report; or |
| | Whether the company has recent significant workplace discrimination/fair employment violations or litigation. |
Generally vote against proposals seeking information on the diversity efforts of suppliers and service providers. Such requests may pose a significant burden on the company.
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Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking to amend a company’s EEO statement or diversity policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, unless the change would be unduly burdensome.
Generally vote against proposals to extend company benefits to, or eliminate benefits from, domestic partners. Decisions regarding benefits should be left to the discretion of the company.
Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gap
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender or race/ ethnicity, or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender or race/ethnicity pay gaps, taking into account:
| | The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy on fair and equitable compensation practices; |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues; |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and |
| | Local laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of ethnic and/or racial minorities. |
Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audit Guidelines
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals asking a company to conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, taking into account:
| | The company’s established process or framework for addressing racial inequity and discrimination internally; |
| | Whether the company adequately discloses workforce diversity and inclusion metrics and goals; |
| | Whether the company has issued a public statement related to its racial justice efforts in recent years, or has committed to internal policy review; |
| | Whether the company has engaged with impacted communities, stakeholders, and civil rights experts; |
| | The company’s track record in recent years of racial justice measures and outreach externally; and |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to racial inequity or discrimination. |
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Environment and Sustainability
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts, taking into account:
| | The company’s current level of disclosure of its workplace health and safety performance data, health and safety management policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms; |
| | The nature of the company’s business, specifically regarding company and employee exposure to health and safety risks; |
| | Recent significant controversies, fines, or violations related to workplace health and safety; and |
| | The company’s workplace health and safety performance relative to industry peers. |
Vote case-by-case on resolutions requesting that a company report on safety and/or security risks associated with its operations and/or facilities, considering:
| | The company’s compliance with applicable regulations and guidelines; |
| | The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its security and safety policies, procedures, and compliance monitoring; and |
| | The existence of recent, significant violations, fines, or controversy regarding the safety and security of the company’s operations and/or facilities. |
Natural Capital- Related and/or Community Impact Assessment Proposals
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on policies and/or the potential (community) social and/or environmental impact of company operations, considering:
| | Alignment of current disclosure of applicable company policies, metrics, risk assessment report(s) and risk management procedures with any relevant, broadly accepted reporting frameworks; |
| | The impact of regulatory non-compliance, litigation, remediation, or reputational loss that may be associated with failure to manage the company’s operations in question, including the management of relevant community and stakeholder relations; |
| | The nature, purpose, and scope of the company’s operations in the specific region(s); |
| | The degree to which company policies and procedures are consistent with industry norms; and |
| | The scope of the resolution. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s (natural gas) hydraulic fracturing operations, including measures the company has taken to manage and mitigate the potential community and environmental impacts of those operations, considering:
| | The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant policies and oversight mechanisms; |
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| | The company’s current level of such disclosure relative to its industry peers; |
| | Potential relevant local, state, or national regulatory developments; and |
| | Controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s hydraulic fracturing operations. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on potential environmental damage as a result of company operations in protected regions, unless:
| | Operations in the specified regions are not permitted by current laws or regulations; |
| | The company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions; or |
| | The company’s disclosure of its operations and environmental policies in these regions is comparable to industry peers. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to report on an existing recycling program, or adopt a new recycling program, taking into account:
| | The nature of the company’s business; |
| | The current level of disclosure of the company’s existing related programs; |
| | The timetable and methods of program implementation prescribed by the proposal; |
| | The company’s ability to address the issues raised in the proposal; and |
| | How the company’s recycling programs compare to similar programs of its industry peers. |
General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms related to social, economic, and environmental sustainability, unless:
| | The company already discloses similar information through existing reports or policies such as an environment, health, and safety (EHS) report; a comprehensive code of corporate conduct; and/or a diversity report; or |
| | The company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar standard within a specified time frame. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting a company report on, or adopt a new policy on, water-related risks and concerns, taking into account:
| | The company’s current disclosure of relevant policies, initiatives, oversight mechanisms, and water usage metrics; |
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| | Whether or not the company’s existing water-related policies and practices are consistent with relevant internationally recognized standards and national/local regulations; |
| | The potential financial impact or risk to the company associated with water-related concerns or issues; and |
| | Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding water use by the company and its suppliers. |
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals restricting a company from making charitable contributions. Charitable contributions are generally useful for assisting worthwhile causes and for creating goodwill in the community. In the absence of bad faith, self-dealing, or gross negligence, management should determine which, and if, contributions are in the best interests of the company.
Data Security, Privacy, and Internet Issues
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the disclosure or implementation of data security, privacy, or information access and management policies and procedures, considering:
| | The level of disclosure of company policies and procedures relating to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, information access and management, and Internet censorship; |
| | Engagement in dialogue with governments or relevant groups with respect to data security, privacy, or the free flow of information on the Internet; |
| | The scope of business involvement and of investment in countries whose governments censor or monitor the Internet and other telecommunications; |
| | Applicable market-specific laws or regulations that may be imposed on the company; and |
| | Controversies, fines, or litigation related to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, or Internet censorship. |
ESG Compensation-Related Proposals
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking a report or additional disclosure on the company’s approach, policies, and practices on incorporating environmental and social criteria into its executive compensation strategy, considering:
| | The scope and prescriptive nature of the proposal; |
| | The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its environmental and social performance and governance; |
| | The degree to which the board or compensation committee already discloses information on whether it has considered related E&S criteria; and |
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| | Whether the company has significant controversies or regulatory violations regarding social or environmental issues. |
Human Rights, Human Capital Management, and International Operations
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies, taking into consideration:
| | Whether such information is publicly disclosed; |
| | Whether the company is lagging industry peers; and |
| | Whether there are recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals to implement company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies, considering:
| | The scope of the request; |
| | The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed; |
| | Whether or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized standards; |
| | Deviation from industry sector peer company standards and practices; |
| | Whether company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how; |
| | Company participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally recognized human rights initiatives; |
| | Scope and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of workplace labor/human rights abuse; and |
| | Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process, considering:
| | The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed, including information on the implementation of these policies and any related oversight mechanisms; |
| | The company’s industry and whether the company or its suppliers operate in countries or areas where there is a history of human rights concerns; |
| | Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights involving the company or its suppliers, and whether the company has taken remedial steps; and |
| | Whether the proposal is unduly burdensome or overly prescriptive. |
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General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims, taking into account:
| | The company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; and |
| | The company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers. |
Operations in High-Risk Markets
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s potential financial and reputational risks associated with operations in “high-risk” markets, such as a terrorism-sponsoring state or politically/socially unstable region, taking into account:
| | The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption; |
| | Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures; |
| | Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws; |
| | Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws; and |
| | Whether the company has been recently involved in recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to its operations in “high-risk” markets. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals calling for companies to report on the risks associated with outsourcing/plant closures, considering:
| | Controversies surrounding operations in the relevant market(s); |
| | The value of the requested report to shareholders; |
| | The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant information on outsourcing and plant closure procedures; and |
| | The company’s existing human rights standards relative to industry peers. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment, taking into account:
| | The company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to preventing workplace sexual harassment; |
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| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers. |
General Recommendation: Vote against reports on foreign military sales or offsets. Such disclosures may involve sensitive and confidential information. Moreover, companies must comply with government controls and reporting on foreign military sales.
Generally vote against proposals asking a company to cease production or report on the risks associated with the use of depleted uranium munitions or nuclear weapons components and delivery systems, including disengaging from current and proposed contracts. Such contracts are monitored by government agencies, serve multiple military and non-military uses, and withdrawal from these contracts could have a negative impact on the company’s business.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting information on a company’s lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures, considering:
| | The company’s current disclosure of relevant lobbying policies, and management and board oversight; |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding trade associations or other groups that it supports, or is a member of, that engage in lobbying activities; and |
| | Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s lobbying-related activities. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, considering:
| | The company’s policies, and management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes; |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; |
| | The company’s disclosure of its direct corporate political contributions; and |
| | Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities. |
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Vote against proposals barring a company from making political contributions. Businesses are affected by legislation at the federal, state, and local level; barring political contributions can put the company at a competitive disadvantage.
Vote against proposals to publish in newspapers and other media a company’s political contributions. Such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.
Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency
General Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case on proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s alignment of political contributions, lobbying, and electioneering spending with a company’s publicly stated values and policies, considering:
| | The company’s policies, management, board oversight, governance processes, and level of disclosure related to direct political contributions, lobbying activities, and payments to trade associations, political action committees, or other groups that may be used for political purposes; |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding: the reasons for its support of candidates for public offices; the reasons for support of and participation in trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and other political activities; |
| | Any incongruencies identified between a company’s direct and indirect political expenditures and its publicly stated values and priorities; and |
| | Recent significant controversies related to the company’s direct and indirect lobbying, political contributions, or political activities. |
Generally vote case-by-case on proposals requesting comparison of a company’s political spending to objectives that can mitigate material risks for the company, such as limiting global warming.
General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals asking a company to affirm political nonpartisanship in the workplace, so long as:
| | There are no recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s political contributions or trade association spending; and |
| | The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibit coercion. |
Vote against proposals asking for a list of company executives, directors, consultants, legal counsels, lobbyists, or investment bankers that have prior government service and whether such service had a bearing on the business of the company. Such a list would be burdensome to prepare without providing any meaningful information to shareholders.
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| 8. | Mutual Fund Proxies |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings. However, mutual fund boards do not usually have compensation committees, so do not withhold for the lack of this committee.
Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes
General Recommendation: For closed-end management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at CEFs that have not provided a compelling rationale for opting-in to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a by-law amendment to a shareholder vote.
Converting Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on conversion proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Past performance as a closed-end fund; |
| | Market in which the fund invests; |
| | Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and |
| | Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proxy contests, considering the following factors:
| | Past performance relative to its peers; |
| | Market in which the fund invests; |
| | Measures taken by the board to address the issues; |
| | Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals; |
| | Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents; |
| | Independence of directors; |
| | Experience and skills of director candidates; |
| | Governance profile of the company; and |
| | Evidence of management entrenchment. |
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Investment Advisory Agreements
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on investment advisory agreements, considering the following factors:
| | Proposed and current fee schedules; |
| | Fund category/investment objective; |
| | Performance benchmarks; |
| | Share price performance as compared with peers; |
| | Resulting fees relative to peers; and |
| | Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control). |
Approving New Classes or Series of Shares
General Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares, considering the following factors:
| | Stated specific financing purpose; |
| | Possible dilution for common shares; and |
| | Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes. |
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors:
| | Potential competitiveness; |
| | Regulatory developments; |
| | Current and potential returns; and |
| | Current and potential risk. |
Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non-fundamental restriction, considering the following factors:
| | The fund’s target investments; |
| | The reasons given by the fund for the change; and |
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| | The projected impact of the change on the portfolio. |
Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Nonfundamental
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to change a fund’s fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on name change proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Political/economic changes in the target market; |
| | Consolidation in the target market; and |
| | Current asset composition. |
Change in Fund’s Subclassification
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes in a fund’s sub-classification, considering the following factors:
| | Potential competitiveness; |
| | Current and potential returns; |
| | Risk of concentration; and |
| | Consolidation in target industry. |
Business Development Companies — Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value
General Recommendation: Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV) if:
| | The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date no more than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940; |
| | The sale is deemed to be in the best interests of shareholders by (1) a majority of the company’s independent directors and (2) a majority of the company’s directors who have no financial interest in the issuance; and |
| | The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either: |
| | Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one- and three-year median TSRs; or |
| | Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholders. |
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Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors:
| | Strategies employed to salvage the company; |
| | The fund’s past performance; and |
| | The terms of the liquidation. |
Changes to the Charter Document
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes to the charter document, considering the following factors:
| | The degree of change implied by the proposal; |
| | The efficiencies that could result; |
| | The state of incorporation; and |
| | Regulatory standards and implications. |
Vote against any of the following changes:
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement to reorganize or terminate the trust or any of its series; |
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement for amendments to the new declaration of trust; |
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement to amend the fund’s management contract, allowing the contract to be modified by the investment manager and the trust management, as permitted by the 1940 Act; |
| | Allow the trustees to impose other fees in addition to sales charges on investment in a fund, such as deferred sales charges and redemption fees that may be imposed upon redemption of a fund’s shares; |
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement to engage in and terminate subadvisory arrangements; or |
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement to change the domicile of the fund. |
Changing the Domicile of a Fund
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on re-incorporations, considering the following factors:
| | Regulations of both states; |
| | Required fundamental policies of both states; and |
| | The increased flexibility available. |
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Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval
General Recommendation: Vote against proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate subadvisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one subadviser.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on distribution agreement proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives; |
| | The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance; |
| | The competitiveness of the fund in the industry; and |
| | The terms of the agreement. |
General Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of a master-feeder structure.
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on merger proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Resulting fee structure; |
| | Performance of both funds; |
| | Continuity of management personnel; and |
| | Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights. |
Shareholder Proposals for Mutual Funds
Establish Director Ownership Requirement
General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a specific minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.
Reimburse Shareholder for Expenses Incurred
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When supporting the dissidents, vote for the reimbursement of the proxy solicitation expenses.
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Terminate the Investment Advisor
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to terminate the investment advisor, considering the following factors:
| | Performance of the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV); |
| | The fund’s history of shareholder relations; and |
| | The performance of other funds under the advisor’s management. |
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GET STARTED WITH ISS SOLUTIONS
Email sales@issgovernance.com or visit www.issgovernance.com for more information.
Founded in 1985, Institutional Shareholder Services group of companies (ISS) empowers investors and companies to build for long-term and sustainable growth by providing high-quality data, analytics and insight. ISS, which is majority owned by Deutsche Bourse Group, along with Genstar Capital and ISS management, is a leading provider of corporate governance and responsible investment solutions, market intelligence, fund services, and events and editorial content for institutional investors and corporations, globally. ISS’ 2,600 employees operate worldwide across 29 global locations in 15 countries. Its approximately 3,400 clients include many of the world’s leading institutional investors who rely on ISS’ objective and impartial offerings, as well as public companies focused on ESG and governance risk mitigation as a shareholder value enhancing measure. Clients rely on ISS’ expertise to help them make informed investment decisions. This document and all of the information contained in it, including without limitation all text, data, graphs, and charts (collectively, the “Information”) is the property of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS), its subsidiaries, or, in some cases third party suppliers.
The Information has not been submitted to, nor received approval from, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or any other regulatory body. None of the Information constitutes an offer to sell (or a solicitation of an offer to buy), or a promotion or recommendation of, any security, financial product or other investment vehicle or any trading strategy, and ISS does not endorse, approve, or otherwise express any opinion regarding any issuer, securities, financial products or instruments or trading strategies.
The user of the Information assumes the entire risk of any use it may make or permit to be made of the Information.
ISS MAKES NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ORIGINALITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, NON-INFRINGEMENT, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY, AND FITNESS for A PARTICULAR PURPOSE) WITH RESPECT TO ANY OF THE INFORMATION.
Without limiting any of the foregoing and to the maximum extent permitted by law, in no event shall ISS have any liability regarding any of the Information for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential (including lost profits), or any other damages even if notified of the possibility of such damages. The foregoing shall not exclude or limit any liability that may not by applicable law be excluded or limited.
© 2025 | Institutional Shareholder Services and/or its affiliates
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EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC
PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
| I. | OVERVIEW |
In accordance with Rule 206(4)-6 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, Equitable Investment Management Group, LLC and Equitable Investment Management, LLC (together “EIM”) have adopted the Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures set forth below (the “Policies and Procedures”). EIM serves as the investment adviser to each series (each, a “Portfolio” and together, the “Portfolios”) of EQ Advisors Trust (“EQAT”) and 1290 Funds (each, a “Trust” and together, the “Trusts”). Equitable Investment Management Group, LLC serves as the investment adviser to EQAT and Equitable Investment Management, LLC serves as the investment adviser to the 1290 Funds. Each Trust has delegated proxy voting responsibility with respect to each Portfolio to EIM. Equitable Investment Management, LLC (the “Administrator”) serves as the Administrator for all the Trusts. The Administrator is generally responsible for monitoring, testing and maintaining compliance policies, procedures and other items for the Trusts, and thus assists in monitoring the Trusts’ compliance with these Policies and Procedures. These Policies and Procedures have been designed to ensure that proxies relating to each Trust’s portfolio securities are voted in the best interest of the Trust.
Equitable Investment Management Group, LLC also serves as the investment adviser to certain other investment advisory accounts, including the EQ Allocation Funds Trust, EQ Offshore Multimanager Funds Trust, and the EQ Model Portfolios LLC (together, “Other Accounts”). To the extent applicable, these Policies and Procedures will apply to such Other Accounts.
| II. | TRUSTS’ PROXY VOTING PROGRAM |
EIM has established a Proxy Voting Committee that is responsible for monitoring and administering the Trusts’ proxy voting program (the “Program”), as described below. The Administrator, as the administrator, assists with the administration of the Program. The Proxy Voting Committee is composed of EIM’s and the Administrator’s Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”), officers of EIM and the Administrator, and/or members of EIM’s or the Administrator’s (as applicable) Investment Management Services, Legal Departments and Compliance Departments, or any combination thereof, who may be advisory members of the Committee. The Proxy Voting Committee holds meetings as needed, but no less frequently than annually.
| A. | Sub-Advised Portfolios. EIM is responsible for the selection and ongoing monitoring of investment sub-advisers (the “Sub-Advisers”) who, among other responsibilities, provide portfolio management services including day-to-day research and stock selection for a Portfolio or an allocated portion of a Portfolio (a “Sub-Advised Portfolio”). EIM views proxy voting as a function that is incidental and integral to the portfolio management services provided by Sub-Advisers. Therefore, except as described in Section III below, EIM, in turn, delegates proxy voting responsibility with respect to each Sub-Advised Portfolio to the applicable Sub-Adviser. |
| B. | “Fund-of-Funds” Portfolios. EIM provides the day-to-day portfolio management services to certain Portfolios or an allocated portion of a Portfolio (“Allocated Portion”), each of which seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in other mutual funds managed by EIM (“Underlying Affiliated Portfolios”), unaffiliated mutual funds (“Underlying Unaffiliated Funds”) or exchange-traded funds (“Underlying ETFs”) (referred to collectively as the “Fund-of-Funds Portfolios”). Accordingly, EIM retains proxy voting responsibility with respect to each Fund-of-Funds Portfolio and votes proxies in accordance with the Policies and Procedures set forth in Section III below. |
| III. | PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES |
It is EIM’s policy to vote proxies on behalf of a Portfolio in the best interest of the Portfolio and its shareholders. EIM believes that these Policies and Procedures represent the voting positions most likely to support a Portfolio’s and its shareholders’ best interests across a range of sectors and contexts.
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| A. | Underlying Affiliated Portfolios. EIM will vote the Fund-of-Funds Portfolios’ or Allocated Portions’ shares in Underlying Affiliated Portfolios either for or against a proposal, or abstain, in the same proportion as the vote of all other securities holders of the applicable Underlying Affiliated Portfolio (whether or not the proposal presents an issue as to which EIM or its affiliates could be deemed to have a conflict of interest). If there are no security holders of an Underlying Affiliated Portfolio except Fund-of-Funds Portfolio, EIM will vote a Fund-of-Funds’ Portfolios’ shares in Underlying Affiliated Portfolio in its discretion, subject to compliance with other provisions of these Procedures, including Section III.E.2. below regarding resolution of potential conflicts of interest regarding a proposal. |
| B. | Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, Underlying ETFs and Certain Sub-Advised Portfolios. |
| a. | With respect to voting proxies of Underlying Unaffiliated Funds and Underlying ETFs where a Portfolio, and other members of its “advisory group” (as defined in Rule 12d1-4 under the Investment Company Act of 1940) in the aggregate (i) hold more than 25% of the outstanding voting securities of an Underlying Unaffiliated Fund or Unaffiliated ETF as a result of a decrease in the outstanding voting securities of the acquired fund, or (ii) hold more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of an Underlying Unaffiliated Fund or Unaffiliated ETF that is a registered closed-end management investment company or business development company, each member of such “advisory group” will vote its securities in the same proportion as the vote of all other holders of such securities; provided, however, that in circumstances where all holders of the outstanding voting securities of the Underlying Affiliated Fund or Unaffiliated ETF are required by the rule or otherwise under Section 12(d)(1) to vote such securities in the same proportion as the vote of all other holders of such securities, the Portfolio will seek instructions from its security holders with regard to the voting of all proxies with respect to such Underlying Unaffiliated Fund or Underlying ETF securities and vote such proxies in accordance with such instructions. |
| b. | With respect to voting proxies for Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, Underlying ETFs, and certain Sub-Advised Portfolios in all other circumstances as described in Section III.D below, the following guidelines generally will apply: |
| 1. | The decision whether, and if so, how to vote a proxy will be made by EIM based on what it determines to be in the best interest of the relevant Portfolio and its shareholders and in accordance with these procedures. |
| 2. | EIM, with the assistance of Administrator, may enlist the services of an independent proxy voting service to assist with the research and analysis of voting issues, provide voting recommendations and/or carry out the actual voting process, as further described in Section III.E below. |
| 3. | EIM’s policy is to vote all proxies, except under circumstances in which EIM has determined that it is consistent with the best interest of the relevant Portfolio and its shareholders not to vote the proxy or to abstain on one or more proposals. Such circumstances may include the following: |
| 1. | EIM’s policy is to vote all proxies, except under circumstances in which EIM has determined that it is consistent with the best interest of the relevant Portfolio and its shareholders not to vote the proxy or to abstain on one or more proposals. Such circumstances may include the following: |
| a. | When securities are out on loan, they are transferred into the borrower’s name and are voted by the borrower, at its discretion. In most cases, EIM will not take steps to see that loaned securities are voted. However, if EIM determines that a proxy vote is materially important to the relevant Portfolio, EIM will make a good faith effort to recall the loaned security in order to vote. |
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| b. | If an issuer is based in a country that requires “share blocking”1, EIM may determine that the value of exercising the vote is outweighed by the detriment of not being able to sell the shares during the blocking period, in which case EIM may not vote the proxy. |
| c. | EIM may abstain or vote against ballot issues where EIM has not received sufficient information to make an informed decision. |
| 2. | EIM, or the Administrator on EIM’s behalf, provides clients with a copy of these procedures upon request and a description of these procedures is included in EIM’s Form ADV Part 2A. |
| 3. | Any potential material conflicts of interest associated with voting proxies will be disclosed and reviewed by the Trusts’ CCO or other member of EIM’s and the Administrator Legal Department (“Legal”) and Compliance Department (“Compliance”). |
| 4. | EIM will cast votes in a manner consistent with any applicable rule or regulation of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). |
| C. | Seed Capital Investments. EIM and any affiliate will vote Portfolio shares they own, including through “seed money” investments in a Portfolio, either for or against a proposal, or abstain, in the same proportion as the vote of all other security holders of the Portfolio (whether or not the proposal presents an issue as to which EIM or its affiliates could be deemed to have a conflict of interest), or as otherwise required under applicable law (e.g., as may be required under a “mixed and shared funding” order). If EIM or an affiliate is the sole shareholder of a Portfolio, EIM or the affiliate will vote the Portfolio’s shares that it owns in its discretion. |
| D. | Sub-Advised Portfolios; No Delegation. Under certain circumstances EIM may assume responsibility for voting the proxies for shares held by a Sub-Advised Portfolio. For example, if a Sub-Adviser notifies EIM that it is unable or unwilling to assume responsibility for voting a proxy for a Sub-Advised Portfolio (e.g., if voting such proxy presents a potential material conflict of interest for the Sub-Adviser), EIM will vote such proxy in accordance with these procedures. |
| E. | General Policies. EIM, or the Administrator on EIM’s behalf, provides clients with a copy of these procedures upon request and a description of these procedures is included in EIM’s Form ADV Part 2A. Any potential material conflicts of interest associated with voting proxies will be disclosed and reviewed by the Trusts’ CCO and other member of EIM’s and the Administrator Legal Department (“Legal”) and Compliance Department (“Compliance”). EIM will cast votes in a manner consistent with any applicable rule or regulation of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). |
| F. | Record Retention and Inspection. EIM and the Administrator will maintain all documentation associated with EIM’s proxy voting decisions. EIM and the Administrator Compliance is responsible for verifying that such documentation is properly maintained in accordance with its procedures and applicable laws and regulations. |
| 1 | Shareholders in “share blocking” countries wishing to vote must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting (usually one week) with a designated depositary. During the blocking period shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares are returned to clients’ custodian banks. |
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| IV. | CONFLICTS OF INTEREST |
If EIM or the Administrator becomes aware that a proxy voting issue may present a potential material conflict of interest, the issue will be referred to the CCO or other member of Legal and Compliance Department. If the CCO and/or the Legal and Compliance Department determines that an affiliated person of EIM has a potential material conflict, that affiliated person will not participate in the voting decision.
Potential material conflicts may arise between the interests of a Portfolio and EIM or any of its affiliated persons if, for example, a proxy vote relates to a matter involving issuers in which EIM or its affiliates have a substantial economic interest. Potential conflicts of interest include, but are not limited to:
| | Portfolio Managers owning shares of Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, ETFs or shares of securities that are also held in the Portfolios of the Trust(s). |
| | Equitable Financial Life Insurance Company (“Equitable”) holding investments in Underlying Unaffiliated Funds or ETFs that are also held in the Portfolios of the Trust(s). |
| V. | PROXY VOTING SERVICES |
EIM, with the assistance of the Administrator, may engage an independent proxy voting service to assist with the research and analysis of voting issues, provide voting recommendations and/or carry out the actual voting process as deemed necessary. Currently, EIM subscribes to the corporate governance and proxy research services of International Shareholder Services (ISS), a provider of proxy voting services. ISS provides voting recommendations based on established guidelines and practices. The ISS U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines (the “ISS Guidelines”) are attached hereto as Appendix A. Based on its review of the ISS Guidelines, EIM has determined generally to instruct ISS to vote proxies for Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, Underlying ETFs and certain Sub-Advised Portfolios as described in Section III.C above consistent with the ISS Guidelines. However, EIM’s use of the ISS Guidelines is not intended to constrain EIM’s consideration of any proxy proposal, and so there may be times when EIM deviates from the ISS Guidelines. EIM reserves the right not to vote in accordance with the ISS recommendation if it determines that it is not in the best interest of a Portfolio and its Shareholders to do so. In addition, if EIM becomes aware of a conflict of interest between ISS and an issuer subject to a proxy vote, EIM will consider the recommendation of the issuer and instruct ISS to vote the proxy based on what EIM believes to be in the best interest of the Portfolio and its shareholders.
The Proxy Voting Committee, with the assistance of the Administrator, will maintain records regarding EIM’s determination generally to vote proxies for Underlying Unaffiliated Funds, Underlying ETFs, and certain Sub-Advised Portfolios as described in Section III.D above consistent with the ISS Guidelines, and that determination will be reviewed periodically.
The following guidelines describe EIM’s general positions on common proxy issues for Underlying Unaffiliated Funds and Underlying ETFs:
| | Election of Directors: EIM generally votes in favor of slates recommended by the board of directors. |
| | Fee Increases: EIM generally votes against proposals to increase fees. |
| | Changes to the investment strategy, investment objective or fundamental investment restrictions, and proposed mergers: EIM generally votes against changes that would impact adversely the allocation model of a Fund-of-Funds Portfolio. |
Legal and Compliance will conduct a due diligence review of any proxy voting service (“Proxy Service”) to assess (1) the adequacy and quality of the Proxy Service’s staffing, personnel and technology, and whether the Proxy Service has the capacity and competence to adequately analyze proxy issues and the ability to make proxy voting recommendations based on materially accurate and complete information; (2) whether the Proxy Service has the ability to execute proxy votes in accordance with EIM’s instructions; (3) whether the
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Proxy Service has adequately disclosed to EIM the methodologies it uses in formulating its voting recommendations, including its process for obtaining current and accurate information relevant to matters included in its research and on which it makes recommendations, the nature of any third-party information sources that the Proxy Service uses as a basis for its voting recommendations, and how and when the Proxy Service would expect to engage with issuers and third parties; (4) the effectiveness of the Proxy Service’s process for seeking timely input from issuers; and (5) the adequacy of the Proxy Service’s policies and procedures for identifying, disclosing and addressing actual and potential conflicts of interest. EIM or the Administrator will require the Proxy Service to update them on an ongoing basis regarding (1) any business changes relevant to its capacity and competence to provide independent proxy voting advice or carry out voting instructions, (2) any conflicts of interest that may arise with respect to its proxy voting recommendations, and (3) any operational or compliance issues or problems. The due diligence review will be conducted at least annually and may be conducted by on-site visit or written questionnaire. In the event that EIM or the Administrator becomes aware of factual errors, incompleteness or methodological weaknesses in the Proxy Service’s analysis, it will assess whether this materially affected the research or recommendations used by EIM and the Proxy Service’s efforts to correct any material deficiencies in its analysis or methodology.
| VI. | SUB-ADVISERS’ PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES |
Each Sub-Adviser will be required to maintain proxy voting policies and procedures in conformance with Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, and that satisfy the following elements:
| A. | Written Policies and Procedures: The Sub-Adviser must maintain written proxy voting policies and procedures in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and must provide to the Trusts, EIM, and the Administrator, upon request, copies of such policies and procedures. |
| B. | Fiduciary Duty: The Sub-Adviser’s policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to ensure that the Sub-Adviser votes client securities in the best interest of its clients. |
| C. | Conflicts of Interest: The Sub-Adviser’s policies and procedures must include appropriate procedures to identify and resolve as necessary, before voting client proxies, all material proxy-related conflicts of interest between the Sub-Adviser (including its affiliates) and its clients. |
| D. | Voting Guidelines: The Sub-Adviser’s policies and procedures must address with reasonable specificity how the Sub-Adviser will vote proxies, or what factors it will consider, when voting on particular types of matters, e.g., corporate governance proposals, compensation issues and matters involving social or corporate responsibility. The Sub-Adviser’s policies and procedures also should describe the considerations it will take into account if it retains a Proxy Service to assist it in discharging its proxy voting duties and its process for conducting due diligence on, and overseeing, services provided by a Proxy Service. |
| E. | Monitoring Proxy Voting: The Sub-Adviser must have a system and/or process that is reasonably designed to ensure that proxies are voted on behalf of its clients in a timely and efficient manner. |
| F. | Record Retention and Inspection: The Sub-Adviser must have an established system for creating and retaining all appropriate documentation relating to its proxy voting activities as required by applicable laws and regulations. The Sub-Adviser must provide to the Trusts, EIM, and the Administrator such information and records with respect to proxies relating to the Trust’s portfolio securities as required by law and as the Trusts, EIM, or the Administrator may reasonably request. |
EIM, with assistance from the Administrator, will conduct a due diligence review of each Sub-Adviser’s proxy voting policies and procedures (including any proxy voting guidelines) in connection with the initial selection of the Sub-Adviser to manage a Sub-Advised Portfolio and on at least an annual basis thereafter. The Sub-Advisers’ proxy voting policies and procedures may be amended from time to time and need not be identical. As part of its ongoing due diligence and compliance responsibilities, EIM will seek to ensure that
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each Sub-Adviser maintains proxy voting policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to comply with applicable laws and regulations. In addition, each Sub-Adviser is required to provide EIM with an annual proxy voting compliance certification.
| VII. | DISCLOSURE OF TRUSTS’ PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND PROXY VOTING RECORD |
EIM and the Administrator, on behalf of the Trusts, will take reasonable steps as necessary to seek to ensure that the Trusts comply with all applicable laws and regulations relating to disclosure of the Trusts’ proxy voting policies and procedures and proxy voting records. EIM and the Administrator (including, at their option, through third-party service providers) will maintain a system that is reasonably designed to ensure that EIM’s actual proxy voting record and the actual proxy voting record of the Sub-Advisers with respect to the Trusts’ portfolio securities are collected, processed, filed with the SEC and made available to the Trusts’ shareholders as required by applicable laws and regulations.
Amended: September 12, 2019
Amended: December 10, 2014
Amended: July 11, 2007
Adopted: August 6, 2003
Amended: December 15, 2020
Amended: August 2021
Amended: December 2021
Amended: January 2023
Amended: July 2023
Amended: November 2023
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AllianceBernstein L.P.’s (“AB,” “we,” “us,” “our” and similar terms) mission is to work in our clients’ best financial interests to deliver better investment outcomes through differentiated research insights and innovative portfolio solutions. As a fiduciary and investment adviser, we place the interests of our clients first and treat all our clients fairly and equitably, and we have an obligation to responsibly allocate, manage and oversee their investments to seek sustainable, long-term shareholder value.
AB has authority to vote proxies relating to securities in certain client portfolios and, accordingly, AB’s fiduciary obligations extend to AB’s exercise of such proxy voting authority for each client AB has agreed to exercise that duty. AB’s general policy is to vote proxy proposals, amendments, consents or resolutions relating to client securities, including interests in private investment funds, if any (collectively, “proxies”), in a manner that serves the best financial interests of each respective client as determined by AB in its discretion, after consideration of the relevant clients’ investment strategies, and in accordance with this Proxy Voting and Governance Policy (“Proxy Voting and Governance Policy” or “Policy”) and the operative agreements governing the relationship with each respective client (“Governing Agreements”). This Policy outlines our principles for proxy voting, includes a wide range of issues that often appear on voting ballots, and applies to all of AB’s internally managed assets, globally. It is intended for use by those involved in the proxy voting decision-making process and those responsible for the administration of proxy voting (“Investment Stewardship Team”), to ensure that this Policy and its procedures are implemented consistently.1
This Policy forms part of a suite of policies and frameworks including AB’s Stewardship Statement that outline our approach to investment stewardship. Proxy voting is an integral part of this process, enabling us to support sound corporate governance practices, strong shareholder rights, transparent disclosures, and encourage effective oversight of material issues.
This Policy is overseen by the Proxy Voting and Governance Committee (“Proxy Voting and Governance Committee” or “Committee”), which provides oversight and includes senior representatives from Investments, Legal and Operations. It is the responsibility of the Committee to evaluate and maintain proxy voting procedures and guidelines, to evaluate proposals and issues not covered by these guidelines, to consider changes in the Policy, and to review the Policy no less frequently than annually. In addition, the Committee meets at least three times a year and as necessary to address special situations.
Research Underpins Decision Making
As a research-driven firm, we approach proxy voting with the same commitment to rigorous research and engagement that we apply to all our investment activities. The different investment philosophies applied by our investment teams may occasionally result in different conclusions being drawn for certain proposals. In turn, our votes for some proposals may vary from issuer to issuer, while still aligning with our goal of maximizing the long-term value of securities in our clients’ portfolios.
For accounts where proxy voting is directed by clients or newly acquired subsidiary companies, voting decisions may deviate from this Policy. To the extent there are any inconsistencies between this Policy and a client’s Governing Agreements, the Governing Agreements shall supersede this Policy. We do not offer different versions of our Proxy Voting and Governance Policy.
| 1 | Please note that while this Policy is intended to be applied globally, in certain jurisdictions in which we operate, a limited number of votes may vary due to local rules and regulations. |
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To facilitate the efficient and accurate voting of our client’s securities, we subscribe to research services from vendors such as Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis. These research materials are used for informational purposes alongside company filings, and AB’s voting decisions are always guided by AB’s Proxy Voting and Governance Policy. Our investment professionals can access these research and informational materials at any time.
In evaluating proxy issues and determining our votes, we seek the perspective and expertise of various relevant parties. Internally, the Investment Stewardship Team may consult the Committee, Chief Investment Officers, Portfolio Managers, and/or Research Analysts across our equities platform. By partnering with investment professionals, we are empowered to incorporate company-specific fundamental insights into our vote decisions.
Externally, we may engage with companies in advance of their Annual General Meeting, and throughout the year. We believe engagement provides the opportunity to share our philosophy, and more importantly, affect positive changes which we believe will drive shareholder value. In addition, we may engage with shareholder proposal proponents and other stakeholders to understand different viewpoints and objectives.
Proxy voting and engagements work in conjunction to raise and escalate investor concerns to companies. In cases where we determine that the issuer’s behavior isn’t aligned with our clients’ best financial interests, we may escalate our voting and engagement by taking actions such as voting against the relevant directors. The materiality of the issue and the responsiveness of management will guide our approach which is outlined in the AB Stewardship Statement.
Our proxy voting guidelines are both principles-based and rules-based. Subject to client guidelines, we adhere to a core set of principles described in this Policy. We assess each proxy proposal within the framework of these principles, with our ultimate “litmus test” being what we view as most likely to maximize long-term shareholder value. We believe that authority and accountability for setting and executing corporate policies, goals and compensation should generally rest with a company’s board of directors and senior management. In return, we support strong investor rights that allow shareholders to hold directors and management accountable should they fail to act in the best interests of shareholders.
We generally vote proposals in accordance with these guidelines; however, we may deviate from these guidelines if we believe that deviating from our stated Policy is necessary to maximize long-term shareholder value or as otherwise warranted by the specific facts and circumstances of an investment. While our Policy is broadly applicable, we may make exceptions to these guidelines for non-operating companies such as closed-end funds. We will evaluate on a case-by-case basis any proposal not specifically addressed by these guidelines, whether submitted by management or shareholders, always keeping in mind our fiduciary duty to make voting decisions that are in our clients’ best interests.
Shareholder Proposal Assessment Framework
AB’s commitment to maximizing the long-term value of clients’ portfolios drives how we analyze shareholder proposals. Shareholder proposals often address environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) disclosures, which we believe can in some cases help improve the accuracy of our valuation of companies. We think it is
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in our clients’ best interests to incorporate a comprehensive set of risks and opportunities, including but not limited to material ESG issues, from a long-term shareholder value perspective. The evaluation of a proposal that addresses an ESG issue will consider (among other things) the following core factors, as necessary:
| | The materiality of the mentioned ESG issue for the company’s business |
| | The company’s current practice, policy, and framework |
| | The prescriptiveness of the proposal — does the shareholder make a request that unreasonably burdens management? |
| | The context of the shareholder proposal — is the proponent tied to any particular interest group(s)? Does the proposal aim to promote the interest of the shareholders or group that they are associated with? |
| | How does the proposal add value for the shareholders? |
We do not vote in favor of all ESG-related proposals. This shareholder proposal assessment framework applies to all proposals slated by shareholders, globally.
AB’s approach to voting on director elections is grounded in the belief that directors should represent shareholder interests and ensure management is maximizing long-term shareholder value. We generally vote in favor of the management-proposed slate of directors, but we consider a number of factors, including local market best practice, when making our decision. Each company’s board of directors has a duty to act in the best interest of the company’s shareholders at all times. These interests are best served by having directors who bring objectivity to the company and are free from potential conflicts of interests. Accordingly, we believe that companies should have a majority of independent directors and independent key committees. We will incorporate local market regulation and corporate governance codes into our decision making, though we may support requirements that surpass market regulation and corporate governance codes if we believe they will improve corporate governance practices.
We consider a director to be independent if they meet the criteria for independence set forth by the primary exchange or the best practice code in the country where the company is domiciled. We also take into account affiliations, related party transactions, and prior service to the company.
We believe that directors have a duty to respond to shareholder actions that have received significant shareholder support. We may vote against directors who fail to act on key issues. We oppose directors who fail to attend at least 75% of board meetings within a given year without a reasonable excuse. We prioritize transparency and disclosure in our analysis of director elections. If there is insufficient information about nominees disclosed in the proxy statement, we may abstain or vote against.
We also take into account compensation, audit, and governance practices when evaluating directors. If a company lacks a formal key committee or has demonstrated poor practices in these areas, we may vote against relevant directors, which may include committee chairs, committees as a whole, or the full board in cases of multi-year concerns.
Finally, we are committed to engaging with company management to resolve issues that arise. We may do so through phone, written, virtual or in-person communication until a satisfactory resolution is reached.
Sound corporate governance requires that shareholders have a meaningful say in the company’s affairs. We believe that electing directors by a majority of votes cast at an annual meeting is a better method than plurality voting. Under plurality voting standards, a director could be elected by a single affirmative vote even if a majority of shareholders withheld support.
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AB also views majority voting provisions as beneficial to director accountability. Therefore, we generally support companies amending their by-laws to require director nominees be elected by an affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast. However, we recognize that in contested elections where the number of nominees exceeds the number of board seats, a carve-out should be provided to allow for plurality voting. While we generally prefer a majority vote standard, we may take a case-by-case approach if the issuer is a non-operating company such as closed-end funds.
We believe there can be benefits to an executive chairman and to having the positions of chairman and CEO combined as well as split. When the chair is non-independent, the company must have sufficient counter-balancing governance in place, generally through a strong lead independent director. AB therefore generally supports the establishment of a lead independent director if the chairman is non-independent. We believe that having a robust lead independent director role with clearly defined duties and responsibilities, such as the authority to call meetings and approve agendas, is an effective way to balance governance.
If a company already has a lead independent director in place with robust responsibilities, we will generally oppose proposals that require an independent board chairman, unless there are additional concerns regarding board leadership or broader corporate governance.
Typically, a classified board is divided into three classes, each holding office for a term of three years, with only a portion of the board being elected or replaced each year. We generally favor declassified boards, but we may take a case-by-case approach if certain conditions are met, such as an adequate sunset provision, a justifiable financial reason, or if the issuer is a non-operating company such as closed-end funds.
We believe that assessing each nominee’s capacity for a board seat is essential for ensuring meaningful board oversight of management. Nominees who are “over-boarded”, or have too many outside board commitments, may be unable to dedicate sufficient time toward their board oversight responsibilities.
| | Non-Executive Directors: AB generally votes against the appointment of non-executive directors who serve on more than four public company boards. |
| | Active CEOs: AB generally votes against the appointment of active CEOs who serve on more than two public company boards. |
| | Active CEO of the Company Under Voting Consideration: For CEOs of the company under consideration, AB generally votes against their appointment if they serve on more than three public company boards. |
Diversity is an important element of assessing a board’s composition, as it promotes a wider range of perspectives to be considered for companies to both strategize and mitigate risks. We believe diversity is multi-faceted and should incorporate a broad range of factors in order to promote diversity of thought, which may include professional experience, tenure, age, gender, ethnicity, and/or nationality. We comply with the requirements of local market regulation and note that several European countries legally require board-level gender diversity at publicly listed companies.
Taking into account a board’s size as well as regional considerations, AB may vote against the nominating committee chair, or a relevant incumbent board member such as a nominating committee member if the chair is not up for election, when the board lacks sufficient diversity, unless there are mitigating factors (e.g. the board has articulated plans to diversify board membership, or has made recent improvements).
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Compensation policies play a critical role in attracting, retaining, and motivating executives, directors, and employees. Incentives should be aligned with shareholder interests to facilitate long-term value creation and sustainable performance.
It is crucial to establish a direct correlation between variable pay and the company’s operational and financial performance, through metrics that are challenging and align with the company’s strategy. Compensation plans are often complex and are a major corporate expense, so we evaluate them carefully and on a case-by-case basis. In all cases, however, we assess each proposed executive compensation plan within the framework of four guiding principles, each of which ensures a company’s compensation plan helps to align the long-term interests of management with shareholders:
| | Valid measures of business performance tied to the firm’s strategy and shareholder value creation, which are clearly articulated and incorporate appropriate time periods, should be utilized; |
| | Compensation costs should be managed in the same way as any other expense; |
| | Compensation should reflect management’s handling, or failure to handle, any recent social, environmental, governance, ethical or legal issue that had a material adverse financial or reputational effect on the company and; |
| | In granting awards, management should clearly exhibit integrity and a rigorous decision-making process. |
Further, we believe that compensation plans should be sufficiently long-term oriented. Long-term incentive plans should adhere to a minimum of three-year vesting periods and clearly target long-term financial goals. We are generally unsupportive of special bonuses that are not explicitly tied to a company’s financial performance or lack multi-year vesting periods. If a retention grant is awarded, we expect companies to provide a rationale detailing how the award aligns with business needs and overall strategy. In cases where the compensation committee has exercised discretion to adjust pay outcomes, we expect a detailed justification and explanation of the method used to determine the adjustment. Additionally, we expect disclosure on how the revised outcome is consistent with the shareholders’ interests.
We believe that compensation plans should include clawback provisions that require executives to relinquish their awards if their compensation was based on erroneous financial statements or deceitful business practices.
We may oppose plans which include, and directors who establish, compensation plan provisions deemed to be poor practice such as automatic acceleration of equity, or single-triggered, in the event of a change in control. Although votes on compensation plans are by nature only broad indications of shareholder views, they do lead to more compensation-related dialogue between management and shareholders and help ensure that management and shareholders meet their common objective: maximizing shareholder value.
Equity compensation plans (or “omnibus stock plans”) are intended to align the interests of employees and executives with those of shareholders by providing stock-based incentives. While we generally support the use of equity in compensation plans, we assess each plan on a case-by-case basis. Our evaluation criteria include the overall cost of the plan, potential dilution to shareholders, historical burn rates, and the specific design features of the plan. We may vote against equity compensation plans that contain provisions that are misaligned with shareholder interests, such as the ability to reprice options without shareholder approval or the inclusion of evergreen provisions.
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For non-executive directors, we believe that compensation should be structured in such a way that it does not compromise their independence. We will generally oppose performance-based variable remuneration for non-executive directors.
We believe that the company is in the best position to choose its accounting firm, and we generally support management’s recommendation. We recognize that there may be potential conflicts when a company’s independent auditors perform substantial non-audit related services for the company. Therefore, we consider the proportion of non-audit fees to total fees and other factors like auditor tenure to assess independence. Excessive non-audit fees may lead us to vote against the auditor and/or audit committee members. In determining what is excessive we exclude non-audit fees related to extraordinary events such as IPOs, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs. Additionally, we may vote against or abstain if the audit firm is not disclosed, considering local market practices.
In some markets, companies are required to submit their financial statements for shareholder approval. We generally approve financial statements unless there are reasons to vote otherwise, such as if the information is not made available prior to the meeting. In markets requiring the election of internal statutory auditors (e.g., Japan), we generally support management’s nominees if they meet regulatory requirements. However, we may vote against nominees who are designated independent statutory auditors but serve as executives of a subsidiary or affiliate of the issuer, or if there are other reasons to question their independence. We review proposals to limit auditor liability on a case-by-case basis, considering whether such a provision is necessary to secure appointment and whether it helps to maximize long-term shareholder value.
Transactions and Special Situations
Transactions, Restructurings, Mergers and Acquisitions
Proposals requesting shareholder approval for corporate restructurings, merger and acquisitions, and spin-offs are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Our primary objective in assessing and voting on these proposals is to maximize long-term shareholder value. We consider a multitude of factors that could impact the company’s future performance and shareholder returns, including the board’s rationale behind the transaction, the potential financial benefits and risks, the alignment with the company’s long-term strategic goals, and the overall integrity of the transaction process. We may abstain from voting on transactions in instances where there is insufficient information.
Our approach to voting on shareholder rights plans, or poison pills, is grounded in our commitment to protecting shareholder rights and maximizing long-term value. Accordingly, we assess these proposals on a case-by-case basis. We will oppose poison pills that unreasonably seek to impede takeovers or entrench management. We may support proposals which protect shareholders’ right to consider and potentially accept a compelling offer. Additionally, we may support net operating loss rights plans when the protection of a company’s tax assets is material to its financial health and future value. We generally support shareholder proposals that require the company to submit a shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote, though may take a case-by-case approach if the issuer is a non-operating company such as closed-end funds.
The one share, one vote principle — that voting power is proportional to an one’s economic interest — is preferred to ensure the board is accountable to shareholders. AB’s general expectation of companies with
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multi-class equity structures carrying unequal voting rights (or “supervoting shares”) is to attach safeguards for minority shareholders when appropriate and in a cost-effective manner, which may include a sunset provision or periodic shareholder reauthorizations. We expect boards to routinely review existing multi-class share structures and articulate why the structure is beneficial for long-term shareholders. If a multi-class share structure is in place without adequate safeguards, AB will generally vote against relevant directors.
With that backdrop, we acknowledge that multi-class structures may be beneficial for a period of time for certain companies, allowing management to focus on longer-term value creation which benefits all shareholders. Accordingly, AB may refrain from voting against relevant directors if the multi-class capital structure is subject to a formal sunset provision, or if company-specific conditions warrant it.
Proxy access allows “qualified shareholders” to nominate directors. Our voting stance typically favors proposals for proxy access that adhere to the 2010 SEC proposal (since vacated) which allowed a single shareholder, or group of shareholders, who hold at least 3% of the voting power for at least three years continuously to nominate up to 25% of the current board seats, or two directors, for inclusion in the subject company’s annual proxy statement alongside management nominees. We may vote against proposals that include requirements that are stricter than the SEC’s framework including implementation restrictions and against individual board members, or entire boards, who exclude from their ballot properly submitted shareholder proxy access proposals or compete against shareholder proxy access proposals with stricter management proposals on the same ballot. We will generally vote in favor of proposals that seek to amend an existing right to more closely align with the SEC framework. We will evaluate on a case-by-case basis proposals with less stringent requirements than the vacated SEC framework.
Majority Vote Standard for Charter & Bylaw Amendments
We generally favor the implementation of simple majority vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments. This means that a proposal would only need to receive a majority of votes cast in order to be approved. We believe that this approach promotes greater shareholder accountability and ensures that the will of the majority is reflected in important decisions affecting the company. As such, we will generally vote for proposals to reduce supermajority voting requirements, though may take a case-by-case approach if the issuer is a non-operating company such as closed-end funds.
We are generally supportive of the right for shareholders to call special meetings, which allows shareholders to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly scheduled annual meetings. This right may apply only if a shareholder, or a group of shareholders, owns a specified percentage as defined by the relevant company bylaws.
We recognize the importance of the right of shareholders to remove poorly performing directors, respond to takeover offers and take other actions without having to wait for the next annual meeting. However, we also believe it is important to protect companies and shareholders from nuisance proposals. We further believe that striking a balance between these competing interests will maximize shareholder value. We believe that encouraging active share ownership among shareholders generally is beneficial to shareholders and helps maximize shareholder value. Accordingly, we will generally support proposals to establish shareholders’ right to call a special meeting if one is not already in place. When evaluating proposals to reduce the existing special meeting right threshold, we will assess the potential abuse of the right based on the company’s current share ownership structure, and whether the request goes beyond market practice.
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Action by written consent enables a large shareholder or group of shareholders to initiate votes on corporate matters prior to the annual meeting. We believe this is a fundamental shareholder right and, accordingly, will generally support shareholder proposals seeking to restore this right. However, in cases where a company has a majority shareholder or group of related majority shareholders with majority economic interest, we may oppose proposals seeking to restore this right as there is a potential risk of abuse by the majority shareholder or group of majority shareholders. We may also vote against the proposal if the company provides shareholders a right to call special meetings with an ownership threshold of 15% or below in absence of material restrictions, as we believe that shareholder access rights should be considered from a holistic view rather than promoting all possible access rights that may impede one another in contrast to long-term shareholder value.
Material Environmental and Social Issues
Proposals addressing climate change concerns are plentiful and their scope varies. Climate change increasingly receives investor attention as a potential material risk to the sustainability of a wide range of business activities. These proposals may include emissions standards or reduction targets, quantitative goals, and impact assessments. We evaluate these proposals on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the materiality of the issue to the business and whether the proposal is of added benefit to shareholders. We will additionally consider company specific context as well as our ongoing research and engagements for evaluating the company’s existing policies and practices.
For proposals related to climate change, we will carefully assess the company’s current policies/disclosures and its incorporation of national standards and best practices. In addition, we will evaluate the potential enactment of new regulations, as well as any investment risk related to the specific issue.
For issuers with material exposure to climate risk, AB assess the climate risk management strategy by considering factors such as, but not limited to:
Emissions Metrics and Targets
| | Does the company have emissions metrics and targets in place for Scopes 1 and 2 emissions? |
Climate Risk Management
| | Does the company perform scenario analysis that includes the use of a widely recognized, scientifically based 1.5 degree scenario? |
Governance
| | Does the board provide oversight on the issuer’s climate change strategy? |
| | Has the company incurred any recent material failures, or been involved in any controversies, related to managing climate-related risk? |
Disclosure
| | Does the company disclose its exposure to climate risk via the framework developed by the Taskforce on Climate related Financial Disclosure? |
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Companies are increasingly recognizing the importance of managing biodiversity and nature-related factors to generate long-term financial returns for shareholders. This can be achieved by implementing appropriate risk oversight and establishing relevant metrics and targets to manage their reliance on, impact on, and use of natural capital. Companies — particularly those that have significant impacts on local environments or have supply chains exposed to locations with biodiversity-related risk — should disclose how they integrate these factors into their strategy and how they manage material risks and opportunities relating to biodiversity. Additionally, companies should consider engaging with stakeholders, including local communities and conservation organizations, to ensure that their activities do not have a negative impact on biodiversity, which could potentially cause negative reputational or financial risks. Accordingly, we will vote on proposals related to biodiversity on a case-by-case basis.
We believe that increased transparency in political contributions and lobbying expenses is essential for ensuring accountability and promoting responsible corporate citizenship. As such, we generally vote in favor of proposals that request increased disclosure of these expenses, including those paid to trade organizations and political action committees at the federal, state, or local level. By doing so, we can better understand how a company is using its resources to influence political decisions and ensure that these activities align with its stated values and principles and are in the best interests of shareholders. Increased transparency can also help to mitigate reputational risks and promote public trust in the company. We believe that companies have a responsibility to disclose their political contributions and lobbying expenses to their shareholders and the public.
Human capital management is a critical component of a company’s long-term success. Companies should provide fair compensation and benefits, as well as opportunities for career growth and advancement. Additionally, companies should prioritize employee health and safety, both physical and mental, and provide a supportive work environment that fosters collaboration and innovation. Effective communication and engagement with employees is also essential for building a strong corporate culture and ensuring that employees feel valued and heard. By prioritizing human capital management, companies can attract and retain top talent, foster innovation and creativity, and ultimately drive long-term value for shareholders. We will vote case-by-case on proposals related to human capital management considering a company’s current practices, policies and disclosures.
As a fiduciary, we must always act in our clients’ best financial interests. We strive to avoid even the appearance of a conflict that may compromise the trust our clients have placed in us, and we insist on strict adherence to fiduciary standards and compliance with all applicable federal and state securities laws. We have adopted a comprehensive Code of Business Conduct and Ethics (“Code”) to help us meet these obligations. As part of this responsibility and as expressed throughout the Code, we place the interests of our clients first and attempt to mitigate any perceived or actual conflicts of interest.
AB recognizes that potentially material conflicts of interest arise when we engage with a company or vote a proxy solicited by an issuer that sponsors a retirement plan we manage (or administer), that distributes AB-sponsored mutual funds, or with which AB or one or more of our employees have another business or personal relationship, and that such conflicts could affect how we vote on the issuer’s proxy. Similarly, potentially material conflicts of interest arise when engaging with and deciding how to vote on a proposal
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sponsored or supported by a shareholder group that is a client. In order to address any perceived or actual conflict of interest, the procedures set forth below (see Handling Potential Conflicts of Interest section below) have been established for use when we encounter a potential conflict to ensure that our engagement activities and voting decisions are in our clients’ best interest consistent with our fiduciary duties and seek to maximize shareholder value.
Adherence to Stated Proxy Voting Policies
Subject to client guidelines, votes generally are cast in accordance with this Policy. In situations where our Policy involves a case-by-case assessment, the following sections provide criteria that will guide our decision. In situations where our Policy on a particular issue involves a case-by-case assessment and the vote cannot be clearly decided by an application of our stated Policy, a member of the Committee or his/her designee will make the voting decision in accordance with the basic principle of our Policy to vote proxies with the intention of maximizing the value of the securities in our client accounts. In these situations, the voting rationale must be documented either on the voting platform of our proxy services vendor, by retaining relevant emails or another appropriate method. Where appropriate, the views of investment professionals are considered. All votes cast contrary to our stated voting Policy on specific issues must be documented. If a proxy vote involves a potential conflict of interest, the voting decision will be determined in accordance with the processes outlined in the Handing Potential Conflicts of Interest section of the Policy below. On an annual basis, the Committee will receive and review a report of all such votes so as to confirm adherence with the Policy.
When considering a proxy proposal, members of the Committee or investment professionals involved in the decision-making process must disclose to the Committee any potential conflict (including personal relationships) of which they are aware and any substantive contact that they have had with any interested outside party (including the issuer or shareholder group sponsoring a proposal) regarding the proposal. Any previously unknown conflict will be recorded on the Potential Conflicts List (discussed below). If a member of the Committee has a material conflict of interest, he or she generally must recuse himself or herself from the decision-making process.
Potential conflicts related to proxy voting may include, but are not limited to, the following:
| | Votes involving publicly traded clients of AB; |
| | Votes involving publicly traded companies that distribute AB mutual funds; |
| | Votes where investment teams have different views; |
| | Votes involving any clients that try to advocate for proxy voting support; |
| | Voting contrary to the Policy; and |
| | Any other company subject to a material conflict of which a Committee member becomes aware. |
We determine our votes for all meetings of companies that may present a conflict by applying the processes described in the Handling Potential Conflicts of Interest section below. We document all instances when the Conflicts Officer determines our vote.
Handling Potential Conflicts of Interest
When we encounter a potential conflict of interest, we review our proposed vote using the following analysis to ensure our voting decision is in the best interest of our clients:
| | If our proposed vote is consistent with the Policy, no further review is necessary. |
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| | If our proposed vote is contrary to the Policy, the vote will be presented to AB’s Conflicts Officer. The Conflicts Officer’s review and determination will be documented and presented to the Proxy Voting and Governance Committee. The Conflicts Officer will determine whether the proposed vote is reasonable and in line with our fiduciary duties to clients. If the Conflicts Officer cannot determine that the proposed vote is reasonable, the Conflicts Officer may instruct AB to refer the votes back to the client(s) or take other actions as the Conflicts Officer deems appropriate in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular potential conflict. The Conflicts Officer may take or recommend that AB take the following steps: |
| | Recuse or “wall-off” certain personnel from the proxy voting process; |
| | Confirm whether AB’s proposed vote is consistent with the voting recommendations of our proxy research services vendor; or |
| | Take other actions as the Conflicts Officer deems appropriate. |
Review of Third-Party Proxy Service Vendors
AB engages one or more Proxy Service Vendors to provide voting research and voting execution services. From time to time, AB will evaluate each Proxy Service Vendor’s services to assess that they are consistent with this Policy and the best interest of our clients. This evaluation may include: (i) a review of pre-populated votes on the Proxy Service Vendor’s electronic voting platform before such votes are cast, and (ii) a review of policies that address the consideration of additional information that becomes available regarding a proposal before the vote is cast. AB will also periodically review whether Proxy Service Vendors have the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues and provide the necessary services to AB. AB will consider, among other things, the adequacy and quality of the Proxy Service Vendor’s staffing, personnel and/or technology, as well as whether the Proxy Service Vendor has adequate disclosures regarding its methodologies in formulating voting recommendations. If applicable, we will also review whether any potential factual errors, incompleteness or methodological weaknesses materially affected the Proxy Service Vendor’s services and the effectiveness of the Proxy Service Vendor’s procedures for obtaining current and accurate information relevant to matters included in its research.
The Committee also takes reasonable steps to review the Proxy Service Vendor’s policies and procedures addressing conflicts of interest and verify that AB’s primary Proxy Service Vendor(s) is, in fact, independent based on all of the relevant facts and circumstances. This includes reviewing each Proxy Service Vendor’s conflict management procedures on an annual basis. When reviewing these conflict management procedures, we will consider, among other things, (i) whether the Proxy Service Vendor has adequate policies and procedures to identify, disclose, and address actual and potential conflicts of interest; and (ii) whether the Proxy Service Vendor provides adequate disclosure of actual and potential conflicts of interest with respect to the services provided to AB by the Proxy Service Vendor and (iii) whether the Proxy Service Vendor’s policies and procedures utilize technology in delivering conflicts disclosure; and (iv) can offer research in an impartial manner and in the best interests of our clients.
It is AB’s policy to support confidentiality before the actual vote has been cast. Employees are prohibited from revealing how we intend to vote except to (i) members of the Committee; (ii) Portfolio Managers who hold the security in their managed accounts; (iii) the Research Analyst(s) who cover(s) the security; (iv) clients, upon request, for the securities held in their portfolios; (v) clients who do not hold the security or for whom AB does not have proxy voting authority, but who provide AB with a signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement; or (vi) declare our stance on a shareholder proposal(s) that is (are) deemed material for the issuer’s business for generating long-term value in our clients’ best interests. Once the votes have been cast for our mutual fund clients, they are made public in accordance with mutual fund proxy vote disclosures required by the SEC, and we generally post all votes to our public website one business day after the meeting date.
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We may participate in proxy surveys conducted by shareholder groups or consultants so long as such participation does not compromise our confidential voting policy. Specifically, prior to our required SEC disclosures each year, we may respond to surveys asking about our proxy voting policies, but not any specific votes. After our mutual fund proxy vote disclosures required by the SEC each year have been made public and/or votes have been posted to our public website, we may respond to surveys that cover specific votes in addition to our voting policies.
On occasion, clients for whom we do not have proxy voting authority may ask us how AB’s Policy would be implemented. A member of the Committee or one or more Investment Stewardship Team may provide the results of a potential implementation of the AB policy to the client’s account subject to an understanding with the client that the implementation shall remain confidential.
Any substantive contact regarding proxy issues from the issuer, the issuer’s agent or a shareholder group sponsoring a proposal must be reported to the Committee if such contact was material to a decision to vote contrary to this Policy. Routine administrative inquiries from proxy solicitors need not be reported.
A Note Regarding AB’s Structure
AB and AllianceBernstein Holding L.P. (“AB Holding”) are Delaware limited partnerships. As limited partnerships, neither company is required to produce an annual proxy statement or hold an annual shareholder meeting. In addition, the general partner of AB and AB Holding, AllianceBernstein Corporation is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Equitable Holdings, Inc.
As a result, most of the positions we express in this Proxy Voting Policy are inapplicable to our business. For example, although units in AB Holding are publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), the NYSE Listed Company Manual exempts limited partnerships and controlled companies from compliance with various listing requirements, including the requirement that our board have a majority of independent directors.
We publish our voting records on our website one business day after the shareholder meeting date for each issuer company.
Many clients have requested that we provide them with periodic reports on how we voted their proxies. Clients may obtain information about how we voted proxies on their behalf by contacting their Advisor.
All of the records referenced below will be kept in an easily accessible place for at least the length of time required by local regulation and custom, and, if such local regulation requires that records are kept for less than six (6) years from the end of the fiscal year during which the last entry was made on such record, we will follow the US rule of six (6) or more years. If the local regulation requires that records are kept for more than six or more years, we will comply with the local regulation. We maintain the vast majority of these records electronically.
Proxy Voting and Governance Policy
The Policy shall be maintained in the Legal and Compliance Department and posted on our company intranet and on the AB website.
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Proxy Statements Received Regarding Clients’ Securities
For US Securities, AB relies on the SEC to maintain copies of each proxy statement we receive regarding client securities. For Non-US Securities, we rely on ISS, our proxy voting agent, to retain such proxy statements.
Records of Votes Cast on Behalf of Clients
Records of votes cast by AB are retained electronically by our proxy research service vendor.
Pre-Disclosure of Vote Intentions on Select Proposals
As part of our engagement and stewardship efforts, AB may publish our vote intentions on certain proposals in advance of select shareholder meetings, with an emphasis on issuers where our discretionary managed accounts have significant economic exposure. The selected proposals are chosen because they impact a range of key topics where AB may have expressed our viewpoints publicly, through prior engagement or proxy voting. We do not pre-disclose our vote intentions on mergers and acquisition activity. The published vote intentions are available on our website.
Disclosure of Holdings
It is AB’s policy to not disclose holdings information of its discretionary managed accounts outside what is required to be disclosed in a regulatory filing. However, AB will disclose this holdings information to the issuers of the securities subject to an upcoming vote as required by local law or regulation.
Documents Prepared by AB that Are Material to Voting Decisions
The Investment Stewardship Team is responsible for maintaining documents prepared by the Committee or any AB employee that were material to a voting decision. Therefore, where an investment professional’s opinion is essential to the voting decision, the recommendation from investment professionals must be made in writing to a member of Investment Stewardship Team.
To efficiency execute proxy voting for clients’ holdings, AB uses ISS to submit votes electronically.
Issuers initially send proxy information to the custodians of our client accounts. We instruct these custodian banks to direct proxy related materials to ISS’s offices. ISS provides us with research related to each resolution and pre-populates certain ballots based on the guidelines contained in this Policy. AB’s Investment Stewardship Team assesses the proposals via ISS’s web platform, Proxy Exchange, and submits all votes electronically. ISS then returns the proxy ballot forms to the designated returnee for tabulation. In addition, AB’s proxy votes are double-checked in a two-tiered approach. All votes are reviewed real-time by an offshore proxy review team to verify that the executed votes are aligned with our Policy. Votes for significant holdings, as defined by our stake, are additionally reviewed on a monthly basis by the Investment Stewardship Team to ensure their compliance with our Policy.
If necessary, any paper ballots we receive will be voted electronically or via mail or fax.
Share Blocking and Abstaining from Voting Client Securities
Proxy voting in certain countries requires “share blocking.” Shareholders wishing to vote their proxies must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting (usually one week) with a designated depositary.
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During this blocking period, shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares are returned to the clients’ custodian banks. We may determine that the value of exercising the vote is outweighed by the detriment of not being able to sell the shares during this period. In cases where we want to retain the ability to trade shares, we may determine to not vote those shares.
We seek to vote all proxies for securities held in client accounts for which we have proxy voting authority. However, in some markets administrative issues beyond our control may sometimes prevent us from voting such proxies. For example, we may receive meeting notices after the cut-off date for voting or without enough time to fully consider the proxy. Similarly, proxy materials for some issuers may not contain disclosure sufficient to arrive at a voting decision, in which cases we may abstain from voting. Some markets outside the US require periodic renewals of powers of attorney that local agents must have from our clients prior to implementing our voting instructions.
AB will abstain from voting (which generally requires submission of a proxy voting card) or affirmatively decide not to vote if AB determines that abstaining or not voting would be in the applicable client’s best interest. In making such a determination, AB will consider various factors, including, but not limited to: (i) the costs associated with exercising the proxy (e.g., translation or travel costs); (ii) any legal restrictions on trading resulting from the exercise of a proxy (e.g., share-blocking jurisdictions); (iii) whether AB’s clients have sold the underlying securities since the record date for the proxy; and (iv) whether casting a vote would not reasonably be expected to have a material effect on the value of the client’s investment.
Many of our clients have entered into securities lending arrangements with agent lenders to generate additional revenue. We will not be able to vote securities that are on loan under these types of arrangements. However, for AB managed funds, the agent lenders have standing instructions to recall all securities on loan systematically in a timely manner on a best effort basis in order for AB to vote the proxies on those previously loaned shares.
If you have questions or desire additional information about this Policy, please contact ProxyTeam@alliancebernstein.com
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Applicable Entities / Rules
| Applicable Entities: |
American Century Investment Management, Inc. | |
| Statutory/Regulatory: |
Investment Company Act §30(b), Rule 30b1-4; Investment Advisers Act §206, 206(4)-6 | |
| Effective Date(s): |
September/October 2004, Last Revised June 2025 | |
| Policy or Summary: |
Policy | |
| Related Summary: |
Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures | |
| Related Documents: |
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American Century Investment Management, Inc. (the “Adviser”) is the investment manager for a variety of advisory clients, including the American Century family of funds. In such capacity, the Adviser has been delegated the authority to vote proxies with respect to investments held in certain accounts it manages. The following is a statement of the proxy voting policies (the “Policies”) that have been adopted by the Adviser. In the exercise of proxy voting authority, which has been delegated to it by particular clients, the Adviser will apply the Policies in accordance with, and subject to, any specific policies that have been adopted by the client and communicated to and accepted by the Adviser in writing.
| I. | General Principles |
In providing the service of voting client proxies, the Adviser is guided by general fiduciary principles, must act prudently, solely in the interest of its clients, and must not subordinate client interests to unrelated objectives. Except as otherwise indicated in these Policies, the Adviser will use its best efforts to vote all proxies with respect to investments held in the client accounts it manages. Shares may not be voted if the cost or administrative burden of voting shares of a particular portfolio company in the judgment of the Advisor exceeds the benefit to fund shareholders. The Adviser will attempt to consider all factors of its vote that could affect the value of the investment.
Although in most instances the Adviser will vote proxies consistently across all client accounts, the votes will be based on the best interests of each client. As a result, accounts managed by the Adviser may at times vote differently on the same proposals. Examples of when an account’s vote might differ from other accounts managed by the Adviser include, but are not limited to, proxy contests and proposed mergers. In short, the Adviser will vote proxies in the manner that it believes will do the most to maximize shareholder value.
| A. | Non-U.S. Proxies |
The Adviser will generally evaluate non-U.S. proxies in the context of the Policies but will also, where feasible, take into consideration differing laws, regulations, and practices in the relevant foreign market in determining if and how to vote. There may also be circumstances when practicalities and costs involved with non-U.S. investing make it disadvantageous to vote shares. For instance, the
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Adviser generally does not vote proxies in circumstances where share blocking restrictions apply, when meeting attendance is required in person, or when current share ownership disclosure is required.
| B. | Stewardship and Engagement |
As long-term owners and as part of its stewardship efforts, the Adviser undertakes regular contact with portfolio company management to provide the Adviser an opportunity to gain additional information when voting proxies.
| C. | Proposals Involving Sustainability Matters |
The Adviser will vote with the expectation of maximizing shareholder value and believes that certain sustainability issues can potentially impact a company’s long-term financial performance. On a case-by-case basis, the financial materiality and potential risks or economic impact of the sustainability issues underpinning proxy proposals are considered and it is ultimately each team’s portfolio managers that are responsible for making the voting decision.
The portfolio management teams for portfolios that have sustainability considerations in their mandates can place emphasis around those considerations when voting proxies with the objective of enhancing outcomes.
| D. | Exception Voting |
The Adviser reserves the right to vote contrary to the Policies when, in its opinion, the vote will do the most to maximize the investment objective of the account.
| II. | Specific Proxy Matters |
| A. | Routine Matters |
| 1. | Election of Directors |
| a) | Generally. (i)The Adviser will generally support the election of directors that results in a board made up of a majority of independent directors. (ii) In general, the Adviser will vote in favor of management’s director nominees if they are running unopposed. The Adviser believes that management is in the best position to evaluate the qualifications of directors and the needs and dynamics of a particular board. (iii) When management’s nominees are opposed in a proxy contest, the Adviser will evaluate which nominees’ publicly announced management policies and goals are most likely to maximize shareholder value, as well as the past performance of the incumbents. (iv)The Adviser maintains the ability to vote against any candidate whom it believes is not qualified or if there are specific concerns about the individual, such as allegations of criminal wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities. (v) Additional information the Adviser may consider concerning director nominees include, but is not limited to, whether (1) there is an |
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| adequate explanation for repeated absences at board meetings, (2) the nominee receives non-board fee compensation, or (3) there is a family relationship between the nominee and the company’s chief executive officer or controlling shareholder, and/or (4) the nominee has sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively in light of the nominee’s service on other public company boards. |
| b) | Committee Service. The Adviser will withhold votes for non-independent directors who serve on the audit and/or compensation committees of the board. |
| c) | Classification of Boards. The Adviser believes classified boards represent a form of anti-takeover device, which is generally not in the interests of minority shareholders. Accordingly, the Adviser will generally support proposals that seek to declassify boards. Additionally, the Adviser will oppose efforts to adopt classified board structures. |
| d) | Majority Independent Board. The Adviser will support proposals calling for a majority of independent directors on a board. The Adviser believes that a majority of independent directors can help to facilitate objective decision making and enhance accountability to shareholders. |
| e) | Majority Vote Standard for Director Elections. The Adviser will generally vote in favor of proposals calling for directors to be elected by an affirmative majority of the votes cast in a board election, provided that the proposal allows for a plurality voting standard in the case of contested elections. The Adviser may consider voting against such shareholder proposals where a company’s board has adopted an alternative measure, such as a director resignation policy, that provides a meaningful alternative to the majority voting standard and appropriately addresses situations where an incumbent director fails to receive the support of the majority of the votes cast in an uncontested election. |
| f) | Separate CEO and Chair. The Adviser will generally vote against shareholder proposals requesting an independent chair if the board is majority independent. Conversely, if the board is not majority independent, the Adviser will generally vote in favor of management proposals to separate the roles of CEO and chair of the board of directors. |
| g) | Withholding Campaigns. The Adviser will generally support proposals calling for shareholders to withhold votes for directors where such actions will advance the principles set forth in paragraphs 1(a) through 1(f) above. |
| h) | Director Indemnification. The Adviser will generally vote in favor of a corporation’s proposal to indemnify its officers and directors in accordance with applicable state law. Indemnification arrangements are often necessary to attract and retain qualified directors. |
| 2. | Ratification of Selection of Auditors |
The Adviser will generally rely on the judgment of the portfolio company’s audit committee in selecting the independent auditors who will provide the best service to the company. The Adviser believes that independence of the auditors is paramount and will vote against auditors
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whose independence appears to be impaired. The Adviser will generally vote against proposed auditors in circumstances where the auditor has or may have a potential conflict of interest, including where: (a) an auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; (b) non-audit fees are excessive compared to audit fees (c) the audit firm’s tenure is excessively long; or (d) there is reason to believe that the independent auditor has previously rendered an opinion to the company that is either inaccurate or not indicative of the company’s financial position.
| B. | Compensation Matters |
| 1. | Executive and Director Compensation |
| a) | Advisory Vote on Compensation. The Adviser believes there are several effective ways to convey concerns about compensation including voting against the advisory vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay proposals), voting against specific incentive plans or amendments to incentive plans it deems excessive or withholding votes from compensation committee members. The Adviser will consider and vote on a case-by-case basis on say-on-pay proposals and will generally support management proposals unless there are inadequate risk-mitigation features or other specific concerns exist, including if the Adviser concludes that executive compensation is (i) misaligned with shareholder interests, (ii) unreasonable in amount, or (iii) not in the aggregate meaningfully tied to the company’s performance. |
| b) | Frequency of Advisory Votes on Compensation. The Adviser generally supports the triennial option for the frequency of say-on-pay proposals, but will consider management recommendations for an alternative approach. |
| c) | Clawback of Incentive Compensation. The Adviser expects portfolio companies to structure executive compensation plans in a manner that does not encourage excessive risk-taking or insulate management from the consequences of failures of risk management and oversight. The Adviser generally supports properly-structured clawback provisions in executive compensation plans as a way to mitigate the potential for excessive risk taking. In evaluating compensation clawback proposals, the Adviser will consider whether the company has a history of financial restatements, material financial problems, and any other factors deemed relevant. |
| d) | Directors’ Stock Options Plans. The Adviser believes that stock options are an appropriate form of compensation for directors, and the Adviser will generally vote for director stock option plans that are reasonable and do not result in excessive shareholder dilution. Analysis of such proposals will be made on a case-by-case basis and will take into account total board compensation and the company’s total exposure to stock option plan dilution. |
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| 2. | Equity Based Compensation Plans |
The Adviser believes that equity-based compensation plans are economically significant issues upon which shareholders are entitled to vote. The Adviser recognizes that equity-based compensation plans can be useful in attracting and retaining desirable employees. The cost associated with such plans must be measured if plans are to be used appropriately to maximize shareholder value. The Adviser may conduct an analysis of stock option, stock bonus or similar plans or material amendments thereto, including replenishing a with additional shares.
Features that may result in the Adviser voting against the initial adoption of a plan or subsequent amendment to replenish the plan with additional shares include whether the plan:
| a) | Provides for immediate vesting of all stock options in the event of a change of control of the company without reasonable safeguards against abuse (see “Anti-Takeover Proposals” below); |
| b) | Resets outstanding stock options at a lower strike price, unless accompanied by a corresponding and proportionate reduction in the number of shares designated. The Adviser will generally oppose adoption of stock option plans that explicitly or historically permit repricing of stock options, regardless of the number of shares reserved for issuance, since their effect is impossible to evaluate; |
| c) | Establishes restriction periods shorter than three years for restricted stock grants; |
| d) | Does not reasonably associate awards to performance of the company (especially as it relates to the selection of appropriate vesting metrics, which ideally should contain both absolute and relative measures); or |
| e) | Is excessively dilutive to the company. Factors that will be considered in the determination include the company’s overall market capitalization, the performance of the company relative to its peers, and the maturity of the company and its industry; for example, technology companies often use options broadly throughout its employee base, which may justify somewhat greater dilution. |
| 3. | Non-Stock Incentive Plans |
Management may propose a variety of non-stock, cash-based incentive or bonus plans to stimulate employee performance. In general, the cash or other corporate assets required for most incentive plans is not material, and the Adviser will vote in favor of such proposals. Case-by-case determinations will be made of the appropriateness of the amount of shareholder value transferred by proposed plans.
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| C. | Shareholder Rights |
| 1. | One Share, One Vote. The Adviser generally supports proposals to equalize the voting rights of shareholders, including the elimination of special or super voting share classes and the establishment of single-class voting structures. |
| 2. | Right to Call Special Shareholder Meetings. The corporation statutes of many states allow minority shareholders at a certain threshold level of ownership to call a special meeting of shareholders. This right can be eliminated (or the threshold increased) by amendment to the company’s charter documents. The Adviser believes that the right to call a special shareholder meeting is significant for minority shareholders; the elimination of such right will be viewed as an anti- takeover measure and the Adviser will generally vote against proposals attempting to eliminate this right and for proposals attempting to restore it. |
| 3. | Right to Act by Written Consent. The Adviser will generally vote for proposals to permit shareholders to act by written consent if the company does not currently permit shareholders to call for a special meeting or to act by written consent. The Adviser will generally vote against proposals on written consent if the company permits shareholders the right to call for a special meeting. |
| 4. | Proxy Access. The Adviser believes that the ability of qualifying shareholders to nominate a certain number of directors on the company’s proxy statement may have corporate governance benefits. Accordingly, the Adviser will generally vote in favor of proposals to adopt proxy access rules offering a balanced set of limitations. When considering such proposals, the factors taken into account will include the following: (i) the ownership percentages and holding periods proposed; (ii) the maximum proportion of directors that shareholders may nominate each year; and (iii) any other material restrictions included in the proposal. |
| D. | Anti-Takeover Proposals |
In general, the Adviser will vote against any proposal, whether made by management or shareholders, which the Adviser believes would materially discourage a potential acquisition or takeover. In most cases an acquisition or takeover of a particular company will increase share value. The adoption of anti-takeover measures may prevent or frustrate a bid from being made, may prevent consummation of the acquisition, and may have a negative effect on share price when no acquisition proposal is pending. In particular circumstances, the Adviser may vote in favor of some forms of control protective measures if they are responsive to a particular circumstance, are narrowly focused and have a sunset provision reasonably tied to the circumstances.
The items below discuss specific anti-takeover proposals.
| 1. | Staggered Board |
If a company has a “staggered board,” its directors are elected for terms of more than one year and only a segment of the board stands for election in any year. Therefore, a potential
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acquiror cannot replace the entire board in one year even if it controls a majority of the votes. Although staggered boards may provide some degree of continuity and stability of leadership and direction to the board of directors, the Adviser believes that staggered boards are primarily an anti-takeover device and will vote against establishing them and for eliminating them. However, the Adviser does not necessarily vote against the re-election of directors serving on staggered boards.
| 2. | Cumulative Voting |
Cumulative voting gives minority shareholders a stronger voice in the company and a greater chance for representation especially when a company maintains a staggered or classified board.
Accordingly, if a company has a staggered board, the Adviser will: a) vote in favor of any proposal to adopt cumulative voting, and b) vote against any proposal to eliminate cumulative voting that is already in place.
| 3. | “Blank Check” Preferred Stock |
Blank check preferred stock gives the board of directors the ability to issue preferred stock, without further shareholder approval, with such rights, preferences, privileges and restrictions as may be set by the board. In response to a hostile takeover attempt, the board could issue such stock to a friendly party or “white knight” or could establish conversion rights or other rights in the preferred stock which would dilute the common stock and make an acquisition impossible or less attractive. The argument in favor of blank check preferred stock is that it gives the board flexibility in pursuing financing, acquisitions or other proper corporate purposes without incurring the time or expense of a shareholder vote. Generally, the Adviser will vote against blank check preferred stock. However, the Adviser may vote in favor of blank check preferred stock if the proxy statement discloses that such stock is limited to use for a specific, proper corporate objective such as a financing instrument.
| 4. | Elimination of Preemptive Rights |
When a company grants preemptive rights, existing shareholders are given an opportunity to maintain their proportional ownership when new shares are issued. A proposal to eliminate preemptive rights is a request from management to revoke that right.
While preemptive rights will protect the shareholder from having its equity diluted, it may also decrease a company’s ability to raise capital through stock offerings or use stock for acquisitions or other proper corporate purposes. Preemptive rights may therefore result in a lower market value for the company’s stock. In the long term, shareholders could be adversely affected by preemptive rights. The Adviser generally votes against proposals to grant preemptive rights, and for proposals to eliminate preemptive rights.
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| 5. | Non-targeted Share Repurchase |
A non-targeted share repurchase is generally used by company management to prevent the value of stock held by existing shareholders from deteriorating. A non-targeted share repurchase may reflect management’s belief in the favorable business prospects of the company. The Adviser finds no disadvantageous effects of a non-targeted share repurchase and will generally vote for the approval of a non-targeted share repurchase subject to analysis of the company’s financial condition.
| 6. | Increase in Authorized Common Stock |
The issuance of new common stock can also be viewed as an anti-takeover measure, although its effect on shareholder value would appear to be less significant than the adoption of blank check preferred stock. The Adviser will evaluate the amount of the proposed increase and the purpose or purposes for which the increase is sought. If the increase is not excessive and is sought for proper corporate purposes, the Adviser will generally vote to approve the increase. Proper corporate purposes might include, for example, the creation of additional stock to accommodate a stock split or stock dividend, additional stock required for a proposed acquisition, or additional stock required to be reserved upon exercise of employee stock option plans or employee stock purchase plans. Generally, the Adviser will vote in favor of an increase in authorized common stock of up to 100% outstanding and otherwise reserved for all legitimate corporate purposes; increases in excess of 100% are evaluated on a case-by-case basis and will be voted affirmatively if management has provided sound justification for the increase.
| 7. | “Supermajority” Voting Provisions or Super Voting Share Classes |
A “supermajority” voting provision is a provision placed in a company’s charter documents which would require approval by the vote of greater than a simple majority (generally ranging from 66% to 90%) of shareholder votes to approve any type of acquisition of the company.
The supermajority provision makes an acquisition more time-consuming and expensive for the acquiror. Accordingly, the Adviser will generally vote against the introduction of supermajority provisions and in favor of their removal.
| 8. | “Fair Price” Amendments |
Fair price amendments are another type of charter amendment that would require an offeror to pay a “fair” and uniform price to all shareholders in an acquisition. In general, fair price amendments are designed to protect shareholders from coercive, two-tier tender offers in which some shareholders may be merged out on disadvantageous terms. Fair price amendments also have an anti-takeover impact, although their adoption is generally believed to have less of a negative effect on stock price than other anti-takeover measures. The Adviser will carefully examine all fair price proposals. In general, the Adviser will vote against fair price proposals unless the Adviser concludes that it is likely that the share price will not be negatively affected, and the proposal will not discourage acquisition proposals.
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| 9. | Poison Pills or Shareholder Rights Plans |
Some companies have retained some version of a poison pill plan (also known as a shareholder rights plan). Poison pill plans generally provide for the issuance of additional equity securities or rights to purchase equity securities upon the occurrence of certain events the company board deems hostile, such as the acquisition of a large block of stock.
The basic argument against poison pills is that they depress share value, discourage offers for the company and serve to “entrench” management. The basic argument in favor of poison pills is that they give management more time and leverage to deal with a takeover bid and, as a result, shareholders may receive a better price. The Adviser believes that the potential benefits of a poison pill plan are outweighed by the potential detriments. The Adviser will generally vote against all forms of poison pills.
The Adviser will, however, consider on a case-by-case basis poison pills that are very limited in time and preclusive effect. The Adviser will generally vote in favor of such a poison pill if it is linked to a business strategy that will – in the Adviser’s view – likely result in greater value for shareholders, if the term is less than three years, and if shareholder approval is required to reinstate the expired plan or adopt a new plan at the end of this term.
| 10. | Change in Control Agreements |
Change in control (golden parachute) agreements provide substantial compensation to executives who are terminated as a result of a takeover or change in control of their company. The existence of such plans in reasonable amounts probably has only a slight anti-takeover effect. In voting, the Adviser will evaluate the specifics of the plan presented. Features that may result in the Adviser voting against the adoption or extension of such an agreement include the following: (a) single-trigger or modified-single-trigger cash severance; (b) single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards; (c) excessive cash severance (greater than 3X base salary and bonus), especially when triggering adverse tax consequences for the recipient, the company, or both; (d) excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable (as opposed to a provision that provides excise tax gross-ups); (e) excessive change in control payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value; (f) recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or (g) the company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the change in control advisory vote.
| 11. | Reincorporation |
Reincorporation in a new state is often proposed as one part of a package of anti-takeover measures. Several states provide some type of legislation that greatly discourages takeovers. The Adviser will examine reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis.
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Generally, if the Adviser believes that the reincorporation will result in greater protection from takeovers, the reincorporation proposal will be opposed. The Adviser will also generally oppose reincorporation proposals involving jurisdictions that specify that directors can recognize non-shareholder interests over those of shareholders. When reincorporation is proposed for a legitimate business purpose and without the negative effects identified above, the Adviser will generally vote affirmatively.
| 12. | Confidential Voting |
Companies that have not previously adopted a “confidential voting” policy allow management to view the results of shareholder votes. This gives management the opportunity to contact those shareholders voting against management in an effort to change their votes.
Proponents of secret ballots argue that confidential voting enables shareholders to vote on all issues on the basis of merit without pressure from management to influence their decision. Opponents argue that confidential voting is more expensive and unnecessary; also, holding shares in a nominee name maintains shareholders’ confidentiality. The Adviser believes that the only way to insure anonymity of votes is through confidential voting, and that the benefits of confidential voting outweigh the incremental additional cost of administering a confidential voting system. Therefore, the Adviser will generally vote in favor of any proposal to adopt confidential voting.
| 13. | Opting In or Out of State Takeover Laws |
State takeover laws typically are designed to make it more difficult to acquire a corporation organized in that state. The Adviser believes that the decision of whether or not to accept or reject offers of merger or acquisition should be made by the shareholders, without unreasonably restrictive state laws that may impose ownership thresholds or waiting periods on potential acquirors. Therefore, the Adviser will generally vote in favor of opting out of restrictive state takeover laws.
| E. | Transaction-Related Proposals |
The Adviser will review transaction related proposals, such as mergers, acquisitions, and corporate reorganizations, on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the impact of the transaction on each client account. In some instances, such as the approval of a proposed merger, a transaction may have a differential impact on client accounts depending on the securities held in each account. For example, whether a merger is in the best interest of a client account may be influenced by whether an account holds, and in what proportion, the stock of both the acquirer and the acquiror. In these circumstances, the Adviser may determine that it is in the best interests of the accounts to vote the accounts’ shares differently on proposals related to the same transaction.
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| F. | Other Matters |
| 1. | Shareholder-sponsored proposals. Proposals introduced by shareholders will be evaluated for linkage between the proposal, its economic impact, and its potential to maximize long-term shareholder value. Where the economic impact of a proposal is unclear, the Adviser will generally rely on management’s assessment of the proposal if the Adviser believes the assessment is reasonable. |
| 2. | Anti-Greenmail Shareholder Proposals. “Anti-greenmail” proposals generally limit the right of a corporation, without a shareholder vote, to pay a premium or buy out a 5% or greater shareholder. Management often argues that they should not be restricted from negotiating a deal to buy out a significant shareholder at a premium if they believe it is in the best interest of the company. Institutional shareholders generally believe that all shareholders should be able to vote on such a significant use of corporate assets. The Adviser believes that any repurchase by the company at a premium price of a large block of stock should be subject to a shareholder vote. Accordingly, it will generally vote in favor of anti-greenmail proposals. |
| 3. | Director Tenure. Director Tenure proposals ask that age and term restrictions be placed on the board of directors. The Adviser believes that these types of blanket restrictions are not necessarily in the best interests of shareholders and therefore will consider and assess such measures as appropriate. |
| 4. | Director Share Ownership. The Adviser will generally vote against shareholder proposals that would require directors to hold a minimum number of the company’s shares to serve on the board of directors, in the belief that such ownership should be at the discretion of board members. |
| III. | Securities on Loan |
The Adviser shall use commercially reasonable efforts to monitor for material proxy votes with respect to loaned securities. In the event the Adviser has timely knowledge of a material vote, the Adviser will attempt to recall the loaned securities and submit a proxy in accordance with these proxy guidelines. Efforts to recall loaned securities may not be successful and there can be no guarantee that a valid proxy will be submitted in all cases.
| IV. | Use of Proxy Advisory Services |
The Adviser may retain proxy advisory firms to provide services in connection with voting proxies, including, without limitation, to provide information on shareholder meeting dates and proxy materials, translate proxy materials printed in a foreign language, provide research on proxy proposals and voting recommendations in accordance with the Policies, provide systems to assist with casting the proxy votes, and provide reports and assist with preparation of filings concerning the proxies voted.
Prior to the selection of a proxy advisory firm and periodically thereafter, the Adviser will consider whether the proxy advisory firm has the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues and the ability
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to make recommendations based on material accurate information in an impartial manner. Such considerations may include some or all of the following (i) periodic sampling of votes cast through the firm’s systems to determine that votes are in accordance with the Adviser’s Policies and its clients best interests, (ii) onsite visits to the proxy advisory firm’s office and/or discussions with the firm to determine whether the firm continues to have the resources (e.g. staffing, personnel, technology, etc.) capacity and competency to carry out its obligations to the Adviser, (iii) a review of the firm’s policies and procedures, with a focus on those relating to identifying and addressing conflicts of interest and monitoring that current and accurate information is used in creating recommendations, (iv) requesting that the firm notify the Adviser if there is a change in the firm’s material policies and procedures, particularly with respect to conflicts, or material business practices (e.g., entering or exiting new lines of business), and reviewing any such change, and (v) in case of an error made by the firm, discussing the error with the firm and determining whether appropriate corrective and preventative action is being taken. In the event the Adviser discovers an error in the research or voting recommendations provided by the firm, it will take reasonable steps to investigate the error and seek to determine whether the firm is taking reasonable steps to reduce similar errors in the future.
While the Adviser takes into account information from many different sources, including independent proxy advisory services, the decision on how to vote proxies will be made in accordance with these Policies.
| V. | Monitoring Potential Conflicts of Interest |
The Adviser is responsible for monitoring and resolving possible conflicts between the interests of the Adviser and those of its clients with respect to proxy voting. The Adviser has adopted safeguards to address the potential that our proxy voting could be influenced by interests other than those of our fund shareholders and clients. Since our Policies are predetermined by the Adviser, application of the Policies to vote clients’ proxies should in most instances adequately address any possible conflicts of interest. However, for proxy votes inconsistent with the Policies, the Adviser’s Proxy Voting Committee reviews all such proxy votes to determine whether the portfolio manager’s voting rationale appears reasonable and is consistent with the general principles of the Policies. The Proxy Voting Committee also assesses whether certain business or other significant relationships between the Adviser and a company could have influenced an inconsistent vote on that company’s proxy. Issues raising possible conflicts of interest are referred to the Proxy Voting Committee for immediate resolution prior to the time the Adviser casts its vote. With respect to personal conflicts of interest, the Adviser’s Code of Ethics requires all employees to avoid placing themselves in a compromising position where their interests may conflict with those of our clients and restricts their ability to engage in certain outside business activities. Portfolio managers and other personnel involved with proxy voting with a personal conflict of interest regarding a particular proxy vote must recuse themselves and not participate in the voting decisions with respect to that proxy.
In addition, to avoid any potential conflict of interest that may arise when the Adviser votes proxies of a fund, portfolio, or other account (Adviser-Voted Portfolio”) that owns shares of an American Century fund, the Adviser will “echo vote” such shares, if possible. Echo voting means the Adviser will vote the shares in the same proportion as the vote of all the other holders of the fund’s shares. So, for example, if shareholders of a fund cast 80% of their votes in favor of a proposal and 20% against the proposal, any Adviser-Voted Portfolio that owns shares of such fund will cast 80% of its shares in favor of the proposal and 20% against.
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When this is not possible, shares will be voted in consultation with the Adviser-Voted Portfolio client or an appropriate fiduciary responsible for the client (e.g., a committee of the independent directors of a fund or the trustee of a retirement plan).
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The Policies will be examined from time to time and may be amended by the Adviser. With respect to matters that do not fit in the categories stated above, the Adviser will exercise its best judgment as a fiduciary to vote in the manner that will most enhance shareholder value.
Case-by-case determinations will be made by the Adviser. Electronic records will be kept of all votes made.
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IMPORTANT INFORMATION: Following the combination of BNP Paribas Asset Management (BNPP AM) and AXA Investment Managers (AXA IM), we are currently working to develop a new sustainability approach. This document applies to the eligible investment portfolios of whole scope of BNPP AM as of 1st of January 2026 (including previous AXA IM portfolios).
For information on the application of this policy to a specific fund (including applicable methodology), please refer to the relevant product’s legal documentation. These documents can be found on the relevant Funds pages available on our website.
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BNP Paribas Asset Management (BNPP AM)‘s approach to corporate governance derives from our belief that company management, directors and investors all have critical yet unique roles to play in sustaining the health of financial markets and ensuring the efficient allocation of capital. As an investor with a widely diversified portfolio and long-term horizons, we believe that sustainable corporate governance increases the resilience of our investments and creates the framework to enable that a corporation is managed in the long-term interests of its stakeholders. Voting at General Meetings and promoting good corporate governance standards is a key component of our stewardship of companies in which we invest, and a right given to shareholders. As such, we intend to exercise our voting rights in a responsible manner in order to deliver the best outcomes to our clients. We consider this to be central to our fiduciary duty.
Corporate governance refers to the system by which a corporation is directed and controlled. It relates to the functioning of the managing board, supervision and control mechanisms, their inter-relationships and their relationships with stakeholders. Therefore, BNPP AM expects all corporations in which we invest to comply with high corporate governance standards as described in this policy.
This policy provides the foundation for BNPP AM’s proxy voting and company engagement, as well as for participation in related public policy discussions related to governance. We are committed to ensuring that the principles described in this policy are consistently1 exercised across portfolios and markets. However, in applying these principles, we are cognisant that companies are dynamic and a “one size fits all” approach is not always appropriate. We therefore take into account specific circumstances relating to individual companies such as geographic and regulatory differences, as well as size, and the ongoing engagement with the management and directors of the company concerned.
OUR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
Our approach to voting is governed by a set of six principles focused on:
| | Long-term sustainable value creation |
| | The protection of shareholder rights |
| | Independent, effective and accountable board structures |
| | The alignment of incentive structure with the long-term interests of stakeholders |
| | Respect for society and the environment |
| | The disclosure of accurate, adequate, and timely information. |
The first section of this document outlines our key governance and proxy voting principles. The second section sets out the guidelines related to key expectations that we take into consideration when making our voting decision. The third section summarises how environmental and social considerations are integrated into our voting decisions. The final section describes our proxy voting process.
The following principles describe BNPP AM’s expectations of the listed companies in which we invest. They act as a guiding framework by which BNPP AM executes its ownership responsibilities.
1. FOCUS ON LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE VALUE CREATION
The Board of Directors plays a critical oversight role to ensure that companies deliver long-term sustainable value, in balance with the interests of society and the environment. Corporate governance practices ensure the board’s attention remains focused on this goal, with a clear strategy that takes into account all key
| 1 | Subject to technical and legal constraints. |
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stakeholders. Boards should maintain an open dialogue with investors and be prepared to discuss their long-term plans for sustainable value creation.
2. PROTECT SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
Shareholders play a key role in the system of corporate accountability and value creation. Our rights as shareholders allow us to take action to defend the interests of our clients when companies fall short of our expectations. It is therefore critical that shareholder rights be preserved and, where necessary, strengthened. In that respect, companies should ensure that the rights of all investors are protected and should treat investors equitably, notably by respecting the principle of one share — one vote — one dividend. All shareholders should be given the opportunity to vote on decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes and capital increases should be carefully controlled to minimise the dilution of existing shareholders. Anti-takeover devices should not be used and shareholders should have opportunities to address material concerns, including through direct access to proxy votes to nominate directors and through the submission of shareholder proposals.
3. ENSURE INDEPENDENT, EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE BOARD STRUCTURE
There should be a sufficiently counter-balancing structure of the Board and its committees, featuring a strong presence of qualified, engaged, diverse and independent directors to enable objective and effective oversight of the management, supported by independent leadership. Formal evaluation of the Board, executive sessions and succession plans should be in place. Board composition should include a range of directors who, individually and collectively, have the skills, knowledge, expertise necessary to understand the company’s strategy and address emerging risks facing the company and its key stakeholders.
4. ALIGN INCENTIVE STRUCTURES WITH LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF STAKEHOLDERS
Executive compensation plans should be aligned with the long-term performance of the company, and should discourage irresponsible risk-taking, strengthen employee loyalty, take into consideration their impact on inequality and aim to foster inclusive growth. They should include robust financial and non-financial targets, including those relating to the key sustainability risks and opportunities presented by the company’s business model. Compensation programmes should not restrict the company’s ability to attract and retain talented executives, but should respect best market practices and not be disproportionate with regards to performance and peer group. They should be disclosed to shareholders clearly and thoroughly, and be subject to shareholder approval.
5. ENSURE RESPECT FOR SOCIETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Long-term sustainable returns depend on proactive and effective management of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) risks and opportunities to ensure that growth is not at the expense of social and environmental health and stability. As a long-term investor, we expect companies to understand the risks they face and create, as well as the opportunities that better ESG performance might bring to their businesses, and to act responsibly towards all stakeholders. All companies should strive to meet high corporate ESG standards to protect stakeholders’ long-term interests.
6. DISCLOSE ACCURATE, ADEQUATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION
Companies should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on financial and operating results, ownership issues, lobbying activities and performance on key ESG issues, including full disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and commitments to combatting climate change. Corporate reporting
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should aim to provide investors with an accurate and holistic view of foreseeable risks to the company, as well as the company’s contribution to the health and stability of key social and environmental systems. Annual audits of the financial statements carried out on behalf of shareholders by independent external auditors should be required for all companies.
These guidelines detail how BNPP AM will vote on the most common proxy voting items. They address key voting issues, which fall into seven groups:
| 1. | Reports and approval of accounts |
| 2. | Financial operations |
| 3. | Board elections |
| 4. | Remuneration |
| 5. | Environmental and social proposals |
| 6. | Shareholder proposals |
| 7. | Other relevant issues (e.g., related-party transactions). |
For each issue, these guidelines highlight criteria that reflect or tend towards best practices and that we actively support, as well as potential issues of concerns that may trigger an opposition, depending on the specific circumstances of each company.
| 1. | REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS |
In a well-functioning market, which enables investors to perform their fiduciary role vis-a-vis clients’ assets, it is critical that investment decisions which impact the allocation of capital be based on full and accurate information.
| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
| Financial Statements / Director and Auditor Reports | Information provided by the Board presents a full and fair view of company affairs and financial situation, is easily accessible, and disclosed sufficiently in advance of the general meeting2.
The accounts have been reviewed by a majority independent audit committee. The committee should be chaired by an independent director, with no executive and comprised financial experts.
Independent external assurance is carried out annually and the company provides adequate disclosures on key financial and extra-financial risks. |
The accounts are not available in a timely manner.
There are serious concerns about the integrity of the information provided (e.g. the auditors express reservations or refuse to certify the accounts after having discovered serious irregularities...). |
| 2 | For the annual general meeting at least 28 days before the event. |
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| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
| Allocation of Income | The company has provided sufficient information to indicate the level of dividend.
The payout ratio is sustainable with a reasonable pay-out ratio that does not undermine the company’s capacity to invest for the future and does not affect the remuneration of other stakeholders.
Where the dividend is paid in shares, the shareholder has the option to be paid in cash. |
The company does not disclose its income allocation proposal.
The payout ratio is considered excessive. | ||
| Discharge of Board and Management | There is no contentious issue relating to the board or the management of the company. |
There are serious questions about actions of the Board or management for the year in question.
Legal action is being taken against the Board
The auditors had serious reservations about the financial statements or refused to certify the accounts.
The company is in breach of our environmental and social expectations detailed in part III. | ||
| Appointment of Auditors and Audit Fees | The Board and its Audit Committee have implemented a rigorous auditor selection process, based on objective criteria. The selection process and its outcome are disclosed transparently to provide investors with sufficient confidence in the quality of the assurance process.
The audit committee has disclosed its policy for the provision of non-audit services by the auditors (e.g., excluded services and pre-approval works).
There is full disclosure of fees paid to the auditors, with a breakdown between audit, sustainability audit and non-audit fees.
The auditors do not provide advisory services. Otherwise, the remuneration for advisory services does not cast doubt on the auditor’s independence.
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The amount of non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive and no reasonable explanation is provided.
Auditors’ tenure exceeds 24 years.
Auditors’ length of term exceeds 6 years.
There is reason to believe that the independent auditor gave an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position.
Removal or resignation of the former auditor is not explained. |
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| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
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There is periodic rotation of the auditors, to enhance the integrity and reliability of the external audit process.
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| 2. | FINANCIAL OPERATIONS |
Major changes to the core businesses of a corporation and other corporate changes which may in substance or effect, dilute the equity or erode the economic interests or share ownership rights of existing shareholders, including mergers, acquisitions, disposals, and issuance of equity should not be made without prior shareholder approval.
| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
| Authority to issue shares or securities giving access to capital | The authority respects the ‘one share — one vote — one dividend’ principle.
The authority is suitably limited to avoid the dilution risk for current shareholders. |
Requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super voting shares.
General authority with pre-emptive rights exceeds 50% of issued share capital3.
General authority without pre-emptive rights and without priority rights exceeds 10% of issued share capital.
The authority is likely to be used as an anti-take-over measure. | ||
| Share Repurchase Plan | Share repurchase represents the best use of company resources and is limited both in volume and duration, the discount is limited and the authorisation does not exceed 5 years. | The repurchase limit exceeds 10% of issued share capital4.
The holding limit exceeds 10% of a company’s issued share capital in treasury (“on the shelf”).
The duration exceeds 5 years. | ||
| Debt restructuring | The level of dilution given the full conversion of securities is not excessive. | Dilution risk is too high for the ownership interests of existing shareholders and to future earnings.
Bankruptcy or the threat of bankruptcy is the main factor driving the restructuring. | ||
| Merger and acquisitions | Given the complex nature of most merger & acquisition proposals, these activities will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with the relevant fund managers, from a transparency, corporate governance and financial point of view. The limits concerning capital increases will not apply in merger cases. Issues that will be taken into account, where sufficient information is available, include:
The rationale driving the transaction, commercial and strategic sense
The impact of the merger on shareholder value
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| 3 | We apply a limit of 66% for the UK |
| 4 | Including shares held by subsidiaries. We apply a limit of 15% for the UK due to the local code |
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| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
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The offer price i.e., cost vs. premium
Financial viability of the combined companies as a single entity and the associated integration risks
An analysis of the arm’s length nature of the transaction, potential conflicts of interest and an assessment of the deal maker’s ‘good faith’
The presence or lack of a fairness opinion
The proposed changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights
The impact on community stakeholders and employees in both workforces
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| Corporate Restructuring | Votes concerning corporate restructuring are considered non-routine and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Issues that will be taken into account include the shareholder value impact, the absence of conflicts of interests among the various parties, the absence of significant imbalances between categories of shareholders
Spin-offs
Potential tax and regulatory advantages
Planned use of proceeds
Market focus and managerial incentives
Asset sales
Impact on the balance sheet and working capital
Value received for the asset and the potential elimination of diseconomies
Liquidations
Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives
Appraisal value of the assets
The compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation
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| 3. | BOARD ELECTIONS |
We consider the Board to be the cornerstone of good corporate governance as it is the decision-making body charged with overseeing a company’s affairs on behalf of its owners. As such, we push companies we invest in to constitute boards whose approach enables the creation of long-term sustainable value, taking into account the management and supervision of strategic, operational and material financial and non-financial factors and the interests of key stakeholders.
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| Key principles | Potential concerns | |
The Board of Directors is structured so as to appropriately represent the interests of minority shareholders.
The Chair and CEO roles are split and the Chair is independent.
Directors stand for election by shareholders on a regular basis, ideally annually, to ensure accountability.
There is sufficient diversity of skills, knowledge, experience, gender and nationality among the directors to engender debate and innovation.
The Board size is sufficient to facilitate engaged debate between directors.
There is an open and transparent dialogue between the Board, the management team, and its investors.
Directors have sufficient time to devote to their role. They are expected to attend and actively contribute to all board and committee (if any) meetings held.
The Board has established specialised committees that are unconflicted and sufficiently independent to provide advice to the Board on specific issues that might require specific expertise, including:
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There is insufficient biographical information on proposed directors.
Directors’ appointments exceed a four-year mandate.
For non-controlled companies, the candidate is not independent5 and the Board comprises less than 50% independent directors excluding employee representatives. For controlled companies or in cases where a Board has at least 50% of compulsory employee representatives, a different independence threshold can be applied depending on local code and market practice (with a minimum of 33%).
Key committees are not majority independent.
The candidate is both Chair and CEO of the company, and robust counterpower mechanisms have not been implemented6.
For mature markets, fewer than 40% of directors are of the underrepresented gender; for other markets, this proportion is lower than 20%7.
The Board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse composition8.
There is a dual-class share system with differential voting rights.9 |
| 5 | Factors that may compromise independence include: The Director represents a significant shareholder or is related by close family ties to a corporate officer, is an employee or officer of the corporation, is an employee or director of its parent or a company that was acquired within the previous five years, is a chief executive officer of another company (Company B) if one of the following requirements is met: The concerned company (Company A) is directly or indirectly controlled by Company B; an employee or executive of Company A is a director of Company B (within the past 5 years); is a customer, supplier, investment banker or commercial banker of material importance to the corporation or its group, or depends for a significant part of its business on the corporation or its group accounts, has been an auditor of the corporation within the previous five years; has served as a director of the corporation for 12 years or more (or less, depending on local code). |
| 6 | Decision are taken on a case-by-case basis. Robust counterpower mechanisms require presence of a strong lead independent director with wide responsibilities (i.e., the ability to call extraordinary board meeting, to add items to meeting’s agenda, to engage with shareholders and convene meeting without the presence of executives) and a majority independent Board and key committees. |
| 7 | Mature markets: Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Exceptions can be applied if the percentage of underrepresented gender is below the treshold (betwwen 25-40% for mature markets or 10-20% for other marktets) on a case-by-case basis. |
| 8 | For North America and UK/Ireland. |
| 9 | Exception possible if the sunset clause comes into force within 5 years of the IPO. |
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| Key principles | Potential concerns | |
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¡ A Nomination committee that evaluates the composition and functioning of the Board, oversees succession planning of the CEO and the Board, and make recommendation on directors’ (re)appointment.
¡ A Remuneration Committee that determines the company’s remuneration philosophy and design remuneration policies aligning the interest of management with those of long-term shareholders.
¡ An Audit Committee that oversees the company’s process for internal controls and financial reporting, and provide assurances to shareholders on the integrity, objectivity and independence of the external audit process.
There is robust disclosure on the desired ESG skills, and how nominees contribute to the overall Board’s expertise and effective oversight of sustainability matters.
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The candidate is a member of the Remuneration Committee and the board has not been responsive to repeated shareholder voting dissent on remuneration.
The director’s attendance was very low without a satisfactory justification.
The number of directorships held by the nominee is excessive.
The director failed to meet her/his fiduciary duties, or has exhibited behaviour that raises doubts about her/his ability to serve the best interests of stakeholders.
The election is for a non-voting position (except for a temporary election of less than one year).
The company is in breach of our environmental and social expectations, detailed in Part III.
Shareholders cannot vote separately on the election of individual directors. |
| 4. | REMUNERATION |
Boards, through the Remuneration Committee, are responsible for adopting remuneration policies and practices that promote the success of companies in creating value for the longer term, aligning the interest of management with those of long-term shareholders. Remuneration policies and practices should be demonstrably aligned with corporate objectives and business strategy and reviewed regularly.
| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
| Remuneration policy and report | The company presents a transparent, exhaustive and clear overview of its compensation practices. The company explains the philosophy of its executive remuneration policy, and how it is framed within its broader strategy, values and human resources policy.
The policy includes, on an individual basis, the amount, breakdown, and evolution between the different elements of remuneration. It includes the rules to set the base salary.
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The policy lacks transparency.
The board can substantially derogate from the approved remuneration policy.
The remuneration scheme is disproportionate with regard to the evolution of its median employee’s remuneration, named executive officers, or its relevant peer group.
The remuneration or any significant increase to remuneration quantum is not justified and/or is misaligned with regard to performance or with
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| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
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When setting executive pay, the Remuneration Committee and Board consider pay and employment conditions for the general workforce. Any increases to the CEO’s remuneration quantum are well explained and reasonable.
The balance between fixed and variable pay components is appropriately geared towards the company’s long-term performance.
The company has a long-term remuneration policy in place, including environmental and social performance criteria that are transparent, measurable and challenging, and linked to the sustainability strategy.
The policy includes stock ownership and clawback guidelines for executives.
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the evolution of the wider workforce remuneration
The policy allows a pay-for-failure approach or is not long-term oriented.
The company has not included any environmental or social quantifiable and challenging performance criteria within the variable remuneration10. For companies identified as large GHG emitters, there are no climate-related criteria11.
If one or few significant elements of the remuneration are not in line with our guidelines below (to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis depending on the company’s policy and in light of the company’s trend regarding transparency and practices) | |||
| Annual Variable Pay | The bonus is linked to transparent, relevant and challenging criteria aligned to the company’s business and strategy. For relative criteria, robust performance against the peer group is expected.
The company discloses performance criteria, their weights and targets.
The bonus is limited to a certain percentage of the fixed remuneration.
Any non-quantifiable element of the bonus is absent or limited.
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The bonus does not have a cap.
The bonus is not linked to transparent, quantifiable, relevant or challenging criteria. For relative criteria, payment can be made for below median performance.
The nature and weightings for each performance criterion are not disclosed.
The actual level of fulfilment of each performance criterion is not disclosed. |
| 10 | In the case of small and mid-caps, this requirement shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. |
| 11 | For Energy, utilities, industrials, materials and real estate sectors and/or for companies identified as world’s largest GHG emitters. |
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| Long-term Incentive Plan | The plan is understandable to shareholders, with specific and quantitative pre-established criteria and targets for future plans, and is sufficiently long-term oriented (e.g. vesting and performance period of 5 years…).
The company discloses a cap, performance criteria, their weights and performance targets.
For relative criteria, robust performance against the peer group is expected.
The authorities for executive directors are separated from those for employees. Otherwise, the stock options and the free shares allotted to executive directors are limited explicitly.
The volume of the granted additional compensation is reasonable and in line with market practices
The company has the possibility to recover partially or entirely a past plan following special circumstances such as a restatement of the accounts (Clawback policy).
The company has included ESG performance criteria that are transparent, measurable, challenging and material. |
The plan’s volume is excessively dilutive for shareholders.
Grants of stock options and free shares are not integrally linked to the achievement of transparent, pertinent and challenging performance criteria12
For stock options, it is possible to re-test exercising conditions.
Stock options are granted with a discount to the average market price.
The vesting period is less than three years.
The actual level of fulfilment of each performance criterion is not disclosed.
For relative criteria, payment can be made below for median performance. | ||
| Other remuneration | The amount of any severance payment is reasonable, limited and will only be granted in case of forced departure.
The termination payments are conditional on seniority criteria or have explicit performance requirements.
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The termination or change in control payments made to executive directors are in line with best practice in the company’s relevant market, and should not exceed two years for both annual fixed and variable compensation.13 |
| 12 | For example, if the company set objectives that are far below market announcements. |
| 13 | Case-by-case basis based on market practice (e.g. one year in UK and Netherlands). |
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| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
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The policy does not allow exceptional remuneration to be awarded as a matter of course. If it is awarded, it is not repeated, the conditions and maximum level are well described and linked to long term performance criteria. |
The termination payments are not conditional on seniority criteria or with explicit performance requirements
The combination of a severance payment (or a non-compete clause) with an additional pension scheme
The full post-mandate exercise of unvested stock-based plans.
The severance payment or post-mandate exercise is triggered by a voluntary departure.
Exceptional remuneration is granted without any compelling explanation or not linked to performance conditions.
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| Non-executive pay | Pay is linked to the attendance of directors at board and committee meetings, to the importance of their roles, and is in line with market practices.
There is full disclosure of all remuneration components for each director serving on the board. |
Pay is not linked to attendance or is considered excessive.
The global and/or individual amounts are not communicated.
Non-executive directors are granted performance-based pay. |
5. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL PROPOSALS
SAY-ON-CLIMATE PROPOSALS
While acknowledging strategy as being of the prerogative of management, we welcome the movement by some investee companies to submit an advisory vote on their transition plans, as a space for shareholder dialogue and increased engagement. We welcome regular votes or other means of shareholder communication on the progress against these announced strategies, and their regular revision in line with science and investor expectations.
| Key principles | Potential concerns | |
The company discloses all GHG emissions linked to its activities, including the most relevant categories of Scope 3 emissions.
The company has adopted a credible ambition to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, which covers all operations and refers to a 1.5- degree Celsius scenario.
The company has set absolute GHG emissions targets, covering Scopes 1 and 2 as well as the most relevant categories of scope 3 emissions. |
The company fails to disclose all relevant GHG emissions linked to its activities (Scopes 1 2, and 3).
The company fails to set an ambition to achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 or sooner, in line with global efforts to limit warming to 1.5 degree Celsius.
The company fails to set short and medium-term targets to achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 or sooner that address, by priority, the most relevant scopes of emission.
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These targets are set for short, medium and long-term horizons.
The company discloses and quantifies the principal actions it will undertake to deliver the GHG emissions targets including setting out capital expenditure plans and investment in climate solutions where relevant.
The company has a robust approach to the governance of climate-related risks, including Board oversight and executive remuneration aligned with climate change objectives.
The company integrates the notion of just transition into its climate strategy, including by considering the implications on its workforce.
The company ensures alignment of its lobbying activities with the goals of its climate strategy.
In cases where significant dissent is recorded on a Say-on-Climate resolution, we expect the Board to disclose how it intends to consider and address shareholders’ concerns.
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The company fails to report on its climate governance, strategy, risk management, metrics or targets in line with the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) standards.
If not decisive, additional factors may be considered in relation to how the company performs compared to its peers on its climate strategy, considering all recent published information, independent external sources, as well as BNPP AM’s proprietary assessment methodology. |
NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION STATEMENTS
Robust disclosure is essential for investors to effectively gauge companies’ business practices and strategic planning related to E&S risks and opportunities. Thus, we support the adoption of international frameworks that allow companies to report on sustainability information. This allows us to evaluate how the company’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term.
| Key principles | Potential concerns | |
Sustainability reports are prepared with the same rigour and ethical approach as financial statements.
The company discloses how the double materiality assessment was carried out and the elements that led it to judge issues or impacts to be non-material.
The Non-Financial Information Statement has been approved by the Board of directors and reviewed by the Audit committee.
Boards and Audit Committees have an appropriate level of understanding of the sustainability assurance processes.
The Non-Financial Information Statement has been verified by an independent auditor.
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The Non-Financial Information Statement has not been verified by an independent auditor.
The auditor has expressed a qualified opinion.
The company does not disclose the scope and type of the assurance of the sustainability report.
The company is in breach of our environmental and social expectations described in Part III. |
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| Key principles | Potential concerns | |
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The independent auditor’s opinion is unqualified based on a reasonable assurance. Any key sustainability assurance matters are transparently explained, and remedial measures (if necessary) are implemented.
The company provides adequate disclosures on key extra-financial risks (using international disclosure framework such as TCFD, TNFD, CDP)
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| 6. | SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS |
Shareholder proposals are considered on a case-by-case basis in light of the justification by the proponent, company practices, disclosures and commitments, and board support or justification of opposition.
| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
| Environmental and Social | The proposal is in line with our voting guidelines, our Global Sustainability Strategy (GSS) and/or Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) policy.
The proposal introduces or facilitates legal proceedings to compensate shareholders for damage suffered due to the actions of of the company.
The proposal helps to improve the company’s social and environmental performance, contributing to the protection of stakeholders’ long-term interests.
The proposal aligns with our climate change expectations (e.g. GHG emissions disclosure, Net Zero alignment, Paris-aligned climate lobbying reporting, as listed in Part III).
The proposal is designed to address a company’s contribution to systemic risk (e.g., climate change, nature loss, inequality) or reduce its negative externalities, through the production of a report or a requested change in policy or practice.
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The proposal’s intent is in line with stakeholders’ long-term interests but its application is not.
The proposal has already been substantially implemented by the company.
The proposal is not in line with our guidelines or with stakeholders’ long-term interests.
The proposal is not appropriate for the general meeting, appears to be based on inaccurate information or would be impractical, excessively costly or risky to implement.
The proposal appears designed to reverse or slow a company’s progress on social or environmental matters, taking into account the body of the proposal as well as the apparent motivation of the proponent. Such proposals are commonly referred to as ‘anti-ESG’ proposals. |
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| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
| Corporate Governance | The proposal is in line with our Governance and Voting Principles and/or our Global Sustainability Strategy (GSS) or Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) policy.
The proposal aims to improve the governance of the company.
The proposal aims to facilitate Proxy Access.
The proposal seeks greater disclosure of political contributions and lobbying, including governance, policy positions, and full disclosure of recipients.
The proposal seeks to improve transparency of corporate tax policy and practices, including proposals seeking reports prepared using the Global Reporting Initiative’s Tax Standard. |
The proposal is not in line with our Governance and Voting Principles and/or our Global Sustainability Strategy (GSS) or Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) policy.
The proposal is not in line with stakeholders’ long-term interests. |
| 7. | OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES |
| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
| Changes to Company Statutes | The proposed amendment to the company’s by-laws improves the company’s governance.
The proposed amendment respects the ‘one share – one vote – one dividend’ principle.
The proposed amendment introduces in-person AGMs or hybrid format options for investors. |
The proposed amendments carry adverse impacts on shareholder rights (to be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of information provided by the company).
Multiple Voting Shares or non-Voting Depository Receipts are introduced.
An ownership ceiling or voting right ceiling, Priority shares or Golden shares are introduced.
Statutory disclosure thresholds are below 5% of the issued capital.
The proposed amendment reduces the delay of declaration of thresholds rule.
Virtual AGMs are allowed as a general principle. |
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| Voting issues | Key principles | Potential concerns | ||
| Related-party Transactions and other Resolutions | There is full disclosure of information relevant to the resolution which is presented in a fair and balanced way.
The transaction is in line with all shareholders’ interests. |
Insufficient disclosure of relevant information.
The related-party transactions include elements which may be contrary to our remuneration policy (see above).
The related-party transactions benefit a specific shareholder at the expense of others.
Bundled resolutions that include a proposal detrimental to shareholders’ interests.
Blind resolutions. |
PART III: ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL PROPOSALS AND CONSIDERATIONS
In applying our voting policy, we strive to implement the principles and goals outlined in our Stewardship Policy.
Beyond voting on resolutions related to environmental and social issues (such as shareholder proposals, say-on-climate and non-financial reporting that are detailed in our guidelines), we apply environmental and social considerations to voting on other items that we consider strategically important to the company or relevant to managing key impacts on society or the environment.
This is the case for items such as the Discharge of Board and Management / Board Re-elections / Non-Financial Statements and Director & Auditor Reports, to which we apply our environmental and social considerations, depending on the market In addition, we require companies in all sectors to link executive variable compensation plans to relevant environmental and social performance criteria.
We may oppose or abstain on items where the company is at serious risk of violating our exclusion policies – including violating the UN Global Compact principles (UNGCPs), the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE Guidelines), the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) and/or our Sector Policies, linked to environmental, human rights and/or social risks.
More specifically, in cases where a company’s current strategy seems inconsistent with our environmental and social expectations, we may vote against the re-election of the entire Board, or the discharge of the Board, including in the following cases:
| | Failure to comply with our RBC Policies: companies excluded under our Sector Policies and/or International Standards (e.g., UNGCPs, OECD MNE Guidelines, UNGPs, etc.), but which we can still vote on through passive holdings or mandates; |
| | Climate strategy-related concerns, including companies that are among the world’s largest emitters but have not set a net zero ambition or lack a credible transition strategy. |
We may also vote against the re-election the relevant committee members, or the Chair of the Board, in cases of poor management or oversight of ESG risks, including in the following situations:
| | Insufficient transparency of material environmental or social issues, including lack of disclosure on GHG emissions, or non-disclosure to CDP Water and Forests questionnaires. |
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| | Concerns with respect to the company’s climate lobbying activities. In particular, a dissenting vote may be cast at companies particularly exposed to climate issues that fail to appropriately report on their climate lobbying activities (both direct and indirect), or when they are inconsistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement. |
In some cases, our votes against the Board may also serve as an escalation mechanism when companies have not been responsive to our engagements on material environmental and social issues.
We advise our clients to delegate proxy voting authority to BNPP AM to safeguard their shareholder interests. BNPP AM will vote in proxy of its clients solely in the interest of its clients and the ultimate beneficiaries of the funds for which they are responsible. We will not subordinate the interests of our clients to unrelated objectives.
For clients that have delegated proxy voting authority to us, we will make every reasonable effort to ensure that proxies are received and voted in accordance with these proxy voting guidelines.. All BNPP AM clients are informed that this policy and proxy voting procedures are in place.
Although we seek to apply these policies consistently, we will always take into account company-specific circumstances. For that reason, these policies are presented in the form of general principles, which are designed to identify the kinds of practices we would like to see and those that present concerns.
In executing its proxy voting responsibilities, BNPP AM seeks to develop a generally constructive and positive approach with the Boards of companies it invests in, clearly setting out its expectations as a diligent steward of assets. But BNPP AM will not hesitate to oppose management proposals that run counter to these policies, nor to support shareholder proposals consistent with our policies, designed to advance the long-term interests of our clients.
We use the services of several proxy voting providers: ISS, which provides voting research and a voting platform for all companies; Glass Lewis for voting research, and; Proxinvest, which provides research for companies listed in France. These proxy voting providers are used to help us implement our policies and to augment our knowledge of companies and resolutions at forthcoming general meetings. We do not outsource voting activity, as BNPP AM will take each voting decision at every shareholder meeting according to its own voting policy in order to serve its clients’ best interests. Arrangements with proxy voting providers are reviewed annually.
BNPP AM has appointed a Stewardship Committee that is empowered to establish voting guidelines and is responsible for ensuring that those guidelines and procedures are followed. This committee comprises members of the Management, Stewardship, Sustainability and Compliance teams. As proxy voting is considered an integral part of the investment process, the ultimate responsibility for proxy voting lies with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of BNPP AM. This policy is reviewed annually in order to reflect the evolution of corporate governance codes and market practices and is reviewed by our Stewardship Committee and. It is ultimately validated by our Board of Directors, and implemented by the Stewardship team.
This policy applies to BNP Paribas Asset Management Holding, as the parent entity of BNP Paribas Asset Management Europe, the asset management business line of the BNP Paribas Group and, as such, as the ultimate owner of the corporate governance and Sustainability related policies of BNPP AM.
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Our voting policy applies to BNPP AM and to all portfolios that have delegated proxy voting authority to BNPP AM, including the voting rights associated with equity shares held in mutual funds, Collective Investment of Transferable Securities (UCITS), alternative investment funds (AIF), foreign investment funds and investment mandates.1415
As far as possible, we do not apply any specific restrictions on voting regarding the type of resolution nor the issuer in question, but the objective is to vote at all possible general meetings16.
We also accommodate certain custom voting policies, provided for specific client mandates. In case of delegation of portfolio management to external investment managers, when possible and relevant BNPP AM will keep the exercise of voting rights. Where proxy voting is delegated to external investment managers, they are required to have a proxy voting policy, to exercise voting rights in line with market practices and to report regularly on the results achieved.
| 14 | Unless instructed, agreed or otherwise constrained by our clients’ agreement or local regulation and practices. |
| 15 | Although voting may occur in alternative asset classes, this policy would not be applicable considering the specificities of such asset class and only to listed market. |
| 16 | Multi-asset funds are voted whenever the equity component of the fund exceeds 10%. We might not vote when local markets impose meaningful costs for casting the vote (e.g. if a Power of Attorney is needed per AGM or per funds, if our custodians does not offer the proxy voting services in the country ). |
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| 4. | PROXY VOTING PROCESS |
The following points outline the key steps of the proxy voting process from the notification of voting agendas in the context of Annual or Extraordinary General Meetings (AGM-EGM) to actual voting execution:
Voting analysis is done by the stewardship team, which may be supplemented by an enhanced analysis, in particular in case of:
| | Complexity or significance of the issue (items that address critical governance topics, such as executive remuneration, board composition, or major strategic transactions), or resolutions that tackle specific sustainability issues |
| | Potential controversy: Issues involving contentious practices or heightened public interest. |
| | Engagement outcomes: Resolutions tied to ongoing or recent dialogues with the company, where our interactions may influence the voting outcome. |
| | Materiality: The relative size of our shareholding and the importance of the issuer within our investment portfolios. |
| 5. | PROCESS FOR SECURITIES LENDING |
Stock lending aids market liquidity and allows clients to maximise revenues from their holdings and is a technique used by BNPP AM. However, the attendant transfer of voting rights along with the lent shares means that additional scrutiny is required to ensure that lent shares are not put to purposes that are
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detrimental to the long-term interests of the shareowner. Shares will not be lent where the objective of such activities is to vote at general meetings.
BNPP AM as lending agent intends to recall all shares, ahead of the record date (where the record date is not backdated) in advance of general meetings to exercise our full voting right for open-ended funds and mandates. Ongoing securities transactions are monitored by the securities lending team.
| 6. | CONFLICTS OF INTEREST |
As an asset manager owned by a large financial institution, BNPP AM Holding can sometimes face potential conflicts between its clients’ interests and those of BNPP AM in specific circumstances, including the following:
| | Employees being linked personally or professionally with a company whose securities are submitted to vote |
| | Business relations existing between the company whose shares are being voted on and BNP Paribas Group; or |
| | Exercise of voting rights concerning shares of BNP Paribas Group or of significant participations or holdings of the Group. |
BNPP AM has implemented several principles, mechanisms and decision processes to ensure that conflicts of interest do not influence our votes, such as:
| | BNPP AM’s Voting Policy stresses that voting rights are exercised in the best interests of clients to protect and enhance the long-term value of their shareholdings |
| | These Governance and Voting Principles, which determine the decision-making process for the exercise of voting rights are approved by the Board of Directors, which includes independent directors |
| | Employees must comply with BNPP AM’s Code of Ethics and declare any outside business activity. All employees receive annual training on these policies and must complete annual certifications of compliance. |
| | ‘Information barriers’ between BNPP AM’s entities and other BNP Paribas Group companies ensure that BNPP AM employees remain independent and neutral in the exercise of their responsibilities. |
Records of all potential conflicts of interest and their resolution are kept in the Stewardship Committee’s minutes.
Any material conflicts of interest that are identified trigger an escalation process involving top management, including the following:
| | The relevant CIO |
| | The head of Compliance and senior managers of other Control Functions involved |
| | The CEO |
At each level, the “’best interest of clients’ principle is paramount in the decision outcome. When a conflict of interest is identified, it is duly disclosed to the concerned clients where applicable laws so require.
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| 7. | TRANSPARENCY & REPORTING |
BNPP AM is committed to transparency in its proxy voting approach and execution. A copy of this policy can be accessed on our website17. We publish an annual report, providing an overview of proxy voting activities and engagement and we provide quarterly reports to clients. Lastly, voting records of individual agenda items at company meetings and per funds are publicly available in a searchable database.
All the policies and approaches mentioned in this document are publicly available on our website: https://www.bnpparibas-am.com/en/sustainability/sustainability-documents/
BNP PARIBAS ASSET MANAGEMENT Europe, “the investment management company”, is a simplified joint stock company with its registered office at 1 boulevard Haussmann 75009 Paris, France, RCS Paris 319 378 832, registered with the “Autorité des marchés financiers” under number GP 96002.
This material is issued and has been prepared by the investment management company.
This material is produced for information purposes only and does not constitute:
| 1. | an offer to buy nor a solicitation to sell, nor shall it form the basis of or be relied upon in connection with any contract or commitment whatsoever or |
| 2. | investment advice. |
Opinions included in this material constitute the judgement of the investment management company at the time specified and may be subject to change without notice. The investment management company is not obliged to update or alter the information or opinions contained within this material. Investors should consult their own legal and tax advisors in respect of legal, accounting, domicile and tax advice prior to investing in the financial instrument(s) in order to make an independent determination of the suitability and consequences of an investment therein, if permitted. Please note that different types of investments, if contained within this material, involve varying degrees of risk and there can be no assurance that any specific investment may either be suitable, appropriate or profitable for an investor’s investment portfolio.
Given the economic and market risks, there can be no assurance that the financial instrument(s) will achieve its/their investment objectives. Returns may be affected by, amongst other things, investment strategies or objectives of the financial instrument(s) and material market and economic conditions, including interest rates, market terms and general market conditions. The different strategies applied to the financial instruments may have a significant effect on the results portrayed in this material.
All information referred to in the present document is available on www.bnpparibas-am.com .
“The sustainable investor for a changing world” reflects the objective of BNP PARIBAS ASSET MANAGEMENT Europe to integrate sustainable development into its activities, without all funds of BNP PARIBAS ASSET MANAGEMENT Europe belonging to articles 8 or 9 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector (“SFDR”). For more information, please see www.bnpparibas-am.com/en/sustainability.
| 17 | https://www.bnpparibas-am.com/en/sustainability/sustainability-documents/ |
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Proxy Voting
Responsibility to Vote Proxies
As an investment adviser, Brandywine Global owes its clients a duty of care and loyalty with respect to services undertaken on their behalf, including proxy voting. Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires an investment adviser who exercises voting authority with respect to client securities to adopt and implement written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that the investment adviser votes proxies in the best interest of its clients.
Client Accounts for which Brandywine Global Votes Proxies
Brandywine Global votes proxies for each client account for which the client has specifically delegated to Brandywine Global the power to vote proxies in the applicable investment management agreement or other written document, or in instances where the client has assigned Brandywine Global investment discretion over their account. Brandywine Global also votes proxies for any employee benefit plan client subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), unless the applicable investment management agreement specifically reserves the responsibility for voting proxies to the plan trustees or other named fiduciary.
At or prior to the inception of each client account, Brandywine Global will determine whether it has proxy voting authority over such account. In instances where the client has retained proxy voting responsibility, Brandywine Global will have no involvement in the proxy voting process for that client.
General Principles
In exercising discretion to vote proxies for securities held in client accounts, Brandywine Global is guided by general fiduciary principles. Brandywine Global’s goal in voting proxies is to act prudently and solely in the best economic interest of its clients. In furtherance of such goal, Brandywine Global will vote proxies in a manner that Brandywine Global believes will be consistent with efforts to maximize shareholder value and to protect shareholder interests.
Brandywine Global does not exercise its proxy voting discretion to further policy, political or other issues that have no connection to enhancing the economic value of a client’s investment. As part of its fiduciary duty, Brandywine Global does consider environmental, social, and governance issues that may impact the value of an investment, through introducing opportunity or by creating risk, or both.
How Brandywine Global Votes Proxies
Appendix A sets forth general guidelines considered by Brandywine Global in voting common proxy items.
In the case of a proxy issue for which there is a stated position set forth in Appendix A, Brandywine Global generally votes in accordance with the stated position. In the case of a proxy issue for which there is no stated position set forth in Appendix A, Brandywine Global votes on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the General Principles.
The general guidelines set forth in Appendix A are not binding on Brandywine Global, but rather are intended to provide an analytical framework for the review and assessment of common proxy issues. Such guidelines can always be superseded based on an assessment of the proxy issue and determination that a vote that is contrary to such general guidelines is in the best economic interests of client accounts. Different portfolio management teams within Brandywine Global may vote differently on the same issue based on their respective assessments of the proxy issue and determinations as to what is in the best economic interests of client accounts for which they are responsible.
Use of an Independent Proxy Service Firm
Brandywine Global may contract with an independent proxy service firm to provide Brandywine Global with certain services, including but not limited to, information or recommendations with regard to proxy votes or
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other administrative support. Brandywine Global is not required to follow any recommendation furnished by such service provider. The use of an independent proxy service firm to provide proxy voting information or recommendations does not relieve Brandywine Global of its responsibility for any proxy votes.
With respect to any independent proxy service firm engaged by Brandywine Global to provide Brandywine Global with information or recommendations with regard to proxy votes, Brandywine Global will periodically review and assess such firm’s policies, procedures and practices including those with respect to the disclosure and handling of conflicts of interest.
Conflict of Interest Procedures
In furtherance of Brandywine Global’s goal to vote proxies in the best interests of clients, Brandywine Global follows procedures designed to identify and address material conflicts that may arise between the interests of Brandywine Global and its employees and those of its clients before voting proxies on behalf of such clients. Conflicts of interest may arise as a result of the firm’s business or as a result of an employee’s personal relationships or circumstances.
| A. | Procedures for Identifying Conflicts of Interest |
Brandywine Global relies on the procedures set forth below to seek to identify conflicts of interest with respect to proxy voting.
1. Brandywine Global’s Compliance Department annually requires each Brandywine Global employee to complete a questionnaire designed to elicit information that may reveal potential conflicts between the employee’s interests and those of Brandywine Global clients.
2. Brandywine Global treats client relationships as creating a material conflict of interest for Brandywine Global in voting proxies with respect to securities issued by such client or its known affiliates.
3. As a general matter, Brandywine Global takes the position that relationships between a non-Brandywine Global Franklin Resources business unit and an issuer (e.g., investment management relationship between an issuer and a non-Brandywine Global Franklin Resources-owned asset manager) do not present a conflict of interest for Brandywine Global in voting proxies with respect to such issuer because Brandywine Global operates as an independent business unit from other Franklin Resources business units and because of the existence of informational barriers between Brandywine Global and certain other Franklin Resources business units.
| B. | Procedures for Assessing Materiality of Conflicts of Interest |
1. All potential conflicts of interest identified must be brought to the attention of the Investment Committee for resolution.
2. The Investment Committee determines whether a conflict of interest is material. A conflict of interest will be considered material to the extent that it is determined that such conflict is likely to influence, or appear to influence, Brandywine Global’s decision-making in voting the proxy. All materiality determinations will be based on an assessment of the particular facts and circumstances. A written record of all materiality determinations made by the Investment Committee will be maintained.
3. If it is determined by the Investment Committee that a conflict of interest is not material, Brandywine Global may vote proxies following normal processes notwithstanding the existence of the conflict.
| C. | Procedures for Addressing Material Conflicts of Interest |
1. With the exception of those material conflicts identified in A.2. which will be voted in accordance with paragraph C.1.b. below, if it is determined by the Investment Committee that a
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conflict of interest is material, the Investment Committee will determine an appropriate method or combination of methods to resolve such conflict of interest before the proxy affected by the conflict of interest is voted by Brandywine Global. Such determination will be based on the particular facts and circumstances, including the importance of the proxy issue, the nature of the conflict of interest, etc. Such methods may include:
| a. | confirming that the proxy will be voted in accordance with the recommendations of an independent proxy service firm retained by Brandywine Global; |
| b. | in the case of a conflict of interest resulting from a particular employee’s personal relationships or circumstances, removing such employee from the decision-making process with respect to such proxy vote; or |
| c. | such other method as is deemed appropriate given the particular facts and circumstances. |
2. A written record of the method used to resolve a material conflict of interest will be maintained.
Other Considerations
In certain situations, Brandywine Global may decide not to vote proxies on behalf of a client account for which it has discretionary voting authority because Brandywine Global believes that the expected benefit to the client account of voting shares is outweighed by countervailing considerations (excluding the existence of a potential conflict of interest). Examples of situations in which Brandywine Global may determine not to vote proxies are set forth below.
| A. | Share Blocking |
Proxy voting in certain countries requires “share blocking.” This means that shareholders wishing to vote their proxies must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting (e.g. one week) with a designated depositary. During the blocking period, shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares have been returned to client accounts by the designated depositary. In deciding whether to vote shares subject to share blocking, Brandywine Global may consider and weigh, based on the particular facts and circumstances, the expected benefit to client accounts of voting in relation to the potential detriment to clients of not being able to sell such shares during the applicable period.
| B. | Securities on Loan |
Certain clients of Brandywine Global, such as an institutional client or a registered investment company for which Brandywine Global acts as a sub-adviser, may engage in securities lending with respect to the securities in their accounts. Brandywine Global typically does not direct or oversee such securities lending activities. To the extent feasible and practical under the circumstances, Brandywine Global may request that the client recall shares that are on loan so that such shares can be voted if Brandywine Global believes that the expected benefit to the client of voting such shares outweighs the detriment to the client of recalling such shares (e.g., foregone income). The ability to timely recall shares for proxy voting purposes typically is not entirely within the control of Brandywine Global and requires the cooperation of the client and its other service providers. Under certain circumstances, the recall of shares in time for such shares to be voted may not be possible due to applicable proxy voting record dates and administrative considerations.
Proxy Voting-Related Disclosures
| A. | Proxy Voting Independence and Intent |
Brandywine Global exercises its proxy voting authority independently of other Franklin Resources-owned asset managers. Brandywine Global and its employees will not consult with or enter into any formal or
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informal agreements with Brandywine Global’s ultimate parent, Franklin Resources, Inc., any other Franklin Resources business unit, or any of their respective officers, directors or employees, regarding the voting of any securities by Brandywine Global on behalf of its clients.
Brandywine Global and its employees may not disclose to any person outside of Brandywine Global, including without limitation another investment management firm (affiliated or unaffiliated) how Brandywine Global intends to vote a proxy without prior approval from Brandywine Global’s Chief Compliance Officer. Prior approval is not required in instances where Brandywine Global discloses directly to representatives of an issuer how Brandywine Global intends to vote a proxy so long as the disclosure is made solely to representatives of the issuer and Brandywine Global believes that the disclosure is in the best interests of its clients.
If a Brandywine Global employee receives a request to disclose Brandywine Global’s proxy voting intentions to another person outside of Brandywine Global (including an employee of another Franklin Resources business unit) in connection with an upcoming proxy voting matter, the employee should immediately notify Brandywine Global’s Chief Compliance Officer.
If a Brandywine Global portfolio manager wants to take a public stance with regards to a proxy, the portfolio manager must consult with and obtain the approval of Brandywine Global’s Chief Compliance Officer before making or issuing a public statement.
| B. | Disclosure of Proxy Votes and Policy and Procedures |
Upon Brandywine Global’s receipt of any oral or written client request for information on how Brandywine Global voted proxies for that client’s account, Brandywine Global will promptly provide the client with such requested information in writing.
Brandywine Global will deliver to each client, for which it has proxy voting authority, no later than the time it accepts such authority, a written summary of this Proxy Voting policy and procedures. This summary must include information on how clients may obtain information about how Brandywine Global has voted proxies for their accounts and must also state that a copy of Brandywine Global’s Proxy Voting policy and procedures is available upon request.
Brandywine Global must create and maintain a record of each written client request for proxy voting information. Such record must be created promptly after receipt of the request and must include the date the request was received, the content of the request, and the date of Brandywine Global’s response. Brandywine Global must also maintain copies of written client requests and copies of all responses to such requests.
| C. | Delegation of Duties |
Brandywine Global may delegate to non-investment personnel the responsibility to vote proxies in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Appendix A. Such delegation of duties will only be made to employees deemed to be reasonably capable of performing this function in a satisfactory manner.
Proxy Engagement and Certain Non-Proxy Voting Matters
Brandywine Global may determine that it is appropriate and beneficial to engage in a dialogue or written communication with a company or other shareholders regarding certain matters on a company’s proxy statement from time to time, if and to the extent that Brandywine Global determines that doing so is consistent with law and applicable general fiduciary principles. A company or shareholder may also seek to engage with Brandywine Global in advance of the company’s formal proxy solicitation to review issues more generally or gauge support for certain proposals.
Absent a specific contrary written agreement with a client or other legal obligation, Brandywine Global does not (1) render any advice to, or take any action on behalf of, clients with respect to any legal proceedings,
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including bankruptcies and shareholder litigation, to which any securities or other investments held in client accounts, or the issuers thereof, become subject, or (2) initiate or pursue legal proceedings, including without limitation shareholder litigation, on behalf of clients with respect to transactions or securities or other investments held in client accounts, or the issuers thereof. Except as otherwise agreed to in writing with a particular client, the right to take any action with respect to any legal proceeding, including without limitation bankruptcies and shareholder litigation, and the right to initiate or pursue any legal proceedings, including without limitation shareholder litigation, with respect to transactions or securities or other investments held in a client account is expressly reserved to the client.
Recordkeeping
In addition to all other records required by this Policy and Procedures, Brandywine Global will maintain the following records relating to proxy voting:
| A. | a copy of this Policy and Procedures, including any and all amendments that may be adopted; |
| B. | a copy of each proxy statement that Brandywine Global receives regarding client securities; |
| C. | a record of each vote cast by Brandywine Global on behalf of a client; |
| D. | documentation relating to the identification and resolution of conflicts of interest; |
| E. | any documents created by Brandywine Global that were material to a proxy voting decision or that memorialized the basis for that decision; |
| F. | a copy of each written client request for information on how Brandywine Global voted proxies on behalf of the client, and a copy of any written response by Brandywine Global to any (written or oral) client request for information on how Brandywine Global voted proxies on behalf of the requesting client; and |
| G. | records showing whether or not Brandywine Global has proxy voting authority for each client account. |
All required records will be maintained and preserved in an easily accessible place for a period of not less than six years from the end of the fiscal year during which the last entry was made on such record, the first two years in an appropriate office of Brandywine Global. Brandywine Global also will maintain a copy of any proxy voting policies and procedures that were in effect at any time within the last five years.
To the extent that Brandywine Global is authorized to vote proxies for a United States registered investment company, Brandywine Global will maintain such records as are necessary to allow such fund to comply with its recordkeeping, reporting and disclosure obligations under applicable laws, rules and regulations.
In lieu of keeping copies of proxy statements, Brandywine Global may rely on proxy statements filed on the EDGAR system as well as on third party records of proxy statements if the third party provides an undertaking to provide copies of such proxy statements promptly upon request. Brandywine Global may rely on a third party to make and retain, on Brandywine Global’s behalf, records of votes cast by Brandywine Global on behalf of clients if the third party provides an undertaking to provide a copy of such records promptly upon request.
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Appendix A
Proxy Voting Guidelines
Below are proxy voting guidelines that Brandywine Global generally follows when voting proxies for securities held in client accounts. One or more portfolio management teams may decide to deviate from these guidelines with respect to any one or more particular proxy votes, subject in all cases to the duty to act solely in the best interest of client accounts holding the applicable security.
| I. | Compensation |
| A. | We vote for non-employee director stock options, unless we consider the number of shares available for issue excessive. |
| B. | We vote for employee stock purchase programs. |
| C. | We vote for compensation plans that are tied to the company achieving set profitability hurdles. |
| D. | We vote against attempts to re-price options. Also, we vote against the re-election of incumbent Directors in the event of such a re-pricing proposal. |
| E. | We vote against attempts to increase incentive stock options available if they are excessive, either in total or for one individual. |
| F. | We vote against stock option plans allowing for stock options with exercise prices less than 100% of the stock’s price at the time of the option grant. |
| G. | We vote for measures that give shareholders a vote on executive compensation. |
| II. | Governance |
| A. | We vote for proposals to separate the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board positions. |
| B. | We vote against “catch-all” authorizations permitting proxy holders to conduct unspecified business that arises during shareholder meetings. |
| III. | Anti-Takeover |
| We | vote against anti-takeover measures, including without limitation: |
| A. | Staggered Boards of Directors (for example, where 1/3 of a company’s Board is elected each year rather than the entire Board each year). |
| B. | Super-Majority Voting Measures (for example, requiring a greater than 50% vote to approve takeovers or make certain changes). |
| C. | Poison Pills, which are special stock rights that go into effect upon a takeover offer or an outsider acquiring more than a specified percentage of a company’s outstanding shares. |
| IV. | Capital Structure |
We vote against attempts to increase authorized shares by more than twice the number of outstanding shares unless there is a specific purpose for such increase given, such as a pending stock split or a corporate purchase using shares, and we determine that increasing authorized shares for such purpose is appropriate.
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Essex Investment Management Co., LLC — Proxy Voting Policy
(Effective October 1, 2022)
Voting Proxies: Where a firm votes proxies on behalf of clients, the Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-6 requires Essex to establish written policies and procedures regarding how it exercises proxy voting authority with respect to client securities. Essex will vote proxies for the portfolio securities in a client account, unless that client has retained the authority to vote proxies or delegated the authority to a third party (e.g., in the case of an ERISA client, to another plan fiduciary). Essex utilizes proxy voting policies and procedures designed to reasonably ensure that Essex acts in the best interest of clients. Proxies are considered client assets and are managed with the same care, skill and diligence as all other client assets.
Voting Agent: Essex has contracted with an independent third party, Institutional Shareholders Services (“ISS”), to conduct in-depth proxy research, execute proxy votes, and keep various records necessary for tracking proxy voting actions taken and proxy voting materials for the appropriate client account. ISS specializes in providing a variety of fiduciary-level services related to proxy voting and researches proxy issues independent from Essex executed votes. Subject to regular review by the Proxy Voting Committee (discussed below) Essex has adopted ISS’s proxy voting policy guidelines as its own and votes Essex’s clients’ proxies according to those policy guidelines. Essex has adopted certain ISS custom voting policies: ISS Benchmark Policy and the ISS Sustainability Policy. Essex may adopt additional custom policies in the future. Essex will select the appropriate policy to align with the client’s strategy and/or client’s legal entity status. Details of the third party’s proxy voting policy guidelines shall be provided to clients upon request.
Proxy Voting Committee: Essex’s Proxy Voting Committee, which is a subcommittee of the Compliance and Operating Risk Committee, is responsible for deciding what is in the best interests of clients when determining how proxies are voted. The Committee meets at least annually to review ISS’s proxy voting policies and consider whether to continue to adopt them as Essex’s own proxy voting policies. Any changes to ISS’s voting policies must be reviewed, approved, and adopted by the Committee at the time the changes occur. The Committee would also act in any extraordinary circumstances, e.g., in which ISS declines to recommend a proxy vote because of a conflict of interest. Documentation of the annual Committee meeting and its results, including any annual due diligence of ISS to ensure they continue to have the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues, will recorded in the Committee’s minutes.
Securities on Loan: Essex generally does not vote proxies for securities on loan. Some clients may participate in client-directed security lending programs, which require a recall of the loaned securities to properly assign voting rights to the lender. Because of these administrative considerations, Essex may not receive adequate notice of a proxy voting solicitation to arrange a recall of shares through the client’s custodian or other intermediary in time to vote the proxies. Due to these administrative difficulties, Essex does not vote loan securities unless contractually required under a client agreement on a best effort basis.
Share Blocking: Essex may decline to vote proxies if to do so would cause a restriction to be placed on Essex’s ability to trade securities held in client accounts in “share blocking” countries. Accordingly, Essex may abstain from votes in a share blocking country in favor of preserving its ability to trade any particular security at any time.
Participation in Class Action Lawsuits: Essex’s clients may be eligible to participate in class action lawsuits that may result in a settlement or judgment in favor of the class of which the client is a member. Essex is not obligated to take any legal action with regard to class action suits relating to securities purchased by Essex for its clients, and generally does not do so. Should a client, however, wish to retain legal counsel and/or take action regarding any class action suit proceedings, Essex will make reasonable efforts to provide the client or the client’s legal counsel with any reasonable information that may be needed upon client’s reasonable request.
Proxy Voting Records: Advisors that exercise voting authority with respect to Client securities must retain their proxy voting policies and procedures, proxy statements received regarding Client securities, records of votes they cast on behalf of Clients, records of Client requests for proxy voting information and any documents prepared by the advisor that were material to making a decision how to vote or that memorialized the basis for the decision.
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The Advisor utilizes a third-party proxy voting service provider for vote recommendations, statements and records.
| Document | Length of Retention | Department Responsible | ||||
| 1 | Policy and Procedures: A copy of all proxy voting policies and procedures. | 6 Years | Essex Compliance | |||
| 2 | Proxy Statements: A copy of each proxy statement that the investment adviser receives regarding client securities. (Essex may satisfy this requirement by relying on a third party to make and retain, on Essex’s behalf, a copy of a proxy statement because Essex has obtained an undertaking from a third party to provide a copy of the proxy statement promptly upon request) and Essex may rely on obtaining a copy of a proxy statement from the Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system.) | 6 Years | Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) | |||
| 3 | Votes Cast: A record of each vote cast by the investment adviser on behalf of a client. (Essex is relying on ISS to retain these records – see undertaking note in item 2 above) | 6 Years | Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) | |||
| 4 | Decision Documentation: A copy of any document created by the adviser that was material to making a decision how to vote proxies on behalf of a client or that memorializes the basis for that decision. | 6 Years | Essex Portfolio Management and Essex Proxy Voting Committee | |||
| 5 | A copy of each written client request for information on how the adviser voted proxies on behalf of the client, and a copy of any written response by the investment adviser to any (written or oral) client request for information on how the adviser voted proxies on behalf of the requesting client. | 6 Years | Essex Operations |
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UNITED STATES
SUSTAINABILITY PROXY VOTING
GUIDELINES
2026 Policy Recommendations
Effective for Meetings on or after February 1, 2026
Published December 31, 2025
Effective for Shareholder Meeting Reports Published on or after February 25, 2025, Consideration of Certain Diversity Factors in Making Vote Recommendations Is Suspended (for more information, see pp. 18-19)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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| Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections | 174 | |||||
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| Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structures |
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| Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation |
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| Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees |
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| Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee) |
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| Proxy Contests/Proxy Access -Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections |
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| Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations |
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| Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy |
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| Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs) |
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| Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions |
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| Capital | 201 | |||||
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| Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S |
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| Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs) |
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| Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) — Proposals for Extensions |
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| Executive Pay Evaluation | 214 | |||||
| Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation — Management Proposals (Management Say-on-Pay) |
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| Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”) |
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| Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale |
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| Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect |
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| Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations |
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| Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) |
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| Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m)) |
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| Compensation Consultants — Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization |
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| Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors |
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| Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time |
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| Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees |
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| Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances |
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| Reports on Potentially Controversial Business/Financial Practices |
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| Pharmaceutical Pricing, Access to Medicines, Product Reimportation and Health Pandemics |
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| Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits |
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| Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Compensation-Related Proposals |
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| Closed End Funds - Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes |
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| Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction |
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| Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval |
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257 | |||||
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| Introduction |
ISS recognizes the view among many investment professionals that sustainability or environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) factors could present material risks to portfolio investments. Whereas investment managers have traditionally analyzed topics such as board accountability and executive compensation to mitigate risks related to poor corporate governance, incorporating ESG performance factors into investment decisions can give a more comprehensive understanding of the overall risk profile of the companies and ensure sustainable long-term value for their beneficiaries.
Investors concerned with portfolio value preservation and enhancement through the incorporation of sustainability factors can also carry out this active ownership approach through their proxy voting activity. In voting their shares, sustainability-minded investors are generally concerned with ensuring corporate activities are aligned with best practices of disclosure and practice, because they believe that doing so is an effective way to achieve and protect long-term value for their beneficiaries. These investors will tend to support requests for information regarding an issuer’s adoption of, or adherence to, relevant norms, standards, codes of conduct or universally recognized international initiatives.
ISS’ Sustainability Proxy Voting Guidelines
ISS has therefore developed proxy voting guidelines that are consistent with the objectives of sustainability-minded investors and fiduciaries. On ESG matters, ISS’ Sustainability Policy seeks to promote support for recognized global governing bodies promoting sustainable business practices advocating for stewardship of environment, fair labor practices, non-discrimination, and the protection of human rights. Generally, ISS’ Sustainability Policy takes as its frame of reference internationally recognized sustainability-related initiatives such as the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI, previously UNPRI), United Nations Global Compact, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Carbon Principles, International Labour Organization Conventions (ILO), Ceres Roadmap 2030, Global Sullivan Principles, MacBride Principles, and environmental and social European Union Directives. Such initiatives seek to promote a fair, unified and productive reporting and compliance environment in order to mitigate related financial and reputational risks.
These guidelines provide an overview of how ISS approaches proxy voting issues for subscribers of the Sustainability Policy. We consider the merits of each proposal in the context of company-specific circumstances and industry norms. ISS updates the guidelines on an annual basis to take into account emerging issues and trends on environmental, social and corporate governance topics, as well as the evolution of market standards, regulatory changes and client feedback.
The Sustainability Policy guidelines are based on an objective to create and preserve economic value by incorporating awareness of a full range of governance and sustainability issues.
| 1. | Routine/Miscellaneous |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.
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| | Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction. |
| | Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.” |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration:
| | The new quorum threshold requested; |
| | The rationale presented for the reduction; |
| | The market capitalization of the company (size, inclusion in indices); |
| | The company’s ownership structure; |
| | Previous voter turnout or attempts to achieve quorum; |
| | Any provisions or commitments to restore quorum to a majority of shares outstanding, should voter turnout improve sufficiently; and |
| | Other factors as appropriate. |
In general, a quorum threshold kept as close to a majority of shares outstanding as is achievable is preferred.
Vote case-by-case on directors who unilaterally lower the quorum requirements below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration the factors listed above.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to change the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely impact shareholder value.
Change Date, Time, or Location of Annual Meeting
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the proposed change is unreasonable.
Vote against shareholder proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the current scheduling or location is unreasonable.
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to approve other business when it appears as voting item.
Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the issue of auditor indemnification and limitation of liability. Factors to be assessed include, but are not limited to:
| | The terms of the auditor agreement--the degree to which these agreements impact shareholders’ rights; |
| | The motivation and rationale for establishing the agreements; |
| | The quality of the company’s disclosure; and |
| | The company’s historical practices in the audit area. |
Vote against or withhold from members of an audit committee in situations where there is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to ratify auditors unless any of the following apply:
| | An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; |
| | There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position; |
| | Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures; or |
| | Fees for non-audit services (“Other” fees) are excessive. |
Non-audit fees are excessive if:
| | Non-audit (“other”) fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees |
Tax compliance and preparation include the preparation of original and amended tax returns and refund claims, and tax payment planning. All other services in the tax category, such as tax advice, planning, or consulting, should be added to “Other” fees. If the breakout of tax fees cannot be determined, add all tax fees to “Other” fees.
In circumstances where “Other” fees include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (such as initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs) and the company
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makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees that are an exception to the standard “non-audit fee” category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit/audit-related fees/tax compliance and preparation for purposes of determining whether non-audit fees are excessive.
Shareholder Proposals Limiting Non-Audit Services
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to prohibit or limit their auditors from engaging in non-audit services.
Shareholder Proposals on Audit Firm Rotation
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for audit firm rotation, taking into account:
| | The tenure of the audit firm; |
| | The length of rotation specified in the proposal; |
| | Any significant audit-related issues at the company; |
| | The number of audit committee meetings held each year; |
| | The number of financial experts serving on the committee; and |
| | Whether the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated for both audit quality and competitive price. |
| 2. | Board of Directors |
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections
Four fundamental principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:
| | Accountability: Boards should be sufficiently accountable to shareholders, including through transparency of the company’s governance practices and regular board elections, by the provision of sufficient information for shareholders to be able to assess directors and board composition, and through the ability of shareholders to remove directors. |
| | Responsiveness: Directors should respond to investor input, such as that expressed through significant opposition to management proposals, significant support for shareholder proposals (whether binding or non-binding), and tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered. |
| | Composition: Companies should seek directors who can add value to the board through specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives. |
| | Independence: Boards should be sufficiently independent from management (and significant shareholders) so as to ensure that they are able and motivated to effectively supervise management’s performance for the benefit of all shareholders, including in setting and |
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| monitoring the execution of corporate strategy, with appropriate use of shareholder capital, and in setting and monitoring executive compensation programs that support that strategy. The chair of the board should ideally be an independent director, and all boards should have an independent leadership position or a similar role in order to help provide appropriate counterbalance to executive management, as well as having sufficiently independent committees that focus on key governance concerns such as audit, compensation, and nomination of directors. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees1 considered on a case-by-case basis):
Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structures
Classified Board Structure: The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.
Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards: The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.
Director Performance Evaluation: The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:
| | A classified board structure; |
| | A supermajority vote requirement; |
| | Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections or a majority vote standard with no plurality carve-out for contested elections; |
| | The inability of shareholders to call special meetings; |
| | The inability of shareholders to act by written consent; |
| | A multi-class capital structure; and/or |
| | A non–shareholder-approved poison pill. |
| 1 | A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question. |
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Poison Pills: Generally vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case) if:
| | The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature2; |
| | The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or |
| | The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders3. |
Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill3 (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:
| | The trigger threshold and other terms of the pill; |
| | The disclosed rationale for the adoption; |
| | The context in which the pill was adopted, (e.g.) industry factors such as the company’s size and stage of development, sudden changes in its market capitalization, and extraordinary industry-wide or macroeconomic events); |
| | A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; |
| | The company’s overall track record on corporate governance and responsiveness to shareholders; and |
| | Other factors as relevant. |
Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments: Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees2, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:
| | The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification; |
| | Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment; |
| | The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter; |
| | The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions; |
| | The company’s ownership structure; |
| | The company’s existing governance provisions; |
| 2 | If a short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, Sustainability Advisory Services will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption. |
| 3 | Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient. |
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| | The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and, |
| | Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders. |
Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees.
Generally vote against (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:
| | Classified the board; |
| | Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; |
| | Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws; |
| | Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or |
| | Adopted another provision deemed egregious. |
Problematic Governance Structure: For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting7 of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights
| | Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; |
| | A classified board structure; or |
| | Other egregious provisions. |
A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.
Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.
Unequal Voting Rights: Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a multi-class capital structure with unequal voting rights5.
| 4 | Includes companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering. |
| 5 | This generally includes classes of common or preferred stock that have more votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”). Preferred shares that have voting rights only with respect to items that affect the rights of their holders as a class are not generally considered a problematic capital structure. |
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Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:
| | Newly-public companies6 with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public; |
| | Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs; |
| | Convertible preferred shares that vote on an “as-converted” basis; |
| | Situations where the enhanced voting rights are limited in duration and applicability, such as where they are intended to overcome low voting turnout and ensure approval of a specific non-controversial agenda item and “mirrored voting” applies; |
| | Situations where the unequal voting rights are considered de minimis; or |
| | The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained. |
Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions: Vote against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board, where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:
| | The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot; |
| | The board’s rationale for seeking ratification; |
| | Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail; |
| | Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request; |
| | The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision; |
| | The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings; |
| | Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal; |
| | The company’s ownership structure; and |
| | Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals. |
Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals: Generally vote against or withhold from members of the governance committee if:
| | The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals, or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirement in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis. |
| | Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an |
| 6 | Newly-public companies generally include companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering. |
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| insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Generally, continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval. |
Problematic Audit-Related Practices
Generally, vote against or withhold from the members of the audit committee if:
| | The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive (see discussion under “Auditor Ratification”); |
| | The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or |
| | There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm. |
Vote case-by-case on members of the audit committee and potentially the full board if:
| | Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted. |
Problematic Compensation Practices
In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item or in egregious situations, vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:
| | There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance); |
| | The company maintains significant problematic pay practices; |
| | The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders; |
| | The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or |
| | The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions. |
High Non-Employee Director Pay: Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more consecutive or nonconsecutive years/across multiple years) of awarding excessive or otherwise problematic7 non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.
Adverse recommendations may be warranted in the first year for director pay issues that are considered egregious.
| 7 | May include performance awards, retirement benefits, or problematic perquisites. |
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Problematic Pledging of Company Stock: Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:
| | The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity; |
| | The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume; |
| | Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time; |
| | Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and |
| | Any other relevant factors. |
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Failures
Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:
| | Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight8, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately guard against or manage ESG risks; |
| | A lack of sustainability reporting in the company’s public documents and/or website in conjunction with a failure to adequately manage or mitigate ESG risks; |
| | Failure to replace management as appropriate; or |
| | Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company. |
Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero
For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain9, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where Sustainability Advisory Services determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps need to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory.
| 8 | Examples of failure of risk oversight include, but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant environmental incidents including spills and pollution; large scale or repeat workplace fatalities or injuries; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock. |
| 9 | Companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list. |
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Minimum steps needed to be considered to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory are (all minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with the policy):
| | The company has detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including: |
| | Board governance measures; |
| | Corporate strategy; |
| | Risk management analyses; and |
| | Metrics and targets. |
| | The company has declared a Net Zero target by 2050 or sooner and the target includes scope 1, 2, and relevant scope 3 emissions. |
| | The company has set a medium-term target for reducing its GHG emissions and the targets include scope 1, 2, and relevant scope 3 emissions. |
| | The company has a decarbonization strategy in place, with a defined set of quantitative and qualitative actions to reach Net Zero targets. |
| | Expectations about what constitutes “minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory” will increase over time. |
Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:
| | The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are: |
| | Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote; |
| | Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation; |
| | The subject matter of the proposal; |
| | The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings; |
| | Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders; |
| | The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and |
| | Other factors as appropriate. |
| | The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered; |
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| | At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote. |
Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and/or the say-on-pay proposal when the company’s previous say-on-pay received support of less than 70 percent of votes cast. Factors that will be considered in assessing board responsiveness include:
| | Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated); |
| | Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition; |
| | Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns; |
If the company discloses meaningful engagement efforts, but in addition states that it was unable to obtain specific feedback, Sustainability Advisory Services will assess company actions taken in response to the say-on-pay vote as well as the company’s explanation as to why such actions are beneficial for shareholders.
Additional factors that may be considered include:
| | Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated; |
| | The company’s ownership structure |
| | Significant corporate activity, such as a recent merger or proxy contest; and |
| | Any other compensation action or factor considered relevant to assessing board responsiveness. |
If the say-on-pay support level was less than 50 percent of votes cast, this would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness, as assessed under the factors noted above.
Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) if the board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.
Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except nominees who served only part of the fiscal year10) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:
| | Medical issues/illness; |
| 10 | Nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy. |
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| | Family emergencies; and |
| | Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer). |
| | In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board. |
If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.
Overboarded Directors: Generally, vote against or withhold from individual directors who:
| | Sit on more than five public company boards; or |
| | Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own — withhold only at their outside boards11. |
NOTE: For shareholder meeting reports published on or after February 25th, 2025, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has indefinitely halted the consideration of the gender diversity of a company’s board when making vote recommendations with respect to the election or re-election of directors at U.S. companies covered by these guidelines under its proprietary ISS U.S. Sustainability Specialty policy.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee, or other nominees on a case-by-case basis, if the board lacks at least one director of an underrepresented gender identity12.
Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity
NOTE: For shareholder meeting reports published on or after February 25th, 2025, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has indefinitely halted the consideration of the racial and/or ethnic diversity of a company’s board when making vote recommendations with respect to the election or re-election of directors at U.S. companies covered by these guidelines under its proprietary ISS U.S. Sustainability Specialty policy.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) where the board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse members13.
| 11 | Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Sustainability Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships. |
| 12 | Underrepresented gender identity includes directors who identify as women or as non-binary. |
| 13 | Aggregate diversity statistics provided by the board will only be considered if specific to racial and/or ethnic diversity. |
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Vote against or withhold from non-independent directors (Executive Directors and Non-Independent Non-Executive Directors per Sustainability Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors) when:
| | Independent directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board; |
| | The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee; |
| | The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or |
| | The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee. |
Sustainability Policy Classification of Directors — U.S.
| 1. | Executive Director |
| 1.1. | Current officer[1] of the company or one of its affiliates[2]. |
| 2. | Non-Independent Non-Executive Director |
Board Identification
| 2.1. | Director identified as not independent by the board. |
Controlling/Significant Shareholder
| 2.2. | Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group). |
Current Employment at Company or Partnership
| 2.3. | Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives). |
| 2.4. | Officer[1], former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company. |
Former Employment
| 2.5. | Former CEO of the company.[3],[4] |
| 2.6. | Former non-CEO officer[1] of the company or an affiliate[2] within the past five years. |
| 2.7. | Former officer[1] of an acquired company within the past five years[4]. |
| 2.8. | Officer [1] of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years. |
| 2.9. | Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made.[5] |
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Family Members
| 2.10. | Immediate family member[6] of a current or former officer[1] of the company or its affiliates[2] within the last five years. |
| 2.11. | Immediate family member[6] of a current employee of company or its affiliates[2] where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role). |
Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships
| 2.12. | Director who (or whose immediate family member[6]) currently provides professional services[7] in excess of $10,000 per year to: the company, an affiliate[2], or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; either directly or is (or whose family member is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services. |
| 2.13. | Director who (or whose immediate family member[6]) currently has any material transactional relationship[8] with the company or its affiliates[2]; or who is (or whose immediately family member[6] is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationship[8] (excluding investments in the company through a private placement). |
| 2.14. | Director who (or whose immediate family member[6]) is a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments[8] from the company or its affiliates[2]. |
Other Relationships
| 2.15. | Party to a voting agreement[9] to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote. |
| 2.16. | Has (or an immediate family member[6] has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its Compensation Committee[10]. |
| 2.17. | Founder[11] of the company but not currently an employee. |
| 2.18. | Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers. |
| 2.19. | Any material[12] relationship with the company. |
| 3. | Independent Director |
| 3.1. | No material[12] connection to the company other than a board seat. |
Footnotes:
[1] The definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes the chief executive, operating,
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financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will be classified as an Affiliated Outsider under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation in excess of $10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Outsider.
[2] “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. Sustainability Advisory Services uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.
[3] Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).
[4] When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, Sustainability Advisory Services will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.
[5] Sustainability Advisory Services will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. Sustainability Advisory Services will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.
[6] “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.
[7] Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include, but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; legal services; property management services; realtor services; lobbying services; executive search services; and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services; IT tech support services; educational services; and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of $10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an
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entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.
[8] A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity exceeding the greater of $200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of $1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NYSE listing standards. In the case of a company which follows neither of the preceding standards, Sustainability Advisory Services will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).
[9] Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as independent outsiders if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders’ interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.
[10] Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on each other’s boards and at least one serves on the other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).
[11] The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, Sustainability Advisory Services may deem him or her an independent outsider.
[12] For purposes of Sustainability Advisory Services’ director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.
Board refreshment is best implemented through an ongoing program of individual director evaluations, conducted annually, to ensure the evolving needs of the board are met and to bring in fresh perspectives, skills, and diversity as needed.
Term/Tenure Limits
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals regarding director term/tenure limits, considering:
| | The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit; |
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| | The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process; |
| | Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures; |
| | Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to non-independent directors; and |
| | Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner. |
Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for the company to adopt director term/tenure limits, considering:
| | The scope of the shareholder proposal; and |
| | Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment. |
Age Limits
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals seeking to fix the board size or designate a range for the board size.
Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board outside of a specified range without shareholder approval.
Classification/Declassification of the Board
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board.
Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering, at a minimum, the following factors:
| | The reasonableness/scope of the request; and |
| | The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulate voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting, unless:
| | The company has proxy access, thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and |
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| | The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections. |
Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (insider voting power > 50%).
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals on director and officer indemnification liability protection, and exculpation14.
Consider the stated rationale for the proposed change. Also consider, among other factors, the extent to which the proposal would:
| | Eliminate entirely directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care. |
| | Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of loyalty. |
| | Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness. |
| | Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to indemnify. |
Vote for only those proposals providing such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if both of the following apply:
| | If the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and |
| | If only the director’s legal expenses would be covered. |
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and the degree to which they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.
Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:
| | The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers; |
| 14 | Indemnification: the condition of being secured against loss or damage. |
| Limited liability: a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff. |
| Exculpation: to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director or officer to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer. |
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| | The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
| | The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and |
| | The scope and structure of the proposal. |
Establish Other Board Committee Proposals
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee, as such proposals seek a specific oversight mechanism/structure that potentially limits a company’s flexibility to determine an appropriate oversight mechanism for itself. However, the following factors will be considered:
| | Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
| | Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
| | Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
| | Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and |
| | The scope and structure of the proposal. |
Filling Vacancies/Removal of Directors
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.
| | Vote for proposals to restore shareholders’ ability to remove directors with or without cause. |
| | Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies. |
| | Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies. |
One of the principal functions of the board is to monitor and evaluate the performance of the CEO and other executive officers. The board chair’s duty to oversee management may be compromised when he/she is connected to or a part of the management team. Generally, Sustainability Advisory Services recommends supporting shareholder proposals that would require that the position of board chair be held by an individual with no materials ties to the company other than their board seat.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally, support shareholder proposals that would require the board chair to be independent of management.
Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed
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threshold by the Sustainability policy’s definition of independent outsider. (See Sustainability Policy Classification of Directors — U.S.)
Vote for shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors unless they currently meet that standard.
Majority Vote Standard for the Election of Directors
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections. Vote against if no carve-out for a plurality vote standard in contested elections is included.
Generally vote for precatory and binding shareholder resolutions requesting that the board change the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.
Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:
| | Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power; |
| | Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group; |
| | Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group; |
| | Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board. |
Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access.
Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.
Require More Nominees than Open Seats
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against shareholder proposals that would require a company to nominate more candidates than the number of open board seats.
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Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:
| | Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board; |
| | Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders; |
| | Company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and |
| | The company has an independent chair or a lead director, according to Sustainability Advisory Services’ policy definition. This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders. |
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access -Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:
| | Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry; |
| | Management’s track record; |
| | Background to the contested election; |
| | Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements; |
| | Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management; |
| | Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and |
| | Stock ownership positions. |
In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote-no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.
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| 3. | Shareholder Rights & Defenses |
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory, and shareholder review.
To be reasonable, the company’s deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year’s meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120 day window). The submittal window is the period under which shareholders must file their proposal/nominations prior to the deadline.
In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent’s economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.
Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.
Vote for proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders.
Control Share Acquisition Provisions
Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.
Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.
Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.
Control Share Cash-Out Provisions
Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to “cash-out” of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.
Disgorgement provisions require an acquirer or potential acquirer of more than a certain percentage of a company’s stock to disgorge, or pay back, to the company any profits realized from the sale of that company’s stock purchased 24 months before achieving control status. All sales of company stock by the acquirer occurring within a certain period of time (between 18 months and 24 months) prior to the investor’s gaining control status are subject to these recapture-of-profits provisions.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions (provisions that stipulate that an acquirer must pay the same price to acquire all shares as it paid to acquire the control shares), evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.
Generally vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions. Freeze-out provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.
Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of its shares, the practice discriminates against all other shareholders.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to adopt anti-greenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.
Vote case-by-case on anti-greenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.
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Federal Forum Selection Provisions
Federal forum selection provisions require that U.S. federal courts be the sole forum for shareholders to litigate claims arising under federal securities law.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify “the district courts of the United States” as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.
Vote against provisions that restrict the forum to a particular federal district court; unilateral adoption (without a shareholder vote) of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.
Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters
Exclusive forum provisions in the charter or bylaws restrict shareholders’ ability to bring derivative lawsuits against the company, for claims arising out of state corporate law, to the courts of a particular state (generally the state of incorporation).
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the state of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.
For states other than Delaware, vote case-by-case on exclusive forum provisions, taking into consideration:
| | The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision; |
| | Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum; |
| | The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and |
| | Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections. |
Generally vote against provisions that specify a state other than the state of incorporation as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters, or that specify a particular local court within the state; unilateral adoption of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.
Fee-shifting provisions in the charter or bylaws require that a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation and its directors and officers.
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against provisions that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).
Unilateral adoption of a fee-shifting provision will generally be considered an ongoing failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments and Problematic Capital Structures policy.
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:
| | The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing 5-percent holder); |
| | The value of the NOLs; |
| | Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL); |
| | The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and |
| | Any other factors that may be applicable. |
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)
Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: (1) A shareholder approved poison pill in place; or (2) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:
| | Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or |
| | The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate. |
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If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.
Management Proposals to Ratify a Poison Pill
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:
| | No lower than a 20% trigger, flip-in or flip-over; |
| | A term of no more than three years; |
| | No dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill; |
| | Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill. |
In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.
Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:
| | The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent); |
| | The value of the NOLs; |
| | Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs); |
| | The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and |
| | Any other factors that may be applicable. |
Proxy Voting Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Tabulation
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding proxy voting mechanics, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or
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protect shareholder rights. Specific issues covered under the policy include, but are not limited to, confidential voting of individual proxies and ballots, confidentiality of running vote tallies, and the treatment of abstentions and/or broker non-votes in the company’s vote-counting methodology.
While a variety of factors may be considered in each analysis, the guiding principles are: transparency, consistency, and fairness in the proxy voting process. The factors considered, as applicable to the proposal, may include:
| | The scope and structure of the proposal; |
| | The company’s stated confidential voting policy (or other relevant policies) and whether it ensures a “level playing field” by providing shareholder proponents with equal access to vote information prior to the annual meeting; |
| | The company’s vote standard for management and shareholder proposals and whether it ensures consistency and fairness in the proxy voting process and maintains the integrity of vote results; |
| | Whether the company’s disclosure regarding its vote counting method and other relevant voting policies with respect to management and shareholder proposals are consistent and clear; |
| | Any recent controversies or concerns related to the company’s proxy voting mechanics; |
| | Any unintended consequences resulting from implementation of the proposal; and |
| | Any other factors that may be relevant. |
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.
In addition, voting against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:
| | The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot; |
| | The board’s rationale for seeking ratification; |
| | Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail; |
| | Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request; |
| | The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision; |
| | The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings; |
| | Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal; |
| | The company’s ownership structure; and |
| | Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals. |
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Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses.
When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.
Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:
| | The election of fewer than 50% of the directors to be elected is contested in the election; |
| | One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected; |
| | Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and |
| | The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Management or shareholder proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation should be evaluated case-by-case, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:
| | Reasons for reincorporation; |
| | Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and |
| | Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state. |
Vote for reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to act by written consent.
Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent, taking into account the following factors:
| | Shareholders’ current right to act by written consent; |
| | The consent threshold; |
| | The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; |
| | Investor ownership structure; and |
| | Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals. |
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Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions:
| | An unfettered15 right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold; |
| | A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections; |
| | No non-shareholder-approved pill; and |
| | An annually elected board. |
Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against management or shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.
Generally vote for management or shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account the following factors:
| | Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings; |
| | Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred); |
| | The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; |
| | Investor ownership structure; and |
| | Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals that ask the board to consider non-shareholder constituencies or other non-financial effects when evaluating a merger or business combination.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, and anti-greenmail provisions).
Supermajority Vote Requirements
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote.
| 15 | “Unfettered” means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting. |
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Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements. However, for companies with shareholder(s) who have significant ownership levels, vote case-by-case, taking into account:
| | Ownership structure; |
| | Quorum requirements; and |
| | Vote requirements. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only16 meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.
Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:
| | Scope and rationale of the proposal; and |
| | Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices. |
| 4. | Capital/Restructuring |
Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.
Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value.
General Authorization Requests
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:
| | If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares. |
| | If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares. |
| | If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage. |
| | In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization. |
| 16 | Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting. |
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Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:
| | The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes; |
| | On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization; |
| | The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or |
| | The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval. |
However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:
| | In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern; |
| | The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or |
| | A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios. |
For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.
Specific Authorization Requests
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:
| | twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and |
| | the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above. |
Unequal Voting Rights/Dual Class Structure
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:
| | The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, such as: |
| | The company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or |
| | The new class of shares will be transitory; |
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| | The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; and |
| | The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder. |
Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of preferred stock with voting rights superior to the common stock unless:
| | The preferred shares are convertible into common shares and vote on an “as converted” basis prior to conversion, or |
| | The enhanced voting rights of the preferred shares have limited duration and applicability and the shares are voted in a way that mirrors the votes of the common shares (i.e., where such shares are intended to overcome low voting turnout and ensure approval of a specific non-controversial agenda item such as a reverse stock split needed to avoid a delisting). |
Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder- approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that seek preemptive rights, taking into consideration:
| | The size of the company; |
| | The shareholder base; and |
| | The liquidity of the stock. |
General Authorization Requests
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:
| | If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares. |
| | If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares. |
| | If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage. |
| | In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization. |
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| | If no preferred shares are currently issued and outstanding, vote against the request, unless the company discloses a specific use for the shares. |
Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:
| | If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;17 |
| | The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”); |
| | The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they’re convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders; |
| | The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares; |
| | On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization; |
| | The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or |
| | The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval. |
However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:
| | In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern; |
| | The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or |
| | A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios. |
For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.
| 17 | To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan. |
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Specific Authorization Requests
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:
| | twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and |
| | the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account the following:
| | More simplified capital structure; |
| | Enhanced liquidity; |
| | Fairness of conversion terms; |
| | Impact on voting power and dividends; |
| | Reasons for the reclassification; |
| | Conflicts of interest; and |
| | Other alternatives considered. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:
| | The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or |
| | The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Sustainability Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:
| | Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting; |
| | Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing; |
| | The company’s rationale; or |
| | Other factors as applicable. |
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:
| | Greenmail; |
| | The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics; |
| | Threats to the company’s long-term viability; or |
| | Other company-specific factors as warranted. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Sustainability Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as:
| | Adverse governance changes; |
| | Excessive increases in authorized capital stock; |
| | Unfair method of distribution; |
| | Diminution of voting rights; |
| | Adverse conversion features; |
| | Negative impact on stock option plans; and |
| | Alternatives such as spin-off. |
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 20 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.
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For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.
Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.
Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore or provide shareholders with rights of appraisal.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset purchase proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Purchase price; |
| | Fairness opinion; |
| | Financial and strategic benefits; |
| | How the deal was negotiated; |
| | Conflicts of interest; |
| | Other alternatives for the business; and |
| | Non-completion risk. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset sales, considering the following factors:
| | Impact on the balance sheet/working capital; |
| | Potential elimination of diseconomies; |
| | Anticipated financial and operating benefits; |
| | Anticipated use of funds; |
| | Value received for the asset; |
| | Fairness opinion; |
| | How the deal was negotiated; and |
| | Conflicts of interest. |
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities. When evaluating these proposals, the investor should review the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.
Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.
Corporate Reorganization/Debt Restructuring/Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans/Reverse Leveraged Buyouts/Wrap Plans
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt restructuring plan, after evaluating:
| | Dilution to existing shareholders’ positions; |
| | Terms of the offer — discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; termination penalties; exit strategy; |
| | Financial issues — company’s financial situation; degree of need for capital; use of proceeds; effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital; |
| | Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives; |
| | Control issues — change in management; change in control, guaranteed board and committee seats; standstill provisions; voting agreements; veto power over certain corporate actions; and |
| | Conflict of interest — arm’s length transaction, managerial incentives. |
Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration the following:
| | The reasons for the change; |
| | Any financial or tax benefits; |
| | Regulatory benefits; |
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| | Increases in capital structure; and |
| | Changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company. |
Absent compelling financial reasons to recommend for the transaction, vote against the formation of a holding company if the transaction would include either of the following:
| | Increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum (see discussion under “Capital”); or |
| | Adverse changes in shareholder rights. |
Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following:
| | Offer price/premium; |
| | Fairness opinion; |
| | How the deal was negotiated; |
| | Conflicts of interest; |
| | Other alternatives/offers considered; and |
| | Non-completion risk. |
Vote case-by-case on going dark transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:
| | Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock); |
| | Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following: |
| | Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction? |
| | Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction? |
| | Does the company have strong corporate governance? |
| | Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction? |
| | Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders? |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account the following:
| | Percentage of assets/business contributed; |
| | Percentage ownership; |
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| | Financial and strategic benefits; |
| | Governance structure; |
| | Conflicts of interest; |
| | Other alternatives; and |
| | Non-completion risk. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on liquidations, taking into account the following:
| | Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives; |
| | Appraisal value of assets; and |
| | The compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation. |
Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions. Review and evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:
| | Valuation — Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction and strategic rationale. |
| | Market reaction — How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal. |
| | Strategic rationale — Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions. |
| | Negotiations and process — Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value. |
| | Conflicts of interest — Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. |
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| | Governance — Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance. |
Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements, warrants, and convertible debentures taking into consideration:
| | Dilution to existing shareholders’ position: The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. Although newly issued common stock, absent preemptive rights, is typically dilutive to existing shareholders, share price appreciation is often the necessary event to trigger the exercise of “out of the money” warrants and convertible debt. In these instances from a value standpoint, the negative impact of dilution is mitigated by the increase in the company’s stock price that must occur to trigger the dilutive event. |
| | Terms of the offer (discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion, conversion features, termination penalties, exit strategy): |
| | The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial condition. Ideally, the conversion price for convertible debt and the exercise price for warrants should be at a premium to the then prevailing stock price at the time of private placement. |
| | When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, consider factors that influence the discount or premium, such as, liquidity, due diligence costs, control and monitoring costs, capital scarcity, information asymmetry and anticipation of future performance. |
| | Financial issues: |
| | The company’s financial condition; |
| | Degree of need for capital; |
| | Use of proceeds; |
| | Effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital; |
| | Current and proposed cash burn rate; |
| | Going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets. |
| | Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives: A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger or sale of part or all of the company. |
| | Control issues: |
| | Change in management; |
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| | Change in control; |
| | Guaranteed board and committee seats; |
| | Standstill provisions; |
| | Voting agreements; |
| | Veto power over certain corporate actions; and |
| | Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium |
| | Conflicts of interest: |
| | Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor. |
| | Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests? |
| | Market reaction: |
| | The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one day impact on the unaffected stock price. |
Vote for the private placement, or for the issuance of warrants and/or convertible debentures in a private placement, if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.
Reorganization/Restructuring Plan (Bankruptcy)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:
| | Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company; |
| | Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company; |
| | Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an official equity committee); |
| | The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s); |
| | Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and |
| | Governance of the reorganized company. |
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Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:
| | Valuation — Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity. |
| | Market reaction — How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price. |
| | Deal timing — A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date. |
| | Negotiations and process — What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors. |
| | Conflicts of interest — How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80% rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80% of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24 month timeframe. |
| | Voting agreements — Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/ tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights? |
| | Governance — What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger? |
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) — Proposals for Extensions
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally support requests to extend the termination date by up to one year from the SPAC’s original termination date (inclusive of any built-in extension option, and accounting for prior extension requests).
Other factors that may be considered include: any added incentives, business combination status, other amendment terms, and, if applicable, use of money in the trust fund to pay excise taxes on redeemed shares.
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on spin-offs, considering:
| | Tax and regulatory advantages; |
| | Planned use of the sale proceeds; |
| | Valuation of spinoff; |
| | Fairness opinion; |
| | Benefits to the parent company; |
| | Conflicts of interest; |
| | Managerial incentives; |
| | Corporate governance changes; |
| | Changes in the capital structure. |
Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by:
| | Hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives; |
| | Selling the company; or |
| | Liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders. |
These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:
| | Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight; |
| | Signs of entrenched board and management (such as the adoption of takeover defenses); |
| | Strategic plan in place for improving value; |
| | Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; and |
| | The company actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor. |
| 5. | Compensation |
Underlying all evaluations are five global principles that most investors expect corporations to adhere to in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs:
| 1. | Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment, with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: This principle encompasses overall executive pay practices, which must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. It will take into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance; the mix between fixed and variable pay; performance goals; and equity-based plan costs; |
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| 2. | Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation; |
| 3. | Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed); |
| 4. | Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly; |
| 5. | Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices. |
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation — Management Proposals (Management Say-on-Pay)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on ballot items related to executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation.
Vote against Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay or “SOP”) if:
| | There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance); |
| | The company maintains significant problematic pay practices; |
| | The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders. |
Vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:
| | There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP is warranted due to pay for performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof; |
| | The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast; |
| | The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating; or |
| | The situation is egregious. |
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PRIMARY EVALUATION FACTORS FOR EXECUTIVE PAY
Pay-for-Performance Evaluation
Sustainability Advisory Services annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to identify strong or satisfactory alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the Russell 3000 or Russell 3000E Indices, this analysis considers the following:
| 1. | Peer Group18 Alignment: |
| | The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a five-year period. |
| | The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a five-year period. |
| | The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median over one- and three-year periods. |
| 2. | Absolute Alignment19 – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period. |
If the above analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of companies outside the Russell indices, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, our analysis may include any of the following qualitative factors, as relevant to evaluating how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:
| | The overall ratio of performance-based compensation to fixed or discretionary pay; |
| | The ratio of performance- to time-based long-term incentive awards; |
| | Vesting and/or retention requirements for equity awards that demonstrate a long-term focus; |
| | The rigor of performance goals; |
| | The complexity and risks around pay program design; |
| | The transparency and clarity of disclosure; |
| | The company’s peer group benchmarking practices; |
| | Financial/operational results, both absolute and relative to peers; |
| | Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards); |
| | Realizable and/or realized pay compared to granted pay; and |
| 18 | The ISS peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using factors such as market cap, revenue, assets, GICS industry group, and the company selected peers’ GICS industry group. ISS’ peer selection methodology is detailed in the U.S. Peer Group FAQ. |
| 19 | Russell 3000E Index companies (excluding S&P1500 and Russell 3000 companies) are not subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis. |
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| | Any other factors deemed relevant. |
Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:
| | Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements; |
| | Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and |
| | Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements. |
The list of examples below highlights certain problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:
| | Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options); |
| | Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups; |
| | New or materially amended agreements that provide for: |
| | Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus); |
| | CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition; |
| | CIC excise tax gross-up entitlements (including “modified” gross-ups); |
| | Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions; |
| | Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits; |
| | Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason); |
| | Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible; |
| | Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors. |
The above examples are not an exhaustive list. Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Compensation Policies FAQ document for additional detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as problematic and may lead to negative vote recommendations.
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Options Backdating
The following factors should be examined case-by-case to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud:
| | Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes; |
| | Duration of options backdating; |
| | Size of restatement due to options backdating; |
| | Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and |
| | Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future. |
Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness
Consider the following factors case-by-case when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:
| | Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or |
| | Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received low support, taking into account the factors identified under the Responsiveness section in the Board of Directors policy with respect to say-on-pay. |
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.
Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or extended arrangements.
Features that may result in an “against” recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):
| | Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance; |
| | Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards; |
| | Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control; |
| | Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale; |
| | Excessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus); |
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| | Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable; |
| | Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or |
| | Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or |
| | The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote. |
Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.
In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s advisory vote on compensation (management say-on-pay), the say-on-pay proposal will be evaluated in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.
Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans
Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Equity Compensation Plans FAQ document for additional details on the Equity Plan Scorecard policy.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on equity plan proposals subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard framework, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors under three pillars:
| | Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both: |
| | SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and |
| | SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants. |
| | Plan Features: |
| | Quality of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC); |
| | Discretionary vesting authority; |
| | Liberal share recycling on various award types; |
| | Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan; |
| | Dividends payable prior to award vesting; and |
| | Cash-denominated award limits for non-employee directors. |
| | Grant Practices: |
| | The company’s three year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; |
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| | Vesting requirements in CEO’S recent equity grants; |
| | The estimated duration of the plan; |
| | The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards classified by ISS as performance-based; |
| | Whether the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy; and |
| | Whether the company maintains sufficient post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements. |
Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following egregious factors (“overriding factors”) apply:
| | Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition; |
| | The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies — or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies); |
| | The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant pay-for-performance disconnect under certain circumstances; |
| | The plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings; |
| | The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; |
| | The plan lacks sufficient positive features under the Plan Features pillar; or |
| | Any other factors that are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests. |
FURTHER INFORMATION ON CERTAIN EPSC FACTORS
Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)
The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors. SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types.
For proposals subject to Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or
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downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company’s benchmark.20
Three-Year Value-Adjusted Burn Rate
A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Value-Adjusted Burn Rate benchmarks are calculated as the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.
The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate will be calculated as follows:
Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).
Liberal Change in Control Definition
Generally vote against equity plans if the plan has a liberal definition of change in control and the equity awards could vest upon such liberal definition of change-in-control, even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.
Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. “Repricing” includes the ability to do any of the following:
| | Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs; |
| | Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs; |
| | Cancel underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or |
| | Provide cash buyouts of underwater options. |
While the above cover most types of repricing, Sustainability Advisory Services may view other provisions as akin to repricing depending on the facts and circumstances.
Also, vote against or withhold from members of the Compensation Committee who approved repricing (as defined above or otherwise determined by Sustainability Advisory Services) without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.
| 20 | For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company’s SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors. |
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Vote against plans that do not expressly prohibit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval if the company has a history of repricing/buyouts without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.
Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect
If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for problematic pay practices, vote against the plan.
If a significant portion of the CEO’s misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, and there is an equity plan on the ballot with the CEO as one of the participants, Sustainability Advisory Services may recommend a vote against the equity plan. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:
| | Magnitude of pay misalignment; |
| | Contribution of non–performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and |
| | The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer level. |
Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations
Options that have Dividend Equivalent Rights (DERs) associated with them will have a higher calculated award value than those without DERs under the binomial model, based on the value of these dividend streams. The higher value will be applied to new shares, shares available under existing plans, and shares awarded but not exercised per the plan specifications. DERS transfer more shareholder equity to employees and non-employee directors and this cost should be captured.
Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
For Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), include the common shares issuable upon conversion of outstanding Operating Partnership (OP) units in the share count for the purposes of determining: (1) market capitalization in the Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) analysis and (2) shares outstanding in the burn rate analysis.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).
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Employee Stock Purchase Plans — Qualified Plans
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:
| | Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value; |
| | Offering period is 27 months or less; and |
| | The number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the outstanding shares. |
Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where any of the following apply:
| | Purchase price is less than 85 percent of fair market value; or |
| | Offering period is greater than 27 months; or |
| | The number of shares allocated to the plan is more than ten percent of the outstanding shares. |
Employee Stock Purchase Plans — Non-Qualified Plans
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:
| | Broad-based participation (i.e., all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company); |
| | Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary; |
| | Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; |
| | No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a company matching contribution. |
Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when any of the plan features do not meet the above criteria. If the company matching contribution or effective discount exceeds the above, Sustainability Advisory Services may evaluate the SVT cost as part of the assessment.
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.
Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:
| | Addresses administrative features only; or |
| | Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent outsiders, per Sustainability Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time after the company’s initial public offering (IPO), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below). |
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Vote against such proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:
| | Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent outsiders, per Sustainability Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors. |
Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes
Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:
| | If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments may potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments. |
| | If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO, whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments. |
| | If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments are not deemed to potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown for informational purposes. |
Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:
| | Historic trading patterns — the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term; |
| | Rationale for the re-pricing — was the stock price decline beyond management’s control? |
| | Is this a value-for-value exchange? |
| | Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve? |
| | Timing — repricing should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price; |
| | Option vesting — does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period? |
| | Term of the option--the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option; |
| | Exercise price — should be set at fair market or a premium to market; |
| | Participants — executive officers and directors must be excluded. |
If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company’s total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.
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In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing. and warrants additional scrutiny. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.
Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.
Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange.
Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, no adjustments will be made to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation.
Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: One-time Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.
Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:
| | Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating; |
| | Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; |
| | There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants. |
Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management’s control. A review of the company’s historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term.
Ongoing TSO program: Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the
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ongoing TSO program, structure and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited, to the following:
| | Eligibility; |
| | Vesting; |
| | Bid-price; |
| | Term of options; |
| | Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and |
| | Option repricing policy. |
Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:
| | If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and |
| | An assessment of the following qualitative factors: |
| | The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile; |
| | The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation; |
| | Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements; |
| | Equity award vesting schedules; |
| | The mix of cash and equity-based compensation; |
| | Meaningful limits on director compensation; |
| | The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and |
| | The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation. |
Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:
| | The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; |
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| | The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; and |
| | The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk). |
On occasion, director stock plans will exceed the plan cost or burn rate benchmarks when combined with employee or executive stock plans. In such cases, vote case-by-case on the plan taking into consideration the following qualitative factors:
| | The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile; |
| | The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation; |
| | Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements; |
| | Equity award vesting schedules; |
| | The mix of cash and equity-based compensation; |
| | Meaningful limits on director compensation; |
| | The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and |
| | The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation. |
Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors.
Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors.
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use of company stock will be considered.
Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:
| | The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation; |
| | Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and |
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| | Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place. |
Compensation Consultants — Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s), and fees paid.
Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, provided the information requested is relevant to shareholders’ needs, would not put the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its industry, and is not unduly burdensome to the company.
Vote against shareholder proposals seeking to set absolute levels on compensation or otherwise dictate the amount or form of compensation.
Vote against shareholder proposals seeking to eliminate stock options or any other equity grants to employees or directors.
Vote against shareholder proposals requiring director fees be paid in stock only.
Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.
Vote case-by-case on all other shareholder proposals regarding executive and director pay, taking into account company performance, pay level versus peers, pay level versus industry, and long-term corporate outlook.
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans. The following factors will be taken into account:
| | The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained; |
| | The time period required to retain the shares; |
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| | Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements; |
| | Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives; |
| | Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case on proposals calling for an analysis of the pay disparity between corporate executives and other non-executive employees.
Pay for Performance/Performance-Based Awards
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:
| | First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards. |
| | Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test. |
In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation plan for senior executives. These proposals generally include the following principles:
| | Set compensation targets for the plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median; |
| | Deliver a majority of the plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards; |
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| | Provide the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and non-financial performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan; |
| | Establish performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies; |
| | Limit payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance. |
Consider the following factors in evaluating this proposal:
| | What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven? |
| | If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group? |
| | Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure? |
| | What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to? |
Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the addition of certain safeguards in prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives. Safeguards may include:
| | Adoption, amendment, or termination of a 10b5-1 Plan must be disclosed in a Form 8-K; |
| | Amendment or early termination of a 10b5-1 Plan allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board; |
| | Request that a certain number of days that must elapse between adoption or amendment of a 10b5-1 Plan and initial trading under the plan; |
| | Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a 10b5-1 Plan; |
| | An executive may not trade in company stock outside the 10b5-1 Plan; |
| | Trades under a 10b5-1 Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive. |
Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals seeking a policy to prohibit any outside CEO from serving on a company’s compensation committee, unless the company has demonstrated problematic pay practices that raise concerns about the performance and composition of the committee.
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Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to recoup incentive cash or stock compensation made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned turn out to have been in error, or if the senior executive has breached company policy or has engaged in misconduct that may be significantly detrimental to the company’s financial position or reputation, or if the senior executive failed to manage or monitor risks that subsequently led to significant financial or reputational harm to the company. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where an executive’s fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. However, such policies may be narrow given that not all misconduct or negligence may result in significant financial restatements. Misconduct, negligence or lack of sufficient oversight by senior executives may lead to significant financial loss or reputational damage that may have long-lasting impact.
In considering whether to support such shareholder proposals, the following factors will be taken into consideration:
| | If the company has adopted a formal recoupment policy; |
| | The rigor of the recoupment policy focusing on how and under what circumstances the company may recoup incentive or stock compensation; |
| | Whether the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems; |
| | Whether the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent; |
| | Disclosure of recoupment of incentive or stock compensation from senior executives or lack thereof; or |
| | Any other relevant factors. |
Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requiring that executive severance (including change-in-control related) arrangements or payments be submitted for shareholder ratification.
Factors that will be considered include, but are not limited to:
| | The company’s severance or change-in-control agreements in place, and the presence of problematic features (such as excessive severance entitlements, single triggers, excise tax gross-ups, etc.); |
| | Any existing limits on cash severance payouts or policies which require shareholder ratification of severance payments exceeding a certain level; |
| | Any recent severance-related controversies; and |
| | Whether the proposal is overly prescriptive, such as requiring shareholder approval of severance that does not exceed market norms. |
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals prohibiting executives from selling shares of company stock during periods in which the company has announced that it may or will be repurchasing shares of its stock. Vote for the proposal when there is a pattern of abuse by executives exercising options or selling shares during periods of share buybacks.
Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the company exclude the impact of share buybacks from the calculation of incentive program metrics, considering the following factors:
| | The frequency and timing of the company’s share buybacks; |
| | The use of per-share metrics in incentive plans; |
| | The effect of recent buybacks on incentive metric results and payouts; and |
| | Whether there is any indication of metric result manipulation. |
Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company’s executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.
Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to limit the executive benefits provided under the company’s supplemental executive retirement plan (SERP) by limiting covered compensation to a senior executive’s annual salary or those pay elements covered for the general employee population.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment/Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment and/or eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity.
The following factors will be considered:
| | The company’s current treatment of equity in change-of-control situations (i.e. is it double triggered, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares, etc.); |
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| | Current employment agreements, including potential poor pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements. |
Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).
| 6. | Social and Environmental Issues |
Socially responsible shareholder resolutions receive a great deal more attention from institutional shareholders today than in the past. While focusing on value enhancement through risk mitigation and exposure to new sustainability-related opportunities, these resolutions also seek standardized reporting on ESG issues, request information regarding an issuer’s adoption of, or adherence to, relevant norms, standards, codes of conduct or universally recognized international initiatives to promote disclosure and transparency. Sustainability Advisory Services generally supports standards-based ESG shareholder proposals that enhance long-term shareholder and stakeholder value while aligning the interests of the company with those of society at large. In particular, the policy will focus on resolutions seeking greater transparency and/or adherence to internationally recognized standards and principles.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: In determining our vote recommendation on standardized ESG reporting shareholder proposals, we also analyze the following factors:
| | Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable; |
| | Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company’s short-term or long-term share value; |
| | The percentage of sales, assets and earnings affected; |
| | Whether the company has already responded in some appropriate manner to the request embodied in a proposal; |
| | Whether the company’s analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive; |
| | Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s environmental or social practices; |
| | What other companies have done in response to the issue addressed in the proposal; |
| | Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal; and |
| | The degree to which the company’s stated position on the issues raised in the proposal could affect its reputation or sales or leave it vulnerable to a boycott or selective purchasing. |
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a report on a company’s animal welfare standards, or animal welfare-related risks, unless:
| | The company has already published a set of animal welfare standards and monitors compliance; |
| | The company’s standards are comparable to industry peers; and |
| | There are no recent significant fines, litigation, or controversies related to the company’s and/or its suppliers’ treatment of animals. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to phase out the use of animals in product testing, unless:
| | The company is conducting animal testing programs that are unnecessary or not required by regulation; |
| | The company is conducting animal testing when suitable alternatives are commonly accepted and used by industry peers; or |
| | There are recent, significant fines or litigation related to the company’s treatment of animals. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting the implementation of Controlled Atmosphere Killing (CAK) methods at company and/or supplier operations unless such methods are required by legislation or generally accepted as the industry standard.
Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting a report on the feasibility of implementing CAK methods at company and/or supplier operations considering the availability of existing research conducted by the company or industry groups on this topic and any fines or litigation related to current animal processing procedures at the company.
Genetically Modified Ingredients
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting that a company voluntarily label genetically engineered (GE) ingredients in its products. The labeling of products with GE ingredients is best left to the appropriate regulatory authorities.
Vote case-by-case on proposals asking for a report on the feasibility of labeling products containing GE ingredients, taking into account:
| | The potential impact of such labeling on the company’s business; |
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| | The quality of the company’s disclosure on GE product labeling, related voluntary initiatives, and how this disclosure compares with industry peer disclosure; and |
| | Company’s current disclosure on the feasibility of GE product labeling. |
Generally vote for proposals seeking a report on the social, health, and environmental effects of genetically modified organism (GMOs).
Generally vote against proposals to eliminate GE ingredients from the company’s products, or proposals asking for reports outlining the steps necessary to eliminate GE ingredients from the company’s products. Such decisions are more appropriately made by management with consideration of current regulations.
Reports on Potentially Controversial Business/Financial Practices
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s potentially controversial business or financial practices or products, taking into account:
| | Whether the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent abuses; |
| | Whether the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the products/practices in question; |
| | Whether the company has been subject to violations of related laws or serious controversies; and |
| | Peer companies’ policies/practices in this area. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on the company’s lending guidelines and procedures taking into account:
| | Whether the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent abusive lending practices; |
| | Whether the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the lending products in question; |
| | Whether the company has been subject to violations of lending laws or serious lending controversies; and |
| | Peer companies’ policies to prevent abusive lending practices. |
Pharmaceutical Pricing, Access to Medicines, Product Reimportation and Health Pandemics
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting that companies implement specific price restraints on pharmaceutical products unless the company fails to adhere to legislative guidelines or industry norms in its product pricing practices.
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Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting that a company report on its product pricing or access to medicine policies, considering:
| | The potential for reputational, market, and regulatory risk exposure; |
| | Existing disclosure of relevant policies; |
| | Deviation from established industry norms; |
| | Relevant company initiatives to provide research and/or products to disadvantaged consumers; |
| | Whether the proposal focuses on specific products or geographic regions; |
| | The potential burden and scope of the requested report; and |
| | Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines at the company. |
Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on the financial and legal impact of its prescription drug reimportation policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.
Generally vote against proposals requesting that companies adopt specific policies to encourage or constrain prescription drug reimportation. Such matters are more appropriately the province of legislative activity and may place the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its peers.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports outlining the impact of health pandemics (such as COVID-19, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and avian flu) on the company’s operations and how the company is responding to the situation, taking into account:
| | The scope of the company’s operations in the affected/relevant area(s); |
| | The company’s existing healthcare policies, including benefits and healthcare access; and |
| | Company donations to relevant healthcare providers. |
Vote against proposals asking companies to establish, implement, and report on a standard of response to health pandemics (such as COVID-19, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and avian flu), unless the company has significant operations in the affected markets and has failed to adopt policies and/or procedures to address these issues comparable to those of industry peers.
Product Safety and Toxic/Hazardous Materials
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its policies, initiatives/procedures, and oversight mechanisms related to toxic/hazardous materials or product safety in its supply chain.
Generally vote for resolutions requesting that companies develop a feasibility assessment to phase-out of certain toxic/hazardous materials, or evaluate and disclose the potential financial and legal risks associated with utilizing certain materials.
Generally vote against resolutions requiring that a company reformulate its products.
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on resolutions regarding the advertisement of tobacco products, considering:
| | Recent related fines, controversies, or significant litigation; |
| | Whether the company complies with relevant laws and regulations on the marketing of tobacco; |
| | Whether the company’s advertising restrictions deviate from those of industry peers; |
| | Whether the company entered into the Master Settlement Agreement, which restricts marketing of tobacco to youth; and |
| | Whether restrictions on marketing to youth extend to foreign countries. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding second-hand smoke, considering;
| | Whether the company complies with all laws and regulations; |
| | The degree that voluntary restrictions beyond those mandated by law might hurt the company’s competitiveness; and |
| | The risk of any health-related liabilities. |
Generally vote against resolutions to cease production of tobacco-related products, to avoid selling products to tobacco companies, to spin-off tobacco-related businesses, or prohibit investment in tobacco equities. Such business decisions are better left to company management or portfolio managers.
Generally vote against proposals regarding tobacco product warnings. Such decisions are better left to public health authorities.
Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions
Climate change has emerged as the most significant environmental threat to the planet to date. Scientists agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a “greenhouse effect” that traps the planet’s heat. Environmentalists claim that the greenhouse gases produced by the industrial age have caused recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. With notable exceptions, business leaders have described the rise and fall of global temperatures as naturally occurring phenomena and depicted corporate impact on climate change as minimal. Shareholder proposals asking a company to issue a report to shareholders, “at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information,” on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the report include descriptions of efforts within companies to reduce emissions, their financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat and their goals in reducing these emissions from their operations. Proponents argue that there is scientific proof that the burning of fossil fuels causes global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, and that a report on the company’s role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation:
| | Vote for shareholder proposals seeking information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces related to climate change- on its operations and investments, or on how the company identifies, measures, and manage such risks. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reduction of GHG emissions. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on responses to regulatory and public pressures surrounding climate change, and for disclosure of research that aided in setting company policies around climate change. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report/disclosure of goals on GHG emissions from company operations and/or products. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report on reducing methane emissions and to assess the reliability of the company’s methane emission disclosures. |
Companies have faced proposals addressing environmental justice concerns, focused on vulnerable stakeholders — particularly communities of color and low-income communities — who are disproportionately impacted by environmental pollution. These heightened risks can be exacerbated by climate change.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting disclosure of an environmental justice report, as well as a third-party environmental justice assessment.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: For financial institutions and companies that provide financial services, generally vote for shareholder proposals that request the company to increase disclosure of its financed emissions. Generally vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request a company to adopt a policy to reduce its financed emissions. Financed emissions (scope 3, category 15) are emissions associated with a company’s investments, not already covered under scopes 1 and 2 — including but not limited to equity investments, debt investments, and project finance. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:
| | The completeness, feasibility, and rigor of the company’s financed emissions disclosure; |
| | Whether the company’s decarbonization targets and climate transition plan are in alignment with the Paris Agreement, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, and other internationally recognized frameworks; |
| | Whether the company’s methodology is in alignment with the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol), the Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials (PCAF), and other generally accepted calculation and reporting methodologies; and |
| | Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive. |
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Companies have faced proposals requesting disclosure on the just transition — addressing stakeholder concerns within a company’s value chain with regards to the effects of climate change and the energy transition. Relevant stakeholder groups can include employees, suppliers (and workers in supply chains), communities impacted by operations, and other vulnerable groups potentially affected by a company’s climate change strategy. Just transition disclosure should adequately assess, consult on, and address impacts on affected stakeholders regarding climate change risks.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting just transition and labor protection disclosure, in alignment with the International Labour Organization, the World Benchmarking Alliance, and other generally accepted guidelines and indicators.
Natural capital disclosure has moved into the mainstream of climate change reporting. The Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD) and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework have mobilized widespread recognition of the fact that Paris Agreement-aligned targets can only be achieved by integrating natural capital-related concerns. As such, there has been increased market uptake around natural capital disclosures and commitments, particularly around TNFD-aligned reporting, as well as alignment with other internationally accepted reporting frameworks.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting disclosure of TNFD-aligned reporting, including but not limited to a biodiversity impact and dependency assessment. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:
| | The completeness, feasibility, and rigor of the company’s natural capital-related disclosure; |
| | Whether the company’s natural capital disclosure adequately incorporate governance, strategy, risk and impact management, and metrics and targets; |
| | Whether the company’s targets and climate transition plan are in alignment with TNFD, the Global Biodiversity Framework, the Paris Agreement, and other internationally recognized frameworks; and |
| | Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive. |
Natural capital-related shareholder proposals also encompass a broad range of industries. Various market-led initiatives have identified key sectors for investor-issuer engagement, including but not limited to: chemicals, consumer goods, food and agriculture, forestry, mining, oil and gas, packaging, and pharmaceuticals. Some proposals also address indigenous peoples’ rights, which is also a key consideration for natural capital frameworks.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting companies to increase disclosure and/or to adopt sustainable sourcing policies with regards to natural capital-related risks, dependencies, and impacts.
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Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan21, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:
| | The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards; |
| | Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3); |
| | The completeness, feasibility and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions in line with Paris Agreement goals (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant); |
| | Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based; |
| | Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050; |
| | Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years; |
| | Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance; |
| | Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy; |
| | Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and |
| | The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers. |
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:
| | The completeness, feasibility and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure; |
| | The company’s actual GHG emissions performance; |
| | The company’s alignment with relevant internationally recognized frameworks such as the Paris Agreement and IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario; |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and |
| 21 | Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan. |
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| | Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its energy efficiency policies.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on the feasibility of developing renewable energy resources.
Generally vote for proposals requesting that the company invest in renewable energy resources.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on a company’s efforts to diversify the board, unless:
| | The gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; and |
| | The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company. |
Generally vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to take reasonable steps to increase the levels of underrepresented gender identities and racial minorities on the board.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting a company disclose its diversity policies or initiatives, or proposals requesting disclosure of a company’s comprehensive workforce diversity data, including requests for EEO-1 data.
Generally vote for proposals seeking information on the diversity efforts of suppliers and service providers.
Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking to amend a company’s EEO statement or diversity policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, unless the change would be unduly burdensome.
Generally vote for proposals to extend company benefits to domestic partners.
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Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gap
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender or race/ethnicity or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender or race/ethnicity pay gaps, taking into account:
| | The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy and fair and equitable compensation practices; |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues; |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and |
| | Local laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of ethnic and/or racial minorities. |
Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audits
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, considering company disclosures, policies, actions, and engagements.
Environment and Sustainability
Companies have received shareholder proposals requesting increased disclosure of responsible AI policies, procedures, and practices with respect to board oversight, environmental sustainability, and human rights risk mitigation.
AI and data center issues are wide-ranging. Some areas where companies may face AI-related risks that could materially impact their operations include:
| | How high levels of AI-driven energy use may impact GHG emissions targets, climate goals, and climate transition plans; |
| | How using AI to increase fossil fuel development and production may impact climate targets, and may pose legal and reputational risks; |
| | Data centers exacerbating water stress, especially in drought-prone areas; |
| | Child safety; |
| | End use due diligence (how use of AI for surveillance and censorship, especially in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, may impact legal and reputational risk); |
| | Data acquisition and usage (privacy, safety, intellectual property); |
| | Human capital management (bias, discrimination, workplace monitoring, health and safety, automation, and other workforce impacts); |
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| | Just AI transition; |
| | Misinformation and disinformation; |
| | Privacy concerns, and potential promotion of hate speech and discrimination, related to targeted advertising; and |
| | Potential human rights impacts related to weapons development and deployment. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting companies to prepare reports or adopt policies in line with internationally accepted frameworks. The scope of this recommendation takes into consideration the entire AI lifecycle and value chain, from upstream components and data sourcing, to downstream applications, safety and security issues, and other broader societal and environmental impacts.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on resolutions requesting that a company report on safety and/or security risks associated with its operations and/or facilities, considering:
| | The company’s compliance with applicable regulations and guidelines; |
| | The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its security and safety policies, procedures, and compliance monitoring; and |
| | The existence of recent, significant violations, fines, or controversy regarding the safety and security of the company’s operations and/or facilities. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s (natural gas) hydraulic fracturing operations, including measures the company has taken to manage and mitigate the potential community and environmental impacts of those operations.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on potential environmental damage as a result of company operations in protected regions, unless:
| | Operations in the specified regions are not permitted by current laws or regulations; |
| | The company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions; or |
| | The company’s disclosure of its operations and environmental policies in these regions is comparable to industry peers. |
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote FOR proposals to adopt a comprehensive recycling strategy, taking into account:
| | The nature of the company’s business; |
| | The current level of disclosure of the company’s existing related programs; |
| | The timetable and methods of program implementation prescribed by the proposal; |
| | The company’s ability to address the issues raised in the proposal; and |
| | How the company’s recycling programs compare to similar programs of its industry peers. |
Shareholders may request general environmental disclosures or reports on a specific location/operation, often requesting that the company detail the environmental risks and potential liabilities of a specific project. Increasingly, companies have begun reporting on environmental and sustainability issues using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards. The GRI was established in 1997 with the mission of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance. The GRI was developed by Ceres (formerly known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, CERES) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
Ceres was formed in the wake of the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, when a consortium of investors, environmental groups, and religious organizations drafted what were originally named the Valdez Principles. Later to be renamed the CERES Principles, and now branded as the Ceres Roadmap to 2030, corporate signatories to the Ceres Roadmap to 2030 pledge to publicly report on environmental issues, including protection of the biosphere, sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of wastes, energy conservation, and employee and community risk reduction in a standardized form.
The Equator Principles are the financial industry’s benchmark for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing. The Principles were first launched in June 2003 and were ultimately adopted by over forty financial institutions during a three year implementation period. The principles were subsequently revised in July 2006 to take into account the new performance standards approved by the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC). The third iteration of the Principles was launched in June 2013 and it amplified the banks’ commitments to social responsibility, including human rights, climate change, and transparency. Financial institutions adopt these principles to ensure that the projects they venture in are developed in a socially responsible manner and reflect sound environmental management practices.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation:
| | Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company’s environmental and social practices, and/or associated risks and liabilities. |
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| | Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of sustainability reports. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the CERES Roadmap 2030. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the Equator Principles. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting a company to report on, or to adopt a new policy on, water-related risks and concerns, taking into account:
| | The company’s current disclosure of relevant policies, initiatives, oversight mechanisms, and water usage metrics; |
| | Whether or not the company’s existing water-related policies and practices are consistent with relevant internationally recognized standards and national/local regulations; |
| | The potential financial impact or risk to the company associated with water-related concerns or issues; and |
| | Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding water use by the company and its suppliers. |
The Equator Principles are the financial industry’s benchmark for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing. First launched in June 2003, the Principles were ultimately adopted by over forty financial institutions over a three-year implementation period. Since its adoption, the Principles have undergone a number of revisions, expanding the use of performance standards and signatory banks’ banks’ commitments to social responsibility, including human rights, climate change, and transparency. The fourth iteration of the Principles was launched in November 2019, incorporating amendments and new commitment to human rights, climate change, Indigenous Peoples and biodiversity related topics. Financial institutions adopt these principles to ensure that the projects they finance are developed in a socially responsible manner and reflect sound environmental management practices. As of 2024, 131 financial institutions globally are Signatories to the Equator Principles.22
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the Equator Principles.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals restricting a company from making charitable contributions. Charitable contributions are generally useful for assisting worthwhile causes and for creating goodwill in the community. In the absence of bad faith, self-dealing, or gross negligence, management should determine which, and if, contributions are in the best interests of the company.
| 22 | https://equator-principles.com/signatories-epfis-reporting/ |
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Data Security, Privacy, and Internet Issues
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the disclosure or implementation of data security, privacy, or information access and management policies and procedures, considering:
| | The level of disclosure of company policies and procedures relating to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, information access and management, and Internet censorship; |
| | Engagement in dialogue with governments or relevant groups with respect to data security, privacy, or the free flow of information on the Internet; |
| | The scope of business involvement and of investment in countries whose governments censor or monitor the Internet and other telecommunications; |
| | Applicable market-specific laws or regulations that may be imposed on the company; and |
| | Controversies, fines, or litigation related to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, or Internet censorship. |
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Compensation-Related Proposals
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to link, or report on linking, executive compensation to environmental and social criteria (such as corporate downsizings, customer or employee satisfaction, community involvement, human rights, environmental performance, or predatory lending).
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose on tax transparency and country-by-country reporting (CbCR), in alignment with internationally-accepted frameworks, such as the Global Reporting Initiative Tax Standard (GRI 207: Tax 2019) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) BEPS Action 13 (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting).
Human Rights, Labor Issues, and International Operations
Investors, international human rights groups, and labor advocacy groups have long been making attempts to safeguard domestic and international workers’ rights. In instances where companies operate in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), for example, these advocates have asked that the companies adopt global corporate human rights standards that guarantee sustainable wages and safe working conditions for workers in their supply chains. Companies that contract out portions of their manufacturing operations to suppliers have been asked to ensure that the products they receive from those contractors have not been made using forced labor, child labor, or other forms of modern slavery. These companies are asked to adopt formal vendor standards that, among other things, include monitoring or auditing mechanisms. Globalization, relocation of production overseas, and widespread use of subcontractors and vendors, often make it difficult to obtain a complete picture of a company’s labor practices in global markets. Many Investors believe that companies would benefit from adopting a human rights policy based on the Universal Declaration of Human
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Rights and the International Labor Organization’s Core Labor Standards. Efforts that seek greater disclosure on a company’s labor practices and that seek to establish minimum standards for a company’s operations will be supported. In addition, requests for independent monitoring of domestic and international operations will be supported.
The Sustainability Policy generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of principles or codes relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights; such as the use of slave, child, or prison labor; a government that is illegitimate; or there is a call by human rights advocates, pro-democracy organizations, or legitimately-elected representatives for economic sanctions. The use of child labor or forced labor is unethical and can damage corporate reputations. Poor labor practices can lead to litigation against the company, which can be costly and time consuming.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation:
| | Generally vote for proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals to implement human rights standards and workplace codes of conduct. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct, SA 8000 Standards, or human rights due diligence standards. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of principles or codes relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals that call for independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with codes. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals that seek publication of a “Code of Conduct” to the company’s domestic and international suppliers and licensees, requiring they satisfy all applicable standards and laws protecting employees’ wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, and other rights. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on, or the adoption of, vendor standards including: reporting on incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts and providing public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis. |
| | Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with any suppliers that manufacture products for sale using forced labor, child labor, or that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employee’s wages and working conditions. |
| | Vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process. |
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims, taking into account:
| | The company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; and |
| | The company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers. |
These resolutions have called for the adoption of the MacBride Principles for operations located in Northern Ireland. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is well documented that Northern Ireland’s Catholic community faced much higher unemployment figures than the Protestant community. In response to this problem, the UK government instituted the New Fair Employment Act of 1989 (and subsequent amendments) to address the sectarian hiring problems.
Many companies believe that the Act adequately addresses the problems and that further action, including adoption of the MacBride Principles, only duplicates the efforts already underway. In evaluating a proposal to adopt the MacBride Principles, shareholders must decide whether the principles will cause companies to divest, and therefore worsen the unemployment problem, or whether the principles will promote equal hiring practices. Proponents believe that the Fair Employment Act does not sufficiently address the sectarian hiring problems. They argue that the MacBride Principles serve to stabilize the situation and promote further investment.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Support the MacBride Principles for operations in Northern Ireland that request companies to abide by equal employment opportunity policies.
Community Social and Environmental Impact Assessments
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports outlining policies and/or the potential (community) social and/or environmental impact of company operations considering:
| | Alignment of current disclosure of applicable company policies, metrics, risk assessment report(s) and risk management procedures with any relevant, broadly accepted reporting frameworks; |
| | The of regulatory non-compliance, litigation, remediation, or reputational loss that may be associated with failure to manage the company’s operations in question, including the management of relevant community and stakeholder impact relations; |
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| | The nature, purpose, and scope of the company’s operations in the specific region(s); |
| | The degree to which company policies and procedures are consistent with industry norms; and |
| | The scope of the resolution. |
Operations in High-Risk Markets
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s potential financial and reputational risks associated with operations in “high-risk” markets, such as a terrorism-sponsoring state or politically/socially unstable region, taking into account:
| | The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption; |
| | Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures; |
| | Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws; |
| | Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws; and |
| | Whether the company has been recently involved in recent, significant controversies, fines or litigation related to its operations in “high-risk” markets. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals calling for companies to report on the risks associated with outsourcing/plant closures, considering:
| | Controversies surrounding operations in the relevant market(s); |
| | The value of the requested report to shareholders; |
| | The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant information on outsourcing and plant closure procedures; and |
| | The company’s existing human rights standards relative to industry peers. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment, taking into account:
| | The company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to preventing workplace sexual harassment; |
| | Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers. |
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against reports on foreign military sales or offsets. Such disclosures may involve sensitive and confidential information. Moreover, companies must comply with government controls and reporting on foreign military sales.
Generally vote against proposals asking a company to cease production or report on the risks associated with the use of depleted uranium munitions or nuclear weapons components and delivery systems, including disengaging from current and proposed contracts. Such contracts are monitored by government agencies, serve multiple military and non-military uses, and withdrawal from these contracts could have a negative impact on the company’s business.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting information on a company’s lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures, considering:
| | The company’s current disclosure of relevant lobbying policies, and management and board oversight; |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding trade associations or other groups that it supports, or is a member of, that engage in lobbying activities; and |
| | Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s lobbying-related activities. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, considering:
| | The company’s policies, and management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes; |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and |
| | Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities. |
Vote against proposals barring a company from making political contributions. Businesses are affected by legislation at the federal, state, and local level; barring political contributions can put the company at a competitive disadvantage.
Vote against proposals to publish in newspapers and other media a company’s political contributions. Such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals asking a company to affirm political nonpartisanship in the workplace, so long as:
| | There are no recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s political contributions or trade association spending; and |
| | The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibit coercion. |
Vote against proposals asking for a list of company executives, directors, consultants, legal counsels, lobbyists, or investment bankers that have prior government service and whether such service had a bearing on the business of the company. Such a list would be burdensome to prepare without providing any meaningful information to shareholders.
Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s alignment of political contributions, lobbying, and electioneering spending with a company’s publicly stated values and policies, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive. Additionally, Sustainability Advisory Services will consider whether:
| | The company’s policies, management, board oversight, governance processes, and level of disclosure related to direct political contributions, lobbying activities, and payments to trade associations, political action committees, or other groups that may be used for political purposes; |
| | The company’s disclosure regarding: the reasons for its support of candidates for public offices; the reasons for support of and participation in trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and other political activities; |
| | Any incongruencies identified between a company’s direct and indirect political expenditures and its publicly stated values and priorities; |
| | Recent significant controversies related to the company’s direct and indirect lobbying, political contributions, or political activities. |
| 7. | Mutual Fund Proxies |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings. However, mutual fund boards do not usually have compensation committees, so do not withhold for the lack of this committee.
Closed End Funds — Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: For closed-end management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other
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directors on a case-by-case basis) at CEFs that have not provided a compelling rationale for opting-in to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a by-law amendment to a shareholder vote.
Converting Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on conversion proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Past performance as a closed-end fund; |
| | Market in which the fund invests; |
| | Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and |
| | Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proxy contests, considering the following factors:
| | Past performance relative to its peers; |
| | Market in which fund invests; |
| | Measures taken by the board to address the issues; |
| | Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals; |
| | Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents; |
| | Independence of directors; |
| | Experience and skills of director candidates; |
| | Governance profile of the company; |
| | Evidence of management entrenchment. |
Investment Advisory Agreements
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on investment advisory agreements, considering the following factors:
| | Proposed and current fee schedules; |
| | Fund category/investment objective; |
| | Performance benchmarks; |
| | Share price performance as compared with peers; |
| | Resulting fees relative to peers; |
| | Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control). |
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Approving New Classes or Series of Shares
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares, considering the following factors:
| | Stated specific financing purpose; |
| | Possible dilution for common shares; |
| | Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors:
| | Potential competitiveness; |
| | Regulatory developments; |
| | Current and potential returns; and |
| | Current and potential risk. |
Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non-fundamental restriction, considering the following factors:
| | The fund’s target investments; |
| | The reasons given by the fund for the change; and |
| | The projected impact of the change on the portfolio. |
Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Nonfundamental
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to change a fund’s fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on name change proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Political/economic changes in the target market; |
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| | Consolidation in the target market; and |
| | Current asset composition. |
Change in Fund’s Subclassification
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes in a fund’s sub-classification, considering the following factors:
| | Potential competitiveness; |
| | Current and potential returns; |
| | Risk of concentration; |
| | Consolidation in target industry. |
Business Development Companies — Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV) if:
| | The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date no more than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940; |
| | The sale is deemed to be in the best interests of shareholders by (1) a majority of the company’s independent directors and (2) a majority of the company’s directors who have no financial interest in the issuance; and |
| | The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either: |
| | Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one- and three-year median TSRs; or |
| | Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholders. |
Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors:
| | Strategies employed to salvage the company; |
| | The fund’s past performance; |
| | The terms of the liquidation. |
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Changes to the Charter Document
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes to the charter document, considering the following factors:
| | The degree of change implied by the proposal; |
| | The efficiencies that could result; |
| | The state of incorporation; |
| | Regulatory standards and implications. |
Vote against any of the following changes:
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement to reorganize or terminate the trust or any of its series; |
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement for amendments to the new declaration of trust; |
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement to amend the fund’s management contract, allowing the contract to be modified by the investment manager and the trust management, as permitted by the 1940 Act; |
| | Allow the trustees to impose other fees in addition to sales charges on investment in a fund, such as deferred sales charges and redemption fees that may be imposed upon redemption of a fund’s shares; |
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement to engage in and terminate subadvisory arrangements; |
| | Removal of shareholder approval requirement to change the domicile of the fund. |
Changing the Domicile of a Fund
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on re-incorporations, considering the following factors:
| | Regulations of both states; |
| | Required fundamental policies of both states; |
| | The increased flexibility available. |
Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate subadvisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one subadviser.
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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on distribution agreement proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives; |
| | The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance; |
| | The competitiveness of the fund in the industry; |
| | The terms of the agreement. |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of a master-feeder structure.
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on merger proposals, considering the following factors:
| | Resulting fee structure; |
| | Performance of both funds; |
| | Continuity of management personnel; |
| | Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights. |
Shareholder Proposals for Mutual Funds
Establish Director Ownership Requirement
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a specific minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.
Reimburse Shareholder for Expenses Incurred
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When supporting the dissidents, vote for the reimbursement of the proxy solicitation expenses.
Terminate the Investment Advisor
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to terminate the investment advisor, considering the following factors:
| | Performance of the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV); |
| | The fund’s history of shareholder relations; and |
| | The performance of other funds under the advisor’s management. |
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| 8. | Foreign Private Issuers Listed on U.S. Exchanges |
Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against (or withhold from) non-independent director nominees at companies which fail to meet the following criteria: a majority-independent board, and the presence of an audit, a compensation, and a nomination committee, each of which is entirely composed of independent directors.
Where the design and disclosure levels of equity compensation plans are comparable to those seen at U.S. companies, U.S. compensation policy will be used to evaluate the compensation plan proposals. Otherwise, they, and all other voting items, will be evaluated using the relevant regional or market approach under the Sustainability proxy voting guidelines.
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Email sales@issgovernance.com or visit www.issgovernance.com for more information.
Founded in 1985, Institutional Shareholder Services group of companies (ISS) empowers investors and companies to build for long-term and sustainable growth by providing high-quality data, analytics and insight. ISS, which is majority owned by Deutsche Bourse Group, along with Genstar Capital and ISS management, is a leading provider of corporate governance and responsible investment solutions, market intelligence, fund services, and events and editorial content for institutional investors and corporations, globally. ISS’ 2,600 employees operate worldwide across 29 global locations in 15 countries. Its approximately 3,400 clients include many of the world’s leading institutional investors who rely on ISS’ objective and impartial offerings, as well as public companies focused on ESG and governance risk mitigation as a shareholder value enhancing measure. Clients rely on ISS’ expertise to help them make informed investment decisions. This document and all of the information contained in it, including without limitation all text, data, graphs, and charts (collectively, the “Information”) is the property of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS), its subsidiaries, or, in some cases third party suppliers.
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GAMCO INVESTORS, INC. AND AFFILIATES
The Voting of Proxies on Behalf of Clients
Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 30b1-4 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 require investment advisers to adopt written policies and procedures governing the voting of proxies on behalf of their clients.
These procedures will be used by GAMCO Asset Management Inc., Gabelli Funds, LLC, Gabelli & Company Investment Advisers, Inc., and Teton Advisors, Inc. (collectively, the “Advisers”) to determine how to vote proxies relating to portfolio securities held by their clients, including the procedures that the Advisers use when a vote presents a conflict between the interests of the shareholders of an investment company managed by one of the Advisers, on the one hand, and those of the Advisers; the principal underwriter; or any affiliated person of the investment company, the Advisers, or the principal underwriter. These procedures will not apply where the Advisers do not have voting discretion or where the Advisers have agreed to with a client to vote the client’s proxies in accordance with specific guidelines or procedures supplied by the client (to the extent permitted by ERISA).
| I. | Proxy Voting Committee |
The Proxy Voting Committee was originally formed in April 1989 for the purpose of formulating guidelines and reviewing proxy statements within the parameters set by the substantive proxy voting guidelines originally published in 1988 and updated periodically, a copy of which are appended as Exhibit A. The Committee will include representatives of Research, Administration, Legal, and the Advisers. Additional or replacement members of the Committee will be nominated by the Chairman and voted upon by the entire Committee.
Meetings are held on an as needed basis to form views on the manner in which the Advisers should vote proxies on behalf of their clients.
In general, the Director of Proxy Voting Services, using the Proxy Guidelines, and the analysts of GAMCO Investors, Inc. (“GAMI”), will determine how to vote on each issue. For non-controversial matters, the Director of Proxy Voting Services may vote the proxy if the vote is: (1) consistent with the recommendations of the issuer’s Board of Directors and not contrary to the Proxy Guidelines; (2) consistent with the recommendations of the issuer’s Board of Directors and is a non-controversial issue not covered by the Proxy Guidelines; or (3) the vote is contrary to the recommendations of the Board of Directors but is consistent with the Proxy Guidelines. In those instances, the Director of Proxy Voting Services or the Chairman of the Committee may sign and date the proxy statement indicating how each issue will be voted.
All matters identified by the Chairman of the Committee, the Director of Proxy Voting Services or the Legal Department as controversial, taking into account the recommendations of the analysts of GAMI, will be presented to the Proxy Voting Committee. If the Chairman of the Committee, the Director of Proxy Voting Services or the Legal Department has identified the matter as one that (1) is controversial; (2) would benefit from deliberation by the Proxy Voting Committee; or (3) may give rise to a conflict of interest between the Advisers and their clients, the Chairman of the Committee will initially determine what vote to recommend that the Advisers should cast and the matter will go before the Committee.
| A. | Conflicts of Interest. |
The Advisers have implemented these proxy voting procedures in order to prevent conflicts of interest from influencing their proxy voting decisions. By following the Proxy Guidelines and the analysts of GAMI, the Advisers are able to avoid, wherever possible, the influence of potential conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, circumstances may arise in which one or more of the Advisers are faced with a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest in connection with its vote. In general, a conflict of interest may arise when an Adviser knowingly does business with an issuer, and may appear to have a material conflict between its own interests and the interests of the shareholders of an investment
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company managed by one of the Advisers regarding how the proxy is to be voted. A conflict also may exist when an Adviser has actual knowledge of a material business arrangement between an issuer and an affiliate of the Adviser.
In practical terms, a conflict of interest may arise, for example, when a proxy is voted for a company that is a client of one of the Advisers, such as GAMCO Asset Management Inc. A conflict also may arise when a client of one of the Advisers has made a shareholder proposal in a proxy to be voted upon by one or more of the Advisers. The Director of Proxy Voting Services, together with the Legal Department, will scrutinize all proxies for these or other situations that may give rise to a conflict of interest with respect to the voting of proxies.
| B. | Operation of Proxy Voting Committee |
For matters submitted to the Committee, each member of the Committee will receive, prior to the meeting, a copy of the proxy statement, a summary of any views provided by the Chief Investment Officer and any recommendations by GAMI analysts. The Chief Investment Officer or the GAMI analysts may be invited to present their viewpoints. If the Director of Proxy Voting Services or the Legal Department believe that the matter before the committee is one with respect to which a conflict of interest may exist between the Advisers and their clients, counsel may provide an opinion to the Committee concerning the conflict. If the matter is one in which the interests of the clients of one or more of the Advisers may diverge, counsel may so advise and the Committee may make different recommendations as to different clients. For any matters where the recommendation may trigger appraisal rights, counsel may provide an opinion concerning the likely risks and merits of such an appraisal action.
Each matter submitted to the Committee will be determined by the vote of a majority of the members present at the meeting. Should the vote concerning one or more recommendations be tied in a vote of the Committee, the Chairman of the Committee will cast the deciding vote. The Committee will notify the proxy department of its decisions and the proxies will be voted accordingly.
Although the Proxy Guidelines express the normal preferences for the voting of any shares not covered by a contrary investment guideline provided by the client, the Committee is not bound by the preferences set forth in the Proxy Guidelines and will review each matter on its own merits. The Advisers subscribe to Institutional Shareholder Services Inc (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis & Co., LLC (“Glass Lewis”), which supply current information on companies, matters being voted on, regulations, trends in proxy voting and information on corporate governance issues. The information provided by ISS and GL is for informational purposes only.
If the vote cast either by the analyst or as a result of the deliberations of the Proxy Voting Committee runs contrary to the recommendation of the Board of Directors of the issuer, the matter may be referred to legal counsel to determine whether an amendment to the most recently filed Schedule 13D is appropriate.
| II. | Social Issues and Other Client Guidelines |
If a client has provided and the Advisers have accepted special instructions relating to the voting of proxies, they should be noted in the client’s account file and forwarded to the proxy department. This is the responsibility of the investment professional or sales assistant for the client. In accordance with Department of Labor guidelines, the Advisers’ policy is to vote on behalf of ERISA accounts in the best interest of the plan participants with regard to social issues that carry an economic impact. Where an account is not governed by ERISA, the Advisers will vote shares held on behalf of the client in a manner consistent with any individual investment/voting guidelines provided by the client. Otherwise the Advisers may abstain with respect to those shares.
Specific to the Gabelli SRI Fund and the Gabelli Love Our Planet & People ETF, the Proxy Voting Committee will rely on the advice of the portfolio managers of the Gabelli SRI Fund and the Gabelli Love Our Planet & People ETF to provide voting recommendations on the securities held in the portfolio.
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A client may always request to vote their own proxies. Clients engaged in securities lending may make additional requests related to the voting of proxies. GAMI will consider those requests on a case-by-case basis and use best efforts to comply with the request.
| III. | Client Retention of Voting Rights |
If a client chooses to retain the right to vote proxies or if there is any change in voting authority, the following should be notified by the investment professional or sales assistant for the client.
| | Operations |
| | Proxy Department |
| | Investment professional assigned to the account |
In the event that the Board of Directors (or a Committee thereof) of one or more of the investment companies managed by one of the Advisers has retained direct voting control over any security, the Proxy Voting Department will provide each Board Member (or Committee member) with a copy of the proxy statement together with any other relevant information.
| IV. | Proxies of Certain Non-U.S. Issuers |
Proxy voting in certain countries requires “share-blocking.” Shareholders wishing to vote their proxies must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting with a designated depository. During the period in which the shares are held with a depository, shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares are returned to the clients’ custodian. Absent a compelling reason to the contrary, the Advisers believe that the benefit to the client of exercising the vote is outweighed by the cost of voting and therefore, the Advisers will not typically vote the securities of non-U.S. issuers that require share-blocking.
In addition, voting proxies of issuers in non-U.S. markets may also give rise to a number of administrative issues or give rise to circumstances under which voting would impose a cost (real or implied) on its client which may cause the Advisers to abstain from voting such proxies. For example, the Advisers may receive the notices for shareholder meetings without adequate time to consider the proposals in the proxy or after the cut-off date for voting. Other markets require the Advisers to provide local agents with power of attorney prior to implementing their respective voting instructions on the proxy. Other markets may require disclosure of certain ownership information in excess of what is required to vote in the U.S. market. Although it is the Advisers’ policies to vote the proxies for its clients for which they have proxy voting authority, in the case of issuers in non-U.S. markets, we vote client proxies on a best efforts basis.
| V. | Voting Records |
The Proxy Voting Department will retain a record of matters voted upon by the Advisers for their clients. The Advisers will supply information on how they voted a client’s proxy upon request from the client.
The complete voting records for each registered investment company (the “Fund”) that is managed by the Advisers will be filed on Form N-PX for the twelve months ended June 30th, no later than August 31st of each year. A description of the Fund’s proxy voting policies, procedures, and how the Fund voted proxies relating to portfolio securities is available without charge, upon request, by (i) calling 800-GABELLI (800-422-3554); (ii) writing to Gabelli Funds, LLC at One Corporate Center, Rye, NY 10580-1422; or (iii) visiting the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.
The Advisers’ proxy voting records will be retained in compliance with Rule 204-2 under the Investment Advisers Act.
| VI. | Voting Procedures |
| 1. | Custodian banks, outside brokerage firms and clearing firms are responsible for forwarding proxies directly to the Advisers. |
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Proxies are received in one of two forms:
| | Shareholder Vote Instruction Forms (“VIFs”)—Issued by Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”). Broadridge is an outside service contracted by the various institutions to issue proxy materials. |
| | Proxy cards which may be voted directly. |
| 2. | Upon receipt of the proxy, the number of shares each form represents is logged into the proxy system, electronically or manually, according to security. |
| 3. | Upon receipt of instructions from the proxy committee, the votes are cast and recorded for each account. |
Records have been maintained on the ProxyEdge system.
ProxyEdge records include:
Security Name and CUSIP Number
Date and Type of Meeting (Annual, Special, Contest)
Directors’ Recommendation (if any)
How the Adviser voted for the client on item
| 4. | VIFs are kept alphabetically by security. Records for the current proxy season are located in the Proxy Voting Department office. In preparation for the upcoming season, files are transferred to an offsite storage facility during January/February. |
| 5. | If a proxy card or VIF is received too late to be voted in the conventional matter, every attempt is made to vote including: |
| | When a solicitor has been retained, the solicitor is called. At the solicitor’s direction, the proxy is faxed or sent electronically. |
| | In some circumstances VIFs can be faxed or sent electronically to Broadridge up until the time of the meeting. |
| 6. | In the case of a proxy contest, records are maintained for each opposing entity. |
| 7. | Voting in Person |
| a) | At times it may be necessary to vote the shares in person. In this case, a “legal proxy” is obtained in the following manner: |
| | Banks and brokerage firms using the services at Broadridge: |
Broadridge is notified that we wish to vote in person. Broadridge issues individual legal proxies and sends them back via email or overnight (or the Adviser can pay messenger charges). A lead-time of at least two weeks prior to the meeting is needed to do this. Alternatively, the procedures detailed below for banks not using Broadridge may be implemented.
| | Banks and brokerage firms issuing proxies directly: |
The bank is called and/or faxed and a legal proxy is requested.
All legal proxies should appoint:
“Representative of [Adviser name] with full power of substitution.”
| b) | The legal proxies are given to the person attending the meeting along with the limited power of attorney. |
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Appendix A
Proxy Guidelines
PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES
General Policy Statement
It is the policy of GAMCO Investors, Inc, and its affiliated advisers (collectively “the Advisers”) to vote in the best economic interests of our clients. As we state in our Magna Carta of Shareholders Rights, established in May 1988, we are neither for nor against management. We are for shareholders.
At our first proxy committee meeting in 1989, it was decided that each proxy statement should be evaluated on its own merits within the framework first established by our Magna Carta of Shareholders Rights. The attached guidelines serve to enhance that broad framework.
We do not consider any issue routine. We take into consideration all of our research on the company, its directors, and their short and long-term goals for the company. In cases where issues that we generally do not approve of are combined with other issues, the negative aspects of the issues will be factored into the evaluation of the overall proposals but will not necessitate a vote in opposition to the overall proposals.
Board of Directors
We do not consider the election of the Board of Directors a routine issue. Each slate of directors is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Factors taken into consideration include:
| | Historical responsiveness to shareholders |
This may include such areas as:
| | Paying greenmail |
| | Failure to adopt shareholder resolutions receiving a majority of shareholder votes |
| | Qualifications |
| | Nominating committee in place |
| | Number of outside directors on the board |
| | Attendance at meetings |
| | Overall performance |
Selection of Auditors
In general, we support the Board of Directors’ recommendation for auditors.
Blank Check Preferred Stock
We oppose the issuance of blank check preferred stock.
Blank check preferred stock allows the company to issue stock and establish dividends, voting rights, etc. without further shareholder approval.
Classified Board
A classified board is one where the directors are divided into classes with overlapping terms. A different class is elected at each annual meeting.
While a classified board promotes continuity of directors facilitating long range planning, we feel directors should be accountable to shareholders on an annual basis. We will look at this proposal on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the board’s historical responsiveness to the rights of shareholders.
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Where a classified board is in place we will generally not support attempts to change to an annually elected board.
When an annually elected board is in place, we generally will not support attempts to classify the board.
Increase Authorized Common Stock
The request to increase the amount of outstanding shares is considered on a case-by-case basis.
Factors taken into consideration include:
| | Future use of additional shares |
| | Stock split |
| | Stock option or other executive compensation plan |
| | Finance growth of company/strengthen balance sheet |
| | Aid in restructuring |
| | Improve credit rating |
| | Implement a poison pill or other takeover defense |
| | Amount of stock currently authorized but not yet issued or reserved for stock option plans |
| | Amount of additional stock to be authorized and its dilutive effect |
We will support this proposal if a detailed and verifiable plan for the use of the additional shares is contained in the proxy statement.
Confidential Ballot
We support the idea that a shareholder’s identity and vote should be treated with confidentiality.
However, we look at this issue on a case-by-case basis.
In order to promote confidentiality in the voting process, we endorse the use of independent Inspectors of Election.
Cumulative Voting
In general, we support cumulative voting.
Cumulative voting is a process by which a shareholder may multiply the number of directors being elected by the number of shares held on record date and cast the total number for one candidate or allocate the voting among two or more candidates.
Where cumulative voting is in place, we will vote against any proposal to rescind this shareholder right.
Cumulative voting may result in a minority block of stock gaining representation on the board. When a proposal is made to institute cumulative voting, the proposal will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. While we feel that each board member should represent all shareholders, cumulative voting provides minority shareholders an opportunity to have their views represented.
Director Liability and Indemnification
We support efforts to attract the best possible directors by limiting the liability and increasing the indemnification of directors, except in the case of insider dealing.
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Equal Access to the Proxy
The SEC’s rules provide for shareholder resolutions. However, the resolutions are limited in scope and there is a 500 word limit on proponents’ written arguments. Management has no such limitations. While we support equal access to the proxy, we would look at such variables as length of time required to respond, percentage of ownership, etc.
Fair Price Provisions
Charter provisions requiring a bidder to pay all shareholders a fair price are intended to prevent two-tier tender offers that may be abusive. Typically, these provisions do not apply to board-approved transactions.
We support fair price provisions because we feel all shareholders should be entitled to receive the same benefits.
Reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Golden Parachutes
Golden parachutes are severance payments to top executives who are terminated or demoted after a takeover.
We support any proposal that would assure management of its own welfare so that they may continue to make decisions in the best interest of the company and shareholders even if the decision results in them losing their job. We do not, however, support excessive golden parachutes. Therefore, each proposal will be decided on a case-by- case basis.
Anti-Greenmail Proposals
We do not support greenmail. An offer extended to one shareholder should be extended to all shareholders equally across the board.
Limit Shareholders’ Rights to Call Special Meetings
We support the right of shareholders to call a special meeting.
Reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Consideration of Nonfinancial Effects of a Merger
This proposal releases the directors from only looking at the financial effects of a merger and allows them the opportunity to consider the merger’s effects on employees, the community, and consumers.
As a fiduciary, we are obligated to vote in the best economic interests of our clients. In general, this proposal does not allow us to do that. Therefore, we generally cannot support this proposal.
Reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Mergers, Buyouts, Spin-Offs, Restructurings
Each of the above is considered on a case-by-case basis. According to the Department of Labor, we are not required to vote for a proposal simply because the offering price is at a premium to the current market price. We may take into consideration the long term interests of the shareholders.
Military Issues
Shareholder proposals regarding military production must be evaluated on a purely economic set of criteria for our ERISA clients. As such, decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis.
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In voting on this proposal for our non-ERISA clients, we will vote according to the client’s direction when applicable. Where no direction has been given, we will vote in the best economic interests of our clients. It is not our duty to impose our social judgment on others.
Northern Ireland
Shareholder proposals requesting the signing of the MacBride principles for the purpose of countering the discrimination of Catholics in hiring practices must be evaluated on a purely economic set of criteria for our ERISA clients. As such, decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis.
In voting on this proposal for our non-ERISA clients, we will vote according to client direction when applicable. Where no direction has been given, we will vote in the best economic interests of our clients. It is not our duty to impose our social judgment on others.
Opt Out of State Anti-Takeover Law
This shareholder proposal requests that a company opt out of the coverage of the state’s takeover statutes. Example: Delaware law requires that a buyer must acquire at least 85% of the company’s stock before the buyer can exercise control unless the board approves.
We consider this on a case-by-case basis. Our decision will be based on the following:
| | State of Incorporation |
| | Management history of responsiveness to shareholders |
| | Other mitigating factors |
Poison Pill
In general, we do not endorse poison pills.
In certain cases where management has a history of being responsive to the needs of shareholders and the stock is very liquid, we will reconsider this position.
Reincorporation
Generally, we support reincorporation for well-defined business reasons. We oppose reincorporation if proposed solely for the purpose of reincorporating in a state with more stringent anti-takeover statutes that may negatively impact the value of the stock.
Stock Incentive Plans
Director and Employee Stock incentive plans are an excellent way to attract, hold and motivate directors and employees. However, each incentive plan must be evaluated on its own merits, taking into consideration the following:
| | Dilution of voting power or earnings per share by more than 10%. |
| | Kind of stock to be awarded, to whom, when and how much. |
| | Method of payment. |
| | Amount of stock already authorized but not yet issued under existing stock plans. |
| | The successful steps taken by management to maximize shareholder value. |
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Supermajority Vote Requirements
Supermajority vote requirements in a company’s charter or bylaws require a level of voting approval in excess of a simple majority of the outstanding shares. In general, we oppose supermajority-voting requirements. Supermajority requirements often exceed the average level of shareholder participation. We support proposals’ approvals by a simple majority of the shares voting.
Reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Limit Shareholders Right to Act by Written Consent
Written consent allows shareholders to initiate and carry on a shareholder action without having to wait until the next annual meeting or to call a special meeting. It permits action to be taken by the written consent of the same percentage of the shares that would be required to effect proposed action at a shareholder meeting.
Reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
“Say-on-Pay” / “Say-When-on-Pay” / “Say-on-Golden-Parachutes”
Required under the Dodd-Frank Act; these proposals are non-binding advisory votes on executive compensation. We will generally vote with the Board of Directors’ recommendation(s) on advisory votes on executive compensation (“Say-on-Pay”), advisory votes on the frequency of voting on executive compensation (“Say-When-on-Pay”) and advisory votes relating to extraordinary transaction executive compensation (“Say-on-Golden-Parachutes”). In those instances when we believe that it is in our clients’ best interest, we may abstain or vote against executive compensation and/or the frequency of votes on executive compensation and/or extraordinary transaction executive compensation advisory votes.
Proxy Access
Proxy access is a tool used to attempt to promote board accountability by requiring that a company’s proxy materials contain not only the names of management nominees, but also any candidates nominated by long-term shareholders holding at least a certain stake in the company. We will review proposals regarding proxy access on a case-by-case basis taking into account the provisions of the proposal, the company’s current governance structure, the successful steps taken by management to maximize shareholder value, as well as other applicable factors.
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Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures
| 1. | GENERAL |
| A. | Introduction. |
Loomis, Sayles & Company, L.P. (“Loomis Sayles”) will vote proxies of the securities held in its clients’ portfolios on behalf of each client that has delegated proxy voting authority to Loomis Sayles as investment adviser. Loomis Sayles has adopted and implemented these policies and procedures (“Proxy Voting Procedures”) to ensure that, where it has voting authority, proxy matters are handled in the best interests of clients, in accordance with Loomis Sayles’ fiduciary duty, and all applicable law and regulations. The Proxy Voting Procedures, as implemented by the Loomis Sayles Proxy Committee (as described below), are intended to support good corporate governance, including those corporate practices that address environmental and social issues (“ESG Matters”), in all cases with the objective of protecting shareholder interests and maximizing shareholder value.
Loomis Sayles uses the services of third parties (each a “Proxy Voting Service” and collectively the “Proxy Voting Services”), to provide research, analysis and voting recommendations and to administer the process of voting proxies for those clients for which Loomis Sayles has voting authority. Any reference in these Proxy Voting Procedures to a “Proxy Voting Service” is a reference either to the Proxy Voting Service that provides research, analysis and voting recommendations to Loomis Sayles or to the Proxy Voting Service that administers the process of voting proxies for Loomis Sayles or to both, as the context may require. Loomis Sayles will generally follow its express policy with input from the Proxy Voting Service that provides research, analysis and voting recommendations to Loomis Sayles unless the Proxy Committee determines that the client’s best interests are served by voting otherwise.
| B. | General Guidelines. |
The following guidelines will apply when voting proxies on behalf of accounts for which Loomis Sayles has voting authority.
| 1. | Client’s Best Interests. The Proxy Voting Procedures are designed and implemented in a way that is reasonably expected to ensure that proxy matters are conducted in the best interests of clients. When considering the best interests of clients, Loomis Sayles has determined that this means the best investment interest of its clients as shareholders of the issuer. To protect its clients’ best interests, Loomis Sayles has integrated the consideration of ESG Matters into its investment process. The Proxy Voting Procedures are intended to reflect the impact of these factors in cases where they are material to the growth and sustainability of an issuer. Loomis Sayles has established its Proxy Voting Procedures to assist it in making its proxy voting decisions with a view toward enhancing the value of its clients’ interests in an issuer over the period during which it expects its clients to hold their investments. Loomis Sayles will vote against proposals that it believes could adversely impact the current or future market value of the issuer’s securities during the expected holding period. Loomis Sayles also believes that protecting the best interests of clients requires the consideration of potential material impacts of proxy proposals associated with ESG Matters. |
For the avoidance of doubt, and notwithstanding any other provisions of these Proxy Voting Procedures, in all instances in which Loomis Sayles votes proxies on behalf of clients that are employee benefit plans subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), Loomis Sayles
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(a) will act solely in accordance with the economic interest of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries, and (b) will not subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan to any other objective, or promote benefits or goals unrelated to those financial interests of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries.
| 2. | Client Proxy Voting Policies. Rather than delegating proxy voting authority to Loomis Sayles, a client may (a) retain the authority to vote proxies on securities in its account; (b) delegate voting authority to another party; or (c) instruct Loomis Sayles to vote proxies according to a policy that differs from the Proxy Voting Procedures. Loomis Sayles will honor any of these instructions if the instruction is agreed to in writing by Loomis Sayles in its investment management agreement with the client. If Loomis Sayles incurs additional costs or expenses in following any such instruction, it may request payment for such additional costs or expenses from the client. |
| 3. | Stated Policies. In the interest of consistency in voting proxies on behalf of its clients where appropriate, Loomis Sayles has adopted policies that identify issues where Loomis Sayles will (a) generally vote in favor of a proposal; (b) generally vote against a proposal; (c) generally vote as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service; and (d) specifically consider its vote for or against a proposal. However, these policies are guidelines and each vote may be cast differently than the stated policy, taking into consideration all relevant facts and circumstances at the time of the vote. In certain cases where the recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service and the recommendation of the issuer’s management are the same, the vote will generally be cast as recommended and will not be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the Proxy Committee. In cases where the portfolio manager of an account that holds voting securities of an issuer or the analyst covering the issuer or its securities recommends a vote, the proposal(s) will be voted according to these recommendations after a review for any potential conflicts of interest is conducted and will not be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the Proxy Committee. There may be situations where Loomis Sayles casts split votes despite the stated policies. For example, Loomis Sayles may cast a split vote when different clients may be invested in strategies with different investment objectives, or when different clients may have different economic interests in the outcome of a particular proposal. Loomis Sayles also may cast a split vote on a particular proposal when its investment teams have differing views regarding the impact of the proposal on their clients’ investment interests. |
| 4. | Abstentions and Other Exceptions. Loomis Sayles’ general policy is to vote rather than abstain from voting on issues presented, unless the Proxy Committee determines, pursuant to its best judgment, that the client’s best interests require abstention. However, in the following circumstances Loomis Sayles may not vote a client’s proxy: |
| | The Proxy Committee has concluded that voting would have no meaningful, identifiable economic benefit to the client as a shareholder, such as when the security is no longer held in the client’s portfolio or when the value of the portfolio holding is insignificant. |
| | The Proxy Committee has concluded that the costs of or disadvantages resulting from voting outweigh the economic benefits of voting. For example, in some non-US jurisdictions, the sale of securities voted may be legally or practically prohibited or subject to some restrictions for some period of time, usually between the record and meeting dates (“share blocking”). Loomis Sayles believes that the loss of investment flexibility resulting from share blocking generally outweighs the benefit to be gained by voting. Information about share blocking is often incomplete or |
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| contradictory. Loomis Sayles relies on the client’s custodian and on its Proxy Voting Service to identify share blocking jurisdictions. To the extent such information is wrong, Loomis Sayles could fail to vote shares that could have been voted without loss of investment flexibility, or could vote shares and then be prevented from engaging in a potentially beneficial portfolio transaction. |
| | Administrative requirements for voting proxies in certain foreign jurisdictions (which may be imposed a single time or may be periodic), such as providing a power of attorney to the client’s local sub-custodian, cannot be fulfilled due to timing of the requirement, or the costs required to fulfill the administrative requirements appear to outweigh the benefits to the client of voting the proxy. |
| | The client, as of the record date, has loaned the securities to which the proxy relates and Loomis Sayles has concluded that it is not in the best interest of the client to recall the loan or is unable to recall the loan in order to vote the securities1. |
| | The client so directs Loomis Sayles. |
The Proxy Committee will generally vote against, rather than abstain from voting on, ballot issues where the issuer does not provide sufficient information to make an informed decision. In addition, there may be instances where Loomis Sayles is not able to vote proxies on a client’s behalf, such as when ballot delivery instructions have not been processed by a client’s custodian, when the Proxy Voting Service has not received a ballot for a client’s account (e.g., in cases where the client’s shares have been loaned to a third party), when proxy materials are not available in English, and under other circumstances beyond Loomis Sayles’ control.
| 5. | Oversight. All issues presented for shareholder vote are subject to the oversight of the Proxy Committee, either directly or by application of this policy. All non-routine issues will generally be considered directly by the Proxy Committee and, when necessary, the investment professionals responsible for an account holding the security, and will be voted in the best investment interests of the client. All routine “for” and “against” issues will be voted according to this policy unless special factors require that they be considered by the Proxy Committee and, when necessary, the investment professionals responsible for an account holding the security. |
| 6. | Availability of Procedures. Loomis Sayles publishes these Proxy Voting Procedures, as updated from time to time, on its public website, www.loomissayles.com, and includes a description of its Proxy Voting Procedures in Part 2A of its Form ADV. Upon request, Loomis Sayles also provides clients with a copy of its Proxy Voting Procedures. |
| 7. | Disclosure of Vote. Loomis Sayles makes certain disclosures regarding its voting of proxies in the aggregate (not specific as to clients) on its website, www.loomissayles.com. For mutual funds that it manages, Loomis Sayles is required by law to make certain disclosures regarding its voting of proxies annually. This information is also available on the Loomis Sayles website. Additionally, Loomis Sayles will, upon request by a client, provide information about how each proxy was voted with respect to the securities in that client’s account. Loomis Sayles’ policy is not to disclose a client’s proxy voting records to third parties except as required by applicable law and regulations. |
| 1 | Loomis Sayles does not engage in securities lending. However, some clients do opt to lend securities, availing themselves of their custodians’ services. |
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| C. | Proxy Committee. |
| 1. | Proxy Committee. Loomis Sayles has established a Proxy Committee. The Proxy Committee is composed of senior representatives from firm investment teams and members of the Legal and Compliance Department, and other employees of Loomis Sayles as needed. In the event that any member is unable to participate in a meeting of the Proxy Committee, he or she may designate another individual to act on his or her behalf. A vacancy in the Proxy Committee is filled by the prior member’s successor in position at Loomis Sayles or a person of equivalent experience. Each portfolio manager of an account that holds voting securities of an issuer or the analyst covering the issuer or its securities may be an ad hoc member of the Proxy Committee in connection with voting proxies of that issuer. Voting determinations made by the Proxy Committee generally will be memorialized electronically (e.g., by email). |
| 2. | Duties. The Proxy Committee’s specific responsibilities include the following: |
| a. | developing, authorizing, implementing and updating the Proxy Voting Procedures, including: |
(i) annually reviewing the Proxy Voting Procedures to ensure consistency with internal policies and regulatory agency policies, including determining the continuing adequacy of the Proxy Voting Procedures to confirm that they have been formulated reasonably and implemented effectively, including whether they continue to be reasonably designed to ensure that proxy votes are cast in clients’ best interest,
(ii) annually reviewing existing voting guidelines and developing of additional voting guidelines to assist in the review of proxy proposals, and
(iii) annually reviewing the proxy voting process and addressing any general issues that relate to proxy voting;
| b. | overseeing the proxy voting process, including: |
(i) overseeing the vote on proposals according to the predetermined policies in the voting guidelines,
(ii) directing the vote on proposals where there is reason not to vote according to the predetermined policies in the voting guidelines or where proposals require special consideration,
(iii) consulting with the portfolio managers and analysts for the accounts holding the security when necessary or appropriate, and
(iv) periodically sampling or engaging an outside party to sample proxy votes to ensure they comply with the Proxy Voting Procedures and are cast in accordance with the clients’ best interests;
| c. | engaging and overseeing third-party vendors that materially assist Loomis Sayles with respect to proxy voting, such as the Proxy Voting Services, including: |
(i) determining and periodically reassessing whether, as relevant, the Proxy Voting Service has the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues by considering:
(a) the adequacy and quality of the Proxy Voting Service’s staffing, personnel and technology,
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(b) whether the Proxy Voting Service has adequately disclosed its methodologies in formulating voting recommendations, such that Loomis Sayles can understand the factors underlying the Proxy Voting Service’s voting recommendations,
(c) the robustness of the Proxy Voting Service’s policies and procedures regarding its ability to ensure that its recommendations are based on current, materially complete and accurate information, and
(d) the Proxy Voting Service’s policies and procedures regarding how it identifies and addresses conflicts of interest, including whether the Proxy Voting Service’s policies and procedures provide for adequate disclosure of its actual and potential conflicts of interest with respect to the services it provides to Loomis Sayles.
(ii) providing ongoing oversight of the Proxy Voting Services to ensure that proxies continue to be voted in the best interests of clients and in accordance with these Proxy Voting Procedures and the determinations and directions of the Proxy Committee,
(iii) receiving and reviewing updates from the Proxy Voting Services regarding relevant business changes or changes to the Proxy Voting Services’ conflict policies and procedures, and
(iv) in the event that the Proxy Committee becomes aware that a recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service was based on a material factual error (including materially inaccurate or incomplete information): investigating the error, considering the nature of the error and the related recommendation, and determining whether the Proxy Voting Service has taken reasonable steps to reduce the likelihood of similar errors in the future; and
| d. | further developing and/or modifying these Proxy Voting Procedures as otherwise appropriate or necessary. |
| 3. | Standards. |
| a. | When determining the vote of any proposal for which it has responsibility, the Proxy Committee shall vote in the client’s best interests as described in section 1(B)(1) above. In the event a client believes that its other interests require a different vote, Loomis Sayles shall vote as the client instructs if the instructions are provided as required in section 1(B)(2) above. |
| b. | When determining the vote on any proposal, the Proxy Committee shall not consider any benefit to Loomis Sayles, any of its affiliates, any of its or their clients or service providers, other than benefits to the owner of the securities to be voted. |
| c. | If Loomis Sayles becomes aware of additional information relevant to the voting of a shareholder meeting after a vote has been entered but before the applicable voting deadline has passed, it will consider whether or not such information impacts the vote determination entered, and if necessary, use reasonable efforts to change the vote instruction. |
| D. | Conflicts of Interest. |
Loomis Sayles has established policies and procedures to ensure that proxy votes are voted in its clients’ best interests and are not affected by any possible conflicts of interest. First, except in certain limited instances,
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Loomis Sayles votes in accordance with its pre-determined policies set forth in these Proxy Voting Procedures. Second, where these Proxy Voting Procedures allow for discretion, Loomis Sayles will generally consider the recommendations of the Proxy Voting Service in making its voting decisions. However, if the Proxy Committee determines that the Proxy Voting Service’s recommendation is not in the best interests of the firm’s clients, then the Proxy Committee may use its discretion to vote against the Proxy Voting Service’s recommendation, but only after taking the following steps: (1) conducting a review for any material conflict of interest Loomis Sayles may have, and (2) if any material conflict is found to exist, excluding anyone at Loomis Sayles who is subject to that conflict of interest from participating in the voting decision in any way. However, if deemed necessary or appropriate by the Proxy Committee after full disclosure of any conflict, that person may provide information, opinions or recommendations on any proposal to the Proxy Committee. In such event, prior to directing any vote, the Proxy Committee will make reasonable efforts to obtain and consider information, opinions and recommendations from or about the opposing position.
| E. | Recordkeeping. |
Loomis Sayles or the Proxy Voting Service will maintain records of proxies voted pursuant to Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act. The records include: (1) a copy of its Proxy Voting Procedures; (2) proxy statements received regarding client securities; (3) a record of each vote cast; (4) a copy of any document created by Loomis Sayles that is material to making a decision how to vote proxies on behalf of a client or that memorializes the basis for that decision; and (5) each written client request for proxy voting records and Loomis Sayles’ written response to any (written or oral) client request for such records.
Proxy voting books and records are maintained in an easily accessible place for a period of five years, the first two in an appropriate office of Loomis Sayles.
| 2. | PROXY VOTING |
| A. | Introduction |
Loomis Sayles has established certain specific guidelines intended to achieve the objective of the Proxy Voting Procedures: to support good corporate governance, including ESG Matters, in all cases with the objective of protecting shareholder interests and maximizing shareholder value.
| B. | Board of Directors |
Loomis Sayles believes that an issuer’s independent, qualified board of directors is the foundation of good corporate governance. Loomis Sayles supports proxy proposals that reflect the prudent exercise of the board’s obligation to provide leadership and guidance to management in fulfilling its obligations to its shareholders. As an example, it may be prudent not to disqualify a director from serving on a board if they participated in affiliated transactions if all measures of independence and good corporate governance were met.
Annual Election of Directors: Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.
Chairman and CEO are Separate Positions: Vote for proposals that require the positions of chairman and CEO to be held by different persons.
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Director and Officer Indemnification and Liability Protection:
| A. | Vote against proposals concerning director and officer indemnification and liability protection that limit or eliminate entirely director and officer liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care, or that would expand coverage beyond legal expenses to acts such as gross negligence that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligations than mere carelessness. |
| B. | Vote for only those proposals that provide such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if (i) the director or officer was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the director or officer reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company, and (ii) if the director’s or officer’s legal expenses only would be covered. |
Director Nominees in Contested Elections: Votes in a contested election of directors or a “vote no” campaign must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors: (1) long-term financial performance of the issuer relative to its industry; management’s track record; (2) background to the proxy contest; qualifications of director nominees (both slates); (3) evaluation of what each side is offering shareholders as well as the likelihood that the proposed objectives and goals can be met; and (4) stock ownership positions.
Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections:
| A. | Vote for proposals involving routine matters such as election of directors, provided that at least two-thirds of the directors would be independent, as determined by the Proxy Voting Service, and affiliated or inside nominees do not serve on any key board committee, defined as the Audit, Compensation, Nominating and/or Governance Committees. |
| B. | Vote against nominees that are CFOs of the subject company. Generally, vote against nominees that the Proxy Voting Service has identified as not acting in the best interests of shareholders (e.g., due to over-boarding, risk management failures, a lack of diversity, etc.). Vote against nominees that have attended less than 75% of board and committee meetings, unless a reasonable cause (e.g., health or family emergency) for the absence is noted and accepted by the Proxy Voting Service and the board. Vote against affiliated or inside nominees who serve on a key board committee (as defined above). Vote against affiliated and inside nominees if less than two-thirds of the board would be independent. Vote against Governance or Nominating Committee members if both the following are true: a) there is no independent lead or presiding director; and b) the position of CEO and chairman are not held by separate individuals. Generally, vote against Audit Committee members if auditor ratification is not proposed, except in cases involving: (i) investment company board members, who are not required to submit auditor ratification for shareholder approval pursuant to Investment Company Act of 1940 rules; or (ii) any other issuer that is not required by law or regulation to submit a proposal ratifying the auditor selection. Vote against Compensation Committee members when Loomis Sayles or the Proxy Voting Service recommends a vote against the issuer’s “say on pay” advisory vote. |
| C. | Generally, vote against all members of a board committee and not just the chairman or a representative thereof in situations where the Proxy Voting Service finds that the board committee has not acted in the best interests of shareholders. |
| D. | Vote as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service when directors are being elected as a slate and not individually. |
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| E. | When electing directors for any foreign-domiciled issuer to which the Proxy Voting Service believes it is reasonable to apply U.S. governance standards, we generally will vote in accordance with our policies set forth in (A) through (D) above. When electing directors for any other foreign-domiciled issuers, a recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service will generally be followed in lieu of the above stipulations. |
Independent Audit, Compensation and Nominating and/or Governance Committees: Vote for proposals requesting that the board Audit, Compensation and/or Nominating and/or Governance Committees include independent directors exclusively.
Independent Board Chairman:
| A. | Vote for shareholder proposals that generally request the board to adopt a policy requiring its chairman to be “independent” (based on some reasonable definition of that term) with respect to any issuer whose enterprise value is, according to the Proxy Voting Service, greater than or equal to $10 billion. |
| B. | Vote such proposals on a case-by-case basis when, according to the Proxy Voting Service, the issuer’s enterprise value is less than $10 billion. |
Multiple Directorships: Generally vote against a director nominee who serves as an executive officer of any public company while serving on more than two total public company boards and any other director nominee who serves on more than five total public company boards, unless a convincing argument to vote for that nominee is made by the Proxy Voting Service, in which case, the recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service will generally be followed.
Staggered Director Elections: Vote against proposals to classify or stagger the board.
Stock Ownership Requirements: Generally vote against shareholder proposals requiring directors to own a minimum amount of company stock in order to qualify as a director, or to remain on the board.
Term of Office: Vote against shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors.
| C. | Ratification of Auditor |
Loomis Sayles generally supports proposals for the selection or ratification of independent auditors, subject to consideration of various factors such as independence and reasonableness of fees.
| A. | Generally vote for proposals to ratify auditors. |
| B. | Vote against ratification of auditors where an auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; or there is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position. |
| C. | In general, if non-audit fees amount to 35% or more of total fees paid to a company’s auditor we will vote against ratification and against the members of the Audit Committee unless the Proxy Voting Service states that the fees were disclosed and determined to be reasonable. In such instances, the recommendation of the Proxy Voting service will generally be followed. |
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| D. | Vote against ratification of auditors and vote against members of the Audit Committee where it is known that an auditor has negotiated an alternative dispute resolution procedure. |
| E. | Vote against ratification of auditors if the Proxy Voting Service indicates that a vote for the ratification of auditors it is not in the best long term interest of shareholders. |
| D. | Remuneration and Benefits |
Loomis Sayles believes that an issuer’s compensation and benefit plans must be designed to ensure the alignment of executives’ and employees’ interests with those of its shareholders.
401(k) Employee Benefit Plans: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.
Compensation Plans: Proposals with respect to compensation plans generally will be voted as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service.
Compensation in the Event of a Change in Control: Votes on proposals regarding executive compensation in the event of a change in control of the issuer will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Director Related Compensation: Vote proposals relating to director compensation, that are required by and comply with applicable laws (domestic or foreign) or listing requirements governing the issuer, as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (“ESOPs”): Vote for proposals that request shareholder approval in order to implement an ESOP or to increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, except in cases when the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is “excessive” (i.e., generally greater than five percent of outstanding shares), in which case the recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service will generally be followed.
Golden Coffins: Review on a case-by-case basis all proposals relating to the obligation of an issuer to provide remuneration or awards to survivors of executives payable upon such executive’s death.
Golden and Tin Parachutes:
| A. | Vote for shareholder proposals to have golden (top management) and tin (all employees) parachutes submitted for shareholder ratification. |
| B. | Review on a case-by-case basis all proposals to ratify or cancel golden or tin parachutes. |
OBRA (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act)-Related Compensation Proposals:
| A. | Vote for proposals to amend shareholder-approved plans to include administrative features or place a cap on the annual grants any one participant may receive to comply with the provisions of Section 162(m) of OBRA. |
| B. | Vote for amendments to add performance goals to existing compensation plans to comply with the provisions of Section 162(m) of OBRA. |
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| C. | Vote for cash or cash-and-stock bonus plans to exempt the compensation from taxes under the provisions of Section 162(m) of OBRA. |
| D. | Votes on amendments to existing plans to increase shares reserved and to qualify the plan for favorable tax treatment under the provisions of Section 162(m) should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. |
Shareholder Proposals to Limit Executive and Director Pay Including Executive Compensation Advisory Resolutions (“Say on Pay”):
| A. | Generally, vote for shareholder proposals that seek additional disclosure of executive and director pay information. |
| B. | Review on a case-by-case basis (1) all shareholder proposals that seek to limit executive and director pay and (2) all advisory resolutions on executive pay other than shareholder resolutions to permit such advisory resolutions. |
| C. | Vote against proposals to link all executive or director variable compensation to performance goals. |
| D. | Vote for an annual review of executive compensation. |
| E. | Non-binding advisory votes on executive compensation will be voted as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service. |
| F. | For foreign domiciled issuers where a non-binding advisory vote on executive compensation is proposed concurrently with a binding vote on executive compensation, and the recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service is the same for each proposal, a vote will be entered as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service. |
Share Retention by Executives: Generally vote against shareholder proposals requiring executives to retain shares of the issuer for fixed periods unless the board and the Proxy Voting Service recommend voting in favor of the proposal.
Stock Option Plans: A recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service will generally be followed using the following as a guide:
| A. | Vote against stock option plans which expressly permit repricing of underwater options. |
| B. | Vote against proposals to make all stock options performance based. |
| C. | Vote against stock option plans that could result in an earnings dilution above the company specific cap considered by the Proxy Voting Service. |
| D. | Vote for proposals that request expensing of stock options. |
| E. | Capital Structure Management Issues |
Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock: Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock.
Authority to Issue Shares: Vote for proposals by boards to authorize the issuance of shares (with or without preemptive rights) to the extent the size of the proposed issuance in proportion to the issuer’s issued
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ordinary share capital is consistent with industry standards and the recommendations of the issuer’s board and the Proxy Voting Service are in agreement. Proposals that do not meet the above criteria will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Blank Check Preferred Authorization:
| A. | Vote for proposals to create blank check preferred stock in cases when the company expressly states that the stock will not be used as a takeover defense or carry superior voting rights, and expressly states conversion, dividend, distribution and other rights. |
| B. | Vote for shareholder proposals to have blank check preferred stock placements, other than those shares issued for the purpose of raising capital or making acquisitions in the normal course of business, submitted for shareholder ratification. |
| C. | Review proposals to increase the number of authorized blank check preferred shares on a case-by-case basis. |
Common Stock Authorization: Vote against proposed common stock authorizations that increase the existing authorization by more than 100% unless a clear need for the excess shares is presented by the company. A recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service will generally be followed.
Greenshoe Options (French issuers only): Vote for proposals by boards of French issuers in favor of greenshoe options that grant the issuer the flexibility to increase an over-subscribed securities issuance by up to 15% so long as such increase takes place on the same terms and within thirty days of the initial issuance, provided that the recommendation of the issuer’s board and the Proxy Voting Service are in agreement. Proposals that do not meet the above criteria will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Reverse Stock Splits: Vote for management proposals to reduce the number of outstanding shares available through a reverse stock split.
Share Cancellation Programs: Vote for management proposals to reduce share capital by means of cancelling outstanding shares held in the issuer’s treasury.
Share Repurchase Programs: Vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms.
Stock Distributions, Splits and Dividends: Generally vote for management proposals to increase common share authorization, provided that the increase in authorized shares following the split or dividend is not greater than 100 percent of existing authorized shares.
| F. | Mergers, Asset Sales and Other Special Transactions |
Proposals for transactions that have the potential to affect the ownership interests and/or voting rights of the issuer’s shareholders, such as mergers, asset sales and corporate or debt restructuring, will be considered on a case-by-case basis, based on (1) whether the best economic result is being created for shareholders, (2) what changes in corporate governance will occur, (3) what impact they will have on shareholder rights, (4) whether the proposed transaction has strategic merit for the issuer, and (5) other factors as noted in each section below, if any.
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Asset Sales: Votes on asset sales will be determined on a case-by-case basis after considering the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, and potential elimination of inefficiencies.
Conversion of Debt Instruments: Votes on the conversion of debt instruments will be considered on a case-by-case basis after the recommendation of the relevant Loomis Sayles equity or fixed income analyst is obtained.
Corporate Restructuring: Votes on corporate restructuring proposals, including minority squeeze-outs, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, liquidations, and asset sales will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Debt Restructurings: Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt-restructuring plan. Consider the following issues:
| A. | Dilution — How much will ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be? |
| B. | Change in Control — Will the transaction result in a change in control of the company? |
| C. | Bankruptcy — Loomis Sayles’ Corporate Actions Department is responsible for consents related to bankruptcies and debt holder consents related to restructurings. |
| D. | Potential Conflicts of Interest — For example, clients may own securities at different levels of the capital structure; in such cases, Loomis Sayles will exercise voting or consent rights for each such client based on that client’s best interests, which may differ from the interests of other clients. |
Delisting a Security: Proposals to delist a security from an exchange will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Fair Price Provisions:
| A. | Vote for fair price proposals, as long as the shareholder vote requirement embedded in the provision is no more than a majority of disinterested shares. |
| B. | Vote for shareholder proposals to lower the shareholder vote requirement in existing fair price provisions. |
Greenmail:
| A. | Vote for proposals to adopt anti-greenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments. |
| B. | Review anti-greenmail proposals on a case-by-case basis when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments. |
| C. | Vote for proposals to eliminate an anti-greenmail bylaw if the recommendations of management and the Proxy Voting Service are in agreement. If they are not in agreement, review and vote such proposals on a case-by-case basis. |
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Liquidations: Proposals on liquidations will be voted on a case-by-case basis after reviewing relevant factors including but not necessarily limited to management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives, the appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.
Mergers and Acquisitions: Votes on mergers and acquisitions should be considered on a case-by-case basis, generally taking into account relevant factors including but not necessarily limited to: anticipated financial and operating benefits; offer price (cost vs. premium); prospects of the combined companies; how the deal was negotiated; golden parachutes; financial benefits to current management; and changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.
Poison Pills:
| A. | Vote for shareholder proposals that ask a company to submit its poison pill for shareholder ratification. |
| B. | Review on a case-by-case basis shareholder proposals to redeem a company’s poison pill. |
| C. | Review on a case-by-case basis management proposals to ratify a poison pill. |
Reincorporation Provisions: Proposals to change a company’s domicile will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Right to Adjourn: Vote for the right to adjourn in conjunction with a vote for a merger or acquisition or other proposal, and vote against the right to adjourn in conjunction with a vote against a merger or acquisition or other proposal.
Spin-offs: Votes on spin-offs will be considered on a case-by-case basis depending on relevant factors including but not necessarily limited to the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, market focus, and managerial incentives.
Tender Offer Defenses: Proposals concerning tender offer defenses will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
| G. | Shareholder Rights |
Loomis Sayles believes that issuers have a fundamental obligation to protect the rights of their shareholders. Pursuant to its fiduciary duty to vote shares in the best interests of its clients, Loomis Sayles considers proposals relating to shareholder rights based on whether and how they affect and protect those rights.
Appraisal Rights: Vote for proposals to restore, or provide shareholders with, rights of appraisal.
Bundled Proposals: Review on a case-by-case basis bundled or “conditioned” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.
Confidential Voting: Vote for shareholder proposals that request corporations to adopt confidential voting, use independent tabulators and use independent inspectors of election as long as the proposals include
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clauses for proxy contests as follows: in the case of a contested election, management should be permitted to request that the dissident group honor its confidential voting policy. If the dissidents agree, the policy remains in place. If the dissidents do not agree, the confidential voting policy is waived. Vote for management proposals to adopt confidential voting.
Counting Abstentions: Votes on proposals regarding counting abstentions when calculating vote proposal outcomes will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Cumulative Voting: Vote for proposals to permit cumulative voting, except where the issuer already has in place a policy of majority voting.
Equal Access: Vote for shareholder proposals that would allow significant company shareholders equal access to management’s proxy material in order to evaluate and propose voting recommendations on proxy proposals and director nominees, and in order to nominate their own candidates to the board.
Exclusive Forum Provisions: Vote against proposals mandating an exclusive forum for any shareholder lawsuits. Vote against the members of the issuer’s Governance Committee in the event of a proposal mandating an exclusive forum without shareholder approval.
Independent Proxy: Vote for proposals to elect an independent proxy to serve as a voting proxy at shareholder meetings.
Majority Voting: Vote for proposals to permit majority rather than plurality or cumulative voting for the election of directors/trustees.
Preemptive Rights: Votes with respect to preemptive rights generally will be voted as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service subject to the Common Stock Authorization requirements above.
Proxy Access: A recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service will generally be followed with regard to proposals intended to grant shareholders the right to place nominees for director on the issuer’s proxy ballot (“Proxy Access”). Vote for such proposals when they require the nominating shareholder(s) to hold, in aggregate, at least 3% of the voting shares of the issuer for at least three years, and be allowed to nominate up to 25% of the nominees. All other proposals relating to Proxy Access will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Shareholder Ability to Alter the Size of the Board:
| A. | Vote for proposals that seek to fix the size of the board. |
| B. | Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board without shareholder approval. |
Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors:
| A. | Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause. |
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| B. | Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies. |
| C. | Vote for proposals to restore shareholder ability to remove directors with or without cause and proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies. |
Shareholder Advisory Committees: Proposals to establish a shareholder advisory committee will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Shareholder Rights Regarding Special Meetings:
| A. | Vote for proposals that set a threshold of 10% of the outstanding voting stock as a minimum percentage allowable to call a special meeting of shareholders. Vote against proposals that increase or decrease the threshold from 10%. |
| B. | Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to call special meetings. |
Supermajority Shareholder Voting Requirements: Vote for all proposals to replace supermajority shareholder voting requirements with simple majority shareholder voting requirements, subject to applicable laws and regulations. Vote against management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve charter and bylaw amendments.
Unequal Voting Rights:
| A. | Vote against dual class exchange offers and dual class recapitalizations. |
| B. | Vote on a case-by-case basis on proposals to eliminate an existing dual class voting structure. |
Written Consent: Vote for proposals regarding the right to act by written consent when the Proxy Voting Service recommends a vote for the proposal. Proposals regarding the right to act by written consent where the Proxy Voting Service recommends a vote against will be sent to the Proxy Committee for determination. Generally vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to take action by written consent.
| H. | Environmental and Social Matters |
Loomis Sayles has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of its clients.
Loomis Sayles believes good corporate governance, including those practices that address ESG Matters, is essential to the effective management of a company’s financial, litigation and reputation risk, the maximization of its long-term economic performance and sustainability, and the protection of its shareholders’ best interests, including the maximization of shareholder value.
Proposals on environmental and social matters cover a wide range of issues, including environmental and energy practices and their impacts, labor matters, diversity and human rights. These proposals may be voted as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service or may, in the determination of the Proxy Committee, be reviewed on a case-by-case basis if the Proxy Committee believes that a particular proposal (i) could have a material impact on an industry or the growth and sustainability of an issuer; (ii) is appropriate for the issuer and the cost to implement would not be excessive; (iii) is appropriate for the issuer in light of various factors such as reputational damage or litigation risk; or (iv) is otherwise appropriate for the issuer.
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Loomis Sayles will consider whether such proposals are likely to enhance the value of the client’s investments after taking into account the costs involved, pursuant to its fiduciary duty to its clients.
Climate Reporting: Generally vote for proposals requesting the issuer produce a report, at reasonable expense, on the issuer’s climate policies. A recommendation against such proposals by the Proxy Voting Service will be considered by the Proxy Committee.
Workplace Diversity Reporting: Generally vote for proposals requesting the issuer produce a report, at reasonable expense, on the issuer’s workforce diversity or equity policies and/or performance. A recommendation against such proposals by the Proxy Voting Service will be considered by the Proxy Committee.
| I. | General Corporate Governance |
Loomis Sayles has a fiduciary duty to its clients with regard to proxy voting matters, including routine proposals that do not present controversial issues. The impact of proxy proposals on its clients’ rights as shareholders must be evaluated along with their potential economic benefits.
Changing Corporate Name: Vote for management proposals to change the corporate name.
Charitable and Political Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures: Votes on proposals regarding charitable contributions, political contributions, and lobbying expenditures, should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Proposals of UK issuers concerning political contributions will be voted for if the issuer states that (a) it does not intend to make any political donations or incur any expenditures in respect to any political party in the EU; and (b) the proposal is submitted to ensure that the issuer does not inadvertently breach the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 and sections 366 and 367 of the Companies Act 2006.
Delivery of Electronic Proxy Materials: Vote for proposals to allow electronic delivery of proxy materials to shareholders.
Disclosure of Prior Government Service: Review on a case-by-case basis all proposals to disclose a list of employees previously employed in a governmental capacity.
Financial Statements: Generally, proposals to accept and/or approve the delivery of audited financial statements shall be voted as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service. In certain non-US jurisdictions where local regulations and/or market practices do not require the release of audited financial statements in advance of custodian vote deadlines (e.g., Korea), and the Proxy Voting Service has not identified any issues with the company’s past financial statements or the audit procedures used, then Loomis Sayles shall vote for such proposals.
Non-Material Miscellaneous Bookkeeping Proposals: A recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service will generally be followed regarding miscellaneous bookkeeping proposals of a non-material nature.
Ratification of Board and/or Management Acts: Generally, proposals concerning the ratification or approval of the acts of the board of directors and/or management of the issuer for the past fiscal year shall be voted as recommended by the Proxy Voting Service.
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Reimbursement of Proxy Contest Defenses: Generally, proposals concerning all proxy contest defense cost reimbursements should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Reimbursement of Proxy Solicitation Expenses: Proposals to provide reimbursement for dissidents waging a proxy contest should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
State Takeover Statutes: Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freeze out provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, anti-greenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions).
Technical Amendments to By-Laws: A recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service will generally be followed regarding technical or housekeeping amendments to by-laws or articles designed to bring the by-laws or articles into line with current regulations and/or laws.
Transaction of Other Business: Vote against proposals asking for authority to transact open-ended other business without any information provided by the issuer at the time of voting.
Transition Manager Ballots: Any ballot received by Loomis Sayles for a security that was held for a client by a Transition Manager prior to Loomis Sayles’ management of the client’s holdings will be considered on a case-by case basis by the Proxy Committee (without the input of any Loomis Sayles analyst or portfolio manager) if such security is no longer held in the client’s account with Loomis Sayles.
| J. | Investment Company Matters |
Election of Investment Company Trustees: Vote for nominees who oversee fewer than 60 investment company portfolios. Vote against nominees who oversee 60 or more investment company portfolios that invest in substantially different asset classes (e.g., if the applicable portfolios include both fixed income funds and equity funds). Vote on a case-by-case basis for or against nominees who oversee 60 or more investment company portfolios that invest in substantially similar asset classes (e.g., if the applicable portfolios include only fixed income funds or only equity funds). These policies will be followed with respect to funds advised by Loomis Sayles and its affiliates, as well as funds for which Loomis Sayles acts as subadviser and other third parties.
Mutual Fund Distribution Agreements: Votes on mutual fund distribution agreements should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Investment Company Fundamental Investment Restrictions: Votes on amendments to an investment company’s fundamental investment restrictions should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Investment Company Investment Advisory Agreements: Votes on investment company investment advisory agreements should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
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| Fund |
Shareholder |
Shares Beneficially Owned
|
Percentage Owned |
| 1290 AVANTIS® U.S. LARGE CAP GROWTH FUND Class A |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
7,283.321 |
13.79% |
| 1290 AVANTIS® U.S. LARGE CAP GROWTH FUND Class A |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
44,299.148 |
83.86% |
| 1290 AVANTIS® U.S. LARGE CAP GROWTH FUND Class I |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
2,021,942.422 |
21.46% |
| 1290 AVANTIS® U.S. LARGE CAP GROWTH FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC ATTN BRIAN WALSH 1345 AVENUE OF AMERICAS 4TH FLOOR NEW YORK NY 10105 |
1,626,547.706 |
17.26% |
| 1290 AVANTIS® U.S. LARGE CAP GROWTH FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE FUNDS MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC EQ AGGRESSIVE ALLOCATION PORTFOLIO 1345 AVENUE OF AMERICAS 4TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10105 |
1,169,872.964 |
12.42% |
| 1290 AVANTIS® U.S. LARGE CAP GROWTH FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE FUNDS MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC EQ MODERATE-PLUS ALLOCATION PORTFOLIO 1345 AVENUE OF AMERICAS 4TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10105 |
2,121,307.754 |
22.51% |
| 1290 AVANTIS® U.S. LARGE CAP GROWTH FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE FUNDS MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC EQ MODERATE ALLOCATION PORTFOLIO 1345 AVENUE OF AMERICAS 4TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10105 |
1,341,289.411 |
14.23% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class A |
NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC 499 WASHINGTON BLVD JERSEY CITY NJ 07310-1995 |
34,798.038 |
7.35% |
| Fund |
Shareholder |
Shares Beneficially Owned
|
Percentage Owned |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class A |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
352,717.806 |
74.47% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class I |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
21,597,653.02 |
32.41% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class I |
EQ ADVISORS TRUST DYNAMIC EQUITABLE CONSERVATIVE GROWTH MF/EFT- FOF ATTN ROSELLE IBANGA 1345 AVENUE OF AMERICAS 4TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10105 |
3,390,141.776 |
5.09% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE FUNDS MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC EQ MODERATE- PLUS ALLOCATION PORTFOLIO 1345 AVENUE OF AMERICAS 4TH FLOOR NEW YORK NY 10105 |
11,669,164.19 |
17.51% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE FUNDS MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC EQ MODERATE ALLOCATION PORTFOLIO 1345 AVENUE OF AMERICAS 4TH FLOOR NEW YORK NY 10105 |
15,199,966.44 |
22.81% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. FBO SEPARATE ACCT NO 65 ON BEHALF OF VARIOUS 401K PLANS 525 WASHINGTON BLVD FL 27 JERSEY CITY NJ 07310-1606 |
66,379.23 |
26.24% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY AS AGENT FOR ADVISOR TRUST INC.CLARK COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT 403(B)
717 17TH STREET, SUITE 1300 DENVER CO
80202-3304 |
23,678.951 |
9.36% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY AS AGENT FOR ADVISOR TRUST INC.CLARK COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT 403(B)
717 17TH STREET, SUITE 1300 DENVER CO
80202-3304 |
79,488.355 |
31.42% |
| 1290 DIVERSIFIED BOND FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY AS AGENT FOR ADVISOR TRUST, INC.INDIAN PRAIRIE SD
#204 403(B) PLAN
717 17TH STREET, SUITE 1300 DENVER CO
80202-3304 |
22,935.447 |
9.07% |
| Fund |
Shareholder |
Shares Beneficially Owned
|
Percentage Owned |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class A |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
10,000.0 |
20.97% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class A |
PERSHING LLC P O BOX 2052 JERSEY CITY NJ 07303-2052 |
8,745.498 |
18.34% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class A |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
27,560.364 |
57.8% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class I |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
4,173,669.932 |
73.3% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC ATTN BRIAN WALSH 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
980,000.0 |
17.21% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC ATTN BRIAN WALSH 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
10,000.0 |
54.46% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY AS AGENT FOR ADVISOR TRUST, INC.CUSD#200
(IL) 403(B) PLAN
717 17TH STREET, SUITE 1300 DENVER CO
80202-3304 |
1,989.968 |
10.84% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY AS AGENT FOR ADVISOR TRUST, INC. EAST ISLIP UFSD 403(B) PLAN 717 17TH STREET, SUITE 1300 DENVER CO 80202-3304 |
1,241.65 |
6.76% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class R |
PERSHING LLC P O BOX 2052 JERSEY CITY NJ 07303-2052 |
1,016.371 |
5.53% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class R |
PERSHING LLC P O BOX 2052 JERSEY CITY NJ 07303-2052 |
1,016.371 |
5.53% |
| 1290 ESSEX SMALL CAP GROWTH FUND Class R |
PERSHING LLC P O BOX 2052 JERSEY CITY NJ 07303-2052 |
2,788.782 |
15.19% |
| 1290 GAMCO SMALL/MID CAP VALUE FUND Class A |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
281,757.235 |
73.49% |
| Fund |
Shareholder |
Shares Beneficially Owned
|
Percentage Owned |
| 1290 GAMCO SMALL/MID CAP VALUE FUND Class I |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
7,199,919.178 |
73.24% |
| 1290 GAMCO SMALL/MID CAP VALUE FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
1,453,353.354 |
14.78% |
| 1290 GAMCO SMALL/MID CAP VALUE FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO FBO SEPARATE ACCT NO 65 ON BEHALF OF VARIOUS 401K PLANS 525 WASHINGTON BLVD FL 27 JERSEY CITY NJ 07310-1606 |
44,541.191 |
46.58% |
| 1290 GAMCO SMALL/MID CAP VALUE FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
10,485.034 |
10.97% |
| 1290 GAMCO SMALL/MID CAP VALUE FUND Class R |
CHARLES SCHWAB & CO INC SPCIAL CUSTODY A/C FBO CUSTOMERS 211 MAIN STREET SAN FRANCISCO CA 94105-1905 |
21,215.636 |
22.19% |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class A |
EQUITABLE FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. FBO SEPARATE ACCT NO 65 ON BEHALF OF VARIOUS 401K PLANS 525 WASHINGTON BLVD FL 27 JERSEY CITY NJ 07310-1606 |
36,156.477 |
10.57% |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class A |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
243,862.447 |
71.32% |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class A |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
22,079.764 |
6.46% |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class I |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
7,434,837.218 |
76.26% |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC ATTN BRIAN WALSH 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
617,654.544 |
6.34% |
| Fund |
Shareholder |
Shares Beneficially Owned
|
Percentage Owned |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class I |
EQ ADVISORS TRUST DYNAMIC EQUITABLE CONSERVATIVE GROWTH MF/EFT-FOF 1290 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 16 NEW YORK NY 10104-3499 |
834,338.545 |
8.56% |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. FBO SEPARATE ACCT NO 65 ON BEHALF OF VARIOUS 401K PLANS 525 WASHINGTON BLVD FL 27 JERSEY CITY NJ 07310-1606 |
47,155.679 |
50.99% |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY AS AGENT FOR ADVISOR TRUST INC LOCKPORT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT (NY) DENVER CO 80202-3304 |
4,672.292 |
5.05% |
| 1290 HIGH YIELD BOND FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
21,583.625 |
23.34% |
| 1290 LOOMIS SAYLES MULTI-ASSET INCOME FUND Class A |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
457,235.719 |
77.2% |
| 1290 LOOMIS SAYLES MULTI-ASSET INCOME FUND Class I |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
2,654,132.185 |
33.36% |
| 1290 LOOMIS SAYLES MULTI-ASSET INCOME FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
4,218,820.171 |
53.03% |
| 1290 LOOMIS SAYLES MULTI-ASSET INCOME FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE FBO SEPARATE ACCT NO 65 ON BEHALF OF VARIOUS 401K PLANS 525 WASHINGTON BLVD FL 27 JERSEY CITY NJ 07310-1606 |
9,000.176 |
37.15% |
| 1290 LOOMIS SAYLES MULTI-ASSET INCOME FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY AS AGENT FOR ADVISOR TRUST INCUNIVERSITY OF HAWAII
(HI) 403(B)
717 17TH STREET SUITE 1300 DENVER CO 80202-3304 |
2,666.645 |
11.01% |
| 1290 LOOMIS SAYLES MULTI-ASSET INCOME FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC ATTN BRIAN WALSH 1345 AVENUE OF AMERICAS 4TH FLOOR NEW YORK NY 10105 |
10,000.0 |
41.28% |
| Fund |
Shareholder |
Shares Beneficially Owned
|
Percentage Owned |
| 1290 MULTI-ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FUND Class A |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
10,000.0 |
29.23% |
| 1290 MULTI-ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FUND Class A |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
23,456.456 |
68.57% |
| 1290 MULTI-ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FUND Class I |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
1,556,932.867 |
60.87% |
| 1290 MULTI-ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FUND Class I |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
980,000.0 |
38.31% |
| 1290 MULTI-ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. FBO SEPARATE ACCT NO 65 ON BEHALF OF VARIOUS 401K PLANS 525 WASHINGTON BLVD FL 27 JERSEY CITY NJ 07310-1606 |
4,680.188 |
27.68% |
| 1290 MULTI-ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY AS AGENT FOR ADVISOR TRUST INC UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII (HI) 403(B) 717 17TH STREET, SUITE 1300 DENVER CO 80202-3304 |
1,529.143 |
9.04% |
| 1290 MULTI-ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FUND Class R |
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC 1345 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS FL 4 NEW YORK NY 10105 |
10,000.0 |
59.14% |
| 1290 SMARTBETA EQUITY FUND Class A |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
292,617.411 |
92.72% |
| 1290 SMARTBETA EQUITY FUND Class I |
LPL FINANCIAL OMNIBUS CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ATTN MUTUAL FUND TRADING 4707 EXECUTIVE DR SAN DIEGO CA 92121-3091 |
11,428,633.93 |
87.48% |
| 1290 SMARTBETA EQUITY FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY CUST FBO PROSPECT HEIGHTS SD 23 (IL) 403B 717 17TH ST STE 1300 DENVER CO 80202-3304 |
26,729.289 |
12.29% |
| Fund |
Shareholder |
Shares Beneficially Owned
|
Percentage Owned |
| 1290 SMARTBETA EQUITY FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY CUST FBO NEW TRIER HIGH SCHOOL DIST 203 403B 717 17TH ST, STE 1300 DENVER CO 80202-3304 |
45,646.643 |
20.99% |
| 1290 SMARTBETA EQUITY FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY CUST FBO OAK PARK & RIVER FOREST HS 403(B) 717 17TH ST, STE 1300 DENVER CO 80202-3304 |
30,819.483 |
14.17% |
| 1290 SMARTBETA EQUITY FUND Class R |
MATRIX TRUST COMPANY CUST FBO TOWNSHIP HIGH SD #113 (IL) 403(B) 717 17TH ST, STE 1300 DENVER CO 80202-3304 |
32,584.62 |
14.99% |
| Funds |
Gross income from
securities lending
activities (including
income from cash
collateral reinvestment) |
Fees paid
to securities
lending agent from
a revenue split |
Rebate
(Paid to
Borrower) |
Aggregate
fees/compensation
for securities
lending activities
and related services |
Net
income from
securities
lending
activities |
| 1290 Avantis® U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund |
$852 |
$85 |
$2,875 |
$2,960 |
$767 |
| 1290 Diversified Bond Fund |
$3,656 |
$365 |
$576 |
$941 |
$3,291 |
| 1290 Essex Small Cap Growth Fund |
$28,876 |
$2,883 |
$27,425 |
$30,308 |
$25,993 |
| 1290 GAMCO Small/Mid Cap Value Fund |
$35,559 |
$3,552 |
$78,674 |
$82,226 |
$32,007 |
| 1290 High Yield Bond Fund |
$41,662 |
$4,158 |
$220,228 |
$224,386 |
$37,504 |
| 1290 Loomis Sayles Multi-Asset Income Fund |
$32,976 |
$3,290 |
$46,822 |
$50,112 |
$29,686 |
| 1290 Multi-Alternative Strategies Fund |
$4,561 |
$456 |
$42,122 |
$42,578 |
$4,105 |
| 1290 SmartBeta Equity Fund |
$20,101 |
$2,009 |
$32,064 |
$34,073 |
$18,092 |
| (a)(1) |
|
| (a)(2) |
|
| (a)(3) |
|
| (b) |
Fifth Amended and Restated By-Laws. (filed
herewith) |
| (c) |
None, other than Exhibits (a) and (b) |
| (d) |
Investment Advisory Contracts |
| (d)(1) |
|
| (d)(1)(i) |
|
| (d)(1)(ii) |
|
| (d)(1)(iii) |
Amendment No. __ effective as of ____, 2026 to the Investment Advisory Agreement dated as of January 1, 2023,
between 1290 Funds and EIM II. (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (d)(2) |
|
| (d)(3) |
|
| (d)(4) |
|
| (d)(4)(i) |
|
| (d)(5) |
|
| (d)(6) |
|
| (d)(7) |
|
| (d)(8) |
Investment Sub-Advisory Agreement dated as of ____, 2026 between EIM II and AllianceBernstein L.P.
(“AllianceBernstein”). (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (e) |
Underwriting Contracts |
| (e)(1) |
|
| (e)(1)(i) |
|
| (e)(1)(ii) |
|
| (e)(1)(iii) |
|
| (e)(1)(iv) |
| (e)(1)(v) |
|
| (e)(1)(vi) |
|
| (e)(1)(vii) |
Amendment No. 7 effective as of ____, 2026, to the Distribution Agreement dated as of April 16, 2018 between 1290
Funds and ALPS. (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (g) |
Custodian Agreements |
| (g)(1) |
|
| (g)(1)(i) |
|
| (g)(1)(ii) |
|
| (g)(1)(iii) |
|
| (g)(1)(iv) |
|
| (g)(1)(v) |
|
| (g)(1)(vi) |
|
| (g)(1)(vii) |
|
| (g)(1)(viii) |
|
| (g)(1)(ix) |
|
| (g)(1)(x) |
|
| (g)(1)(xi) |
|
| (g)(1)(xii) |
|
| (g)(1)(xiii) |
Amendment No. 13 effective as of ____, 2026 to the Global Custody Agreement dated as of October 27, 2014 between
1290 Funds and JPMorgan Chase Bank. (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (h) |
Other Material Contracts |
| (h)(1) |
|
| (h)(1)(i) |
|
| (h)(1)(ii) |
|
| (h)(1)(iii) |
Amendment No. 3 effective as of ____, 2026, to the Mutual Funds Service Agreement dated January 1, 2023 between
1290 Funds and EIM II. (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (h)(2) |
| (h)(2)(i) |
|
| (h)(2)(ii) |
|
| (h)(2)(iii) |
|
| (h)(2)(iv) |
Amendment No. 4 effective as of ____, 2026, to the Expense Limitation Agreement dated January 1, 2023 between
1290 Funds and EIM II. (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (h)(4) |
|
| (h)(4)(i) |
|
| (h)(4)(ii) |
|
| (h)(4)(iii) |
|
| (h)(4)(iv) |
|
| (h)(4)(v) |
|
| (h)(4)(vi) |
|
| (h)(4)(vii) |
|
| (h)(4)(viii) |
|
| (h)(4)(ix) |
|
| (h)(4)(x) |
|
| (h)(4)(xi) |
|
| (h)(4)(xii) |
|
| (h)(4)(xiii) |
|
| (h)(4)(xiv) |
|
| (h)(4)(xv) |
Amendment No. 15 effective as of ____, 2026 to the Transfer Agency and Service Agreement dated October 29, 2014
between 1290 Funds and SS&C GIDS, Inc. (to be filed by subsequent amendment)
|
| (h)(5)(i) |
|
| (h)(5)(ii) |
|
| (h)(5)(iii) |
| (h)(5)(iv) |
|
| (h)(5)(v) |
|
| (h)(5)(vi) |
|
| (h)(5)(vii) |
|
| (h)(5)(viii) |
|
| (h)(5)(ix) |
|
| (h)(5)(x) |
|
| (h)(5)(xi) |
|
| (h)(5)(xii) |
|
| (h)(5)(xiii) |
|
| (h)(5)(xiv) |
Amendment No. 13 dated as of ____, 2026 to the Securities Lending Agreement with JPMorgan Chase Bank National
Association. (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (h)(6)(i) |
|
| (h)(6)(ii) |
|
| (h)(6)(iii) |
|
| (h)(6)(iv) |
|
| (h)(6)(v) |
|
| (h)(6)(vi) |
|
| (h)(7)(i) |
|
| (h)(7)(ii) |
|
| (h)(7)(iii) |
|
| (h)(7)(iv) |
| (h)(7)(v) |
|
| (h)(7)(vi) |
|
| (h)(8)(i) |
|
| (h)(8)(ii) |
|
| (h)(8)(iii) |
|
| (h)(8)(iv) |
|
| (h)(8)(v) |
|
| (h)(8)(vi) |
|
| (h)(9)(i) |
|
| (h)(9)(ii) |
|
| (h)(9)(iii) |
|
| (h)(9)(iv) |
|
| (h)(9)(v) |
|
| (h)(9)(vi) |
|
| (h)(9)(vii) |
|
| (h)(10)(i) |
|
| (h)(10)(ii) |
|
| (h)(10)(iii) |
| (h)(10)(iv) |
|
| (h)(10)(v) |
|
| (h)(10)(vi) |
|
| (h)(11)(i) |
|
| (h)(11)(ii) |
|
| (h)(11)(iii) |
|
| (h)(11)(iv) |
|
| (h)(11)(v) |
|
| (h)(11)(vi) |
|
| (h)(12)(i) |
|
| (h)(12)(ii) |
|
| (h)(12)(iii) |
|
| (h)(12)(iv) |
|
| (h)(12)(v) |
|
| (h)(12)(vi) |
|
| (h)(13)(i) |
|
| (h)(13)(ii) |
|
| (h)(13)(iii) |
|
| (h)(13)(iv) |
|
| (h)(13)(v) |
|
| (h)(13)(vi) |
| (h)(14)(i) |
|
| (h)(14)(ii) |
|
| (h)(14)(iii) |
|
| (h)(14)(iv) |
|
| (h)(14)(v) |
|
| (h)(14)(vi) |
|
| (h)(15)(i) |
|
| (h)(15)(ii) |
|
| (h)(15)(iii) |
|
| (h)(15)(iv) |
|
| (h)(15)(v) |
|
| (h)(15)(vi) |
|
| (h)(16)(i) |
|
| (h)(16)(ii) |
|
| (h)(16)(iii) |
|
| (h)(16)(iv) |
|
| (h)(16)(v) |
|
| (h)(16)(vi) |
|
| (h)(17)(i) |
|
| (h)(17)(ii) |
|
| (h)(17)(iii) |
|
| (h)(17)(iv) |
| (h)(17)(v) |
|
| (h)(17)(vi) |
|
| (h)(18)(i) |
|
| (h)(19)(i) |
|
| (h)(19)(ii) |
|
| (h)(20)(i) |
|
| (i) |
Legal Opinion |
| (i)(1) |
Opinion and Consent of K&L Gates LLP. (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (j) |
Other Consents |
| (j)(1) |
Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. (to be filed by subsequent amendment) |
| (k) |
None. |
| (l) |
|
| (m) |
Distribution Plans |
| (m)(1) |
|
| (m)(2) |
|
| |
|
| (n) |
Multiple Class Plan |
| (n)(1) |
|
| (p) |
Codes of Ethics |
| (p)(1)(i) |
|
| (p)(1)(ii) |
|
| (p)(2) |
|
| (p)(3) |
|
| (p)(4) |
|
| (p)(5) |
|
| (p)(6) |
|
| (p)(7) |
|
| (p)(8) |
|
| (p)(9) |
Code of Business Conduct and Ethics of AllianceBernstein, revised January 2025. (to be filed by subsequent
amendment) |
| Other Exhibits: | |
| |
|
| Name* |
Position with Underwriter |
Positions with Fund |
| Stephen Kyllo |
President, Chief Operating Officer, Director, and Chief Compliance Officer |
None |
| Eric T. Parsons |
Vice President, Controller and Assistant Treasurer |
None |
| Jason White** |
Secretary |
None |
| Brian Schell |
Vice President and Treasurer |
None |
| Richard C. Noyes |
Senior Vice President, General Counsel, Assistant Secretary |
None |
| Liza Price |
Vice President, Managing Counsel |
None |
| Jed Stahl |
Vice President, Managing Counsel |
None |
| Terence Dignan |
Vice President |
None |
| James Stegall |
Vice President |
None |
| Hilary Quinn |
Vice President |
None |
| Eric Theroff |
Assistant Secretary |
None |
| Adam Girard |
Tax Officer |
None |
| |
1290 FUNDS | |
| |
By: |
/s/ Steven M. Joenk |
| |
Name: |
Steven M. Joenk |
| |
Title: |
Trustee, President and Chief Executive Officer |
| Signature |
Title |
Date |
| /s/ Steven M. Joenk |
Trustee, President and Chief Executive Officer |
August 19, 2026 |
| Steven M. Joenk | ||
| /s/ Gary S. Schpero* |
Chairman of the Board |
August 19, 2026 |
| Gary S. Schpero | ||
| /s/ Michael Clement* |
Trustee |
August 19, 2026 |
| Michael Clement | ||
| /s/ Donald E. Foley* |
Trustee |
August 19, 2026 |
| Donald E. Foley | ||
| /s/ Marcia Haydel* |
Trustee |
August 19, 2026 |
| Marcia Haydel | ||
| /s/ Kimberly Thompson Laughton* |
Trustee |
August 19, 2026 |
| Kimberly Thompson Laughton | ||
| /s/ H. Thomas McMeekin* |
Trustee |
August 19, 2026 |
| H. Thomas McMeekin | ||
| /s/ Kathleen Stephansen* |
Trustee |
August 19, 2026 |
| Kathleen Stephansen | ||
| /s/ Patricia Haverland* |
Trustee |
August 19, 2026 |
| Patricia Haverland | ||
| /s/ Jeffery Perry* |
Trustee |
August 19, 2026 |
| Jeffery Perry | ||
| /s/ Brian E. Walsh |
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Chief Accounting Officer) |
August 19, 2026 |
| Brian E. Walsh |
| * By: |
/s/ Steven M. Joenk |
|
| |
Steven M. Joenk (Attorney-in-Fact) |
|