12
Compulsion of law
2.11
Information
that
would
otherwise
be
confidential
may
be
disclosed
when
required
by
a
statutory
provision
33
34
In Hong Kong, the
Court of Appeal
held in
FDC Co Ltd and
Others v The
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
[1990] 1 HKLR 277 that the compulsion of law exception
only applies
to Hong Kong law and did not
include a foreign law.
Accordingly, under
Hong Kong law an order
of a
foreign court will
not release a
bank from its
duty of secrecy
to its
customer where that
duty is
governed by the law of Hong Kong.
2.12
Therefore, to
satisfy this
compulsion of
law UBSHK
would have
to rely
on Hong
Kong statute
– a
provision of US law,
such as an
SEC Rule, is
unlikely to be sufficient
for this purpose.
While there
are numerous statutory provisions
that require the disclosure
of information that would
otherwise be
confidential, none applies directly to this situation.
2.13
Equally,
a US
court order
is also
unlikely to
be sufficient
for this
purpose: it
was held
in
others v A bank
[1983] 2 All
ER 464 at 475 that
a subpoena requiring disclosure issued
by a foreign
court did
not qualify
as compulsion
by law
on the
basis that
“[t]
he fact
is that
confidentiality is
not
rendered
illegal
by
a
subpoena
requiring
disclosure,
which
is
to
be
contrasted
with
some
form
of
legislation to that end
”. The facts in
FDC Co Ltd v The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
277
36
are closely analogous with
[1983] 2 All ER
464, where, as noted, it
was held by that the first
qualification, compulsion of law,
applied only to a Hong Kong law
and did
not include a foreign law.
37
For completeness, while it is possible
to rely on implied consent,
there is likely to be a high bar
to meet in order to do so.
In
Turner v Royal
Bank of Scotland Plc
[1999] 2 All E.R 664, regarding
the banker’s duty of confidentiality, it was decided that established
market practice of
sharing of
customer information
between banks
(which practice
was generally
known only
to the
banks themselves)
did not
amount to
implied consent of the customer as this
practice was not known by the
customer.
To amount to implied
consent, the practice under which
disclosure is
made must
be “
notorious, certain and
reasonable
” (
Turner v
Royal Bank
of Scotland
Plc
[1999] 2
All E.R
664 at
670, Sir
Richard Scott VC quoting from
Chitty on Contracts
(27th edn, 1994), vol I, para 13-014.)
The practice
of sharing
information with
local regulators
in order
to enable
banking business
to be
conducted within
the relevant
local
jurisdiction is, in our experience, well
established such that it might be considered
“
notorious, certain and reasonable
”.
In this context, it is
possible that
much of
the information
contained in
the Covered
Books and
Records would
be information
of a
sort that
customers (and
particularly more sophisticated customers of the kind
that would normally be offered services
by UBSHK in respect of SBSs)
may expect
would be shared with the SEC.
In part, the ability
to rely on
implied consent will
depend on the
information provided to
customers when UBSHK
provides services in
SBSs.
If no information about the jurisdiction
or regulators involved is provided then
UBSHK would rely on the customer’s
own understanding of
regulatory obligations on banks, the US nexus and the SEC’s
role in these services.
Conversely, if customers are informed that UBSHK’s
activity in SBSs is conducted on a cross-border basis
into the US and is subject to oversight by
the SEC then the ability to rely on
implied
consent increases.
Similarly, if customers are informed that de
tailed information on all aspects of UBSHK’s
activity in SBSs is subject to
examination by the SEC then the ability to rely on implied consent
increases further still.
33
See the
example given
by Bankes
LJ in
Tournier
v National
Provincial &
Union Bank
[1924] 1
K.B 461
at 473
of the
Bankers’ Books
Evidence Act 1879.
In Hong Kong, various ordinances and subsidiary legislation set out provisions requiring
disclosure under compulsion
34
For the general duty
of confidentiality: compulsion
by an or
der of a Hong
Kong court includes
a mareva (freezing
injunction) under the
High
Court Ordinance (Cap. 4),
section 21L and
Practice Direction 11.1;
garnishee order (order to
show cause) under Rules
of the High
Court
(Cap. 4A), Ord 49, Garnishee Proceedings;
and a writ of subpoena (witness summons) under Evidence
Ordinance (Cap. 8), section 77A.
For the banker’s duty of confidentiality:
X AG and others v A bank
[1983] 2 All ER 464 at 475.
35
In
FDC Co
Ltd and
Others v
The Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A.
[1990] 1
HKLR 277,
the US
Internal Revenue Service
(
IRS
inspect the
plaintiff’s records
regarding accounts
held with
the Hong
Kong branch
of the
defendant bank.
The IRS
served notice
on the
defendant bank’s
US headquarters and obtained
US court orders for
the production of the
records.
The plaintiff applied for
and obtained
interim injunctions against the defendant
in Hong Kong to
restrain disclosure pending trial.
In this appeal to
have the interim injunctions
discharged, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal considered the four exceptions, as
established in
Tournier
and held that the compulsion of law
exception only applies to Hong Kong law and did not include
foreign law.
36
In
FDC Co Ltd and
Others v The Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A.
[1990] 1 HKLR 277,
a request for customer information
was made to the
head office of the defendant’s bank in New York
by the Inland Revenue Services to assist a tax investigation. However, since the accounts
were held in the
Hong Kong branch of the
bank the request was
denied. See
FDC Co Ltd and
Others v The Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A.
[1990] 1 HKLR 277 at 284.
37
It is noted that the Court of Appeal in
FDC Co Ltd
v The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A
.
[1990] 1 HKLR 277 did not take the same approach
as Leggatt J in
X AG and others v A bank
[1983] 2 All ER 464, and did not feel it necessary to consider the effect of the subpoena
upon the
bank by regarding the matter as irrelevant to the decision. Ibid. at 286 (Yang
J A): “
Mr Hoffman argues that our case is a dispute between
Hong Kong courts and United States courts. With respect
to him, I do not see the problem quite in that light.
The question is simply one of
applying our own
law in our
own courts
”. The English
courts have affirmed
the approach of
the Hong Kong
Court of Appeal
in
Bank of
Tokyo Ltd v Karoon
0036335-0000808 UKO1: 2005333372.8