17
3.6
This entails in
practice that by way
of general principle, the
Rights
Holder’s written consent
may be
required in
order for
UBS ESE
IT to
be able
to disclose
confidential information
to third
parties (please
see below)
44
3.7
Please note
that the
duty of
confidentiality and
the related
consent requirement
does not
depend on
whether the Rights Holder
is a professional or
institutional client or
a retail client as
they should apply
to any customer of the bank.
Exemptions from the consent requirement – Just cause
3.8
Based on the
general rules mentioned
above under paragraph
3.2 of this
Annex 1, as
a matter of
Italian
law it should be possible to exclude the need for an express consent from the Rights Holder when the
disclosure is justified by a “just cause”.
3.9
The principle
of “just
cause” (as
outlined in
Article 622
of the Italian
Criminal Code
mentioned above)
would exempt
professionals (including
banks) that
disclose confidential
information to
third parties
from being
alleged with
a breach
of the
confidentiality obligation.
There is
no definition
of “just
cause”
under Article 622 of the Italian Criminal Code nor have
the Italian courts clarified the scope/meaning
of this concept. However, in general terms (
i.e.
with no specific reference to bank secrecy), this
could
be considered as a
set of circumstances
that legitimate the disclosure
of confidential information,
such
as the existence of
a legislative provision imposing the
disclosure or the order
of an authority (
e.g.
court order).
3.10
In this respect,
we note that
under Italian law,
banks operating in
Italy may be
subject to mandatory
requests to provide
information to supervisory authorities
under certain circumstances.
In particular,
the
mandatory nature
of such
requests may
be inferred
from certain
provisions which
envisage the
application of sanctions
in case of non-compliance
with the request
of information
45
. We consider that
in
principle
responding
to
a
request
of
disclosure
from
an
Italian
regulator
may
theoretically
be
considered as a “just cause” for the disclosure of confidential information.
3.11
However, we cannot exclude
that the just
cause as per
Paragraph 3.10 and
3.11 above could be
limited
to mandatory requests
for information
coming from
Italian
authorities. Indeed,
whilst under
the Italian
banking and financial regulations
there are no specific
prohibitions or restrictions to
the effect that the
Italian branch of an
EEA bank may not
submit to inspections by,
or provide documents to, a
foreign
(e.g.
third
country)
authority,
by
way
of
general
principle
we
cannot
exclude
that
under
certain
circumstances a request
for information coming
from a foreign
authority may be
considered as non-
binding
as
a
matter
of
Italian
law
and
thus
may
not
exempt
a
firm
from
the
confidentiality
duties
imposed on it under the bank secrecy rules
46
. As such, lacking a specific provision in the context of a
bank secrecy
regime, it is
not clear
under Italian law
whether a request
of information coming
from
44
As mentioned above, based on Assumption 4 we assume that if a consent for the disclosure is required, this will be validly pr
ovided by the
Rights Holder.
45
We c
onsider that the “legitimate” nature of the request should be presumed
to the extent the request comes from a public authorit
y who has
effective supervisory powers on the banks as envisaged under the law.
46
We note that under the Italian
banking and finan
cial regulation, certain
provisions envisage the carrying
out of on
-
site inspections by foreign
regulators. In particular, pursuant to Article 54 of
Legislative Decree No. 385 of 1st
September 1993 (the
Italian Banking Act
) the Bank of
Italy may agree with the supervisory authority of a third country the modalities for carrying out inspections at the branches of banks based
in the respective countries, on a reciprocity
basis. In addition, pursuant to Article
6-
ter
(8) of Legislative Decree No.
58 of 24 February 1998
(the
Italian Financial Act
) the
Bank of
Italy and CONSOB
(within the
respective areas of
supervision) may agree
with the
supervisory
authorities of third countries
the modalities for inspections
of branches of investment firms
or banks located within
the respective territories.
We consider that these provisions relate to bilateral relationships between the Bank of Italy
and CONSOB (on one side) and a third country
regulator (on the other side)
having as object local inspections
within the respective territories
but limited to branches of firms
based in such
territories, in principle
including e.g. inspections by
the SEC at
Italian branches of
US banks (or
vice versa
). Therefore, we
consider that
these provisions should not be relevant
here as the target firm (UBS
ESE IT) is not the Italian
branch of a US bank. In
any case, whilst these
provisions empower the Bank
of Italy and
CONSOB to agree on
the
modalities
for inspections of local
branches through an arrangement
with the third
country regulator (e.g.
through a cooperation
agreement or memorandum of
understanding), such arrangement
(or the lack
thereof) should
not of
itself be
conclusive to
determine the
legal basis
for the
powers of
a foreign
regulator to
be able
to carry
out said
inspections at (or to obtain documents
/ information from) branches located in Italy. Indeed we assume that we are not required to provide
advice
on
the
general ability
of
the
SEC
as
a
prudential
regulator
to
exercise
supervisory
functions including
through
local
access or
inspections (including the carrying out
of On-Site Inspection) and to
obtain documents and information from
firms/branches located in Italy
which are under the jurisdiction
of the SEC in respect
of the provision of services
in the US and we assume
this matter is out of scope
of this
opinion. In particular, our analysis as set forth
herein focuses on the restrictions
applicable to UBS ESE IT
for submitting to inspections and
providing access
to Covered
Books and
Records and
particularly on
the issue
of whether
a request
from the
SEC to
UBS ESE
IT may
constitute the legal ground in order to UBS ESE IT
be exempted from the duty confidentiality under the Italian
bank secrecy regime.
0036335-0000808 UKO1: 2005583510.12