IFRS 7 Disclosure	6 Months Ended
IFRS 7 Disclosure	Apr. 30, 2026
IFRS 7 Disclosure [Abstract]
IFRS 7 Disclosure	MARKET RISK Market risk capital is calculated using the Standardized Approach under Basel III. The Bank continues to use Value-at-Risk (VaR) as an internal management metric to monitor and control market risk. Calculating VaR The Bank computes total VaR on a daily basis by combining the General Market Risk (GMR) and Idiosyncratic Debt Specific Risk (IDSR) associated with the Bank’s trading positions. GMR is determined by creating a distribution of potential changes in the market value of the current portfolio using historical simulation. The Bank values the current portfolio using the market price and rate changes of the most recent 259 trading days for equity, interest rate, foreign exchange, credit, and commodity products. GMR is computed as the threshold level that portfolio losses are not expected to exceed more than one out of every 100 trading days. A one-day holding period is used for GMR calculation. IDSR measures idiosyncratic (single-name) credit spread risk for credit exposures in the trading portfolio using Monte Carlo simulation. The IDSR model is based on the historical behaviour of five-year idiosyncratic credit spreads. Similar to GMR, IDSR is computed as the threshold level that portfolio losses are not expected to exceed more than one out of every 100 trading days. IDSR is measured for a ten-day holding period. The following graph discloses daily one-day VaR usage and trading net revenue, reported on a TEB, within Wholesale Banking. Trading net revenue includes trading income and net interest income related to positions within the Bank’s market risk capital trading books. For the second quarter ending April 30, 2026, there were 9 days of trading losses and trading net revenue was positive for 86 % of the trading days, reflecting normal trading activity. Losses in the quarter did not exceed VaR on any trading day. VaR is a valuable risk measure but it should be used in the context of its limitations, for example: ● VaR uses historical data to estimate future events, which limits its forecasting abilities; ● It does not provide information on losses beyond the selected confidence level; and ● It assumes that all positions can be liquidated during the holding period used for VaR calculation. The Bank continuously improves its VaR methodologies and incorporates new risk measures in line with market conventions, industry best practices, and regulatory requirements. To mitigate some of the shortcomings of VaR, the Bank uses additional metrics designed for risk management purposes. This includes stress testing as well as sensitivities to various market risk factors. The following table presents the end of quarter, average, high, and low usage of TD’s VaR metric. TABLE 29: PORTFOLIO MARKET RISK MEASURES (millions of Canadian dollars) For the three months ended For the six months ended April 30 January 31 April 30 April 30 April 30 2026 2026 2025 2026 2025 As at Average High Low Average Average Average Average Interest rate risk $ 11.7 $ 15.3 $ 23.5 $ 9.8 $ 12.6 $ 12.8 $ 14.0 $ 12.6 Credit spread risk 18.0 19.6 26.0 13.5 14.8 20.1 17.2 19.9 Equity risk 27.9 17.6 36.9 7.3 16.1 9.6 16.8 8.9 Foreign exchange risk 2.1 4.1 8.2 1.3 5.1 3.8 4.6 3.9 Commodity risk 25.1 35.5 49.6 25.1 37.1 23.1 36.3 14.5 Idiosyncratic debt specific risk 16.2 17.1 20.0 14.3 15.3 23.4 16.2 21.5 Diversification effect 1 (65.0) (69.1) n/m 2 n/m (58.8) (56.9) (64.0) (49.2) Total Value -at-Risk (one-day) $ 36.0 $ 40.1 $ 54.1 $ 32.0 $ 42.2 $ 35.9 $ 41.1 $ 32.1 The aggregate VaR is less than the sum of the VaR of the different risk types due to risk offsets resulting from portfolio diversification. 2 Not meaningful. It is not meaningful to compute a diversification effect because the high and low may occur on different days for different risk types. Validation of VaR Model The Bank uses a back-testing process to compare actual profits and losses to VaR to review their consistency with the statistical results of the VaR model. Non-Trading Interest Rate Risk The Bank’s non-trading interest rate risk arises mainly from traditional personal and commercial banking activity and is generally the result of mismatches between the maturities and repricing dates of the Bank’s assets and liabilities. The primary measures for managing and controlling this risk are Economic Value of Shareholders’ Equity (EVE) Sensitivity and Net Interest Income Sensitivity (NIIS). The EVE Sensitivity measures the change in the net present value of the Bank’s banking book assets, liabilities, and certain off-balance sheet items given a specific interest rate shock. It reflects a measurement of the potential present value impact on shareholders’ equity without an assumed term profile for the management of the Bank’s own equity and excludes product margins. The NIIS measures the NII change over a twelve-month horizon for a specified change in interest rates for banking book assets, liabilities, and certain off- balance sheet items assuming a constant balance sheet over the period. The Bank’s Market Risk policy sets overall limits on the non-trading interest rate risk measures. These limits are periodically reviewed and approved by the Risk Committee. In addition to the Board policy limits, book-level risk limits are set for the Bank’s management of non-trading interest rate risk by Risk Management. Exposures against these limits are routinely monitored and reported, and breaches of the Board limits, if any, are escalated to both the Asset Liability and Capital Committee (ALCO) and the Risk Committee. The following table shows the potential before-tax impact of an immediate and sustained 100 bps increase or decrease in interest rates on the EVE and NIIS measures. TABLE 30: NON-TRADING INTEREST RATE SENSITIVITY MEASURES (millions of Canadian dollars) As at April 30, 2026 January 31, 2026 April 30, 2025 EVE NII EVE NII EVE NII Sensitivity Sensitivity 1 Sensitivity 3 Sensitivity 1,3 Sensitivity 3 Sensitivity 1,3 Canadian U.S. Total Canadian U.S. Total Total Total Total Total dollar 2 dollar dollar 2 dollar Before-tax impact of 100 bps increase in rates $ (1,191) $ (2,492) $ (3,683) $ 354 $ 57 $ 411 $ (2,521) $ 745 $ (2,612) $ 679 100 bps decrease in rates 1,144 2,263 3,407 (390) (71) (461) 2,179 (815) 2,116 (769) Represents the twelve-month NII exposure to an immediate and sustained shock in rates, and may include adjustments for non-recurring items. 2 Includes other currency exposures. 3 Effective the second quarter ended April 30, 2026, includes exposures from Wholesale Banking. Prior periods do not include Wholesale Banking As at April 30, 2026, an immediate and sustained 100 bps increase in interest rates would have a negative impact to the Bank’s EVE of $ 3,683 million, an increase of $ 1,162 million from last quarter, and a positive impact to the Bank’s NII of $ 411 million, a decrease of $ 334 million from last quarter. An immediate and sustained 100 bps decrease in interest rates would have a positive impact to the Bank’s EVE of $ 3,407 million, an increase of $ 1,228 million from last quarter, and a negative impact to the Bank’s NII of $ 461 million, a decrease of $ 354 million from last quarter. The quarter over quarter increase in EVE sensitivity is largely attributed to Treasury activity primarily in support of lower US dollar NII sensitivity. Liquidity Risk The risk of having insufficient cash or collateral to meet financial obligations and an inability to, in a timely manner, raise funding or monetize assets at a non- distressed price. Financial obligations can arise from deposit withdrawals, debt maturities, commitments to provide credit or liquidity support or the need to pledge additional collateral. TD’S LIQUIDITY RISK APPETITE TD follows a disciplined liquidity management program, which is subject to risk governance and oversight, and is designed to maintain sufficient liquidity to permit the Bank to operate through a significant liquidity event without relying on extraordinary central bank assistance. The Bank maintains access to a stable and diversified funding base and aligns its funding profile with that of the assets and contingent obligations it supports. WHO MANAGES LIQUIDITY RISK The Risk Committee, the ALCO and the Treasurer are accountable for the identification, assessment, control, monitoring and oversight of liquidity risk. ● The Risk Committee regularly reviews the Bank’s liquidity position and approves the Bank’s Liquidity Risk Management Framework biennially and related policies annually. ● The Bank’s ALCO is responsible for establishing effective management structures and practices to ensure appropriate measurement, management, and governance of liquidity risk. ● The Global Liquidity & Funding (GLF) Committee, a subcommittee of the ALCO comprised of senior management from Treasury, Wholesale Banking and Risk Management, identifies and monitors the Bank’s liquidity risks. In addition to our committee oversight framework, liquidity risk management activities are subject to the three lines of defence governance model. Treasury, the first line of defence for the management of liquidity risk, is subject to independent second line challenge and oversight by Risk Management. TD’s Internal Audit is the third line of defence. The three lines of defence are independent of the business whose activities generate liquidity risks. The Bank’s liquidity risk appetite and liquidity risk management approach have not changed substantially from that described in the Bank’s 2025 MD&A. For a complete discussion of liquidity risk, refer to the “Liquidity Risk” section in the Bank’s 2025 MD&A. Liquid assets The Bank’s unencumbered liquid assets could be used to help address potential funding needs arising from stress events. Liquid asset eligibility considers estimated stressed market values and trading market depth, as well as operational, legal, or other impediments to sale, rehypothecation or pledging. Assets held by the Bank to meet liquidity requirements are summarized in the following tables. The tables do not include assets held within the Bank’s insurance businesses as these are used to support insurance-specific liabilities and capital requirements. TABLE 31: SUMMARY OF LIQUID ASSETS BY TYPE AND CURRENCY (millions of Canadian dollars, except as noted) As at Securities received as collateral from securities financing and Bank-owned derivative Total Encumbered Unencumbered liquid assets transactions liquid assets liquid assets liquid assets 1 April 30, 2026 Cash and central bank reserves $ 18,895 $ – $ 18,895 $ 2,051 $ 16,844 Obligations of government, federal agencies, public sector entities, and multilateral development banks 2 111,472 107,727 219,199 106,362 112,837 Equities 19,172 8,035 27,207 21,076 6,131 Other debt securities 7,807 21,301 29,108 11,846 17,262 Other securities – – – – – Total Canadian dollar-denominated 157,346 137,063 294,409 141,335 153,074 Cash and central bank reserves 87,832 – 87,832 – 87,832 Obligations of government, federal agencies, public sector entities, and multilateral development banks 217,540 156,479 374,019 178,673 195,346 Equities 67,214 70,625 137,839 77,536 60,303 Other debt securities 82,738 42,285 125,023 35,873 89,150 Other securities 26,694 2,907 29,601 8,866 20,735 Total non-Canadian dollar-denominated 482,018 272,296 754,314 300,948 453,366 Total 3 $ 639,364 $ 409,359 $ 1,048,723 $ 442,283 $ 606,440 October 31, 2025 Total Canadian dollar -denominated $ 155,500 $ 128,048 $ 283,548 $ 124,734 $ 158,814 Total non-Canadian dollar-denominated 479,607 223,847 703,454 279,201 424,253 Total $ 635,107 $ 351,895 $ 987,002 $ 403,935 $ 583,067 Unencumbered liquid assets include on-balance sheet assets, assets borrowed or purchased under resale agreements, and other off-balance sheet collateral received less encumbered liquid assets. 2 Includes National Housing Act Mortgage-Backed Securities (NHA MBS). 3 Effective April 30, 2026, collateral received from margin loans and collateral delivered to facilitate client shorts has been included . Unencumbered liquid assets held in The Toronto-Dominion Bank, its domestic and foreign subsidiaries, and branches are summarized in the following table. TABLE 32: SUMMARY OF UNENCUMBERED LIQUID ASSETS BY BANK, SUBSIDIARIES, AND BRANCHES (millions of Canadian dollars) As at April 30 October 31 2026 2025 The Toronto-Dominion Bank (Parent) $ 231,554 $ 257,722 Bank subsidiaries 340,442 306,961 Foreign branches 34,444 18,384 Total $ 606,440 $ 583,067 FUNDING The Bank has access to a variety of unsecured and secured funding sources. The Bank’s funding activities are conducted in accordance with liquidity risk management policies that require assets be funded to the appropriate term and to a prudent diversification profile. The Bank’s primary approach to funding is to maximize the use of deposits raised through its personal, wealth and business banking channels. The deposits raised from these sources were approximately 62 % (October 31, 2025 – 64 %) of the Bank’s total funding. Non-personal deposit funding as reflected below does not include the Bank’s Wholesale Banking deposits (including Corporate & Investment Banking). TABLE 40: SUMMARY OF DEPOSIT FUNDING (millions of Canadian dollars) As at April 30 October 31 2026 2025 Personal $ 641,827 $ 650,396 Non-personal 305,886 316,319 Total $ 947,713 $ 966,715 WHOLESALE FUNDING The Bank maintains various registered external wholesale term (greater than 1 year) funding programs to provide access to diversified funding sources, including asset securitization, covered bonds, and unsecured wholesale debt. The Bank raises term funding through Senior Notes, NHA MBS, notes backed by credit card receivables (Evergreen Credit Card Trust) and home equity lines of credit (Genesis Trust II). The Bank’s wholesale funding is diversified by geography, currency, and funding types. The Bank raises short-term (1 year or less) funding using certificates of deposit and commercial paper. The Bank maintains depositor concentration limits in respect of short-term wholesale deposits so that it is not overly reliant on individual depositors for funding. The Bank further limits short-term wholesale funding maturity concentration in an effort to mitigate refinancing risk during a stress event.