| UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 |
☒ |
| Pre-Effective Amendment No. |
☐ |
| Post-Effective Amendment No. 510 |
☒ |
| UNDER THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 |
☒ |
| Amendment No. 512 |
☒ |
| Elizabeth A. Davin, Esq. JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1111 Polaris Parkway
Columbus, OH 43240 |
Allison M. Fumai, Esq. Dechert LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 |
Stephen T. Cohen, Esq. Dechert LLP 1900 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 |
| ☐ |
immediately upon filing pursuant to paragraph (b) |
| ☐ |
on (date) pursuant to paragraph (b) |
| ☐ |
60 days after filing pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) |
| ☐ |
on (date) pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) |
| ☒ |
75 days after filing pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) |
| ☐ |
on (date) pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) |
| ☐ |
The post-effective amendment designates a new effective date for a previously filed post-effective amendment. |
| JPMorgan U.S. Large Cap Value Plus ETF |
Ticker: [ ] |
Listing Exchange: [ ] |
| ANNUAL FUND OPERATING EXPENSES
(Expenses that you pay each year as a percentage of the
value of your investment) |
|
| Management Fees |
[ ]% |
| Other
Expenses1 |
[ ] |
| Dividend and Interest Expense on Short Sales |
[ ] |
| Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses2 |
[ ] |
| WHETHER OR NOT YOU SELL YOUR SHARES, YOUR
COST WOULD BE: | ||
| |
1 Year |
3 Years |
| SHARES ($) |
[ ] |
[ ] |
| Portfolio Manager |
Managed the Fund Since |
Primary Title with
Investment Adviser |
| Scott Blasdell |
2026 |
Managing Director |
| James Brown |
2026 |
Managing Director |
| NON-FUNDAMENTAL INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE |
| An investment objective is fundamental if it cannot be changed without the consent of a majority of the outstanding Shares of the
Fund. The Fund’s investment objective is not fundamental and may be
changed without the consent of a majority of the outstanding
Shares of the Fund. |
| |
U.S. Large Cap
Value Plus ETF |
| Authorized Participant Concentration Risk |
• |
| Cyber Security Risk |
○ |
| Depositary Receipts Risk |
○ |
| Derivatives Risk |
• |
| Equity Market Risk |
• |
| Financial Sector Risk |
• |
| Foreign Securities Risk |
○ |
| General Market Risk |
• |
| Healthcare Sector Risk |
• |
| High Portfolio Turnover Risk |
• |
| Industrials Sector Risk |
• |
| Industry and Sector Focus Risk |
• |
| Large Cap Company Risk |
• |
| Long/Short Strategy Risk |
• |
| Market Trading Risk |
• |
| New Fund Risk |
○ |
| Preferred Securities Risk |
○ |
| Prepayment Risk |
○ |
| Real Estate Securities Risk |
• |
| Regulatory and Legal Risk |
○ |
| Securities Lending Risk |
○ |
| |
U.S. Large Cap
Value Plus ETF |
| Short Selling Risk |
• |
| Smaller Company Risk |
• |
| Swap Agreement Risk |
• |
| Transactions and Liquidity Risk |
○ |
| Value Investing Risk |
• |
| Volcker Rule Risk |
○ |
| WHAT IS A DERIVATIVE? |
| Derivatives are securities or contracts (for example, futures and options) that derive their value from the performance of underlying
assets or securities. |
| WHAT IS A CASH EQUIVALENT? |
| Cash equivalents are highly liquid, high-quality instruments with maturities of three months or less on the date they are purchased.
They include securities issued by the U.S. government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, repurchase agreements, certificates of
deposit, bankers’ acceptances, commercial paper, variable rate master
demand notes, money market mutual funds and bank deposit
accounts. |
| Fund Name |
Ticker |
Listing Exchange |
| JPMorgan U.S. Large Cap Value Plus ETF (the “U.S. Large Cap Value Plus ETF” or the “Fund”) |
[ ] |
[ ] |
| 1 | |
| 1 | |
| 1 | |
| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 3 | |
| 5 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 6 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 7 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | |
| 8 | |
| 8 | |
| 8 | |
| 8 | |
| 8 | |
| 8 | |
| 8 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 10
|
| Instrument |
Part II
Section Reference |
| Bank Obligations: Bankers’ acceptances, certificates of deposit and time deposits. Bankers’ acceptances are bills of exchange or time drafts drawn on
and accepted by a commercial bank. Maturities are generally six months or
less. Certificates of deposit are negotiable certificates
issued by a bank for a specified period of time and earning
a specified return. Time deposits are non-negotiable
receipts issued by a bank in exchange for the deposit of
funds. |
Bank Obligations |
| Borrowings: The Fund may borrow for temporary purposes and/or for investment purposes. Such a practice will result in leveraging of the Fund’s
assets and may cause the Fund to liquidate portfolio positions when it
would not be advantageous to do so. The Fund must maintain
continuous asset coverage of 300% of the amount borrowed,
with the exception for borrowings not in excess of 5% of the
Fund’s total assets made for temporary administrative
purposes. |
Miscellaneous
Investment
Strategies and Risks |
| Commercial Paper: Secured and unsecured short-term promissory notes issued by corporations and other entities. Maturities generally vary from a
few days to nine months. |
Commercial Paper |
| Common Stock: Shares of ownership of a
company. |
Equity Securities,
Warrants and Rights |
| Common Stock
Warrants and Rights:
Securities, typically issued with preferred securities or bonds, that give the holder the right to buy a
proportionate amount of common stock at a specified price.
|
Equity Securities,
Warrants and Rights |
| Convertible
Securities: Bonds or preferred securities
that can convert to common stock. |
Convertible
Securities |
| Instrument |
Part II
Section Reference |
| Exchange-Traded Funds (“ETFs”): Ownership interest in unit investment trusts, depositary receipts, and other pooled investment vehicles that hold a
portfolio of securities or stocks designed to track the price performance
and dividend yield of a particular broad-based, sector or
international index. ETFs include a wide range of
investments. |
Investment
Company Securities
and Exchange-
Traded Funds |
| Foreign Investments: Equity and debt securities (e.g., bonds and commercial paper) of foreign entities and obligations of foreign branches of U.S. banks
and foreign banks. Foreign securities may also include American Depositary
Receipts (“ADRs”), Global Depositary Receipts
(“GDRs”), European Depositary Receipts
(“EDRs”) and American Depositary Securities
(“ADSs”). |
Foreign Investments
(including Foreign
Currencies) |
| Futures Transactions: The Fund may purchase and sell futures contracts on securities and indexes of securities. |
Futures Transactions |
| Initial Public
Offering (“IPOs”): A transaction in which a
previously private company makes its first sale of stock to
the public. |
Equity Securities,
Warrants and Rights |
| Interfund Lending: Involves lending money and borrowing money for temporary purposes through a credit facility. |
Miscellaneous
Investment
Strategies and Risks |
| Investment Company
Securities: Shares of other investment
companies, including money market funds for which the
Adviser and/or its affiliates serve as investment adviser or
administrator. The Adviser will waive certain fees when
investing in funds for which it serves as investment adviser, to the extent required by law or by contract. |
Investment
Company Securities
and Exchange-
Traded Funds |
| Master Limited
Partnerships (“MLPs”): Limited partnerships that
are publicly traded on a securities exchange.
|
Master Limited
Partnerships |
| Options and Futures Transactions: The Fund may purchase and sell
(a) exchange traded and over-the-counter put and call
options on securities, indexes of securities and futures
contracts on securities and indexes of securities and (b)
futures contracts on securities and indexes of securities. |
Options and Futures
Transactions |
| Preferred Securities: A class of stock that generally
pays a dividend at a specified rate and has preference over
common stock in the payment of dividends and in
liquidation. |
Equity Securities,
Warrants and Rights |
| Private Placements, Restricted Securities and Other
Unregistered
Securities: Securities not registered under the Securities Act of 1933, such as privately
placed commercial paper and Rule 144A securities. |
Miscellaneous
Investment
Strategies and Risks |
| Real Estate
Investment Trusts
(“REITs”): Pooled investment vehicles which
invest primarily in income producing real estate or real estate related
loans or interest. |
Real Estate
Investment Trusts |
| Securities Issued in Connection
with Reorganizations and Corporate Restructurings:
In connection with reorganizing or restructuring of an issuer,
an issuer may issue common stock or other securities to holders of its
debt securities. |
Miscellaneous
Investment
Strategies and Risks |
| Securities Lending:
The lending of up to
33 1∕3% of the Fund’s total assets. In
return the Fund will receive cash as collateral. |
Securities Lending |
| Short Selling: The Fund sells a security it does not own in anticipation of a decline in the market value of the security. To complete the transaction, the
Fund must borrow the security to make delivery to the buyer. The Fund is
obligated to replace the security borrowed by purchasing it
subsequently at the market price at the time of
replacement. |
Short Selling |
| Structured Investments: A security having a return tied to an underlying index or other security or asset class. Structured investments generally are
individually negotiated agreements and may be traded over-the-counter.
Structured investments are organized and operated to
restructure the investment characteristics of the underlying
index, currency, commodity or financial
instrument. |
Structured
Investments |
| Instrument |
Part II
Section Reference |
| Swaps and
Related Swap Products:
Swaps involve an exchange of obligations by two parties. Caps and floors entitle a purchaser to a principal
amount from the seller of the cap or floor to the extent that a specified
index exceeds or falls below a predetermined interest rate
or amount. The Fund may enter into these transactions to
manage its exposure to changing interest rates and other
factors. |
Swaps and Related
Swap Products |
| Temporary Defensive
Positions: To respond to unusual
circumstances the Fund may invest a portion of its total
assets in cash and cash equivalents for temporary defensive
purposes. |
Miscellaneous
Investment
Strategies and Risks |
| Treasury Receipts: The Fund may purchase interests
in separately traded interest and principal component parts
of U.S. Treasury obligations that are issued by banks or
brokerage firms and that are created by depositing U.S.
Treasury notes and U.S. Treasury bonds into a special account at a
custodian bank. Receipts include Treasury Receipts (TRs),
Treasury Investment Growth Receipts (TIGRs), and
Certificates of Accrual on Treasury Securities
(CATS). |
Treasury Receipts |
| U.S. Government
Agency Securities:
Securities issued or guaranteed by agencies and instrumentalities of the U.S. government. These include all
types of securities issued by the Government National Mortgage Association
(“Ginnie Mae”), the Federal National Mortgage
Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”),
including funding notes, subordinated benchmark notes, CMOs and
REMICs. |
U.S. Government
Obligations |
| U.S. Government
Obligations: May
include direct obligations of the U.S. Treasury, including
Treasury bills, notes and bonds, all of which are backed as
to principal and interest payments by the full faith and credit of the United States, and separately traded principal and interest component parts of such
obligations that are transferable through the Federal book-entry system
known as Separate Trading of Registered Interest and
Principal of Securities (“STRIPS”) and Coupons
Under Book Entry Safekeeping (“CUBES”). |
U.S. Government
Obligations |
| Variable and Floating Rate Instruments: Obligations with interest rates which are reset daily, weekly, quarterly or some other frequency and which
may be payable to the Fund on demand or at the expiration of a specified
term. |
Debt Instruments |
| When-Issued
Securities, Delayed
Delivery Securities
and Forward Commitments: Purchase or contract to purchase
securities at a fixed price for delivery at a future
date. |
When-Issued
Securities, Delayed
Delivery Securities
and Forward
Commitments |
| Committee |
Fiscal Year Ended
[ ] |
| Audit and Valuation Committee |
[ ] |
| Compliance Committee |
[ ] |
| Governance Committee |
[ ] |
| Equity Committee |
[ ] |
| ETF Committee |
[ ] |
| Fixed Income Committee |
[ ] |
| Money Market and Alternative Products Committee |
[ ] |
| Name of Trustee |
Dollar Range of
Equity Securities in
U.S. Large Cap Value Plus ETF |
Aggregate Dollar Range of Equity Securities in all Registered
Investment Companies Overseen by the
Trustee in Family of Investment Companies1, 2 | ||
| Independent Trustees |
|
| ||
| Stephen P. Fisher |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Gary L. French |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Kathleen M. Gallagher |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Robert J. Grassi |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Frankie D. Hughes |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Raymond Kanner |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Thomas P. Lemke |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Mary E. Martinez |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Marilyn McCoy |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Shaun Real3
|
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Emily A. Youssouf |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Interested Trustees |
|
| ||
| Robert Deutsch |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Nina O. Shenker |
None |
Over $100,000 | ||
| Name of Trustee |
Total Compensation
Paid From the Fund Complex1 |
| Independent Trustees | |
| John F. Finn2
|
$700,000 |
| Stephen P. Fisher |
525,000 |
| Gary L. French |
460,0003
|
| Kathleen M. Gallagher |
525,0004
|
| Robert J. Grassi |
525,0005
|
| Frankie D. Hughes |
460,000 |
| Raymond Kanner |
525,0006
|
| Thomas P. Lemke |
525,000 |
| Lawrence R. Maffia2
|
460,000 |
| Mary E. Martinez |
600,000 |
| Marilyn McCoy |
460,0007
|
| Shaun Real8
|
- |
| Emily A. Youssouf |
460,0003
|
| Interested Trustees |
|
| Robert Deutsch |
525,0008
|
| Nina O. Shenker |
460,0007
|
| |
Non-Performance Based Fee Advisory Accounts | |||||
| Registered Investment
Companies |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles |
Other
Accounts | ||||
| Number
of
Accounts |
Total Assets
($ thousands) |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total Assets
($ thousands) |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total Assets
($ thousands) | |
| U.S. Large Cap Value Plus ETF | ||||||
| Scott Blasdell |
|
$ |
|
$ |
|
$ |
| James Brown |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Performance Based Fee Advisory Accounts | |||||
| Registered Investment
Companies |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles |
Other
Accounts | ||||
| Number
of
Accounts |
Total Assets
($ thousands) |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total Assets
($ thousands) |
Number
of
Accounts |
Total Assets
($ thousands) | |
| U.S. Large Cap Value Plus ETF | ||||||
| Scott Blasdell |
|
$ |
|
$ |
|
$ |
| James Brown |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Name of Fund |
Benchmark |
| U.S. Large Cap Value Plus ETF |
[ ] |
| 1 | |
| 1 | |
| 3 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 5 | |
| 9 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 10 | |
| 20 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 26 | |
| 32 | |
| 41 | |
| 45 | |
| 49 | |
| 50 | |
| 51 | |
| 52 | |
| 53 | |
| 53 | |
| 55 | |
| 55 | |
| 55 | |
| 56 | |
| 59 | |
| 61 | |
| 62 | |
| 62 | |
| 62 | |
| 63 | |
| 63 | |
| 63 | |
| 64 | |
| 64 | |
| 65 | |
| 66 | |
| 76 | |
| 77 | |
| 77 | |
| 79 | |
| 81 | |
| 82 | |
| 82 | |
| 83 | |
| 83 |
| 84 | |
| 84 | |
| 85 | |
| 86 | |
| 87 | |
| 88 | |
| 92 | |
| 93 | |
| 93 | |
| 94 | |
| 95 | |
| 95 | |
| 95 | |
| 96 | |
| 96 | |
| 97 | |
| 102 | |
| 105 | |
| 106 | |
| 108 | |
| 108 | |
| 109 | |
| 110 | |
| 110 | |
| 111 | |
| 111 | |
| 112 | |
| 117 | |
| 118 | |
| 119 | |
| 119 | |
| 119 | |
| 123 | |
| 124 | |
| 124 | |
| 125 | |
| 125 | |
| 126 | |
| 127 | |
| 127 | |
| 127 | |
| 128 | |
| 128 | |
| 128 | |
| 129 | |
| 130 | |
| 131 | |
| 132 | |
| 132 | |
| 132 | |
| 133 | |
| 141 |
| Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1) |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years
(or longer) |
Number of Funds in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/ Directorships Held During the Past 5
Years (or
longer)(3) |
| Independent Trustees |
|
|
|
| Stephen P. Fisher (1959); Trustee, since 2018. |
Retired; Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, NYLIFE Distributors LLC (registered broker- dealer) (serving in various roles 2008- 2013); Chairman, NYLIM Service Company LLC (transfer agent) (2008- 2017); New York Life Investment Management LLC (registered investment adviser) (serving in various roles 2005- 2017); Chairman, IndexIQ Advisors LLC (registered investment adviser for ETFs) (2014-2017); President, MainStay VP Funds Trust (2007-2017), MainStay DefinedTerm Municipal Opportunities Fund (2011-2017) and Main- Stay Funds Trust (2007-2017) (registered investment companies). |
174 |
None. |
| Gary L. French
(1951); Trustee, since 2014. |
Real Estate Investor (2011-2020); Investment management industry Consultant and Expert Witness (2011-present); Senior Consultant for The Regulatory Fundamentals Group LLC (2011-2017). |
174 |
Independent Trustee, The China Fund, Inc. (2013- 2019); Exchange Traded Concepts Trust II (2012- 2014); Exchange Traded Concepts Trust I (2011- 2014). |
| Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1) |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years (or longer) |
Number of Funds in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/ Directorships Held During the Past 5 Years (or
longer)(3) |
| Kathleen M. Gallagher (1958); Trustee, since 2018. |
Retired; Chief Investment Officer – Benefit Plans, Ford Motor Company (serving in various roles 1985-2016). |
174 |
Non-Executive Director, Legal & General Investment Management (Holdings) (2018- present); Non-Executive Director, Legal & General Investment Management America (U.S. Holdings) (financial services and insurance) (2017- present); Advisory Board Member, State Street Global Advisors Total Portfolio Solutions (2017-present); Member, Client Advisory Council, Financial Engines, LLC (registered investment adviser) (2011-2016); Director, Ford Pension Funds Investment Management Ltd. (2007- 2016). |
| Robert J. Grassi
(1957); Trustee, since 2014. |
Sole Proprietor, Academy Hills Advisors LLC (2012- 2024); Pension Director, Corning Incorporated (2002- 2012). |
174 |
None. |
| Frankie D. Hughes (1952); Trustee, since 2008. |
President, Ashland Hughes Properties (property management) (2014–present); President and Chief Investment Officer, Hughes Capital Management, Inc. (fixed income asset management) (1993– 2014). |
174 |
None. |
| Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1) |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years (or longer) |
Number of Funds in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/ Directorships Held During the Past 5 Years (or
longer)(3) |
| Raymond Kanner (1953); Trustee, since 2017. |
Retired; Managing Director and Chief Investment Officer, IBM Retirement Funds (2007–2016). |
174 |
Advisory Board Member, Penso Advisors, LLC (2020- 2024); Advisory Board Member, Los Angeles Capital (2018-present); Advisory Board Member, State Street Global Advisors Total Portfolio Solutions (2017-present); Acting Executive Director, Committee on Investment of Employee Benefit Assets (CIEBA) (2016-2017); Advisory Board Member, Betterment for Business (robo advisor) (2016– 2017); Advisory Board Member, BlueStar Indexes (index creator) (2013–2017); Director, Emerging Markets Growth Fund (registered investment company) (1997-2016); Member, Russell Index Client Advisory Board (2001- 2015). |
| Thomas P. Lemke
(1954); Trustee, since 2014. |
Retired since 2013. |
174 |
Independent Trustee of Advisors’ Inner Circle III fund platform, consisting of the following: (i) the Advisors’ Inner Circle Fund III, (ii) the Gallery Trust, (iii) the Schroder Series Trust, (iv) the Delaware Wilshire Private Markets Fund (since 2020), (v) Chiron Capital Allocation Fund Ltd., (vi) formerly the Winton Diversified Opportunities Fund (2014-2018), and (vii) Symmetry Panoramic Trust (since 2018). |
| Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1) |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years (or longer) |
Number of Funds in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/ Directorships Held During the Past 5 Years (or
longer)(3) |
| Mary E. Martinez (1960); Chairman, since 2026; Trustee, since 2013. |
Real Estate Investor/ Adviser (2010– present); Managing Director, Bank of America (asset management) (2007– 2008); Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Trust Asset Management, U.S. Trust Company (asset management) (2003–2007); President, Excelsior Funds (registered investment companies) (2004–2005). |
174 |
None. |
| Marilyn McCoy (1948); Trustee, since 1999. |
Retired; Vice President of Administration and Planning, Northwestern University (1985– 2023). |
174 |
None. |
| Shaun Real (1965); Trustee, since 2026. |
Partner, Financial Services, Ernst & Young (EY), Boston (2010–2025); New England Financial Services Industry Leader, EY (2018– 2024); Wealth and Asset Management Assurance Practice Leader, EY (2010– 2018); Assurance Practice, EY (1987– 2010). |
174 |
Board Member, New England Council (2021– present); Director Emeritus, Expect Miracles Foundation (2015–2021); Board Member, Milton-Hoosic Club (2017–2020); Board Member, Canton Youth Hockey (2017– 2020). |
| Name (Year of Birth; Term of Office,
and Length of Time Served)(1) |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years (or longer) |
Number of Funds in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee(2)
|
Other Trusteeships/ Directorships Held During the Past 5 Years (or
longer)(3) |
| Emily A. Youssouf (1951); Trustee, since 2014. |
Adjunct Professor (2011-present) and Clinical Professor (2009-2011), NYU Schack Institute of Real Estate; Board Member and Member of the Audit Committee (2013-present), Chair of Finance Committee (2019-present), Member of Related Parties Committee (2013-2018) and Member of the Enterprise Risk Committee (2015- 2018), PennyMac Financial Services, Inc.; Board Member (2005-2018), Chair of Capital Committee (2006-2016), Chair of Audit Committee (2005-2018), Member of Finance Committee (2005-2018) and Chair of IT Committee (2016-2018), NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation. |
174 |
Trustee, NYC School Construction Authority (2009-present); Board Member, NYS Job Development Authority (2008-present); Trustee and Chair of the Audit Committee of the Transit Center Foundation (2015-2019). |
| Interested Trustees |
|
|
|
| Robert F.
Deutsch(4)
(1957); Trustee, since 2014. |
Retired; Head of ETF Business for JPMorgan Asset Management (2013-2017); Head of Global Liquidity Business for JPMorgan Asset Management (2003-2013). |
174 |
Treasurer and Director of the JUST Capital Foundation (2017- present); Advisory Board Chair, Lerner Business School at the University of Delaware (2018- present). |
| Nina O.
Shenker(4)
(1957); Trustee, since 2022. |
Vice Chair (2017- 2021), General Counsel and Managing Director (2008-2016), Associate General Counsel and Managing Director (2004-2008), J.P. Morgan Asset & Wealth Management. |
174 |
Director and Member of Executive, Legal and Human Resources Committees; American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (2018-present). |
| Name of Committee |
Members |
Committee Chair |
| Audit and Valuation Committee |
Ms. Gallagher Mr. French Mr. Kanner Mr. Real |
Ms. Gallagher |
| Compliance Committee |
Mr. Lemke Mr. Fisher Mr. Grassi Ms. Hughes |
Mr. Lemke |
| Governance Committee |
Ms. Martinez
Mr. Fisher
Mr. French
Ms. McCoy |
Ms. Martinez |
| ETF Committee |
Mr. Deutsch Ms. Gallagher Ms. Hughes Mr. Kanner Ms. Shenker Ms. Youssouf |
Mr. Deutsch |
| Equity Committee |
Mr. Kanner Mr. Deutsch Mr. French Ms. McCoy |
Mr. Kanner |
| Fixed Income Committee |
Mr. Grassi Ms. Hughes Ms. Shenker Ms. Youssouf |
Mr. Grassi |
| Money Market and Alternative Products Committee |
Mr. Fisher Ms. Gallagher Mr. Lemke Mr. Real |
Mr. Fisher |
| Name (Year of Birth), Positions Held with the Trust (Since) |
Principal Occupations During Past 5 Years |
| Matthew J. Kamburowski (1980), President and Principal Executive Officer (2025)* |
Managing Director, Chief Administrative Officer for J.P. Morgan pooled vehicles and Global Head of Business Transformation. Mr. Kamburowski has been with JPMorgan Chase & Co. since 2001. |
| Timothy J. Clemens (1975),
Treasurer and Principal
Financial Officer (2020) |
Managing Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr. Clemens has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since 2013. |
| Gregory S. Samuels (1980),
Secretary (2022) (formerly
Assistant Secretary 2014-2022) |
Managing Director and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase. Mr. Samuels has been with JPMorgan Chase since 2010. |
| Stephen M. Ungerman (1953),
Chief Compliance Officer
(2014) |
Managing Director, JPMorgan Chase & Co. Mr. Ungerman has been with JPMorgan Chase & Co. since 2000. |
| Kiesha Astwood-Smith (1973), Assistant Secretary (2021) |
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase since June 2021; Senior Director and Counsel, Equitable Financial Life Insurance Company (formerly, AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company) from September 2015 through June 2021.
|
| Matthew Beck (1988), Assistant Secretary (2021)* |
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase since May 2021; Senior Legal Counsel, Ultimus Fund Solutions from May 2018 through May 2021; General Counsel, The Nottingham Company from April 2014 through May 2018. |
| Elizabeth A. Davin (1964),
Assistant Secretary (2022)*
(formerly Secretary 2018-2022) |
Executive Director and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase. Ms. Davin has been with JPMorgan Chase (formerly Bank One Corporation) since 2004. |
| Carmine Lekstutis (1980),
Assistant Secretary (2014) |
Executive Director and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase. Mr. Lekstutis has been with JPMorgan Chase since 2011. |
| Erika K. Messbarger (1987), Assistant Secretary (2025)* |
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase; Ms. Messbarger has been with JPMorgan Chase since October 2011. |
| Henry F. Pickell (1980), Assistant Secretary (2025)* |
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase; Mr. Pickell has been with JPMorgan Chase since July 2018. |
| Max Vogel (1990),
Assistant Secretary (2021) |
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase since June 2021; Associate, Proskauer Rose LLP (law firm) from March 2017 to June 2021. |
| Zachary E. Vonnegut-Gabovitch (1986), Assistant Secretary (2017) |
Executive Director and Assistant General Counsel, JPMorgan Chase. Mr. Vonnegut-Gabovitch has been with JPMorgan Chase since September 2016. |
| Frederick J. Cavaliere (1978), Assistant Treasurer (2015)** |
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr. Cavaliere has been with JPMorgan since May 2006. |
| Michael M. D’Ambrosio (1969),
Assistant Treasurer (2014) |
Managing Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr. D’Ambrosio has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since 2012. |
| Aleksandr Fleytekh (1972), Assistant Treasurer (2023) |
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr. Fleytekh has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since February 2012. |
| Name (Year of Birth), Positions Held with the Trust (Since) |
Principal Occupations During Past 5 Years |
| Shannon Gaines (1977),
Assistant Treasurer (2019)* |
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr. Gaines has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since January 2014. |
| Jeffrey D. House (1972), Assistant Treasurer (2023)* |
Vice President, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr. House has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since July 2006. |
| Nektarios E. Manolakakis (1972), Assistant Treasurer (2020) |
Managing Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since 2025, formerly Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since February 2021, formerly Vice President, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since 2014; Vice President, J.P. Morgan Corporate & Investment Bank 2010-2014. |
| Joseph Parascondola (1963), Assistant Treasurer (2023)** |
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Mr. Parascondola has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since 2006. |
| Gillian I. Sands (1969), Assistant Treasurer (2023) |
Executive Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. Ms. Sands has been with J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. since September 2012. |
| Tier One |
Up to $15 billion |
0.0030% |
| Tier Two |
Next $85 billion |
0.0025% |
| Tier Three |
Over $100 billion |
0.0015% |
| |
|
|
| Other Fees: |
|
|
| Minimum |
|
$20,000 per Fund per year |
| Tier One |
Up to $15 billion |
0.0030% |
| Tier Two |
Next $85 billion |
0.0025% |
| Tier Three |
Next $300 billion |
0.0015% |
| Tier Four |
Over $400 billion |
0.10% |
| |
|
|
| Other Fees: |
|
|
| Minimum |
|
$15,000 per Fund per year |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Accept an accounting irregularity |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
financial
statements give a
true and fair view
of the financial
position of the
Company for the
recent fiscal year,
and of its financial
performance and
its cash flows for
the year then
ended in
accordance with
the law. |
| Accept the financial statements/statutory
report |
World |
North America |
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the Company for the recent fiscal year, and of its financial performance and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with the law. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve a special transactions financial
report |
China, Western
Europe, Latin
America |
|
We recommend
FOR this Proposal,
because according
to our policy,
approving the
special transactions
financial report
ensures
transparency and
gives shareholders
a clear overview of
significant
transactions,
supporting
informed decision-
making. |
| Receive the annual report and accounts |
World |
North America |
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the Company for the recent fiscal year, and of its financial performance and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with the law. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the discharge of the auditors |
Western Europe |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because after
reviewing the
auditor acts for the
fiscal year that has
ended, we find it
advisable to grant
discharge from
liability to the
auditors. |
| Ratify auditor AND director remuneration |
World |
United States |
We generally recommend FOR the auditor when the following conditions are met: 1) non-audit fees do not make up a substantial proportion of all fees the auditor is charging the company; 2) auditor tenure is less than 20 years and 3) total auditor fees (as a universe percentile according to market cap categories) ˂90th percentile. The purpose is to maintain some independence for the auditor. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Ratify auditor appointment and
remuneration |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-
Pacific, Western
Europe |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
the auditor when
the following
conditions are met:
1) non-audit fees
do not make up a
substantial
proportion of all
fees the auditor is
charging the
company; 2)
auditor tenure is
less than 20 years
and 3) total auditor
fees (as a universe
percentile
according to
market cap
categories) ˂90th
percentile. The
purpose is to
maintain some
independence for
the auditor. |
| Ratify the appointment of a non-statutory
auditor |
World |
|
We recommend FOR this Proposal, because according to our policy, ratifying the appointment of a non-statutory auditor strengthens oversight and reinforces the integrity of reporting. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Ratify the appointment of a special
transactions auditor |
China, Western
Europe, Latin
America |
|
We recommend
FOR this Proposal,
because according
to our policy,
ratifying the
appointment of a
special transactions
auditor ensures
independent
review of
significant
transactions and
strengthens
disclosure and
transparency. |
| Ratify the appointment of an auditor |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR the auditor when the following conditions are met: 1) non-audit fees do not make up a substantial proportion of all fees the auditor is charging the company; 2) auditor tenure is less than 20 years and 3) total auditor fees (as a universe percentile according to market cap categories) ˂90th percentile. The purpose is to maintain some independence for the auditor. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Ratify the appointment of statutory AND
sustainability auditors |
Western Europe |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
the auditor when
the following
conditions are met:
1) non-audit fees
do not make up a
substantial
proportion of all
fees the auditor is
charging the
company; 2)
auditor tenure is
less than 20 years
and 3) total auditor
fees (as a universe
percentile
according to
market cap
categories) ˂90th
percentile. The
purpose is to
maintain some
independence for
the auditor. |
| Remove the auditor |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR the removal of the auditors whenever the Company may deem it necessary to ensure auditor independence and integrity. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Allot securities |
Western Europe |
United Kingdom |
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
allotment of shares
or securities will
enable the
Company to
capitalize on future
business
opportunities. This
flexibility provides
the Company with
the ability to act
promptly and
strategically to
business decisions,
ensuring it remains
competitive and
well-positioned for
long-term success. |
| Allot securities |
United Kingdom |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the proposed allotted securities are no more than 33% of currently issued share capital. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Appropriate profits/surplus/retained
earnings |
World |
North America |
We recommend
FOR this Proposal,
because according
to our policy,
allocating
corporate earnings
through
appropriate
distribution of
profits, surplus, or
retained earnings
supports
shareholder
interests and long-
term value
creation. |
| Approve a share repurchase plan |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-
Pacific, Western
Europe |
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our policy, the proposed share repurchase plan would grant the Company greater flexibility in managing its capital structure. Furthermore, share repurchases are widely regarded as an effective strategy for enhancing shareholder value and financial position of companies. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve a stock exchange listing |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
approval of the
stock exchange
listing would create
investment
opportunities for
the Company and
provide greater
liquidity while
diversifying the
risks associated
with it. |
| Approve a stock terms revision |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Approve adjustment in the share repurchase
price |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-Pacific |
|
We recommend FOR this Proposal, because according to our policy, allocating corporate earnings through appropriate distribution of profits, surplus, or retained earnings supports shareholder interests and long- term value creation. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve capital utilization/cash management |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-Pacific |
|
We recommend
FOR this Proposal,
because according
to our policy, the
proposed capital or
cash utilization
enables the
company to
support its strategic
initiatives and
efficiently finance
its operations. |
| Approve credit and/or debt financing |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-Pacific |
|
We recommend
FOR this Proposal,
because according
to our policy,
approving credit or
debt financing
provides the
company with the
necessary capital to
support strategic
initiatives, maintain
liquidity, and
ensure financial
flexibility. |
| Approve dividends |
World |
North America |
We generally
recommend FOR
this Proposal,
because according
to our policy, the
proposed dividend
distribution is
financially prudent,
maintains sufficient
liquidity, and
supports consistent
shareholder
returns. |
| Change share par value |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the new par value is less than or equal to old par value. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Conduct a stock split |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
proposed reverse
stock split would
make the
Company’s
common stock a
more attractive and
cost-effective
investment for
many investors,
thereby enhancing
the liquidity of
current
stockholders and
potentially
broadening the
investor base. |
| Distribute profit/dividend/etc according to a
sharing plan |
World |
North America |
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
proposed
distribution plan
will not put the
companýs liquidity
at risk. |
| Exchange debt for equity |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our policy, the proposed exchange of debt for equity would strengthen the Company’s financial position by reducing its liabilities, improving its balance sheet and enhancing its creditworthiness. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Increase authorized shares |
World |
Brazil |
We generally
recommend FOR
except when one of
the following
conditions is met:
1) The new
proposed stock is
˃50% of total
authorized shares
of common stock;
2) The increase is
NOT tied to a
specific transaction
or financing
proposal; and 3)
The Share pool was
NOT used up due to
equity plans. |
| Increase authorized shares |
Brazil |
|
We generally recommend FOR except when one of the following conditions is met: 1) The increase is NOT tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal; and 2) The Share pool was NOT used up due to equity plans. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Issue bonds |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
approval of this
proposal will give
the Company
greater flexibility in
considering and
planning for future
corporate needs,
including, but not
limited to, stock
dividends, grants
under equity
compensation
plans, stock splits,
financings,
potential strategic
transactions,
including mergers,
acquisitions, and
business
combinations, as
well as other
general corporate
transactions. |
| Issue shares |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when there is a
purpose for the
share issuance and
when the
shareholder rights
on the issued
shares will not be
superior to
outstanding shares. |
| Issue shares below NAV |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the shares to be issued below NAV are 25% or less of the outstanding shares. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Issue shares upon exercise of warrants |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
proposed issuance
of shares will
provide the
Company with a
source of capital to
fund its corporate
endeavors and
activities. |
| Re-price options |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
re-pricing options
when external and
uncontrollable
market factors
caused the stock
price to decrease. |
| Repurchase and/or cancel shares |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-
Pacific, Western
Europe |
|
We recommend FOR this Proposal because, according to our policy, share repurchase/ cancellation can enhance shareholder value and provide the company with flexibility in managing its capital effectively. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Repurchase bonds |
World |
|
We recommend
FOR this Proposal
because, according
to our policy,
repurchase of
bonds allows the
company to
manage its debt
efficiently, reduce
interest expenses,
and optimize its
capital structure,
ultimately
supporting financial
flexibility and long-
term shareholder
value. |
| Create a new class of shares |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
these proposals
when the new class
of shares to be
created will not
have blank-check
authority and will
not have superior
voting rights to the
existing class of
shares. |
| Reclassify/convert shares |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the conversion would provide equal rights to shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Create a new class of shares |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
these proposals
when the new class
of shares to be
created will not
have blank-check
authority and will
not have superior
voting rights to the
existing class of
shares. |
| Reclassify/convert shares |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the conversion would provide equal rights to shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the sustainability auditor |
Western Europe |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the statutory
auditor passed the
auditor test or
when the
sustainability
auditor is a
different auditor
than the statutory
auditor. |
| Approve the sustainability report |
Western Europe,
Australia |
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our policy, the proposed report demonstrates the Company’s commitment to sustainability and provides valuable information about its ongoing initiatives. This transparency enables shareholders to better understand the Company’s sustainability efforts and progress, aligning with best practices in corporate responsibility and long-term value creation. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Advise on executive compensation (say-on-
pay) |
United States,
United Kingdom |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the total
compensation is
reasonable
considering the
company’s
performance as
measured by
change in adjusted
stock price, and
considering the
following
requirements: 1)
the compensation
plan includes
specific and defined
performance
metrics and 2) the
company made
changes to the
executive
compensation plan
if the company
received less than
70% approval on
the most recent
say-on-pay/
remuneration
policy or
remuneration
report vote. |
| Advise on executive compensation (say-on-
pay) |
World |
United States,
United Kingdom |
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is reasonable considering the company’s performance as measured by change in adjusted stock price. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve a stock compensation plan (non-
SPAC) |
United States |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the plan
results in dilution of
10% or less and
when the average
burn rate over the
last three years is
3% or less (or the
company has been
public for five years
or less). |
| Approve a stock compensation plan (non-
SPAC) |
World |
United States |
We generally
recommend FOR
when the plan
results in dilution of
10% or less. |
| Approve a stock compensation plan (SPAC) |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR if
the plan is for the
newly formed
entity arising from
the business
combination with a
special purpose
acquisition
company (SPAC)
and the authorized
share pool doesn’t
exceed 3% of the
new entity’s
authorized share
capital. |
| Approve an employee stock purchase plan |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the plan is qualified under Section 423(c) or has dilution of 10% or less and when there is no evergreen provision. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve an employment/ management/
severance/ partnership agreement |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-
Pacific, Western
Europe |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Approve bonuses |
United States,
United Kingdom |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is reasonable considering the company’s performance as measured by change in adjusted stock price, and considering the following requirements: 1) the compensation plan includes specific and defined performance metrics and 2) the company made changes to the executive compensation plan if the company received less than 70% approval on the most recent say-on-pay/ remuneration policy or remuneration report vote. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve bonuses |
World |
United States,
United Kingdom |
We generally
recommend FOR
when the total
compensation is
reasonable
considering the
company’s
performance as
measured by
change in adjusted
stock price. |
| Approve executive/director/related party
transactions |
Western Europe |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the amount
doesn’t exceed 2%
of the company’s
annual revenue or
$1,000,000. |
| Approve future executive remuneration |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia,
Middle East &
North Africa |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the proposed
compensation
includes
performance-based
metrics. |
| Approve other compensation |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the executive compensation policy |
United States,
United Kingdom |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the total
compensation is
reasonable
considering the
company’s
performance as
measured by
change in adjusted
stock price, and
considering the
following
requirements: 1)
the compensation
plan includes
specific and defined
performance
metrics and 2) the
company made
changes to the
executive
compensation plan
if the company
received less than
70% approval on
the most recent
say-on-pay/
remuneration
policy or
remuneration
report vote. |
| Approve the executive compensation policy |
World |
United States,
United Kingdom |
We generally recommend FOR when the total compensation is reasonable considering the company’s performance as measured by change in adjusted stock price. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the non-executive directors’
compensation |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-
Pacific, Western
Europe, Eastern
Europe & Central
Asia |
|
We recommend
FOR this Proposal,
because according
to our policy, the
proposed non-
executive directors’
compensation is
commensurate
with their
contributions and
supports the
company in
remaining
competitive in
attracting and
retaining skilled
board members. |
| Decide the frequency of the executive
compensation vote |
World |
|
We generally
recommend an
annual frequency
for the say-on-pay
vote. |
| Reduce the legal reserve |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-
Pacific, Western
Europe, Developed
Asia-Pacific |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, the proposed reduction of legal reserves is commensurate with the Company’s current financial position and would strengthen its cashflow. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Allow for the removal of directors only with
cause |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal because according to our policy, directors should be removed with or without cause. This level of flexibility allows the Company to make necessary changes to its leadership when deemed appropriate. Allowing for the removal of directors with or without cause ensures that the Board can effectively address issues such as performance concerns and maintain the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Allow for the removal of directors without
cause |
World |
|
We generally
recommend a vote
FOR because
according to our
policy, allowing
shareholders to
remove a director
without cause
enhances
accountability and
strengthens
shareholder rights.
This provision
empowers
shareholders to
take action if they
believe a director is
not acting in the
best interests of
the company,
ensuring greater
transparency and
governance. |
| Approve director indemnification |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, approval of director indemnification would enable the Company to provide a greater scope of protection to directors in cases of litigations. Further, such a provision would also help the Company to attract, retain and motivate its directors whose efforts are essential to the Company’s success. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve director liability insurance |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
approval of director
liability insurance
would enable the
Company to
provide a greater
scope of protection
to directors in cases
of litigations.
Further, such a
provision would
also help the
Company to attract,
retain and motivate
its directors whose
efforts are essential
to the Company’s
success. |
| Approve election and remuneration for the
executive director(s) |
Developed Asia-
Pacific, Western
Europe |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the director(s) passes our election of director test and the executive compensation passes our test. If any director or the executive compensation does not pass our tests, we will recommend against the proposal. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve election and remuneration for the
non-executive director(s) |
United Kingdom |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adjusted stock price over the director’s tenure is not poor (given that the director tenure is at least three years). Additionally, the following governance factors are considered: director attendance, independence on key committees, the cybersecurity score of the company, the presence of zombie directors on the board, overboarding, the percentage of independent directors on the board, the implementation of previously approved shareholder proposals, and the presence of at least one diverse director on the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve election and remuneration for the
non-executive director(s) |
Developed Asia-
Pacific, Western
Europe |
United Kingdom |
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adjusted stock price over the director’s tenure is not poor (given that the director tenure is at least three years). Additionally, the following governance factors are considered: director attendance, independence on key committees, the cybersecurity score of the company, overboarding, the percentage of independent directors on the board, and the presence of at least one diverse director on the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve financial statements and discharge
directors |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
financial
statements give a
true and fair view
of the financial
position of the
Company for the
recent fiscal year,
and of its financial
performance and
its cash flows for
the year then
ended in
accordance with
the law. |
| Approve the directors’ report |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because approval
of the directors’
report is in the best
interests of the
Company and its
shareholders. |
| Approve the discharge of the board and
president |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, we find no breach of fiduciary duty that compromised the Company and shareholders’ interests for the fiscal year that has ended. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the discharge of the management
board |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, we
find no breach of
fiduciary duty that
compromised the
Company and
shareholders’
interests for the
fiscal year that has
ended. |
| Approve the discharge of the supervisory
board |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, we
find no breach of
fiduciary duty that
compromised the
Company and
shareholders’
interests for the
fiscal year that has
ended. |
| Approve the previous board’s actions |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, we
find no breach of
fiduciary duty that
compromised the
Company and
shareholders’
interests for the
fiscal year that has
ended. |
| Approve the spill resolution |
Australia |
|
We generally recommend FOR this resolution when the company has failed our executive compensation test. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Authorize exculpation of officers (DGCL) |
World |
|
We generally
recommend a vote
FOR because
according to our
policy,
implementation of
the exculpation
provision pursuant
to Delaware Law
will enable the
Company to attract,
retain and motivate
its officers whose
efforts are essential
to the Company’s
success.
Additionally,
Delaware’s
exculpation law
strikes a balanced
approach, offering
protection to
directors while
ensuring
accountability for
significant breaches
of their fiduciary
duties. |
| Authorize the board to execute legal
formalities |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia,
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-Pacific |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because approval
of the proposal is
necessary in order
to carry out the
legal formalities
related to the
meeting. |
| Authorize the board to fill vacancies |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the appointees will face a shareholder vote at the next annual meeting. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Change the size of the board of directors |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR if
the board size is
between 5 and 15. |
| Classify the board |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, staggered
terms for directors
increase the
difficulty for
shareholders to
make fundamental
changes to the
composition and
behavior of a
board. We prefer
that the entire
board of a company
be elected annually
to provide
appropriate
responsiveness to
shareholders. |
| Declassify the board |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, staggered terms for directors increase the difficulty for shareholders to make fundamental changes to the composition and behavior of a board. We prefer that the entire board of a company be elected annually to provide appropriate responsiveness to shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Delegate authority to a committee |
Western Europe |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because the
delegation of
authority to the
committee is in the
best interests of
the Company and
its shareholders. |
| Elect a company clerk/secretary |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, the nominee appears qualified. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Elect a director to board |
United States,
United Kingdom |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adjusted stock price over the director’s tenure is not poor (given that the director tenure is at least three years). Additionally, the following governance factors are considered: director attendance, independence on key committees, the cybersecurity score of the company, the presence of zombie directors on the board, overboarding, the percentage of independent directors on the board, the implementation of previously approved shareholder proposals, and the presence of at least one diverse director on the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Elect a director to board |
World |
United States,
United Kingdom |
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adjusted stock price over the director’s tenure is not poor (given that the director tenure is at least three years). Additionally, the following governance factors are considered: director attendance, independence on key committees, the cybersecurity score of the company, overboarding, the percentage of independent directors on the board, and the presence of at least one diverse director on the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Elect a director to committee |
United States,
United Kingdom |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adjusted stock price over the director’s tenure is not poor (given that the director tenure is at least three years). Additionally, the following governance factors are considered: director attendance, independence on key committees, the cybersecurity score of the company, the presence of zombie directors on the board, overboarding, the percentage of independent directors on the board, the implementation of previously approved shareholder proposals, and the presence of at least one diverse director on the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Elect a director to committee |
World |
United States,
United Kingdom |
We generally
recommend FOR
when the change in
adjusted stock price
over the director’s
tenure is not poor
(given that the
director tenure is at
least three years).
Additionally, the
following
governance factors
are considered:
director
attendance,
independence on
key committees,
the cybersecurity
score of the
company,
overboarding, the
percentage of
independent
directors on the
board, and the
presence of at least
one diverse
director on the
board. |
| Elect directors and appoint the auditor |
Western Europe |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the director(s) passes our election of director test and the auditor passes our auditor ratification test. If any director or the auditor does not pass our tests, we will recommend against the proposal. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Elect directors and fix the number of directors
|
United Kingdom |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adjusted stock price over the director’s tenure is not poor (given that the director tenure is at least three years). Additionally, the following governance factors are considered: director attendance, independence on key committees, the cybersecurity score of the company, the presence of zombie directors on the board, overboarding, the percentage of independent directors on the board, the implementation of previously approved shareholder proposals, and the presence of at least one diverse director on the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Elect directors and fix the number of directors
|
Canada, Western
Europe |
United Kingdom |
We generally
recommend FOR
when the change in
adjusted stock price
over the director’s
tenure is not poor
(given that the
director tenure is at
least three years).
Additionally, the
following
governance factors
are considered:
director
attendance,
independence on
key committees,
the cybersecurity
score of the
company,
overboarding, the
percentage of
independent
directors on the
board, and the
presence of at least
one diverse
director on the
board. |
| Elect multiple directors to the board |
World |
United States,
United Kingdom |
We generally recommend FOR when each director passes our election of director test. If any director does not pass this test, we will recommend against the proposal. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Eliminate the retirement age requirement |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
this proposal
because, in
accordance with
our policy, the
Company and its
shareholders are in
the best position to
determine the
approach to
corporate
governance,
particularly board
composition.
Imposing inflexible
rules, such as age
limits for outside
directors, does not
necessarily
correlate with
returns or benefits
for shareholders.
Similar to arbitrary
term limits, age
limits could force
valuable directors
off the board solely
based on their age,
potentially
undermining the
effectiveness of the
board. |
| Fix the number of directors |
Canada, Western
Europe |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the board size is between 5 and 15. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Receive the directors’ report |
World |
North America |
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, the financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the Company for the recent fiscal year, and of its financial performance and its cash flows for the year that has ended. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt an exclusive forum for disputes |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, having an exclusive forum will allow the Company to address disputes and litigations in an exclusive jurisdiction, with familiarity of the law, and reduce the administrative cost and burden related to settlement. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt an anti-greenmail provision |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
adoption of an anti-
greenmail provision
will prevent the
likelihood of
potential hostile
takeover which
could be
detrimental to the
shareholders’
interests. |
| Advise on merger related compensation |
World |
United States |
We generally
recommend FOR
when 1) the total
severance package
doesn’t exceed 3X
the previous year’s
CAP for the highest
paid NEO. |
| Advise on merger related compensation |
United States |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when 1) the total
severance package
doesn’t exceed 3X
the previous year’s
CAP for the highest
paid NEO 2) there is
no excise tax
gross-up and 3) the
payment is double-
trigger. |
| Approve a joint venture agreement |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve a liquidation plan |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR if
the following
conditions are met:
the transaction is
the best strategic
alternative for the
company and the
appraisal value is
fair. |
| Approve an anti-takeover measure(s) |
Australia |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Approve an extension amendment proposal
(for SPACs) |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the trust
deposit payment is
not less than the
previous trust
deposit payment. |
| Approve an M&A agreement (sale or
purchase) |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Approve an M&A-related share issuance |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Approve an opt-out plan |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Approve the restructuring plan |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Change the domicile / jurisdiction of
incorporation |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the
shareholders will
maintain the same
or similar rights. |
| Proceed with bankruptcy |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
approval of the
bankruptcy plan is
the best available
alternative in order
for the Company to
provide a
reasonable value
for its shareholders. |
| Remove an antitakeover provision(s) |
World |
|
We recommend FOR this Proposal, because, according to our policy, the removal of the antitakeover provision can increase shareholder value by enhancing market responsiveness and facilitating potential takeovers that may lead to premium buyouts. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Ratify a poison pill |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our policy, approval of the proposal will acknowledge both the advantages and inherent risks of implementing a shareholder rights plan, or poison pill. While these plans can deter hostile takeovers, they also carry the risk of management entrenchment in some cases. Ensuring that shareholders are given a voice on the advisability of such a plan is crucial to safeguarding the Company from these risks, promoting transparency, and maintaining a balance between protecting shareholder interests and preventing potential misuse of the plan. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt notice and access provisions |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, approval of the notice and access provision would provide shareholders with sufficient disclosure and ample time to make informed decisions regarding the election of directors at shareholder meetings. This provision ensures that shareholders have the opportunity to review relevant information regarding the nominees, the Company’s performance, and other important matters, therefore enabling the shareholders to participate meaningfully in the governance process. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve administrative and/or procedural
items |
World |
|
We recommend
FOR this Proposal,
because according
to our policy,
approving
administrative and
procedural items
related to the
convening of
shareholder
meetings ensures
proper
organization,
compliance with
governance
requirements, and
smooth conduct of
proceedings. |
| Change the location/date/time of a
shareholder meeting |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
proposed change
will increase the
likelihood of
increased
attendance rate in
meetings, not to
mention the
benefits of
flexibility and
improved
accessibility to
shareholders. |
| Indicate if you are a controlling shareholder
or have a personal interest in the proposal |
Canada, Israel, Latin
America |
|
This test will indicate NO if the shareholder is not a controlling shareholder and does not have a personal interest in the approval of this proposal. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt an investment policy |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR if
the investment
strategy is cogent. |
| Approve the company as investment trust |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Approve the fundamental investment
objective |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, a
fundamental
investment
objective for funds
will ensure that any
revision or matter
related to the
fund’s activities will
be brought up for
shareholder
approval, thereby
protecting their
interests as
shareowners. By
involving
shareholders in key
decisions, the
Company
reinforces
transparency,
accountability, and
the protection of
shareholder value. |
| Approve the investment advisory agreement |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are met: the investment fees are reasonable (3% or less) and the investment strategy is cogent. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the non-fundamental investment
objective |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, a
fundamental
investment
objective for funds
will ensure that any
revision or matter
related to the
fund’s activities will
be brought up for
shareholder
approval, thereby
protecting their
interests as
shareowners. |
| Approve the reorganization |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Approve the sub-investment advisory
agreement |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR sub-investment advisory agreements when the sub-advisory fees are paid by the primary adviser and the investment strategy is cogent. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Change the fund’s fundamental restriction to
non-fundamental |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
the proposal would
increase the Fund’s
exposure to
significant losses
arising from
investment in high-
risk assets.
Moreover, contrary
to a fundamental
investment
restriction, non-
fundamental
investment
restrictions are
often focused on
short-term
investing which is
subject to market
volatility and
fluctuations. |
| Convert the closed-end fund to an open-end
fund |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, the conversion to an open-end fund would provide for portfolio diversification hence reducing the Company’s risk exposure, and at the same time providing greater liquidity to its shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Issue/approve a 12b-1 plan (the distribution
of funds through intermediaries) |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, approval of the 12b-1 plan would enable the Fund to facilitate its distribution and sale through various intermediaries, which would be beneficial in improving its asset position. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Amend other articles/bylaws/charter |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Appoint a rating agency |
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia,
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-
Pacific, Developed
Asia-Pacific, Latin
America |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because the
appointment of the
proposed rating
agency is in the
best interests of
the Company and
its shareholders. |
| Approve appointment of a (non-director)
executive |
Middle East &
North Africa,
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We recommend
FOR this Proposal,
because according
to our policy,
approving the
appointment of the
executive ensures
the company has
the necessary
management in
place to support
operational
continuity. |
| Approve company related-party transactions |
Emerging &
Frontier Asia-
Pacific, Developed
Asia-Pacific,
Western Europe |
|
We recommend
FOR the proposed
transaction as we
believe it will allow
the company to
execute on its
operational and
strategic objectives. |
| Approve other company policies |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve political & charitable contributions
|
United Kingdom |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, it is necessary to allow the Company to fund charitable and political activities, which is in the best interests of shareholders. Such contributions can enhance the Company’s reputation, strengthen stakeholder relationships, and support its broader social and corporate responsibility goals, ultimately benefiting long- term shareholder value. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the appointment of a (director)
executive |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the change in adjusted stock price over the director’s tenure is not poor (given that the director tenure is at least three years). Additionally, the following governance factors are considered: director attendance, independence on key committees, the cybersecurity score of the company, overboarding, the percentage of independent directors on the board, and the presence of at least one diverse director on the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the company name change |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
proposed name
change supports
strategic changes
that enhance the
Company’s
business objectives.
Furthermore, the
proposed name
change will more
effectively reflect
the Company’s
mission and vision,
thereby
strengthening its
marketing and
branding efforts
and improving its
overall market
positioning. |
| Approve the continuance of company |
Canada |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
approval of this
proposal is in the
best interests of
the Company and
its shareholders. |
| Approve the convening of the corporate
assembly |
Western Europe |
|
We generally recommend FOR because approval of the convening of the corporate assembly or shareholders’ meeting is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve the staking consideration |
World |
|
We recommend
FOR the Proposal,
because according
to our policy,
approving staking
consideration in
blockchain
networks enhances
yield by supporting
network security
and transaction
validation. This
complies with
regulatory
standards,
reflecting
responsible digital
asset management
and industry best
practices. |
| Approve the staking fee |
World |
|
We recommend
FOR approval of the
staking fee,
because according
to our policy, the
fee helps cover the
Company’s
operational costs
associated with
staking activities.
The fee aligns with
industry standards
and ensures
transparency and
fairness to clients in
digital asset staking
services. |
| Attend to other business |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the company is domiciled in the US or Canada. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Ratify decisions made in the prior fiscal year
|
Western Europe,
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the act is
related to routine
matters such as the
distribution of
dividends, release
from liability, or
decisions made in
the fiscal year that
has ended. |
| Reimburse proxy contest expenses |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt an advanced notice requirement |
United States,
Australia |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the policy
stipulates that
nominations must
be submitted no
later than 60-90
days prior to the
annual meeting and
that nominations
must be submitted
no earlier than 120-
150 days prior to
the annual
meeting. |
| Adopt an advanced notice requirement |
Canada |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the policy
stipulates that
nominations must
be submitted no
later than 30-65
days before the
annual meeting and
that nominations
must be submitted
no earlier than
30-65 days prior to
the annual
meeting. |
| Adopt, renew, or amend a shareholder rights
plan |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the proposed plan expands rights for shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt/increase proxy access |
World |
|
We generally
recommend a vote
FOR because
according to our
policy, shareholders
should have the
right to nominate
their own
representatives to
the board. Proxy
access would
enhance the
Company’s
governance by
empowering
shareholders with
greater influence
over the direction
of the company,
fostering more
accountability and
alignment with
shareholder
interests. |
| Allow virtual-only shareholder meetings |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, virtual meetings will increase the likelihood of an improved attendance rate in meetings, not to mention the benefits of flexibility, reducing costs and improved accessibility. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve preemptive rights |
Western Europe |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, pre-
emptive rights
allow shareholders
to maintain their
proportional
ownership in the
Company in the
event of new share
issuance, protecting
their interests and
ensuring they are
not diluted by
future equity
offerings. |
| Eliminate preemptive rights |
United Kingdom |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the
disapplication of
rights is for 24% or
less of shares. |
| Establish the right to call a special meeting |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the proposal will strengthen shareholder rights (i.e. lower the threshold required to call a special meeting). |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Expand the right to act by written consent |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
right to act on
written consent
allows an increased
participation of
shareholders in the
voting process,
thereby
democratizing
voting and giving
shareholders the
right to act
independently from
the management. |
| Redeem a shareholder rights plan |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the additional
shares for the
beneficiaries of the
poison pill are more
attractive than
takeover by a
hostile party. |
| Restrict the right to act by written consent |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, the right to act on written consent allows an increased participation of shareholders in the voting process, thereby democratizing voting and giving the shareholders the right to act independently from the management. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Restrict the right to call a special meeting |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal because according to our policy, the ability of shareholders to call special meetings is widely regarded as an important aspect of good corporate governance. We believe the Company’s current threshold appropriately balances the rights of shareholders to call a special meeting with the broader interests of the Company and its shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt confidential voting |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
approval of the
proposal will
preserve the
confidentiality and
integrity of vote
outcomes. |
| Adopt unequal voting rights |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, in order to
provide equal
voting rights to all
shareholders,
companies should
not utilize dual
class capital
structures. |
| Amend the quorum/voting requirement |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the proposed quorum is at least 33% of shares entitled to vote. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve cumulative voting |
World |
China |
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy cumulative voting could make it possible for an individual shareholder or group of shareholders with special interests to elect one or more directors to the Company’s Board of directors to represent their particular interests. Such a shareholder or group of shareholders could have goals that are inconsistent, and could conflict with, the interests and goals of the majority of the Company’s shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve cumulative voting |
China |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
cumulative voting
allows a significant
group of
shareholders to
elect a director of
its choice -
safeguarding
minority
shareholder
interests and
bringing
independent
perspectives to
Board decisions. |
| Approve plurality voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR plurality voting when plurality voting will only be used in contested situations. In uncontested situations, we do not prefer for plurality voting to be used. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve/increase supermajority voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company’s corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore, paving the way for a more meaningful voting outcome. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Eliminate cumulative voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy cumulative voting could make it possible for an individual shareholder or group of shareholders with special interests to elect one or more directors to the Company’s Board of directors to represent their particular interests. Such a shareholder or group of shareholders could have goals that are inconsistent, and could conflict with, the interests and goals of the majority of the Company’s shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Eliminate or reduce supermajority voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company’s corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity and paving the way for a more meaningful voting outcome. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Eliminate unequal voting rights |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, companies should ensure that all shareholders are provided with equal voting rights, promoting fairness, accountability, and alignment between economic ownership and control. By adopting a one- share, one-vote structure, the Company can better uphold shareholder democracy and support long-term value creation for all investors. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Appoint an auditor |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because according to our policy, the appointment of auditors is a responsibility entrusted to the board of directors, specifically the Audit Committee. In our view, the procedures governing the selection of auditors adhere to standard corporate governance and accounting practices. Unless there are significant concerns that could jeopardize the integrity and independence of the auditors, we believe that approving this proposal is neither necessary nor justified at this time. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Limit auditor non-audit services |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
auditors should not
provide non-audit
services. This
practice ensures
the independence
and integrity of the
audit process,
maintaining
objectivity and
minimizing any
potential conflicts
of interest that
could undermine
the reliability of the
Company’s financial
reporting. |
| Rotate the auditor |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the auditor is proposed to be rotated no more frequently than every 20 years. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on board member information |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, the
information being
requested in the
shareholder
proposal is
unnecessary and
will not result in
any additional
benefit to the
shareholders. |
| Report on board oversight |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR this proposal when less than 40% of 13 specific board governance criteria are being met. These criteria include items such as: say-on-pay is on the agenda, the CEO and chairman positions are held by different people, and all classes of stock have equal voting rights. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on proxy voting review |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR this proposal when less than 40% of 13 specific board governance criteria are being met. These criteria include items such as: say-on-pay is on the agenda, the CEO and chairman positions are held by different people, and all classes of stock have equal voting rights. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Issue dividends |
World |
|
We recommend a
vote AGAINST this
proposal because
according to our
policy, the
Company’s
dividend payout
plan should be
governed by the
board of directors
after taking into
account relevant
factors such as the
Company’s liquidity
and financial
position. |
| Issue shares |
World |
|
We generally
recommend a vote
AGAINST this
proposal because
according to our
policy, the approval
could cause
potential excessive
dilution in the
interests of the
shareholders and
could potentially
overvalue the
Company’s stock
price with such an
excessive issuance
that is
disproportionate to
its needs. |
| Require shareholder approval to authorize
the issuance of bonds/debentures |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Require shareholder approval to reclassify
shares or conversion rights |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
companies should
ensure that all
shareholders are
provided with equal
voting rights,
promoting fairness,
accountability, and
alignment between
economic
ownership and
control. By
adopting a one-
share, one-vote
structure, the
Company can
better uphold
shareholder
democracy and
support long-term
value creation for
all investors. |
| Create a new class of shares |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
these proposals
when the new class
of shares to be
created will not
have blank-check
authority and will
not have superior
voting rights to the
existing class of
shares. |
| Reclassify/convert shares |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the conversion would provide equal rights to shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt a climate action plan / emissions
reduction / resource restriction |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST the
proposal, because,
according to our
policy, its approval
would not provide
additional benefits
or value to
shareholders, given
the Company’s
existing robust
policy and strategy
on climate change. |
| Adopt a GMO policy |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
the proposal would
impose
unnecessary
burdens on the
Company’s
operations. |
| Adopt animal welfare standards |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, the matters raised in the proposal have already been addressed by the Company. Moreover, the proposal advocates for impractical and imprudent actions that could negatively impact the business and its results. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve an annual advisory vote on climate
change |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because according to our policy, adopting this proposal is unnecessary and unwarranted in light of the Company’s existing approach to climate change and sustainability. The Company already implements effective strategies in these areas, making the proposal redundant. Furthermore, approval would result in significant administrative costs and financial burdens, diverting resources from other critical initiatives. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Reduce fossil fuel financing |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, the Company is already committed to meeting its climate action goals related to sustainable financing. As businesses move to achieving their net zero goals, we believe that the Company’s current policies in financing will bridge the transition to a low carbon economy. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on animal welfare |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy and given the
current applicable
laws and
regulations that the
Company must
comply with, we do
not believe that the
requested report
would add
meaningful value to
the policies,
processes,
practices, and
resources that are
already in place.
Additionally,
approval of this
proposal would
result in the
Company incurring
unnecessary costs
and expenses as it
is in the best
interests of
shareholders for
the board to
manage the
Company’s
disclosures and
risks. |
| Report on costs and risks associated with a
climate (or similar) plan |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST when the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting required of the Company. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on GMO |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, preparing a
report regarding
GMOs would
provide no
incremental and
meaningful
information to the
Company’s
shareholders.
Moreover, given
the Company’s
current compliance
with SEC reporting
requirements and
other government
regulators of
GMOs, we believe
that approval of
this proposal will
accrue unnecessary
costs and
administrative
burden to the
Company. |
| Report on the company’s climate plan /
emissions / resource use |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST when the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting required of the Company. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Amend the clawback provision |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the proposal
is only asking to
expand the
clawback provision
to include fraud
and misconduct. |
| Approve a retirement plan |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Cap executive gross pay |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because according to our policy, implementing a cap on executive compensation gross pay, could negatively impact the hiring and retention of the Company’s key executives and employees. Such a restriction would limit the Company’s ability to fully capitalize on the skills, expertise, and experience that individual leaders bring to the organization. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Change the use of ESG metrics in
compensation |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
this resolution
when the company
has failed our
executive
compensation test. |
| Deduct stock buybacks from pay |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, adoption of
the proposal will
not enhance the
Company’s
compensation
decision-making
process. |
| Discontinue executive perquisites |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our policy, the granting of executive perquisites has been a key driver of inflated executive compensation. Since these perquisites are not directly linked to company performance, they contribute to compensation packages that may not align with shareholder interests or the Company’s overall success. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Discontinue stock option and bonus programs |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
this resolution
when the company
has failed our
executive
compensation test. |
| Discontinue the professional services
allowance |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
the proposal
because according
to our policy,
limiting the use of
corporate funds for
the personal
benefit of
executives is in the
best interests of
shareholders. |
| Implement an advisory vote on executive
compensation |
World |
|
We recommend FOR this Proposal, because according to our policy, an advisory vote on executive compensation helps ensure that pay practices remain fair, transparent, and aligned with shareholder interests. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Implement double triggered vesting |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
vesting of equity
awards over a
period of time is
intended to
promote long-term
improvements in
performance. The
link between pay
and long-term
performance can
be severed if
awards pay out on
an accelerated
schedule. More
importantly, a
double trigger
vesting provision
would provide
protection to the
Company’s
employees in the
event of transition
or change of
control. |
| Include legal/compliance costs in
adjustments |
World |
|
We recommend FOR this Proposal, because according to our policy, including legal and compliance costs in performance adjustments ensures that the financial impact of executive decisions is fully reflected, thereby promoting accountability and aligning compensation with effective risk management. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Include performance metrics in compensation |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
this resolution
when the company
has failed our
executive
compensation test. |
| Prohibit equity vesting for government
service |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal, as, according to our policy, its implementation could hinder the Company’s ability to attract key employees. Additionally, it could inadvertently penalize individuals who may wish to enter or return to governmental service. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Remove tax gross-ups |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, tax
gross-ups payments
can lead to unclear
compensation
packages and do
not align with
performance-based
incentives.
Additionally, tax
gross-ups can
represent a
significant cost to
companies without
providing
meaningful benefits
to recipients. By
eliminating such
payments, the
Company can
promote more
transparent,
performance-driven
compensation
structures. |
| Report on executive compensation |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the requested report is not asking for environmental and/or social metrics. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Require a shareholder vote to ratify executive
or director severance pay |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, excessive executive compensation packages has been an ongoing cause of concern among shareholders and investors. While the Company argues that its severance and termination payments are reasonable, we believe that it is in the best interests of the stockholders if they ratify executive compensation in such form. We believe that approval of this proposal will enable the stockholders to voice their views and opinions regarding the Company’s executive severance payments and will ensure decisions are in their best interests. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Require that executives retain shares |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
requiring senior
executives to hold a
significant portion
of stock obtained
through executive
pay plans aligns the
interests of
executives with the
long-term success
of the Company,
encouraging
decisions that drive
sustained value for
shareholders and
promoting a focus
on long-term
growth. |
| Use a deferral period for compensation |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
this resolution
when the company
has failed our
executive
compensation test. |
| Use GAAP metrics for compensation |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR this resolution when the company has failed our executive compensation test. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Allow for the removal of directors without
cause |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR the proposal because according to our policy, allowing to remove directors without cause provides flexibility to the Company to make necessary changes to its leadership when deemed appropriate. Allowing for the removal of directors without cause ensures that the Board can effectively address issues such as performance concerns and maintain the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Amend the indemnification/liability
provisions for directors |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
approval of the
indemnification and
liability provisions
will enable the
Company to attract,
retain, and
motivate its
directors, whose
efforts are crucial
to its long-term
success. By
providing directors
with appropriate
protection against
personal liability,
the Company
ensures that
directors can make
decisions in the
best interests of
the Company
without undue
concern about
personal financial
risks. |
| Change the size of the board of directors |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the board size is between 5 and 15. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Classify the board |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, staggered
terms for directors
increase the
difficulty for
shareholders to
make fundamental
changes to the
composition and
behavior of a
board. We prefer
that the entire
board of a company
be elected annually
to provide
appropriate
responsiveness to
shareholders. |
| Create a CEO succession plan |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a CEO succession plan would safeguard a smooth transition and alignment into a new leadership whenever the need arises, thereby ensuring continuity and shareholder confidence in the Company. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Create a key committee |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
board of directors
should establish
key Board
committees—
namely Audit,
Compensation, and
Nominating
committees—
composed solely of
independent
outside directors.
This structure
ensures sound
corporate
governance
practices, enhances
objectivity, and
strengthens the
oversight of critical
areas within the
Company. |
| Create a non-key committee |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Declassify the board |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
staggered terms for
directors increase
the difficulty for
shareholders to
make fundamental
changes to the
composition and
behavior of a
board. We prefer
that the entire
board of a company
be elected annually
to provide
appropriate
responsiveness to
shareholders. |
| Decrease the required director experience /
expertise / diversity |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Designate an independent chairman |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, there is an inherent potential conflict in having a non- independent director serve as Chairman of the Board. To further ensure independence and accountability in the board room, we believe it is crucial for the Chairman to be independent. This structure enhances effective governance and strengthens the oversight of management, ultimately benefiting the Company and its shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Elect a director to board |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, allowing a
shareholder to
elect a director to a
board is not in the
best interests of
the Company.
Instead, the board
should continue to
nominate directors
for shareholder
approval, as they
possess the
expertise and
resources to find
the most qualified
candidates. |
| Eliminate term limits |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, elimination of term limits will help the Company to attract, retain and motivate directors who can contribute valuable insights and long- term strategic guidance. This will also ensure continuity and strengthen the Company’s governance by retaining knowledgeable and capable leadership of experienced directors. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Eliminate the retirement age requirement |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR this proposal because, in accordance with our policy, the Company and its shareholders are in the best position to determine the approach to corporate governance, particularly board composition. Imposing inflexible rules, such as age limits for outside directors, does not necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders. Similar to arbitrary term limits, age limits could force valuable directors off the board solely based on their age, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Ensure compensation advisor independence |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
approval of the
proposal would
recognize the
valuable role of a
compensation
advisor in ensuring
that the Company’s
compensation
decisions are made
based on
independent and
impartial advice.
This helps to ensure
fairness and
objectivity in
setting executive
compensation,
aligning it with the
Company’s long-
term goals and best
interests of its
shareholders. |
| Establish a stakeholder position to board |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, the current selection process, composition and skillset of the board of directors already captures stakeholder representation in the board room. As such, approval of the proposal would be redundant and duplicative. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Introduce a retirement age requirement |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in accordance with our policy, the Company and its shareholders are in the best position to determine the approach to corporate governance, particularly board composition. Imposing inflexible rules, such as age limits for outside directors, does not necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders. Similar to arbitrary term limits, age limits could force valuable directors off the board solely based on their age, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the board. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Introduce term limits |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST this
proposal because,
in accordance with
our policy, it would
not serve a useful
purpose. Having
experienced
directors on the
board is crucial for
the Company’s
long-term success
and the
enhancement of
shareholder value. |
| Require director experience / expertise /
diversity or other limits on the board |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, it is in the
best interests of
the shareholders
for the board and
nominating
committee to
manage the
composition and
qualifications of the
board members. |
| Require stock ownership for directors |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the following conditions are met: 1) The cash value of required ownership does not exceed the one-year salary of the lowest-paid director and 2) the director has at least 3 years from their start date to meet the requirement. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Separate the chairman and CEO positions |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy we believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt a paid sick leave policy |
World |
|
We generally
recommend a vote
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approving
this proposal would
lead to unnecessary
costs and expenses.
Additionally, this
policy is not
universally
applicable, as it
would only affect
the Company’s
non-unionized
employees. In
contrast, unionized
employees are
typically governed
by collective
bargaining
agreements that
address such
matters. |
| Modify business operations with a high-risk
country, entity, region, etc. |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR if the country has a score of 4 from the U.S. Department of State travel advisories. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Reduce sales/marketing of alcohol products/
services |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
the proposal is
unnecessary as the
Company already
complies with the
applicable federal
laws and
regulations and
given the
Company’s nature
of business, we
believe that
approval of the
proposal would
significantly impact
its operations. |
| Reduce sales/marketing of drug products/
services |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, approval of the proposal is unnecessary as the Company already complies with the applicable federal laws and regulations and given the Company’s nature of business, we believe that approval of the proposal would significantly impact its operations. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Reduce sales/marketing of gambling
products/services |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
the proposal is
unnecessary as the
Company already
complies with the
applicable federal
laws and
regulations and
given the
Company’s nature
of business, we
believe that
approval of the
proposal would
significantly impact
its operations. |
| Reduce sales/marketing of other products/
services |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, approval of the proposal is unnecessary as the Company is already required to comply with applicable federal laws and regulations and given the Company’s nature of business, we believe that approval of the proposal would significantly impact its operations. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Reduce sales/marketing of pornography
products/services |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
the proposal would
significantly impact
the Company’s
business
operations. |
| Reduce sales/marketing of tobacco/vape
products/services |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
the proposal is
unnecessary as the
Company already
complies with the
applicable federal
laws and
regulations and
given the
Company’s nature
of business, we
believe that
approval of the
proposal would
significantly impact
its operations. |
| Reduce sales/marketing of unhealthy foods/
beverages |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, the Company is already addressing the issues related to the consumption of its products through its sustainability and current marketing initiatives. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Reduce sales/marketing of weapon products/
services |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, the
Company has in
place extensive
procedures to
ensure that
weapon sales are
made in strict
compliance with all
applicable United
States laws and
regulations. |
| Report on artificial intelligence |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because according to our policy, the proposed report on artificial intelligence would be an unnecessary addition to the Company’s existing efforts in AI reporting. Also, approval of the proposal would pose significant administrative costs and financial burden to the Company. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on content management |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
this proposal would
result in the
Company incurring
unnecessary costs
and expenses.
Additionally, it is in
the best interests
of shareholders for
the board to
manage the
Company’s
disclosures and
risks. |
| Report on cybersecurity |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST unless the
Company receives a
failing grade on
their cybersecurity
risk score. |
| Report on data privacy |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST when the
report is clearly and
fully redundant
with other
reporting required
of the Company. |
| Report on high-risk country operations |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST when the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting required of the Company. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on intellectual property transfers |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on maternal health outcomes |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on plant closure community impacts |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on product information / production |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
this proposal would
result in the
Company incurring
unnecessary costs
and expenses by
duplicating efforts
that are already
underway and
providing additional
reports with
information that is
already available to
shareholders. |
| Report on product pricing/distribution |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses by duplicating efforts that are already underway and providing additional reports with information that is already available to shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on public health risks |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on suppliers / partners / customers /
sales |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, approval of
this proposal would
result in the
Company incurring
unnecessary costs
and expenses.
Additionally, it is in
the best interests
of shareholders for
the board to
manage the
Company’s
disclosures and
risks. |
| Report on worker health and safety |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST when the report is clearly and fully redundant with other reporting required of the Company. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Address fair lending |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST the proposal because, according to our policy, it would not meaningfully improve the Company’s existing robust policies and risk oversight structure, nor enhance any current disclosures that provide shareholders with meaningful information on how the Company addresses and oversees risks related to discrimination. Additionally, we are concerned that such an evaluation could, in today’s highly litigious environment, inadvertently provide a roadmap for lawsuits against the Company, potentially leading to significant legal costs for shareholders in the long term. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Address income inequality |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, the Company’s existing compensation processes are guided by the fundamental principle that decisions are made on the basis of the individual’s personal capabilities, qualifications and contributions to the Company’s needs and not on gender. Moreover, given the Company’s current efforts to equal employment opportunity, we believe that approval of this proposal will accrue unnecessary costs and administrative burden to the Company. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Address labor disputes |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST this
proposal because,
in accordance with
our policy, the
Company has
already addressed
the labor concerns
raised in the
proposal. As such,
approval of the
requested report is
unnecessary and
would result in
significant
administrative
costs, diverting
Company resources
from more relevant
and meaningful
priorities. |
| Address sexual harassment complaints |
World |
|
This proposal is
considered on a
case-by-case basis
by the guidelines
committee. |
| Adopt an anti-discrimination policy |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, this could put the Company in an uncompetitive position in terms of hiring prospective talents due to the rigid requirements of the proposal. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt diversity-based hiring |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, this could
put the Company in
an uncompetitive
position in terms of
hiring prospective
talents due to the
rigid requirements
of the proposal. |
| Adopt merit-based hiring |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, this could
put the Company in
an uncompetitive
position in terms of
hiring prospective
talents due to the
rigid requirements
of the proposal. |
| Become a public benefit corporation |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, the proposal is not necessary and is not in the best long-term interest of the Company and its shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Provide a human rights impact assessment |
World |
|
We generally
recommend a vote
AGAINST because,
while human rights
impact assessments
(HRIAs) are
valuable for
identifying and
mitigating risks,
mandating rigid
reporting can
undermine their
effectiveness. Such
reporting
requirements may
encourage
superficial
compliance without
meaningful human
rights
improvements. |
| Provide a report promoting DEI practices |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on abortion policy |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, providing a
report on a highly
sensitive topic
could cause
divisiveness among
the Company, its
employees,
customers and
shareholders. The
complexity of views
drawn from
reporting the
policies on abortion
or something
similar could pose
significant
reputational and
legal risks for the
Company which
could subsequently
affect its operations
and performance. |
| Report on collective bargaining/union
relations |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in line with our policy and given the Company’s compliance with applicable laws regarding freedom of association, we believe its approval would not provide additional benefits to employees or create further value for shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on fetal tissue use |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, providing a
report on a highly
sensitive topic
could cause
divisiveness among
the Company, its
employees,
customers and
shareholders. The
complexity of views
drawn from
reporting the
policies on fetal
tissue use or
something similar
could pose
significant
reputational and
legal risks for the
Company which
could subsequently
affect its operations
and performance. |
| Report on human trafficking |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the Company’s current policies which effectively articulate their long-standing support for, and continued commitment to, human rights, the proposal would be duplicative and unnecessary. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on in vitro fertilization |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, providing a report on a highly sensitive topic could cause divisiveness among the Company, its employees, customers and shareholders. The complexity of views drawn from reporting the policies on abortion or something similar could pose significant reputational and legal risks for the Company which could subsequently affect its operations and performance. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on prison/slave/child labor |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy and given the
current applicable
laws and
regulations that the
Company must
comply with, we do
not believe that the
requested report
would add
meaningful value to
the policies,
processes,
practices, and
resources that are
already in place.
Additionally,
approval of this
proposal would
result in the
Company incurring
unnecessary costs
and expenses as it
is in the best
interests of
shareholders for
the board to
manage the
Company’s
disclosures and
risks. |
| Report on sexual harassment complaints |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on the costs/risks of DEI practices |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST this
proposal because,
in accordance with
our policy,
conducting a cost/
benefit report or a
stand-alone DEI
audit by the
Company or a
group acting on its
behalf could
potentially uncover
violations of
regulations or laws,
which could pose
both legal and
reputational risks.
Additionally, we are
concerned that
such report could,
in our highly
litigious society,
serve as a roadmap
for lawsuits against
the Company,
potentially leading
to significant costs
for shareholders in
the long term. |
| Report on worker misclassification |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, approval of the proposal would not create additional benefits to the employees or value for the shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Request the company cease or re-evaluate
DEI activities |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this Proposal because, according to our policy, requests to cease or re-evaluate DEI activities risk undermining the significant benefits that diversity, equity, and inclusion bring to the company. Scaling back these efforts could also negatively affect talent attraction, retention, and overall company performance. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Rescind the racial equity audit |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST because, according to our policy, the proposed rescinding of the racial audit undermines efforts to assess the impacts of the Company’s diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) practices. Racial audits are essential in identifying and addressing disparities, and reversing this initiative would limit shareholders’ ability to evaluate the materiality and effectiveness of the Company’s DEI efforts. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt exclusive forum bylaws |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy,
having an exclusive
forum will allow the
Company to
address disputes
and litigations in an
exclusive
jurisdiction, with
familiarity of the
law, and reduce the
administrative cost
and burden related
to settlement. |
| Relinquish intellectual property |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy the proposal would not meaningfully improve the Company’s disclosure and reporting policies in place but is rather duplicative of its current efforts in addressing issues with product access and pricing. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on concealment clauses |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on employee arbitration claims |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST this
proposal because,
in accordance with
our policy, it
presents a one-size-
fits-all approach
that could
adversely impact
the Company’s
ability to effectively
use arbitration. |
| Report on patent process |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy the proposal would not meaningfully improve the Company’s disclosure and reporting policies in place and we do not believe the report would result in any additional benefit to shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on whistleblowers |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Make a self-tender offer |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, the proposal
is not necessary
and is not in the
best long-term
interest of the
Company and its
shareholders. |
| Remove an antitakeover provision(s) |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, removal of
the Company’s
antitakeover
provisions may
leave the Company
vulnerable to a
hostile takeover.
Additionally, the
current
antitakeover
provisions provide
more time for
management to
consider offers and
negotiate better
terms. |
| Request an M&A / restructure |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Ratify a poison pill |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because according to our policy, approval of the proposal will acknowledge both the advantages and inherent risks of implementing a shareholder rights plan, or poison pill. While these plans can deter hostile takeovers, they also carry the risk of management entrenchment in some cases. Ensuring that shareholders are given a voice on the advisability of such a plan is crucial to safeguarding the Company from these risks, promoting transparency, and maintaining a balance between protecting shareholder interests and preventing potential misuse of the plan. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Convert the closed-end fund to an open-end
fund |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote AGAINST this proposal because, according to our policy, a closed-end fund structure tends to provide higher returns to shareholders, as the value of shares is influenced by market dynamics, which can result in trading at a premium or discount to NAV. Additionally, closed-end funds often generate higher income by utilizing leverage, making them particularly attractive to income-focused investors. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt MacBride Principles, Sullivan
Principles, or similar |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
adoption of this
proposal would be
duplicative and
would make the
Company
unnecessarily
accountable to
different sets of
overlapping fair
employment
guidelines that are
already covered in
its policies. |
| Approve other company policies |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Disassociate from industry associations |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, companies benefit from industry associations, especially when it comes to influential policies that can directly affect businesses. As such, disassociation from such groups could potentially pose potential reputational and systemic risks that could be detrimental to the Company’s business in the long-run. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Prepare an independent third-party audit |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST this
proposal because,
in accordance with
our policy,
conducting a stand-
alone audit by the
Company or a
group acting on its
behalf could
potentially reveal
violations of
regulations and
laws, which could
be legally and
reputationally
problematic.
Additionally, we are
concerned that
such an audit could,
in our highly
litigious society,
provide a roadmap
for lawsuits against
the Company,
which could result
in significant costs
for shareholders
over the long term. |
| Report on another matter |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on key-person risk |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
because according
to our policy, the
requested report
would be beneficial
to the Company in
mitigating risks
associated with key
persons whose
services and
contributions are
crucial to its
success.
Additionally, the
proposal would
enable the
Company to
develop effective
succession plans,
ensuring continuity
and minimizing
disruption in the
event of the
departure of these
key individuals. |
| Reimburse proxy contest expenses |
World |
|
This proposal is considered on a case-by-case basis by the guidelines committee. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on charitable contributions |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST this proposal because, in accordance with our policy, the Company already carefully evaluates and reviews its charitable activities, and makes information about its corporate giving publicly available. We do not believe that implementing the proposal would justify the administrative costs and efforts, nor would it provide a meaningful benefit to the Company’s shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on government financial support |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on lobbying expenditures |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on partnerships with political (or
globalist) organizations |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on political contributions |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the current applicable laws and regulations that the Company must comply with, we do not believe that the requested report would add meaningful value to the policies, processes, practices, and resources that are already in place. Additionally, approval of this proposal would result in the Company incurring unnecessary costs and expenses as it is in the best interests of shareholders for the board to manage the Company’s disclosures and risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Report on public policy advocacy |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy and given the Company’s policies and oversight mechanisms related to its political contributions and activities, we believe that the shareholder proposal is unnecessary and will not result in any additional benefit to the shareholders. Rather, the proposal promotes impractical and imprudent actions that would negatively affect the business and results. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Revoke a public policy endorsement |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, political
endorsement and
spending is an
integral part of a
business, as
Companies should
have a voice on
policies affecting
them. As such,
approval of this
proposal will strictly
limit the Company’s
flexibility in
supporting the
advocacies that are
congruent with its
business. |
| Support a public policy endorsement |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, although the Company must comply with federal, state, and local campaign finance and lobbying regulations that are currently in place, we believe that political endorsements, often in the form of contributions, increase the possibility of misalignment with corporate values which in turn could lead to reputational risks. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt a fair elections/advance notice bylaw |
Canada |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the policy
stipulates that
nominations must
be submitted no
later than 30-65
days before the
annual meeting and
that nominations
must be submitted
no earlier than
30-65 days prior to
the annual
meeting. |
| Adopt a fair elections/advance notice bylaw |
United States |
|
We generally
recommend FOR
when the policy
stipulates that
nominations must
be submitted no
later than 60-90
days prior to the
annual meeting and
that nominations
must be submitted
no earlier than 120-
150 days prior to
the annual
meeting. |
| Adopt/increase proxy access |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR when the proposed ownership requirement is at least 3%. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Allow virtual-only shareholder meetings |
World |
|
We recommend
AGAINST this
Proposal, because
according to our
policy, virtual
meetings should
complement, not
replace, in-person
shareholder
meetings, as relying
solely on them may
undermine
transparency and
shareholder
participation. |
| Establish the right to call a special meeting |
World |
|
We generally
recommend FOR if
the proposal will
strengthen
shareholder rights
(i.e. lower the
threshold required
to call a special
meeting). |
| Introduce the right to act by written consent |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, the right to act on written consent allows an increased participation of shareholders in the voting process, thereby democratizing voting and giving shareholders the right to act independently from the management. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Oppose the right to act by written consent |
World |
|
We generally
recommend
AGAINST because
according to our
policy, the right to
act on written
consent allows an
increased
participation of
shareholders in the
voting process,
thereby
democratizing
voting and giving
the shareholders
the right to act
independently from
the management. |
| Require shareholder approval for bylaw
amendments |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, approval of the proposal will ensure that shareholders have a voice in revising or adopting the bylaws which could compromise their interests. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Adopt a majority vote for director election |
World |
|
We generally
recommend a vote
FOR because
according to our
policy, a majority
vote requirement in
boardroom
elections enhance
director
accountability to
shareholders. This
standard ensures
that shareholder
dissatisfaction with
director
performance has
tangible
consequences,
transforming the
election process
from a mere
formality into one
that truly reflects
shareholders’
voices. |
| Adopt confidential voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, approval of the proposal will preserve the confidentiality and integrity of vote outcomes. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve cumulative voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy cumulative voting could make it possible for an individual shareholder or group of shareholders with special interests to elect one or more directors to the Company’s Board of directors to represent their particular interests. Such a shareholder or group of shareholders could have goals that are inconsistent, and could conflict with, the interests and goals of the majority of the Company’s shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Approve/increase supermajority voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend AGAINST because according to our policy, a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company’s corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity, therefore, paving the way for a more meaningful voting outcome. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Eliminate cumulative voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy cumulative voting could make it possible for an individual shareholder or group of shareholders with special interests to elect one or more directors to the Company’s Board of directors to represent their particular interests. Such a shareholder or group of shareholders could have goals that are inconsistent, and could conflict with, the interests and goals of the majority of the Company’s shareholders. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Eliminate or reduce supermajority voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a simple majority vote will strengthen the Company’s corporate governance practice. Contrary to supermajority voting, a simple majority standard will give the shareholders equal and fair representation in the Company by limiting the power of shareholders who own a large stake in the entity and paving the way for a more meaningful voting outcome. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Promote equal voting rights |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, a differential in voting power may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic importance to them. In order to provide equal voting right to all shareholders, we prefer that companies do not utilize multiple class capital structures. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Restrict nomination of directors |
World |
|
We generally recommend a vote FOR because, according to our policy, a simple majority requirement in director elections, combined with a mandatory resignation policy and prohibition on the renomination of directors, ensures that the election results accurately reflect shareholder sentiment. Specifically, this approach addresses situations where a director receives less than a majority of votes, aligning the election outcome with shareholder expectations and maintaining effective governance. |
| Proposal |
Region(s) to
Include |
Region(s) to
Exclude |
Vote
Recommendation |
| Tabulate proxy voting |
World |
|
We generally recommend FOR because according to our policy, adoption of proxy tabulation simplifies the voting process without compromising transparency or shareholder participation. This streamlined approach ensures that shareholder votes are accurately counted and reported, making it easier for investors to engage in the decision- making process. At the same time, it preserves the integrity and transparency of the voting process, ensuring that all shareholders have an equal opportunity to influence key decisions while promoting efficient governance practices. |
| A-1 |
A short-term obligation rated ‘A-1’ is rated in the highest category by S&P Global
Ratings. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is
strong. Within this category, certain obligations are designated with a plus
sign (+). This indicates that the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial
commitments on these obligations is extremely strong. |
| A-2 |
A short-term obligation rated ‘A-2’ is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects
of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher rating
categories. However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial
commitments on the obligation is satisfactory. |
| A-3 |
A short-term obligation rated ‘A-3’ exhibits adequate protection parameters. However,
adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to weaken an
obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation. |
| B |
A short-term obligation rated ‘B' is regarded as vulnerable and has significant speculative characteristics. The obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial
commitments; however, it faces major ongoing uncertainties that could lead to the
obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments.
|
| C |
A short-term obligation rated ‘C’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is
dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor
to meet its financial commitments on the obligation. |
| D |
A short-term obligation rated ‘D’ is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For
non-hybrid capital instruments, the ‘D’ rating category is used when payments on
an obligation are not made on the date due, unless S&P Global Ratings
believes that such payments will be made within any stated grace period.
However, any stated grace period longer than five business days will be treated
as five business days. The ‘D’ rating also will be used upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action and where
default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay
provisions. A rating on an obligation is lowered to ‘D’ if it is subject to a
distressed debt restructuring. |
| F1 |
HIGHEST SHORT-TERM CREDIT QUALITY. Indicates the strongest intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments; may have an added “+” to
denote any exceptionally strong credit feature. |
| F2 |
GOOD SHORT-TERM CREDIT QUALITY. Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments. |
| F3 |
FAIR SHORT-TERM CREDIT QUALITY. The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments is adequate. |
| B |
SPECULATIVE SHORT-TERM CREDIT QUALITY. Minimal capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerability to near term adverse changes in financial and economic conditions. |
| C |
HIGH SHORT-TERM DEFAULT RISK. Default is a real possibility. |
| RD |
RESTRICTED DEFAULT. Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its financial commitments, although it continues to meet other financial obligations. Typically applicable to entity ratings only. |
| D |
DEFAULT. Indicates a broad-based default event for an entity, or the default of a short-
term obligation. |
| P-1 |
Ratings of Prime-1 reflect a superior ability to repay short-term debt obligations. |
| P-2 |
Ratings of Prime-2 reflect a strong ability to repay short-term debt obligations. |
| P-3 |
Ratings of Prime-3 reflect an acceptable ability to repay short-term obligations. |
| NP |
Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime
rating categories. |
| R-1 (high) |
Highest credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations
as they fall due is exceptionally high. Unlikely to be adversely affected by future
events. |
| R-1 (middle) |
Superior credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations
as they fall due is very high. Differs from R-1 (high) by a relatively modest degree.
Unlikely to be significantly vulnerable to future events. |
| R-1 (low) |
Good credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations as
they fall due is substantial. Overall strength is not as favorable as higher rating
categories. May be vulnerable to future events, but qualifying negative factors
are considered manageable. |
| R-2 (high) |
Upper end of adequate credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations as they fall due is acceptable. May be vulnerable to future events. |
| R-2 (middle) |
Adequate credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations as they fall due is acceptable. May be vulnerable to future events or may be
exposed to other factors that could reduce credit quality. |
| R-2 (low) |
Lower end of adequate credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations as they fall due is acceptable. May be vulnerable to future events.
A number of challenges are present that could affect the issuer’s ability to meet such
obligations. |
| R-3 |
Lowest end of adequate credit quality. There is a capacity for the payment of short-term
financial obligations as they fall due. May be vulnerable to future events and the
certainty of meeting such obligations could be impacted by a variety of
developments. |
| R-4 |
Speculative credit quality. The capacity for the payment of short-term financial obligations as they fall due is uncertain. |
| R-5 |
Highly speculative credit quality. There is a high level of uncertainty as to the capacity
to meet short-term financial obligations as they fall due. |
| D |
When the issuer has filed under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or winding up statute or there is a failure to satisfy an obligation after the exhaustion of grace periods,
a downgrade to D may occur. DBRS Morningstar may also use SD (Selective Default)
in cases where only some securities are impacted, such as the case of a “distressed
exchange.” |
| AAA |
An obligation rated ‘AAA’ has the highest rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings. The
obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is extremely
strong. |
| AA |
An obligation rated ‘AA’ differs from the highest-rated obligations only to a small
degree. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is
very strong. |
| A |
An obligation rated ‘A’ is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes
in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories.
However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation is still strong. |
| BBB |
An obligation rated ‘BBB’ exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse
economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to weaken the obligor’s
capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
| BB,B,CCC,CC and C |
Obligations rated ‘BB’, ‘B’, ‘CCC’, ‘CC’, and ‘C’ are regarded as having significant
speculative characteristics. ‘BB’ indicates the least degree of speculation and
‘C’ the highest. While such obligations will likely have some
quality and protective characteristics, these may be outweighed by large
uncertainties or major exposure to adverse conditions. |
| BB |
An obligation rated ‘BB’ is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues.
However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business,
financial, or economic conditions that could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity
to meet its financial commitments on the obligation. |
| B |
An obligation rated ‘B’ is more vulnerable to nonpayment than obligations rated ‘BB’,
but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely
impair the obligor’s capacity or willingness to meet its financial
commitments on the obligation. |
| CCC |
An obligation rated ‘CCC’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment, and is dependent
upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its
financial commitments on the obligation. In the event of adverse business,
financial, or economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to have the
capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
| CC |
An obligation rated ‘CC’ is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment. The ‘CC’ rating
is used when a default has not yet occurred but S&P Global Ratings expects default to
be a virtual certainty, regardless of the anticipated time to
default. |
| C |
An obligation rated ‘C’ is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment, and the obligation
is expected to have lower relative seniority or lower ultimate recovery compared with
obligations that are rated higher. |
| D |
An obligation rated ‘D’ is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For non-hybrid
capital instruments, the ‘D’ rating category is used when payments on an
obligation are not made on the date due, unless S&P Global Ratings believes
that such payments will be made within five business days in the absence of a
stated grace period or within the earlier of the stated grace period or 30
calendar days. The ‘D’ rating also will be used upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action and where default on an
obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions. A
rating on an obligation is lowered to ‘D’ if it is subject to a distressed debt
restructuring. |
| AAA |
HIGHEST CREDIT QUALITY. ‘AAA’ ratings denote the lowest expectation of default
risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of
financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected
by foreseeable events. |
| AA |
VERY HIGH CREDIT QUALITY. ‘AA’ ratings denote expectations of very low default
risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This
capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.
|
| A |
HIGH CREDIT QUALITY. ‘A’ ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The
capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may,
nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than
is the case for higher ratings. |
| BBB |
GOOD CREDIT QUALITY. ‘BBB’ ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are
currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered
adequate, but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this
capacity. |
| BB |
SPECULATIVE. ‘BB’ ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk,
particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over
time; however, business or financial flexibility exists that supports the
servicing of financial commitments. |
| B |
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE. ‘B’ ratings indicate that material default risk is present, but a
limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are currently being met;
however, capacity for continued payment is vulnerable to deterioration in the business
and economic environment. |
| CCC |
SUBSTANTIAL CREDIT RISK. Default is a real possibility. |
| CC |
VERY HIGH LEVELS OF CREDIT RISK. Default of some kind appears probable. |
| C |
NEAR DEFAULT. A default or default-like process has begun, or the issuer is in standstill, or for a closed funding vehicle, payment capacity is irrevocably impaired.
Conditions that are indicative of a ‘C’ category rating for an issuer
include: |
| |
●the issuer has entered into a grace or cure period following
non-payment of a material financial obligation;
●the issuer has entered into a temporary negotiated waiver or standstill agreement following a payment default on a material financial obligation; ●the formal announcement by the issuer or their agent of a
distressed debt exchange; ●a closed financing vehicle where payment capacity is irrevocably impaired such that it is not expected to pay interest and/or principal in full during the life of the transaction, but where no payment default is imminent. |
| RD |
RESTRICTED DEFAULT. ‘RD’ ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch’s opinion has
experienced: |
| |
●an uncured payment default or distressed debt exchange on a
bond, loan or other material financial obligation, but
●has not entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or
other formal winding-up procedure, and
●has not otherwise ceased operating. This would include: ●the selective payment default on a specific class or currency
of debt; ●the uncured expiry of any applicable grace period, cure period or default forbearance
period following a payment default on a bank loan, capital markets security or other
material financial obligation;
●the extension of multiple waivers or forbearance periods upon a payment default on one or more material financial obligations, either in series or in parallel; ordinary execution of a distressed debt exchange on one or more material financial obligations. |
| D |
DEFAULT. ‘D’ ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch Ratings’ opinion has entered into
bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up
procedure or that has otherwise ceased business. |
| Aaa |
Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal risk. |
| Aa |
Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit
risk. |
| A |
Obligations rated A are judged to be upper-medium-grade and are subject to low credit risk. |
| Baa |
Obligations rated Baa are subject to moderate credit risk. They are considered medium- grade and as such may possess certain speculative characteristics. |
| Ba |
Obligations rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements and are subject to substantial credit risk. |
| B |
Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk. |
| Caa |
Obligations rated Caa are judged to be of poor standing and are subject to very high credit risk. |
| Ca |
Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with
some prospect of recovery in principal and interest. |
| C |
Obligations rated C are the lowest-rated class of bonds and are typically in default, with
little prospect for recovery of principal or interest. |
| AAA |
Highest credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is exceptionally high and unlikely to be adversely affected by future events. |
| AA |
Superior credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is considered high. Credit quality differs from AAA only to a small degree. Unlikely to be
significantly vulnerable to future events. |
| A |
Good credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is substantial,
but of lesser credit quality than AA. May be vulnerable to future events, but qualifying
negative factors are considered manageable. |
| BBB |
Adequate credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is considered acceptable. May be vulnerable to future events. |
| BB |
Speculative, non-investment grade credit quality. The capacity for the payment of financial obligations is uncertain. Vulnerable to future events. |
| B |
Highly speculative credit quality. There is a high level of uncertainty as to the capacity
to meet financial obligations. |
| CCC/CC/C |
Very highly speculative credit quality. In danger of defaulting on financial obligations.
There is little difference between these three categories, although CC and C ratings are
normally applied to obligations that are seen as highly likely to default, or
subordinated to obligations rated in the CCC to B range. Obligations in respect
of which default has not technically taken place but is considered inevitable
may be rated in the C category. |
| D |
When the issuer has filed under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or winding up statute or there is a failure to satisfy an obligation after the exhaustion of grace periods,
a downgrade to D may occur. DBRS Morningstar may also use SD (Selective Default)
in cases where only some securities are impacted, such as the case of a “distressed
exchange.” |
| AAA |
An insurer rated ‘AAA’ has extremely strong financial security characteristics. ‘AAA’ is
the highest insurer financial strength rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings.
|
| AA |
An insurer rated ‘AA’ has very strong financial security characteristics, differing only
slightly from those rated higher. |
| A |
An insurer rated ‘A’ has strong financial security characteristics, but is somewhat more
likely to be affected by adverse business conditions than are insurers with higher
ratings. |
| BBB |
An insurer rated ‘BBB’ has good financial security characteristics, but is more likely to
be affected by adverse business conditions than are higher-rated insurers. |
| BB, B, CCC, and CC |
An insurer rated ‘BB’ or lower is regarded as having vulnerable characteristics that may
outweigh its strengths, ‘BB’ indicates the least degree of vulnerability within
the range and ‘CC’ the highest. |
| BB |
An insurer rated ‘BB’ has marginal financial security characteristics. Positive attributes
exist, but adverse business conditions could lead to insufficient ability to meet financial
commitments. |
| B |
An insurer rated ‘B’ has weak financial security characteristics. Adverse business
conditions will likely impair its ability to meet financial commitments. |
| CCC |
An insurer rated ‘CCC’ has very weak financial security characteristics, and is
dependent on favorable business conditions to meet financial commitments. |
| CC |
An insurer rated ‘CC’ has extremely weak financial security characteristics and is likely
not to meet some of its financial commitments. |
| SD and D |
An insurer rated ‘SD’ (selective default) or ‘D’ is in default on one or more of its
insurance policy obligations.
The ‘D’ rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the
taking of similar action if payments on a policy obligation are at risk. A
‘D’ rating is assigned when S&P Global Ratings believes that the
default will be a general default and that the obligor will fail to pay
substantially all of its obligations in full in accordance with the policy
terms. An ‘SD’ rating is assigned when S&P Global Ratings
believes that the insurer has selectively defaulted on a specific class of
policies but it will continue to meet its payment obligations on other classes
of obligations. An ‘SD’ includes the completion of a distressed debt
restructuring. Claim denials due to lack of coverage or other legally permitted
defenses are not considered defaults. |
| AAA |
EXCEPTIONALLY STRONG. ‘AAA’ IFS Ratings denote the lowest expectation of ceased or interrupted payments. They are assigned only in the case of exceptionally strong capacity to meet policyholder and contract obligations. This capacity is highly
unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events. |
| AA |
VERY STRONG. ‘AA’ IFS Ratings denote a very low expectation of ceased or interrupted payments. They indicate very strong capacity to meet policyholder and contract obligations. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events. |
| A |
STRONG. ‘A’ IFS Ratings denote a low expectation of ceased or interrupted payments.
They indicate strong capacity to meet policyholder and contract obligations. This
capacity may, nonetheless, be more vulnerable to changes in circumstances or in
economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings. |
| BBB |
GOOD. ‘BBB’ IFS Ratings indicate that there is currently a low expectation of ceased
or interrupted payments. The capacity to meet policyholder and contract obligations on
a timely basis is considered adequate, but adverse changes in circumstances and
economic conditions are more likely to impact this capacity. |
| BB |
MODERATELY WEAK. ‘BB’ IFS Ratings indicate that there is an elevated vulnerability to ceased or interrupted payments, particularly as the result of adverse
economic or market changes over time. However, business or financial alternatives may
be available to allow for policyholder and contract obligations to be met in a
timely manner. |
| B |
WEAK. ‘B’ IFS Ratings indicate two possible conditions. If obligations are still being
met on a timely basis, there is significant risk that ceased or interrupted payments could
occur in the future, but a limited margin of safety remains. Capacity for
continued timely payments is contingent upon a sustained, favorable business and
economic environment, and favorable market conditions. Alternatively, a
‘B’ IFS Rating is assigned to obligations that have experienced
ceased or interrupted payments, but with the potential for extremely high
recoveries. Such obligations would possess a recovery assessment of
‘RR1’ (Outstanding). |
| CCC |
VERY WEAK. ‘CCC’ IFS Ratings indicate two possible conditions. If obligations are
still being met on a timely basis, there is a real possibility that ceased or interrupted
payments could occur in the future. Capacity for continued timely payments is
solely reliant upon a sustained, favorable business and economic environment,
and favorable market conditions. Alternatively, a ‘CCC’ IFS Rating
is assigned to obligations that have experienced ceased or interrupted payments,
and with the potential for average to superior recoveries. Such obligations
would possess a recovery assessment of ‘RR2’ (Superior),
‘RR3’ (Good), and ‘RR4’ (Average). |
| CC |
EXTREMELY WEAK. ‘CC’ IFS Ratings indicate two possible conditions. If obligations are still being met on a timely basis, it is probable that ceased or interrupted
payments will occur in the future. Alternatively, a ‘CC’ IFS Rating is assigned to
obligations that have experienced ceased or interrupted payments, with the
potential for average to below-average recoveries. Such obligations would
possess a recovery assessment of ‘RR4’ (Average) or
‘RR5’ (Below Average). |
| C |
DISTRESSED. ‘C’ IFS Ratings indicate two possible conditions. If obligations are still
being met on a timely basis, ceased or interrupted payments are imminent. Alternatively,
a ‘C’ IFS Rating is assigned to obligations that have experienced
ceased or interrupted payments, and with the potential for below average to poor
recoveries. Such obligations would possess a recovery assessment of
‘RR5’ (Below Average) or ‘RR6’ (Poor). |
| F1 |
Insurers are viewed as having a strong capacity to meet their near-term obligations. When an insurer rated in this rating category is designated with a (+) sign, it is viewed
as having a very strong capacity to meet near-term obligations. |
| F2 |
Insurers are viewed as having a good capacity to meet their near-term obligations. |
| F3 |
Insurers are viewed as having an adequate capacity to meet their near-term obligations. |
| B |
Insurers are viewed as having a weak capacity to meet their near-term obligations. |
| C |
Insurers are viewed as having a very weak capacity to meet their near-term obligations. |
| RR1 |
OUTSTANDING RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. ‘RR1’ rated securities have characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 91%–100% of
current principal and related interest. |
| RR2 |
SUPERIOR RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. ‘RR2’ rated securities have characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 71%–90% of current
principal and related interest. |
| RR3 |
GOOD RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. ‘RR3’ rated securities have characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 51%–70% of current
principal and related interest. |
| RR4 |
AVERAGE RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. ‘RR4’ rated securities have characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 31%–50% of current
principal and related interest. |
| RR5 |
BELOW AVERAGE RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. ‘RR5’ rated securities have characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 11%–
30% of current principal and related interest. |
| RR6 |
POOR RECOVERY PROSPECTS GIVEN DEFAULT. ‘RR6’ rated securities have characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering 0%–10% of current
principal and related interest. |
| Aaa |
Insurance companies rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, subject to the
lowest level of credit risk. |
| Aa |
Insurance companies rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk. |
| A |
Insurance companies rated A are judged to be upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit risk. |
| Baa |
Insurance companies rated Baa are judged to be medium-grade and subject to moderate credit risk and as such may possess certain speculative characteristics. |
| Ba |
Insurance companies rated Ba are judged to be speculative and are subject to substantial
credit risk. |
| B |
Insurance companies rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk. |
| Caa |
Insurance companies rated Caa are judged to be speculative of poor standing and are subject to very high credit risk. |
| Ca |
Insurance companies rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect of recovery of principal and interest. |
| C |
Insurance companies rated C are the lowest rated and are typically in default, with little
prospect for recovery of principal or interest. |
| P-1 |
Ratings of Prime-1 reflect a superior ability to repay short-term debt obligations. |
| P-2 |
Ratings of Prime-2 reflect a strong ability to repay short-term debt obligations. |
| P-3 |
Ratings of Prime-3 reflect an acceptable ability to repay short-term obligations. |
| P-4 |
Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime
rating categories. |
| SP-1 |
Strong capacity to pay principal and interest. An issue determined to possess a very strong capacity to pay debt service is given a plus (+) designation. |
| SP-2 |
Satisfactory capacity to pay principal and interest, with some vulnerability to adverse
financial and economic changes over the term of the notes. |
| SP-3 |
Speculative capacity to pay principal and interest. |
| D |
‘D’ is assigned upon failure to pay the note when due, completion of a distressed
debt restructuring, or the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of
similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for
example, due to automatic stay provisions. |
| MIG 1 |
This designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is afforded by established cash flows, highly reliable liquidity support or demonstrated broad-based access to the market for refinancing. |
| MIG 2 |
This designation denotes strong credit quality. Margins of protection are ample, although not as large as in the preceding group. |
| MIG 3 |
This designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Liquidity and cash-flow protection
may be narrow, and market access for refinancing is likely to be less
well-established. |
| SG |
This designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Debt instruments in this category may lack sufficient margins of protection. |
| VMIG 1 |
This designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is afforded by the
superior short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and legal
protections that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon
demand. |
| VMIG 2 |
This designation denotes strong credit quality. Good protection is afforded by the strong
short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and legal protections
that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
|
| VMIG 3 |
This designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Adequate protection is afforded by
the satisfactory short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and
legal protections that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon
demand. |
| SG |
This designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Demand features rated in this
category may be supported by a liquidity provider that does not have a sufficiently
strong short-term rating or may lack the structural or legal protections
necessary to ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon
demand. |
| Pfd-1 |
Preferred shares rated Pfd-1 are generally of superior credit quality, and are supported
by entities with strong earnings and balance sheet characteristics. Pfd-1 ratings
generally correspond with issuers with a AAA or AA category reference
point1.
|
| Pfd-2 |
Preferred shares rated Pfd-2 are generally of good credit quality. Protection of dividends
and principal is still substantial, but earnings, the balance sheet and coverage ratios are
not as strong as Pfd-1 rated companies. Generally, Pfd-2 ratings correspond with
issuers with an A category or higher reference point. |
| Pfd-3 |
Preferred shares rated Pfd-3 are generally of adequate credit quality. While protection of
dividends and principal is still considered acceptable, the issuing entity is more
susceptible to adverse changes in financial and economic conditions, and there
may be other adverse conditions present which detract from debt protection.
Pfd-3 ratings generally correspond with issuers with a BBB category or higher
reference point. |
| Pfd-4 |
Preferred shares rated Pfd-4 are generally speculative, where the degree of protection
afforded to dividends and principal is uncertain, particularly during periods of economic
adversity. Issuers with preferred shares rated Pfd-4 generally correspond with
issuers with a BB category or higher reference point. |
| Pfd-5 |
Preferred shares rated Pfd-5 are generally highly speculative and the ability of the entity
to maintain timely dividend and principal payments in the future is highly uncertain.
Entities with a Pfd-5 rating generally correspond with issuers with a B category
or higher reference point. Preferred shares rated Pfd-5 often have
characteristics that, if not remedied, may lead to default. |
| D |
When the issuer has filed under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or winding up or
the issuer is in default per the legal documents, a downgrade to D may occur. Because
preferred share dividends are only payable when approved, the non-payment of a
preferred share dividend does not necessarily result in a D. DBRS Morningstar
may also use SD (Selective Default) in cases where only some securities are
impacted, such as the case of a “distressed exchange”. See the
Default Definition document posted on the website for more
information. |
| (a) Articles of Incorporation | |
| (a)(1) |
|
| (a)(2) |
|
| (a)(3) |
|
| (b) By-laws | |
| |
|
| (c) Instruments Defining Rights of Security Holders: Incorporated by reference to Exhibits (a) and (b). | |
| (d) Investment Advisory Contracts | |
| (d)(1)(a) |
|
| (d)(1)(b) |
|
| (d)(2) |
|
| (d)(3)(a) |
|
| (d)(3)(b) |
|
| (d)(3)(c) |
|
| (d)(4) |
|
| (d)(5)(a) |
|
| (d)(5)(b) |
|
| (d)(6) |
|
| (d)(7) |
|
| (e) Underwriting Contracts | |
| (e)(1) |
|
| (e)(2) |
|
| (f) Bonus or Profit Sharing Contracts: Not applicable. | |
| (g) Custodian Agreements | |
| (g)(1)(a) |
|
| (g)(1)(b) |
|
| (g)(1)(c) |
|
| (g)(1)(d) |
|
| (g)(1)(e) |
|
| (g)(1)(f) |
|
| (g)(1)(g) |
|
| (g)(2)(a) |
|
| (g)(2)(b) |
|
| (h) Other Material Contracts | |
| (h)(1)(a) |
|
| (h)(1)(b) |
|
| (h)(1)(c) |
|
| (h)(1)(d) |
|
| (h)(2)(a) |
|
| (h)(2)(b) |
|
| (h)(3) |
|
| (h)(4)(a) |
|
| (h)(4)(b) |
|
| (h)(4)(c) |
|
| (h)(4)(d) |
|
| (h)(4)(e) |
|
| (h)(5)(a) |
|
| (h)(5)(b) |
|
| (h)(6) |
|
| (h)(7)(a) |
|
| (h)(7)(b) |
|
| (h)(7)(c) |
|
| (h)(7)(d) |
|
| (h)(7)(e) |
|
| (h)(7)(f) |
| (h)(7)(g) |
|
| (h)(7)(h) |
|
| (h)(7)(i) |
|
| (h)(7)(j) |
|
| (i) Legal Opinion | |
| |
Opinion and consent of counsel. To be filed by amendment. |
| (j) Other Opinions | |
| |
Consent of independent registered accounting firm. Not applicable. |
| (k) Omitted Financial Statements: Not applicable. | |
| (l) Initial Capital Agreements: Not applicable. | |
| (m) Rule 12b-1 Plan: Not applicable. | |
| (n) Rule 18f-3 Plan: Not applicable. | |
| (o) Reserved. | |
| (p) Codes of Ethics | |
| (p)(1) |
|
| (p)(2) |
|
| (p)(3) |
|
| (q) Power of Attorney | |
| (q)(1) |
|
| (q)(2) |
|
| (q)(3) |
|
| Name with Registrant |
Positions and Office with JPMorgan
Distribution Services,
Inc. |
Positions and Offices with the Funds |
| Wendy K. Barta |
Director, President & Managing Director |
None |
| Jason Chodos |
Managing Director & Chief Risk Officer |
None |
| Andrea L. Lisher |
Director & Managing Director |
None |
| Michael R. Machulski |
Director & Managing Director
|
None |
| Joseph F. Sanzone |
Director & Managing Director |
None |
| Matthew J. Kamburowski |
Managing Director |
President & Principal Executive Officer |
| Frank J. Drozek |
Executive Director & Assistant Treasurer |
None |
| James A. Hoffman |
Executive Director & Chief Administrative Officer |
None |
| Rachel Horn |
Executive Director & Assistant Secretary |
None |
| Kevin Kloza |
Executive Director & Chief Compliance Officer |
None |
| Carmine Lekstutis |
Executive Director & Chief Legal Officer |
Assistant Secretary |
| Christopher J. Mohr |
Executive Director & Assistant Treasurer |
None |
| Christopher G. Sprules |
Executive Director & Treasurer |
None |
| Adetunji Ogunmefun |
Vice President & Secretary |
None |
| Sarah A. Clark |
Vice President & Assistant Secretary |
None |
| Andrea Belen Daneri |
Vice President & Assistant Secretary |
None |
| Chike N. Egbuniwe |
Vice President & Assistant Secretary |
None |
| Name with Registrant |
Positions and Office with JPMorgan
Distribution Services,
Inc. |
Positions and Offices with the Funds |
| Ken Corrado |
Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Officer |
None |
| Alysee N. Pelletier |
Vice President & Assistant Secretary |
None |
| Emilia Wade |
Assistant Secretary |
None |
| J.P. Morgan Exchange-Traded Fund Trust | |
| By: |
Matthew J. Kamburowski* |
| |
Name: Matthew J. Kamburowski |
| |
Title: President and Principal Executive Officer |
| Stephen P. Fisher* |
| Stephen P. Fisher |
| Trustee |
| Gary L. French* |
| Gary L. French |
| Trustee |
| Kathleen M. Gallagher* |
| Kathleen M. Gallagher |
| Trustee |
| Robert J. Grassi* |
| Robert J. Grassi |
| Trustee |
| Frankie D. Hughes* |
| Frankie D. Hughes |
| Trustee |
| Raymond Kanner* |
| Raymond Kanner |
| Trustee |
| Thomas P. Lemke* |
| Thomas P. Lemke |
| Trustee |
| Timothy J. Clemens* |
| Timothy J. Clemens |
| Treasurer and Principal Financial Officer |
| *By |
/s/ Elizabeth A. Davin |
| |
Elizabeth A. Davin |
| |
Attorney-In-Fact |
| Mary E. Martinez* |
| Mary E. Martinez |
| Trustee |
| Marilyn McCoy* |
| Marilyn McCoy |
| Trustee |
| Shaun Real* |
| Shaun Real |
| Trustee |
| Emily A. Youssouf* |
| Emily A. Youssouf |
| Trustee |
| Robert F. Deutsch* |
| Robert F. Deutsch |
| Trustee |
| Nina O. Shenker* |
| Nina O. Shenker |
| Trustee |
| Matthew J. Kamburowski* |
| Matthew J. Kamburowski |
| President and Principal Executive Officer |