UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
_________________
FORM 6-K
REPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER
PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-16 OR 15d-16 UNDER
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Date: July 30, 2025
UBS Group AG
(Registrant's Name)
Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
(Address of principal executive office)
Commission File Number: 1-36764
UBS AG
(Registrant's Name)
Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
Aeschenvorstadt 1, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
(Address of principal executive offices)
Commission File Number: 1-15060
Indicate by check mark whether the registrants file or will file annual reports under cover of Form
20-F or Form 40-
F.
Form 20-F
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This Form 6-K consists of (i) the presentation materials related to the second quarter 2025 financial
results of UBS and (ii) the prepared remarks of Sergio Ermotti for the media conference of 30 July
2025, which appear immediately following this page.
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2Q2025 Media Briefing
30 July 2025
Remarks by Sergio P. Ermotti, Group Chief Executive Officer
Good morning. Thank you for joining us here in person, or remotely.
As you may have heard during the analysts’ call, the quarter kicked off with extreme volatility in
global financial markets in April. As you can see on the first slide during this period, we
sustained robust momentum by staying close to our clients while following through on a critical
phase of our integration of Credit Suisse.
This allowed us to deliver strong results which contributed to a first-half underlying return on
CET1 capital of 13.3%.
We continue to demonstrate the power of our differentiated business model and our diversified
global footprint, while maintaining our balance sheet for all seasons and steadily improving our
risk-adjusted returns since the acquisition.
Group invested assets reached a record 6.6 trillion dollars and private and institutional client
activity was strong across all our regions.
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We continue to be a reliable partner for the Swiss economy, supporting communities, families
and businesses to achieve their goals, granting or renewing 40 billion Swiss francs of loans in
the quarter.
And we are further reducing the execution risk of the integration. We finalized the migration of
our clients booked outside of Switzerland and completed the first wave of Swiss client
migrations.
So, overall, I am very satisfied with our performance, thanks to the extraordinary focus of our
colleagues across the firm.
Later, Todd and I will be happy to answer any questions you have on our results.
The Proposals
Now, let’s turn to the other topic I wanted to comment on today: the banking reform proposals
put forward by the Swiss Federal Council on June 6.
As you know, we support most of these as long as they are consistent with the Federal
Council’s aims of being targeted, proportionate and internationally aligned.
However, we strongly disagree with the proposed capital requirements, which fall well short of
international best practices. They do not represent a conservative approach to regulation.
Instead, as you can see on this slide, these rules are extreme and adopt the most onerous
components from other key financial centers that compete with Switzerland, without any of the
corresponding measures other jurisdictions put in place to mitigate economic damage and
competitive distortions.
The direction of travel also diverges from recent developments in Europe, the UK, and the
United States. Switzerland risks becoming an outlier in financial regulation, with unknown and
yet-to-be measured consequences for its economy and standing in the world.
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In addition, the proposals only partially reflect the true lessons learned from Credit Suisse’s
collapse. Credit Suisse didn't fail due to inadequate capital requirements.
The real problem was that the rules were not implemented consistently and coherently. Credit
Suisse benefited from regulatory exceptions that delayed recognition of losses on foreign
subsidiaries. Had it fully implemented existing regulations for capital treatment of those
subsidiaries, it would have held double the capital it actually did in the year before it collapsed.
The PUK report clearly identified these weaknesses, but the Federal Council's proposed
regulatory measures fail to recognize their importance.
In contrast, UBS has been fully implementing the rules for years. As a consequence, by March
2023 UBS was in such a position of strength that Swiss and international regulators saw it as
part of the solution, by acquiring Credit Suisse. That avoided unnecessary risks for Switzerland
and the financial system and immediately helped restore financial stability.
Looking at the next slide, let me explain why the proposed capital requirements are extreme.
Based on current regulation, UBS will already have to absorb an additional 18 billion dollars in
capital. This includes 9 billion from the removal of the the regulatory concessions granted to
Credit Suisse, and around another 9 billion to meet the current progressive requirements due to
the enlarged size of the combined business.
On top of this comes the 24 billion in additional capital, which on June 6 we said we would
need if the proposals were adopted.
Add it all up, and UBS would need to hold 42 billion of additional capital. This is the absolute
amount.
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This slide shows how extreme this proposal is, comparing it to our current requirement and
those of our peers. As you can see, the de-facto minimum CET1 ratio requirements for UBS
would be at least 50% higher than the average across global systemically important banks.
This is the ultimate proof the proposed capital measures are neither proportionate nor
internationally aligned.
No free lunch
I've heard theories that we can simply move money around, reclassify businesses or sell assets to
address these requirements. Let me be direct: there are no easy or quick fixes and it’s unrealistic
to assume that UBS shareholders or clients outside Switzerland will bear increased costs on their
own.
Even the expert report by Alvarez & Marsal, which was commissioned by the Federal Council,
highlights this issue.
The report makes clear that higher capital will affect our competitive position. It also details the
potential negative impact on Swiss households, businesses, counterparties, taxpayers and, of
course, our shareholders.
As a globally connected bank, UBS brings the best of the world to its clients in Switzerland. Yet
to provide these unique products and services, we need an international presence, which these
proposed rules are designed to punish.
As these rules would raise the cost of our primary raw material – capital – it stands to reason
that they would affect the price and availability of these services, including for corporate and
retail customers in our Swiss subsidiary.
As services like payments, capital markets activities, foreign exchange and trade finance become
more costly, so does running a business and everyday banking. It isn’t possible to isolate capital
rules from real world economic impact – every franc has a ripple effect.
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Duty to contribute
In closing, let me just say that our efforts in contributing to the public debate are about serving
our shareholders, clients, employees and the Swiss economy with transparency and
accountability.
We have a unique business model, which is sometimes overlooked here in Switzerland. We are
the only truly global wealth manager and the systemically important bank with the highest
share of revenues derived from asset-gathering activities, which makes us particularly stable and
lower-risk.
We are Switzerland’s leading bank, and a positive reflection of the way in which our country
punches above its weight, with GDP per adult twice that in Germany or France and a stock
market capitalization relative to GDP that’s far above most of our European neighbours.
Switzerland is the world's 20th largest economy, so it should not be surprising that we are
around the 20th-largest bank.
We benefit from our Swiss heritage and believe that Switzerland benefits from a diversified and
competitive financial center with UBS at its core. And we are strong thanks to our global
footprint – not in spite of it.
Remember, that as leaders of a listed company with shareholders and bondholders around the
world, UBS executives and board members have a legal and fiduciary duty, as well as a moral
obligation, to present facts accurately and with an appropriate level of due diligence. Not
everybody offering opinions and assessments is subject to the same standards.
After what happened at Credit Suisse, we understand the need for society to reflect on what
happened and consider ways to avoid future crises.
That is why we will continue to engage with policymakers, analyse and clearly address the
economic realities these proposals create. We know this is not a negotiation. But where
appropriate we will, in a constructive spirit, offer our views on how we believe Switzerland and
UBS can strike the right balance.
We believe it is the right thing to do for UBS, our employees and clients, and Switzerland.
Thank you.
# # # # #
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrants have duly
caused this report to be signed on their behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.
UBS Group AG
By: /s/ David Kelly
_
Name: David Kelly
Title: Managing Director
By: /s/ Ella Copetti-Campi
Name: Ella Copetti-Campi
Title: Executive Director
UBS AG
By: /s/ David Kelly
_
Name: David Kelly
Title: Managing Director
By: /s/ Ella Copetti-Campi
Name: Ella Copetti-Campi
Title: Executive Director
Date: July 30, 2025